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This study explores how some mental health nurses are therapeutic, in terms of the art of 
healing, and how they have learned to be this way. The study originated in my experience of 
feeling abject while working as a mental health nurse. The research question addressed this 
situation through exploring whether or not therapeutic education was needed in mental health 
nursing. Ten mental health nurses participated in the study. Giorgi’s (2009) empirical 
phenomenological method was chosen because of its established status, and its grounding in 
Husserlian phenomenology which places a primacy on experience. A review of the literature 
included commentaries, qualitative empirical studies, case studies, and theoretical models, 
and indicated that mental health nurses may be therapeutic in idiosyncratic ways. A crucial 
aspect to these ways unfolded in this study as openness, through which the other may come 
to be in her own truthfulness. Significant methodological considerations were how we 
‘constitute’ meaning, how meaning can ‘force itself’ like a gestalt, empathy may be self-
alienating, and words ‘sedimented’ in tradition. These linked to how we can question being 
captivated in ‘experiences of truth’. Findings from Giorgi’s (2009) method were that mental 
health nurses are therapeutic through ‘being with’ others, through innate characteristics, that 
learning is through openness, and is facilitated through a therapeutic environment. Giorgi’s 
(2009) method is critiqued, and compared to a phenomenology of the therapeutic in relation 
to the research interviews (after Husserl and Merleau-Ponty). It was shown that the 
phenomenological ‘opens up’ language while method narrows meaning. The phenomenology 
showed that allowing an uncertain relation between two people was crucial, and how 
recognising the sensual aspect of meaning opened a healing space for another to be, through 
which a person’s own truthfulness may emerge. Openness appears to be innate, indicating 
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This chapter outlines how this thesis is organised, including key ideas, and why I was 
interested in researching what some mental health nurses ‘do’ that is ‘therapeutic’, what and 
how they ‘know’ what they do, and how they have come to learn this ‘knowing and doing.’ 
The inverted commas are there to indicate something uncertain that I will explore throughout 
this research, which evolved as part of this research in itself. The study has been like an 
unfolding of understanding, in ways in which I was unaware of sometimes, until certain things 
seemed to reveal themselves as insistent, and so worth following further.  
The research question is, “What is the need, if any, for therapeutic education in mental 
health nursing?” The question is primarily aimed at exploring what it is that some mental 
health nurses know and do that is therapeutic, as the art of healing as opposed to the medical 
psychiatric sense of cure, and how they have learned to be therapeutic in this way. The 
emphasis on the therapeutic as the art of healing is aligned with Gadamer (1990, p. 190 cited 
in Moran, 2000, p. 281) who sees art as countering the “hubris of concepts,” meaning that 
theories or rigidly held ideas would get in the way of something more important. Therefore, 
to try to define what ‘therapeutic as an art of healing’ might be here, from the outset, would 
be the wrong place to start. I can say that it is not about the medical psychiatric cure, which 
can be viewed as therapeutic in one strict sense which aligns precisely with the 
implementation of a concept. There is a certain uncertainty regarding definitions, as what 
emerges here will be something that either evades being pinned down in technical terms, or 
may appear banal on description.  
 I think of healing as being like a kind of ‘salve’ which may not be so much about a cure 
than with making something possible, to do with being with another person. This way of 
thinking about the therapeutic in mental health nursing is based on everyday experiences of 
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working in mental health nursing settings, where it seemed that some nurses appeared to be 
therapeutic without relying on any theories. Yet it appeared that they ‘knew’ something 
important, and were doing something important, in terms of being therapeutic, while this 
practice was ‘invisible’ to those who prescribe psychiatric and psychological treatment in 
mental health settings. Patients would ask for those mental health nurses, or seek them out to 
spend time with them. The research question is not intended to address the content of what 
type of education is needed, if any, and how this might be implemented or organised, 
although, drawing on the research, implications with respect to what a therapeutic education 
for mental health nurses might mean are discussed.  
This chapter firstly looks at the origins of the research question, and secondly, the origins 
of the methodology, which are closely linked through being phenomenological. Thirdly, it 
outlines an overall view of mental health nursing as a discipline that is under the sway of 
mainstream psychiatry, and to a lesser extent, psychology, unable to establish itself as a 
therapeutic discipline in its own right. Finally, a summary of each chapter is outlined.  
1.2 The origins of the research question 
The research question is rooted in the experience of working as a mental health nurse in 
acute care settings (in-patient units) while also training as a psychotherapeutic counsellor and 
psychotherapist, and subsequent work as a nurse therapist in community mental health 
settings. Some years prior to working as a mental health nurse, and creating a tension with it, 
I also had an academic training in science, leading to work as a geologist, then, after some 
time, in philosophy as part of a vocational life of spirituality as a Franciscan friar. This tension 
is important to this research as it helped to reveal something significant about the work of 
mental health nurses which led to the research question, principally around the phenomena of 
belonging and recognition, which will be outlined here. The work involved in geology was 
valued by others, seen as significant, where a person’s training and ideas were taken seriously, 
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encompassing a knowledge that was significant or ‘visible’ to others. In a similar way, life as 
a Franciscan was recognised by others as about significant knowledge, including spirituality. 
The move to mental health nursing however, was disturbing, in that the knowledgeable, 
therapeutic activity of that discipline counted little to others apart from patients. For example, 
at a ward meeting once, while discussing a patient, I was advised, by a well-meaning 
psychiatrist, to “leave the therapy to the professionals.” I wondered what I had spent the last 
three years qualifying as in mental health nursing if it had little to do with being therapeutic. 
I wondered why there was apparently nothing ‘professionally therapeutic’ about the mental 
health nurses who I had seen taking care of someone who had just been admitted after 
attempting suicide. It is those kinds of mental health nurses who I hoped would respond to 
the research question, to share their understanding of what it is, for them, that is therapeutic 
in their ‘work,’ to catch something of how each one might be therapeutic and how this has 
been learned. I had noticed, in everyday ways, that if I were worried or upset about something 
in my own life, I would somehow be able to find myself near certain mental health nurses 
and talking with them, without feeling that I was a burden, or a trouble, or a problem to be 
solved.  
The environment of mental health nursing began to create for me an experience of 
invisibility in terms of recognition as being therapeutic, within an overarching framework of 
psychiatric medicine, and clinical psychology, as well as the more abrasive effects of feeling 
powerless and helpless. It took time to register this whole experience for what it was, as not 
being regarded as important in terms of what is therapeutic. The immersion in a framework 
of knowledge that marginalised the importance of how mental health nurses were with 
patients, was particularly striking. It appeared that many other nurses in practice did not have 
a difficulty with this situation. In the literature of mental health nursing, however, the aspect 
of not being significant has been noted (Cutclffe & Happell, 2009; Happell, 2004), although 
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this has little impact on mental health care (Barker & Buchanan-Barker, 2003; 2011a; b; 
2012). This sense of ‘invisibility’ has also been theorised in general nursing as being due to 
a “structure that prohibits” (Bjorklund, 2004, p. 119), and commented on by prominent mental 
health nurse academics, with some resignation (Barker, Buchanan-Barker, Rolfe & Cutcliffe, 
2005). There is a tragic side to this lack of recognition also, as it has been identified, along 
with lack of autonomy and power, as a factor threatening a nurse’s sense of identity, which 
has been linked to high suicide rates amongst nurses (Alderson, 2006; 2008; Alderson, Saint-
Jean & Rhéaume, 2011; Alderson, Parent-Rocheleau & Mishara, 2015). Beginning a separate 
education in counselling and psychotherapy brought some distance from this experience, 
opening up new avenues of understanding and academic pursuit. This therapeutic education, 
involving group therapy, the ‘giving and receiving’ of individual therapy, and extensive 
supervision, introduced a way of articulating experience which was phenomenological but 
also explored ideas on being ‘subject to’ culture, embodiment, something unconscious, and 
language (Loewenthal & Snell, 2003).  
My experience of mental health nursing left several questions, two of which were: What 
was the attraction of mental health nursing, and what was being rejected in the distancing 
from it? These questions are personal and have taken some time to answer, and were central 
to the progress of the research. The answer to both questions is linked to once feeling a sense 
of belonging as a Franciscan friar, of the Roman Catholic Order of Friars Minor. This 
religious order follows the charism of Saint Francis of Assisi, who, in the 12th century, made 
it his occupation to care for, and live with, the lepers who were excluded in squalor outside 
the walls of his home town (Sweeney, 2015). St Francis, “who stayed with lepers and bathed 
their wounds, sponging pus and sores,” is taken as an exemplar in the work of the 
psychoanalyst, Julia Kristeva, of the link between grace and the abject, in so far as in 
embracing what is excluded and rejected, one comes into a reconciliatory communication 
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again with others and the Other (God, for the Christian mystic) (Kristeva, 1982, p. 127). For 
the Franciscans, modern day lepers included the homeless, refugees, those dying alone in 
hospices, the learning disabled and those with mental illness. Indeed, as leprosy died out in 
medieval Europe, the leprosarium became the place where the criminal and the ‘mad’ were 
housed (Foucault, 1962). Being Franciscan encouraged the encounter with one’s own 
abjection, or spiritual poverty and humility in the language of the religious. When I eventually 
left the Friars, due to not being able to accept religious dogma, I wanted to remain Franciscan 
in spirit and live in this way, impossible as it seems now. Mental health nursing seemed to 
offer a way of being a ‘secular Franciscan,’ living in a way that seemed the only way to live 
in the world at that time. But the effects of being a mental health nurse slowly made me feel 
abject, and there was no spirituality or religious order to give meaning to such an experience 
in a community to which I belonged. In working as a mental health nurse, there seemed to be 
something in play which created an overbearing weight which I experienced as ‘given’ in the 
phenomenological sense. I recognised a need to be designated by some other word rather than 
‘nurse’ (mental health nurse or not) and this also drove a need to qualify as a counsellor or 
psychotherapist.  
It was as if in mental health nursing that I had moved into a ‘field of significance’ which 
was bigger than my own determined activity to be a Franciscan in a secular way. Something 
far more influential was at work, which Lacan would call the Other (Fink, 1995). Lacanian 
theory was helpful as a means to speak of something that was ‘given’ phenomenologically, 
as it facilitated an understanding of the difficulty of being a mental health nurse in that I 
needed recognition as ‘masculine’ by others (those from whom I needed recognition), and the 
Other. Intermingled with this need for recognition, perhaps, I was speechless with 
disappointment at the question from Lacan’s hysteric, directed at me, ‘Are you a man or a 
woman?’ (Fink, 1995). 
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Here is Lacan, on desire and recognition (showing Hegelian influences):  
“Man’s desire finds its meaning in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds 
the key to the object desired as because its first object of desire is to be recognised by the other” 
(Lacan, 1977, p. 58 cited in Borch-Jacobsen, 1991, p. 132).  
It is only now possible to interpret my experience, outlined above, in terms of being subject 
to, and ‘subjected to’, something by qualifying and working as a mental health nurse, which 
could be described as something like a field of feminine signifiers, created by culture and 
society, but which were not ‘just words or signs’ but carried with them effects which for me 
were destructive. A way of thinking about this is that the Order of the Friars Minor is a 
recognised religious order of the Roman Catholic church, whose aim is to spread the Gospel, 
and crucially, it is a ‘masculine’ pursuit, due to its acknowledgement as such by the Other, 
and embedded in this, its central role to represent, and embody, ‘The Word.’ The ‘Word’ 
comes from a masculine culture and institution (Fink, 1995). For example, the optional 
diploma courses in Franciscan spirituality in Rome, which I wanted to do, were entirely filled 
with women, taught by men; while the theology and philosophy degree courses required of 
my training were mainly enrolled with men, and taught by men. Nursing had to do with 
something that was linked to spirituality, with a long association with Christian monastic, and 
more recently, conventual, traditions (Foucault, 1962; Fry, 1998; Rogers, 1970). While 
Lacanian theory here seems seductive, leading into another field of significance, 
phenomenologically the theory seemed to coincide with my ordinary experiences. In nursing, 
the signifiers of the discipline were feminine, not recognised by the Other as masculine - for 
example, the call bell in the toilets had a diagram of a woman in a skirt and nursing headgear. 
They were feminising, which I could not accept ‘as mine.’ I tried to understand this 
experience of feminisation in terms of abjection, in that it may also be that what nurses do is 
beyond signification, to do with the feminine, abject in a Kristevan psychoanalytical sense 
(McSherry, Loewenthal & Cayne, 2015). But abject also in the ordinary sense is what 
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someone might feel if they take on an identity that is feminine in the eyes of the Other, or 
indeed others who count (such as my father), while he, or she, is embodied with a masculine 
identity. One cannot simply put on another self like one was “changing a coat” (Kierkegaard, 
1954, p. 186 cited in Friedman, 1999, p. 371). What all of this experience seemed to indicate 
phenomenologically was that I was “overrun with words” in some way, culturally inscribed 
as an infant as ‘masculine’ but idiosyncratically written (see Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 155).   
Coming to understand this experience was how the interest in researching mental health 
nursing developed, and then it felt important to try to contribute something to the overlooked 
field of what mental health nurses ‘know and do’ that is therapeutic, and how they learn this. 
Through this also, it was felt some understanding could be contributed as to the ‘nature’ of 
the therapeutic in general. Significantly for me, also, it seemed important to gain recognition 
from the Other of some kind.  
1.3 Origins of the methodology 
The methodology emerged from taking experience seriously. This is what Husserl asks 
us to do essentially, to take seriously how we experience the everyday world, and to look 
seriously at that experience of “the things themselves” (Husserl, 1984, p. 10 cited in Moran, 
2000, p. 93). This simple idea appears to be revolutionary, and may indicate why Husserl is 
“arguably the most influential figure in 20th century continental philosophy” (Polt, 1999, 
p.14). Allowing the ‘things themselves’ to emerge felt like trying to get out of the way, to not 
hinder something that the other person may be going through that will help him in some way, 
yet my being there is needed. I have also tried to get out of the way of myself, in coming to 
understand the experience of being a mental health nurse. This involves being open to 
experience, which is phenomenological, involving a “prohibition” to explain (Heidegger, 
1962, 59/35) something which is revealing, and fundamentally descriptive in the sense of 
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being disclosed “into words for the very first time” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 362/315; Polt, 1999). 
Although this sounds simple, it is deceptively complex and difficult in real life.  
Phenomenology has given words to be able to express some of this. ‘Constituting 
subjectivity’ and ‘intersubjectivity’, for example, point towards an idea of what may be going 
on here between two people (Husserl, 1973, p. 427). There is also a sense that to impose 
thoughts on someone else is ultimately aggressive, but further along this train of thought it 
could be seen that to speak at all may well be violent as words may ‘hit’ home, somehow. 
This ‘hitting’ gives another angle to Lacan’s words, “… that we do our dissecting with 
concepts, not with a knife” (Lacan, 1988, p. 2). Merleau-Ponty is more explicit, in speaking 
about how reflection and decision are acts that are “violent whose truth is confirmed through 
its being performed” (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xxxv/21) (see Verhage, 2010). 
Phenomenology seems to be not about imposing anything, and more about allowing 
something to be revealed, or reveal itself in its own time, if at all.  
The approach to this research reflects some of this. There is an attempt at not trying to 
grasp at ideas too vehemently, and trying to allow something to become discernible in 
exploring different aspects, trying to be open to others, and being with thoughts that appear. 
This approach seems more amenable to catching the sense of how I might be blocking 
something from ‘coming through’ about mental health nursing, including my relation to it. 
Writing and throwing things away, and even writing things that said what I did not intend 
when read by someone else. For example, in my attachment to showing how symptoms of 
some kind may be susceptible to description because they ‘take hold’ in some way, it came 
to light that the need for description as defining something may be a ‘symptom’ of some kind 
also. Symptom is not intended in any medical, or psychoanalytical way here, but as something 
that ‘repeats,’ or captivates us. For example, my experience of abjection as a mental health 
nurse would not change, even though I tried to change it, or ‘shift’ it, through therapy and 
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with others. A broader example would be a credo, such as the Christian Apostle’s Creed, 
which starts, “I believe in God, the Father Almighty…” (www.catholic.org); these are not 
‘just words’ for some, because they may gain purchase on a person in such a way that they 
repeat throughout a life, establishing a sense of certainty.  
It is perhaps no coincidence that Heidegger’s interest in hermeneutics was sparked when 
he was studying theology, as hermeneutics sprang from an exegesis which places such 
certainty under scrutiny (Inwood, 2000; Moran, 2000). For Heidegger, phenomenology is 
descriptive in that it is not explanatory (see Heidegger, 1962, p. 59/35), while descriptions 
are always in a process of development and illumination and are therefore interpretations (see 
Heidegger, 1962, § 32; Polt, 1999). This is a compelling idea, but it does not account for the 
‘repeat’ of a dogma, for example, or how an individual may not be “constantly compelled to 
face the possibility of disclosing an even more primordial and more universal horizon from 
which we may draw the answer to the question, ‘What is “Being”?’” (Heidegger, 1962, § 
49/26-27; Polt, 1999, p. 41). Phenomenology opens up such problems, of course, and 
Heidegger would critique this one in terms of “metaphysics of presence” perhaps (Polt, 1999, 
p. 5). For Heidegger (1984, p. 185 in Polt, 1999, p. 92), “the misunderstanding of human 
existence in general” is the setting up of a universal ground of its meaning (Polt, 1999, p. 92). 
However, the idea of a more substantial reality behind this one of semblance, which can 
account for everything, has not given up its grip, as in the Credo, but also in other credos, 
and of how, for example, in that of science, genetics may explain ‘mental disorders’ (Gournay 
& Ritter, 1997; cf. Dawson, 1997; 1998; Lego, 1997). Heidegger was against these kinds of 
credos, through his hermeneutical phenomenology, indicating that ‘things do not have to be 
this way’ because human Being is temporal and so it can change (Polt, 1999). At first 
impression, Husserl’s phenomenology appears to lend itself more to the idea that 
consciousness gives an essence to how things can be known, reflecting a more static ontology 
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as a “science of essences” (Polt, 1999, p. 14). However, Husserl’s investigations revealed, 
especially because of their closeness to such a position, some of the complexities in which 
we are involved with in the world, and Merleau-Ponty’s development of these is also taken 
up in this research (Zahavi, 2003; Moran, 2000).  
Deciding on what strand of phenomenology to follow as a methodology was also based 
on a previous study, my own unpublished MSc Thesis (McSherry, 2007), rooted in an interest 
in the claims of an empirical method (Giorgi, 1997; 2000; 2006) ‘applied’ to meanings. Giorgi 
(2009) claims that Husserl’s phenomenology can be adapted to underpin a psychological 
method in order to give adequate findings of essential structures of meaning. However, in my 
MSc thesis, questions arose as to how the central moves in Giorgi’s (1997) method, free 
imaginative variation, and the normative use of language, undermined and restricted any 
findings. Choosing Husserl’s phenomenology, and following this, Giorgi’s (2009) method, is 
therefore a way of addressing these concerns in a more thorough way. Exploring Giorgi’s 
(2009) empirical method also addresses the research question obliquely, in that what mental 
health nurses know and do therapeutically is not recognised as an empirically validated 
therapeutic endeavour (Barker, Buchanan-Barker, Rolfe & Cutcliffe, 2005), perhaps for 
significant reasons regarding what is therapeutic.  
1.4  Definitions as ‘family likenesses’ and non-technical 
A sense of definition is followed here which is in accord with Wittgenstein’s concept of 
‘family likenesses’ (Kenny, 2006, p. 122), pointing towards how the meaning of a word is 
found in its use,  
“They form a family, the members of which have family likenesses. Some of them have the same 
nose, others the same eyebrows and others again the same way of walking; and these likenesses 
overlap. The idea of a general concept being a common property of its particular instances connects 
up with other primitive, too simple, ideas of the structure of language” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 17 
in Kenny, 2006, p. 122).  
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I am indicating that it is important to prevent a reification of a picture into a metaphysical 
illusion that the word reflects an unchanging essence (Stolorow & Atwood, 2017), although 
clearly it can be believed that this is the case (as in a credo). The meaning which a concept 
acquires is linked to its use in different settings, so the therapeutic, and other terms such as 
‘education,’ are not to be understood in this research as technical terms; they are terms which 
acquire a meaning depending on their use, or what the explanation of the meaning explains 
(Kenny, 2006). “Familiarity with context” allows such meaning to be revealed (Kenny, 2006, 
p. 121). The noun ’therapeutic,’ refers to the art of healing, as well as that branch of medicine 
which is concerned with the remedial treatment of disease (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014). 
The adjective may refer to the healing of disease (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014). This 
study emphasises the therapeutic as pertaining to the art of healing, and, as noted, following 
Gadamer (2000, p. 281), sees art as a “corrective to the hubris of concepts.” These definitions 
from the Oxford Dictionary (2014), and those which follow, are intended to be read more as 
‘food for thought’ rather than technical, fixed meanings. The noun, healing, may refer to 
restoration to health, recovery from sickness, curing and cure. It can also refer to mending 
and reparation; restoration of wholeness, well-being, safety, or prosperity; spiritual 
restoration and salvation (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014). Definitions miss out something 
of the ‘art’ that is woven into the context of a term’s use, as will be shown in the Methodology 
chapter. This indicates that what is happening here is that the subject of the research refers to 
something that is not reducible to technical terms, but rather that which has something more 
to do with a ‘gesture’ in context:  
“Just think of the words exchanged by lovers! They’re loaded with feeling. And surely you can’t 
just agree to substitute for them any other sounds you please, as you can with technical terms. 
Isn’t this because they are gestures? And a gesture… is instilled, and yet assimilated… For the 
signs of assimilation are that I want to use this word, that I prefer to use none at all to using one 
that is forced on me, and similar reactions” (Wittgenstein, 1982, ¶712 in Heaton, 2010, p. 204).  
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The definitions of these terms are left ‘loose,’ in context, as the ‘game’ in which meaning 
is assigned, depends on a “form of life” - a way of living in a communal setting - in which 
that game has developed (Wittgenstein, 1953, I, ¶ 23 in Kenny, 2006, p. 130). Keeping words 
in context has relevance for this research in particular, linked to what may take place between 
a mental health nurse and another person. Trying to define meaning too strictly would go 
against what the argument is trying to convey, which is about how being therapeutic may 
have to do with being open to the other, or understanding complex situations, or knowing one 
does not understand them, often following a process that is not deductive but tacit, in relation, 
and intuitive, while not excluding representational knowledge.  
Bearing in mind the above argument, the following outlines some meanings of ‘education,’ 
‘knowledge,’ ‘nursing’ and ‘nurse;’ words which are not intended to define.  
Education 
The noun, ‘education,’ can refer to the process of receiving, or giving, a systematic 
instruction; or refer to a body of knowledge acquired while being educated; or information 
about, or training in a particular subject. It can also refer to an enlightening experience 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2014). While each of these definitions is relevant to the research, 
the ones which appear most relevant for mental health nursing are acquired knowledge, and 
an enlightening experience. Therapeutic education might then be akin to an enlightening 
experience of the art of healing, which may possibly be linked to acquired knowledge.  
Knowledge 
The definition of knowledge that appears most relevant for this study is that which refers 
to the fact or condition of knowing something; referring to the fact of knowing, or being 
acquainted with a thing or person, or familiarity gained by experience (Oxford English 
Dictionary 2015). Knowledge linked to familiarity and acquaintance is seen as most relevant 
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to mental health nursing. It is anticipated that this knowledge is not only representational but 
is also embodied.  
Nursing and nurse 
The statutory body responsible for the registration of nurses in the United Kingdom, the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (www.nmc.org.uk), defines nursing as:  
 “the use of clinical judgement in the provision of care to enable people to improve, 
maintain or recover health, to cope with health problems, and to achieve the best possible 
quality of life, whatever their disease or disability until death” (Royal College of Nursing 
2003). 
 
Following the European Tuning Project (Tuning Project, 2009), the Nursing and 
Midwifery Council adopted the definition of the nurse as: 
  “A professional person achieving a competent standard of practice at first cycle level 
following successful completion of an approved academic and practical course. The nurse is 
a safe, caring, and competent decision-maker, willing to accept personal and professional 
accountability for his/her actions and continuous learning. The nurse practises within a 
statutory framework and code of ethics delivering nursing practice (care) that is 
appropriately based on research, evidence and critical thinking that effectively responds to 
the needs of individual clients (patients) and diverse populations.” 
What is perhaps most significant for this study is the characteristics of nursing that 
involve judgement and personal accountability. This potentially places the individual nurse 
in ethical situations which are beyond ethical frameworks and codes of practice. Willis, Grace 
and Roy (2008, E32-E33 in Wright & Brajtman, 2011, pp. 22-23)), based on a synthesis of 
nursing theories and models, proposed that the discipline be defined as “facilitating 
humanization, meaning, choice, quality of life, and healing in living and dying.” The person 
is seen as a unique individual capable of wholeness and integrity.  
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1.5  An overall view of mental health nursing 
In the literature, there is a concern that mental health nursing is dying out as a therapeutic 
endeavour as it remains completely aligned to a biomedical model of psychiatry, such that a 
more generic kind of mental health worker would be required, resulting in a loss of identity 
for the profession and deterioration in expertise (Clarke, 2006; Cutcliffe & Lynn, 2008; 
Happell, 2014; Hercelinskyi, Cruickshank, Brown & Phillips, 2014; Holmes, 2006; Stickley, 
Clifton & Callagahan, et al., 2009). Under the dominance of the biomedical model, which 
these authors lament, interventions would emphasise cognitive and behavioural approaches 
to correct “faulty thinking” (for example, England, 2006, p. 735; Gournay, Denford, Parr & 
Newell, 2000), and involve assessing risk and encouraging compliance with medication (as 
encouraged, for example, by Gournay, 2000; 2001; Rice, 2008a; b; c; 2011). McCabe (2005, 
p. 182) perhaps summarises this view when she claims, “We need to get to a place where we 
make the automatic links in our head as psychiatric nurses between neurobiological 
functioning and psychiatric symptoms” (cf. Bjorklund, 2006). A systematic literature review 
showed how there is a split between mental health nurses who adhere to this medical model 
and those who favour more relational or complex views (for example, Cutcliffe, 2009a; 
Dziopa & Aherne, 2009; Holmes & Gastaldo, 2004), which has been discussed by Cutcliffe 
(2000). Even the movement towards recovery-oriented, destigmatising practices in mental 
health services (Repper, 2000), which was meant to encourage interdependence (that is, 
relationships with others) in, and through, changes in society, is becoming “co-opted” as a 
field for psychiatric and psychological “experts” (Edgley, Stickley, Wright, & Repper, J., 
2012, p. 121; see also Buchanan-Barker & Barker, 2009; Davies, 2013), with a focus instead 
on ‘resilience and self-agency’ aligned to a biomedical approach (for example, Frost, Tirupati, 
& Johnston, et al., 2017). This shift in the ‘recovery model’ was warned against (Thornton & 
Lucas, 2011), and is not surprising, especially perhaps in view of Barker’s (2003) sense of 
psychiatry as a ‘colonising’ power.  
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Linked with the dominant biomedical model in psychiatry (Carlyle, Crowe & Deering, 
2012), mental health nurses still have no clear professional identity which could define 
educational programmes and what it is they actually do (Hercelinskyi, Cruickshank, Brown 
& Phillips, 2014). Barker (2006) goes so far as to say that those mental health nurses who 
‘follow orders’ in this paradigm, for example, assisting in restraint, in electro-convulsive 
therapy, administering psychotropic medication without informing the person of the effects, 
are ethically derelict. In a study on the therapeutic relationship in in-patient mental health 
settings, Cutcliffe, Santos, Kozel, Taylor and Lees (2015) found that this setting is often 
“devoid of warm therapeutic relationships, respectful interactions, information or choice 
about treatment and any kind of formal/informal ‘talk therapy.’” They follow this by saying 
that the ‘care’ environment instead is dominated by “coercion, disinterest, inhumane 
practices, custodial and controlling practitioners, and a gross overuse of pharmacological 
‘treatments’” (Cutcliffe, et al., 2015, p. 375). They note that it is remarkable that, in this 
milieu, some mental health nurses still continue to work therapeutically (Cutcliffe, et al., 
2015). Winship’s (2006) acknowledges that physical restraint is sometimes necessary in 
psychiatric settings, but he calls for a greater focus on the interpersonal and psychological, as 
well as Winnicottian, aspects of ‘holding’ another. In this respect, Winship (2006, pp. 56-58) 
calls for mental health nurses to “develop the confidence and repertoire” to become 
“therapeutic agents themselves,” through “talking to patients as a technique of dealing with 
emotional distress,” rather than relying on other disciplines (see also Bak, Brandt-
Christensen, Sestoft, & Zoffmann, 2012; Buchanan-Barker & Barker, 2005; Lakeman & 
Cutcliffe, 2009; Moran, Cocoman, Scott, Matthews, Staniuliene & Valimaki, 2009).   
Barker’s (2006) argument seems of enormous importance, and in a sense, reflects the 
background at the heart of this study, in that what is being noticed is that a mental health 
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nurse, in being therapeutic, responds according to the person so that she ‘may not follow 
orders’. 
The issue of psychiatric power is not being directly addressed, although it is the 
background to all mental health nursing (McKeown & White, 2015). Against this background 
mental health nursing does not qualify as a profession, as it does not prescribe treatment 
(Clarke, 1999), and neither is it perhaps a science, art or vocation, but is a job (Lucas, 1993; 
Clarke, 2006). Not much appears to have essentially changed in nursing since Freidson (1970, 
p. 20) noted that “there is great weakness in the position of the occupation,” with respect to 
its professional status. Collins (2006) argues that mental health nursing is not nursing at all, 
and it may be time for a complete change in order to separate from psychiatry and nursing. 
Morrall (2006, pp.56-57) proposes that any attempt to break from psychiatry, however, is 
“self-aggrandising” and unrealistic, going so far as to say some mental health nurses are 
“asinine.” From a Foucauldian perspective, he argues that mental health nursing is 
subordinate to psychiatry but in a relationship in which it ‘enjoys’ something of psychiatry’s 
power and hegemony. These arguments are left aside here, to focus on the therapeutic, 
although they are revisited.   
Despite the influence of psychiatry, it appears that mental health nurses practise in 
idiosyncratic ways to form therapeutic relationships, while also struggling to define what it is 
they actually do with patients (Barker, Jackson & Stevenson, 1999; Browne, Cashin & 
Graham, 2012; Dziopa & Aherne, 2009; Hanson & Taylor, 2000). An important view of 
mental health nursing for this research is that in order to be therapeutic a mental health nurse 
needs to be able to tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty (Cutcliffe, 2000; Philbin, 1997), and 
chaos (Holmes & Gastaldo, 2004). Over forty years ago prominent nurse theorists and 
practitioners such as Peplau (1988) and Altschull (1972) observed the lack of willingness 
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and/or ability of mental health nurses to articulate what they do, and this appears to have 
changed little (Browne, Cashin & Graham, 2012).  
A more recent exception to mental health nursing finding a voice, the Tidal Model (Barker, 
2001), emphasises the importance of the patient’s own understanding and words to describe 
his experience (Brookes, Murata, & Tansey, 2006). However, this has become marginalised 
as a model for recovery and psychiatric care (Barker & Buchanan-Barker, 2011a; b). As 
noted, some mental health nurses may also choose not to engage much at all with patients 
(Stenhouse, 2011), reflecting perhaps a difficulty in staying open to what patients in mental 
distress invoke in others. Yet it is consistently reported in the literature that patients often find 
the activity of mental health nurses to be therapeutic within the context of a relationship, 
which includes providing one-to-one time talking (Coatsworth-Puspoky, Forchuk & Ward-
Griffin, 2006; Hopkins, Loeb & Fick, 2009; Latvala, 2002; Latvala, Saranto & Pekalla, 2004). 
The variety of approaches found in this context is in line with other studies across Europe 
which indicate that mental health nurses tend to use a plurality of therapeutic approaches 
without necessarily following management guidelines (Chambers, Kantaris, Guise & 
Valimaki, 2015). This appears significant because it implies that mental health nursing 
potentially occupies an open space therapeutically, where engagement with the other person 
can be a creative process; although this open space is framed and encroached upon by 
orthodox psychiatry. Holmes, Gastaldo and Perron (2007, p. 85) praise nursing in general in 
being able to accept diversity, and “polyvocality,” while also challenging “totalising 
perspectives.”  
However, commentaries in the literature reflect a discipline that is in decline (Barker, 
2006; Cutcliffe, 2008; Happell, 2014; Koekkoek, Van Meijel, Schene, & Hutschemaekers, 
2009), or perhaps a return to the attendants of old (Nolan, 1993; Peplau, 1994), to a means of 
supplying technical assistants to psychiatry (McKeown & White, 2015). Nursing’s governing 
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body, the Nursing and Midwifery Council, continues to promote the biomedical model of 
mental health nursing (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2010), with the additional element, 
which applies to all nursing, of caring as indicated by the 6 C’s (care, compassion, courage, 
communication, commitment and competence), devised by Cummings and Bennett (2012). 
It is important to keep in mind what Bradshaw (2016, p.73) notes, that Cummings and Bennett 
(2012) offer no “references or acknowledgements” to give depth to the idea of the 6Cs, and 
likens this kind of move to “McDonaldised dehumanisation” (after Ritzer (2011)), which has 
turned “virtues into commodities.” The governance of mental health nursing continues a trend 
towards technologizing the discipline, geared towards audit and risk management, where even 
clinical supervision and reflective practice are technologies of governance (Banks, Clifton, 
Purdy & Crawshaw, 2015). In contrast, in their review, Cutcliffe, Santos, Kozel, Taylor and 
Lees (2015, p. 380) noticed that what service users wanted most from mental health nurses 
as ‘treatment’ were “practises of being open, offering human attention, and unrestrained 
respect of human dignity,” including being listened to and taken seriously.  
 
1.6 Summary of chapters 
The Theory chapter derives from a review of the literature and focuses on the 
‘personal process’ aspects of mental health nursing, as opposed to those aspects which relate 
to medication and containment as ‘cure’. It outlines how a mental health nurse’s openness to 
others may be therapeutic, as the beginning of healing, and in uncertain, and abject 
encounters. There is a distinction made between ways of ‘being open’ to another through 
theory or method, and being open without such theories or methods, which is viewed as 
enabling a unique encounter with the other person. This encounter perhaps may reflect how 
a person has come to be amongst others throughout their lives. Understanding this ‘coming 
to be’ may involve ‘truthfulness,’ and is seen as a way into thinking about the kind of 
therapeutic education mental health nurses may need. The literature indicates that mental 
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health nurses primarily learn through practice, including learning from peers and mentors or 
more experienced practitioners. 
The Methodology chapter outlines a philosophical background to, and aspects of, 
Husserl’s phenomenology, which then links to Merleau-Ponty. Significant is how Husserl 
speaks of the world as ‘constituted’ by subjectivity, and this idea is made more complicated 
by subjectivity being linked with constituting intersubjectivity, including ‘sedimented’ 
meanings. What appears important is that certainty may feel like an “experience of truth” 
(Husserl, 1970a, ¶ 51 cited in Welton, 1999, p.21), which may emerge like a familiar pattern 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2014). Husserl shows how science is a tradition, and examines how 
language, especially writing, is seductive, so that it can be as if it speaks of something real, 
and conveys “idealities” separating subjectivity-relative origins (Husserl, 1989, p. 269 cited 
in Zahavi, 2003, p. 136). These ideas are explored with respect to meaning, as it is meanings 
we look for in research, and I also focus on the aspect of Husserl’s examination of empathy 
which he refers to as “self-alienating” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 124).  
The Method chapter principally describes and explores Giorgi’s (1997; 2006; 2009; 
2012; 2014) descriptive phenomenological empirical method. Giorgi (2009) argues that it is 
possible to describe empirically what is given phenomenologically, and in such a way that 
interpretation is minimal, which was its attraction as a research method in this study. His 
method is organised so that it fulfils what he sees as the scientific criteria of being systematic, 
methodical, general, and critical (Giorgi, 1997). Key stages of the method are illustrated with 
examples from this research. Of particular importance is the practice of free imaginative 
variation to come to arrive at essential aspects of a meaning, through careful attention to the 
responses of the research participant. Giorgi’s (2009) method is critiqued, including from the 
standpoint of an assumption that “people in a shared cultural and linguistic community name 
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and identify their experience in a consistent and shared manner” (von Eckartsberg, 1998, p. 
15).  
The Findings chapter presents the findings of Giorgi’s (2009) empirical research 
method with respect to responses to the research question from participants in the study. 
These are presented as an individual general synthesis for each participant, as well as a general 
synthesis regarding all participants. Findings indicate that the therapeutic as the art of healing 
is a minor aspect of the work of those mental health nurses interviewed, while it is the main 
reason most of them became nurses. A key theme in the findings is ‘being with’, which 
includes that what is therapeutic occurs in idiosyncratic ways. The mental health nurses 
interviewed appear to have learned to be therapeutic mainly through life experience, as well 
as learning through practice. Being therapeutic appears to link with the person of the mental 
health nurse. Characteristics and activities that nurses speak about which they see as 
therapeutic cannot be removed from the situated context of how a nurse has come to be. Being 
open to others was present, to varying degrees, in all mental health nurses interviewed. 
Learning to be therapeutic is vulnerable to the communities of learning, the psychiatric 
environments, in which nurses practised. Five key themes related to the research question 
emerged from the method as findings. These themes are, that therapeutic activity is 
subordinate to administrative and medical activities, therapeutic activity is ‘being with’ 
clients over time, and how this happens depends on personality characteristics; learning is 
through practice and openness with others, including patients, and learning is facilitated by a 
therapeutic environment.  
The Phenomenology chapter (Chapter 6) presents a phenomenology of the therapeutic 
in relation to the interviews and this study. This phenomenology is in contrast to Giorgi’s 
(2009) method, whose ‘scientific’ criteria force it along a certain path. What emerged was a 
way of thinking about meaning, and being in relation, which reflected back upon, and put into 
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question, all that went before in the study. Distinctions emerged regarding meaning and 
openness which seemed to clarify how mental health nurses may be therapeutic, and may 
learn to be therapeutic, which involves a certain truthfulness. This is complex, linking back 
to ideas on empathy, being ‘held captive’ in meanings, and how words, language, and speech, 
can define, restrict, and open up, experience. These aspects are explored in some detail. The 
phenomenology gives precedence to the “originary giving intuition… [as]… the source of all 
knowledge” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 45 - after §24 of Husserl’s Ideas I), and stands in contrast to 
method.  
The Discussion chapter (Chapter 7) concludes the study. It provides an overview, 
looking back at the study, and then divides into six overlapping areas. The experience of 
abjection is revisited, in terms now of meaning. Coming to be therapeutic is discussed in 
terms of how there is a ‘circularity’ to learning where the circle does not close, and this is 
spoken of in a sense of an ‘unfolding’. Openness appears to be a condition of such learning. 
A third area looks at how being in relation to another person is vital to being therapeutic, 
involving being called into question. The fourth area discusses the sense of meaning as 
‘given’ and ‘sensual’, the latter perhaps being vital to what is therapeutic. The former sense 
of meaning is addressed further in the fifth section, and appears to be what an empirical 
method especially ‘finds’. Such meanings from the empirical method are like ‘sign posts’, 
indicating that something else is needed. A final area addresses what is implicit throughout 
the study, that meaning of some kind is conveyed which is understood (as in this writing here, 
for example). However, these meanings are conveyed through certain aspects of empathy and 
the tradition of spoken speech (Merleau-Ponty, 2014), with implications for the research 
study. A deceptively simple distinction emerges with respect to the phenomenological and 
the empirical, in that the former ‘opens up’ speech, and along with it, our experience. How 
this ‘openness’ can be allowed, and happens, may be a question for further research.  
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 In conclusion, this chapter has attempted to summarise the process of the research 
study, spanning its origins to its findings. The study evolved from taking seriously the 
experience of being a mental health nurse, how that could be researched through 
phenomenology, and what phenomenology meant with regard to that experience. This 
evolved in an unfolding way, each shift and change linked to being open to others, and 
oneself, which in itself spoke of what the study was researching. Empirical method seemed 
to fall short, ‘indicating’ only something else that eluded definition but was not beyond 
speaking about. The phenomenology opened up this ‘speaking’, showing how the research 
now was in relation to what was therapeutic, seen, viewed, and clarified, through the 
experience of being with the research participants in the interviews, and also that of this study. 
The circularity is clear, but in an ‘unfolding’ that does not close itself, or complete itself so 
that something might be ‘closed out’. This ‘unfolding’ traces out the whole trajectory of the 





2.1  Introduction 
This research addresses the question, “What is the need, if any, for therapeutic education 
in mental health nursing?” As outlined in the Introduction chapter (Section 1.1), this question 
is aimed at the therapeutic relating to the art of healing, without defining ‘art’ too strictly. A 
looser sense of ‘definition’ has to do with putting theory aside or under question. This includes 
not defining healing too strictly either, even though I have envisaged it as being like a ‘salve’ 
that may be about allowing something different or new to become possible, through being 
with another person (Introduction, Chapter 1, Section 1.1). The focus is on what mental health 
nurses know, and do, that is therapeutic and how have they learned to be therapeutic. This 
may indicate what kind of education, if any, may facilitate a mental health nurse in being 
therapeutic.  
The approach to this study is one in which I have tried to ‘let things show themselves’ in 
the spirit of Husserl’s phenomenology. There are reasons for this wanting to ‘allow 
experience’ to ‘speak’. Firstly, as discussed in the Introduction chapter (Section 1.2), while 
trying to follow a credo in doing mental health nursing, I was struck by the experience of 
feeling abject, which emerged in an awareness that seemed to give precedence to something 
that comes to be ‘felt.’ The experience as a mental health nurse then held a certain ‘truth’ 
which was more insistent than a credo. Some of the complexity here will be left for the 
Methodology chapter. Secondly, and for example, in following through on Lacanian theory, 
inspired by some of Lacan’s insights, what I noticed was that ‘theory’ ended up in an ever 
more narrowing view of others so that I became enclosed, for example, reduced to thinking 
of others as ‘subject positions’ as opposed to persons. But it appears that we need credos to 
live, to help us feel secure and, as I will note here, perhaps protect us from an unbearable 
despair (see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3). A difficulty then was how to walk along 
24 
 
a path that did not stray too much into theories, or credos, so that to be surprised by another, 
through an openness, would still be possible. This can be difficult as we are always caught up 
in something, as will be discussed. So, my approach to this Theory chapter has been to read 
and to leave aside, to follow paths and to walk back along those paths in the opposite 
direction, until something seemed to follow me along to ‘speak for itself’. I was hoping to 
‘find’ something this way, or perhaps that something would ‘find itself’ beside me, as opposed 
to seizing too hastily on a meaning.  
Looking at the Nursing and Midwifery Council’s guidelines for nurse education was 
disappointing, in that there was something ‘lifeless’ in the way that nursing was thought of as 
‘caring’ (see Appendix 1; Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2010; Nursing and Midwifery 
Council, 2017a), perhaps because nothing seemed to be critically called into question or 
problematised. Paley’s (2002; 2008; 2011) criticism on ‘care’ in nursing, was refreshing, and 
counterbalanced by Dowling (2004) saying he had missed out something about the reality of 
care. I will come back to these points. On exploring the mental health nursing literature, it 
felt as if there was nothing coherent in this body of knowledge, and it felt at times like 
foundering in confusion. There was the over-riding impression that the academics who wrote 
the literature were mainly ignored by most mental health nurses in practice, reflected in a lack 
of interest in research (Bahtsevani, Khalaf, & Willman, 2005; Fisher & Davis, 2008; Fisher 
& Happell, 2008; Gournay & Ritter, 1997; Happell, 2004; Lines, 2001). This reflected my 
experience, in that most mental health nurses I knew (many of them women) were not 
concerned with academic recognition. This led into theory again, especially Lacan, who gives 
reasons as to why ‘the feminine’ is not so caught up in ‘making a name for itself’ (Fink, 
1995), which I then set aside without dismissing this idea as it may indicate something 
liberating (in my view) about ‘being feminine.’ What I felt came through in such views was 
that the ‘feminine’ (whatever that meant) slipped through those ‘masculine’ (whatever that 
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meant) nets. This struck me as being important and as having to do with why many nurses I 
knew were happy being nurses but I was not. These ideas were set aside in order to open up 
wider views as to what may be therapeutic about mental health nursing, while still the 
Lacanian influence remained in looking at the feminine through Kristeva’s (1982; 1986) 
theory of the semiotic. Importantly, it seemed that not being overly influenced by research or 
theory could also signify that what mental health nurses know and do may be difficult or 
impossible to say or write, and this is one thread of thinking which will be explored in this 
chapter (Section 2.6.1).  
 Regarding the literature review, I first started in a systematic way, and then abandoned 
this, putting aside a lot of material relating to what Cutcliffe (2000) calls the ‘contain and fix’ 
strand in mental health nursing (see below, Section 2.3). A different approach to the literature 
as outlined above, reading and setting aside, and waiting for something to emerge became 
more important. It felt mistaken to follow a thread too wishfully. Exploring the literature in 
this way was anxiety-provoking, as it seemed for a while that there was nothing to be found 
but a wide range of diverse ideas on how mental health nurses ought to practise.  
It began to become clear, in the literature and in everyday interactions with mental health 
nurses in working environments, that there was a confusion at the heart of mental health 
nursing care, as to what mental health nursing is for, and what some mental health nurses 
actually do. Finding some clarity in this confusion has taken time, as discussed in the 
Introduction (Chapter 1), and also involved being open to others in everyday practice. It 
appeared that some mental health nurses were therapeutic in an encounter with the other 
person, through openness, involving being with the other person in unique, idiosyncratic 
ways.  
This sense of idiosyncrasy is supported in the guidelines for mental health nursing 
education in that there is recognition of the ‘therapeutic use of self’ (Appendix 1), and in the 
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diversity of approaches, including that of ‘care,’ in the mental health nursing literature 
(Section 2.3). In the former, there appears to be a tacit acknowledgment of something 
ineluctable to ‘care,’ while also being uncritical of what ‘care’ may mean and the wider field 
of psychiatric power to which nursing is allied and subservient (Cutcliffe & Happell, 2009; 
Cutcliffe & Wieck, 2008). In the latter (the mental health nursing literature), ‘care’ is put 
under question, while the wide diversity in therapeutic approaches discussed and advocated, 
apart from the standard practices of assisting psychiatry, appears to indicate that it does not 
really matter how mental health nurses practise therapeutically as it is not relevant to the field 
of psychiatric care, and so, those mental health nurses who have an interest in being 
therapeutic can ‘do their own thing’ (see Browne, Hurley & Lakeman, 2014).  
There is an ambiguity revealed here however, a ‘something’ that is hard to define, which 
is linked to what happens in the encounter between a mental health nurse and another person. 
I will try to elucidate in this chapter this ‘something’ without falling into the step of the 
language of any one approach to ‘theorising’ because this may narrow thinking. In trying to 
understand what may be difficult to speak about in mental health nursing, certain aspects of 
the literature stayed with me, and seemed important. For example, Peplau’s (1952) idea that 
the nurse learns from the patient, was striking.  
From reading, and talking to mental health nurses, and others, and thinking about what 
emerged, this chapter took shape as an exploration of how it appears that in mental health 
nursing being therapeutic is not primarily about learning a theory, or having a formal 
education, although these may be helpful in some way, but depends on how a person has 
‘come to be’ in his, or her, life. Being with another in a certain ‘openness’ to him, I argue, is 
what facilitates healing, or the therapeutic, and this openness perhaps cannot be taught, or 
even learned, yet it is itself what enables learning (since if I am closed to the other person 
how can I learn from him?). This openness, I argue, has to do with a person’s being, and is 
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also explored further in the Methodology chapter (Chapter 3, Section 3.5.4). Such openness 
can also be potentially dangerous at times, as in some cases, it leads into an encounter with 
what is abject, or violent, which may place one’s own person at risk.  
The chapter is organised so that, firstly, the focus of the research question within the wider 
view of the therapeutic in mental health nursing is outlined, reflecting on educational 
guidelines and examples of nursing models. There is a focus on mental health nursing as 
‘care’ while also being invisible as a treatment, invisibility perhaps having to do with the 
nature of the therapeutic in mental health nursing. The notion of ‘care’ is problematised to an 
extent. Secondly, the therapeutic as relating to the art of healing is addressed with respect to 
the ‘personal process’ strand in the mental health literature, being to do with something that 
happens between the nurse and the other person, as compared to a ‘contain and fix’ strand of 
‘medical cure’ (Cutcliffe, 2000). Thirdly, it outlines how openness to another person may 
form the basis of the therapeutic as the art of healing in mental health nursing, through staying 
with the other person in an uncertain encounter, and with what may be abject in such an 
encounter also, involving examples from the literature.  
Abjection is briefly explored through Kristeva (1982) as her language and thought is 
helpful in thinking about experiences of being open to the other person in which meaning has 
collapsed. Being ‘open’ as a therapeutic way of being may be ‘prepared for’ perhaps through 
theories or methods, although I argue that these may ‘close down’ the other person, and that 
being open to the other without depending on such presuppositions, allows for a unique 
encounter with the other person which is in itself healing. It is argued too that this latter 
openness is phenomenological in that it allows space for the other person to be. For example, 
I view Husserl’s reduction (see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1), in which he tries to 
achieve a presuppositionless perspective (Zahavi, 2003), in terms of being potentially 
therapeutic as it facilitates a movement towards ‘getting out of the way’ of the other (‘leading 
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back’ out of oneself). But such openness is problematic, as shown through captivation in 
credos, and theories. I will argue that the unique encounter cannot be described adequately in 
words, nor outside of unique events, and this is illustrated with an example from outside of 
nursing. I am not trying to ‘mystify’ the therapeutic here through phrases like ‘unique 
encounter’, but rather indicate something that ‘unfolds.’ Fourthly, implications regarding how 
some mental health nurses are therapeutic, through being open to the other person, are 
outlined in terms of situated learning, intuition, emotional labour and tacit knowledge. It 
appears that being ‘open’ to the other person may be facilitated in an environment, or 
community of learning, where how one has ‘come to be’ may be freely explored and 
understood, to a significant extent. This can be understood in terms of ‘truthfulness’ as 
outlined here (after Wittgenstein, 1998, cited in Heaton, 2010). This would not however, 
imply that being ‘open’ can be taught or learned, as there appears to be something mysterious 
or unknown involved that is perhaps to do with the tacit dimension (Polanyi, 1983).  
2.2  The focus of the research question within the wider view of nursing 
It is worth noting that the literature has been created by a minority of nurses who are 
academically minded, as well as directives from the professional nursing body, the Nursing 
and Midwifery Council. While there are many models of nursing (for example, Peplau, 1988; 
Rogers, 1970; Parse, 1981; Roper, Logan & Tierney, 1980; Watson, 2012), and principally 
two which relate directly to mental health nursing (Barker, 2001; 2003; Peplau, 1988), along 
with other proposed approaches (see Section 2.3, this chapter), none of these has gained any 
consistent purchase in mental health nursing, either perhaps because no single way fits its 
eclectic, pragmatic practice (McCrae, 2011), or the evidence-based paradigm is now 
dominant (Beebe, Adams, & El-Mallakh, 2011; Stein, 2009; 2013; Watson, 2012). 
Nevertheless, reflected in these models and approaches, mental health nurses perceive their 
roles as therapeutic through developing and maintaining supportive relationships, facilitating 
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personal development, and attending to physical and emotional needs, as well as 
administering medication (Barker, Reynolds & Stevenson, 1997; Fourie, McDonald, Connor 
& Bartlett, 2005; Hopkins, Loeb & Fick, 2009; Nolan, 1993; Peplau, 1988).  
Despite appeals to establish nursing as a science based on scientific method, much practice, 
and learning in placements, is still based on a tradition of caring, trial and error, and authority 
(Cutcliffe, 2009b; Crook, 2001; Zauszniewski, Bekhet, & Haberlein, 2012; Zauszniewski & 
Suresky, 2004). The vast majority of mental health nurses learn through practice in 
placements, strongly influenced by other nurses, and patient contact, as well as 
communication skills in basic training (Appendix 1; Dowling, 2004; Koekkoek, Van Meijel, 
Schene & Hutschemaekers, 2009; Zauszniewski, Bekhet & Haberlein, 2012). A negative 
aspect of learning through practice is that the reliance on cultures of already established 
nursing practices can lead to hostile environments for newly qualified mental health nurses, 
or those who wish to be innovative (Cutcliffe, 2009b).  McCrae (2011, p. 224) notes that 
nursing models, and theories applicable to nursing, are often regarded as “unrealistic dogma” 
and as “diversions from intuitive care.” But also, it is widely acknowledged that mental health 
nurses do not see research as clinically relevant to practice, although they respect it (Beech, 
1998; Browne, Cashin & Graham, 2012; Carrion, Woods & Norman, 2004; Happell, 2004; 
Yadav & Fealy, 2012). These factors may indicate that theories or models fail to put words 
on what is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to speak about definitively, as does the failure of 
scientific method to influence everyday mental health nursing (Clarke, 1999).  
Nursing as a result is vulnerable to ‘top down’ directives, for example, from the Nursing 
and Midwifery Council, in promoting the 6 C’s, care, compassion, competence, courage, 
communication and commitment (Cummings & Bennett, 2012), as a reaction to the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust scandal of failed care (Francis, 2013). Indeed, the 
Francis Report (Francis, 2013) has been influential in driving proposed changes to 
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undergraduate nurse education, the current curriculum being seen as not focusing enough on 
patient care (Hemingway, Clifton & Edward, 2016). As a result, The Shape of Caring Review 
(Health Education England, 2015) proposed changes to the current three-year degree 
specialist training to a more generic training, comprising a two-year core curriculum of 
general nursing followed by one year of specialisation (adult, child, learning disability, mental 
health or public health) and a fourth year of preceptorship when in employment (Rosser, 
2015; Hemingway, Clifton & Edward, 2016). The implication here is that nursing is simply 
about ‘caring’ along with some technical skills. A new nurse associate role for ‘hands-on’ 
work, has also been created, which frees qualified nurses to do more technical and clinical 
interventions (Hemingway, Clifton & Edward, 2016, p. 331; NHS Employers, 2017), as well 
as proposals for an apprenticeship in nursing (Donohue, 2016). The emphasis on physical 
health shows that the biomedical model of care is dominant (Hemingway, Clifton & Edward, 
2016, p. 332), reflected also in how the authors of the Shape of Caring Review “made no 
direct attempt to engage with academics responsible for teaching and researching mental 
health nursing” (Coffey, Pryjmachuk & Duxbury, 2016, p. 738).  
Hemingway, Clifton & Edward (2016) fear that the real reasons for new routes into nursing 
are about economics rather than improving nursing care. It appears that mental health nursing 
environments, and education, are now “fully embedded in a business model predominated by 
cutting costs, increasing efficiencies and increasing productivity” (Hemingway, Clifton & 
Edward, 2016, p. 335). Currently, the Nursing and Midwifery Council is in consultation 
regarding new standards of proficiency and a framework for education for nurses, with an 
emphasis on technical skills, and these new standards, as well as the current guidelines, will 
be briefly discussed below (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2010; 2017a; b).  
The following paragraph sketches what the Nursing and Midwifery Council (2010, 
pp. 17-18) expects from a mental health nurse in training, regarding therapeutic interpersonal 
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interactions. The mental health nurse is expected to show “therapeutic use of self”, as well as 
maintain therapeutic relationships using a range of interpersonal approaches and skills. It is 
not specified how ‘therapeutic’ is meant to be understood in these guidelines for training. It 
is explicit that the mental health nurse herself be therapeutic, while also being able to use 
learned conceptual knowledge to promote the therapeutic; the latter involves exploration of 
the patient’s experience and making sense of it with him. But at the same time, he or she, is 
required to “draw on a range of evidence-based psychological, psychosocial interventions and 
other complex therapeutic skills to provide person-centred support and care.” There is 
recognition then in the guidelines for practice and education that mental health nurses use a 
range of learned concepts, but as well as these something more, which is to do with the person 
of the nurse. Unfortunately, this ‘something more’ is not developed in the guidelines, and it 
is interesting to note whether this may be a tacit reference to something that nurses know and 
do but cannot speak about.  
The new guidelines, currently in consultation (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 
2017b), still focus on care that is meant to put the patient first (person-centred care), but with 
a greater emphasis on all nurses being competent in medical technical nursing procedures, 
while preserving the four strands of nursing (adult, child, learning disability, mental health). 
Applicants for nurse training will have to possess, and be able to develop, “inherent strengths” 
of “emotional intelligence and resilience,” as well as possessing the “attributes” of “being 
caring, empathetic and compassionate” (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2017a, p. 5).   
In the new draft guidelines, these ‘strengths and attributes’ will be assessed 
continually during training, “alongside knowledge, skills and competencies” (Nursing and 
Midwifery Council, 2017a, p. 5). There is a sense here then that being therapeutic has 
something to do with the person of the nurse, and the focus on this is in response to such 
scandals as highlighted in the Francis Report (Francis, 2013). Yet, these ways of being 
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become described as ‘skills,’ as if anyone could learn them as technical competencies. In the 
new draft guidelines, there is an assumption that nursing is a profession and that nurses are 
autonomous, “working in partnership with other healthcare professionals to meet health and 
nursing care needs of people, families, communities and populations” (Nursing and 
Midwifery Council, 2017a, p. 3); not noting that professional status has been the subject of 
intense debate (Morrall, 2006; Clarke, 2006). The outcomes for learning also specifically note 
the need for candour and self-awareness, including of one’s own vulnerabilities. Those 
outcomes which appear most relevant for this study give a sense that there is something 
already known of what the qualified nurse ought to be like, and despite the descriptions, this 
cannot be made explicit. For example, Outcome 1.6 says, “Understand the meaning of 
resilience and emotional intelligence and explain their influence on judgements and decisions 
in complex, challenging and unpredictable situations” (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 
2017a, p. 8). There is a sense here that meaning can be pinned down, regarding being resilient 
and emotionally intelligent, or what a nurse may be tacitly ‘doing’ in being therapeutic. It is 
seen as a communication skill to be aware of one’s “own unconscious bias in communication 
encounters” (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2017a, p. 23), but how a nurse would develop 
this awareness is not discussed.  
Regarding mental health nursing in the draft guidelines there is an expectation of a 
more intensive training in communication skills, including solution focused therapies, 
cognitive behavioural therapy techniques, talking therapies, and developing therapeutic 
relationships (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2017a, p. 24). The ‘learned concepts’ of the 
2010 guidelines are made more explicit in the 2017 draft guidelines as ‘skills,’ and as can be 
seen, are part of the theories and ideas in the psy-complex to which Parker (1997) refers. 
Unfortunately, there is nothing critical in these guidelines, as to how, for example, toxic 
learning communities might influence a student nurse (see Cutcliffe, 2009b), or what is meant 
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by ‘care’ and other words like ‘empathy’ and ‘compassion.’ It appears that assumptions are 
being made here that it is already understood what these words mean, that they mean 
something which is already defined.  
The mixture of ‘professional’ care, learned concepts of the above-mentioned 
therapies, and psychiatry, points to a confusion then right at the heart of mental health nursing 
as to what it is mental health nurses are there to do. Questions come to mind: Are nurses 
meant to uphold a certain way of thinking about what it is to be a person, as communicated 
through the psy-complex, and therefore, in standard psychiatric care? Are they meant to 
believe they are part of an autonomous profession while also being subject to psychiatry? The 
discipline is in a confusing state, on the border between an academic pursuit (in the wider, 
dominant paradigm of psychiatry, and psychology, this is ‘evidence-based’ practice (Rice, 
2008a, b, c; Caldwell, Scalafani, Swarbrick & Piren, 2010; cf. Holmes, Perron & O’Byrne, 
2006a)) and one which involves other ways of relating and being, while also being subject to 
psychiatric medicine (Hewitt, 2009). There appears a tacit indication here, however, that 
mental health nurses work therapeutically in idiosyncratic ways through being with a person 
(therapeutic relationships, talking therapies, therapeutic use of self), although their main role 
is to provide safe psychiatric environments, and assist psychiatry. None of this tension is 
made explicit in the guidelines, although it is debated in the mental health nursing literature 
in different ways.  
To give a sense of what some nurses may be struggling to express tacitly or indirectly 
regarding being with, and caring for, another person, I will mention three nursing models 
here, developed by M. E. Rogers (1970), Parse (1981) and Watson (2012). These theorists 
speak of ‘care’ in a kind of language that is attacked in the nursing literature, from different 
perspectives, for example, as ‘slave morality’ (Paley, 2002), as lacking scientific rigour 
(Gournay, 2001; Beebe, Adams & El-Mallakh, 2011), and as inventing a metaphysical, 
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private language (Barker & Reynolds, 1994). Paley’s (2002) critique is particularly incisive 
as it addresses caring as an ideological practice. I will argue that Paley (2002) has missed out 
on something to do with nursing, regarding healing, which evades theory or description, 
although agreeing with him that ‘caring’ may, in some cases, disguise something 
pathological.  
Theorists like M. E. Rogers (1970), Parse (1981) and Watson (2012), believe there is 
something healing about being with another person, and they are trying to put words on that 
experience either through establishing a science of caring, or an overarching ‘methodology 
of caring.’ M. E. Rogers (1970) speaks of a person as an expression of a rhythmicality with 
the universe in a constant flow of energy which has patterns. Nursing can become a ‘science’ 
of this rhythmicality. At the same time, she follows Carl Rogers (1961, p. 93 in Rogers, 1970, 
p. 69) in emphasising “the warm, subjective encounter of two persons” as being more 
effective in facilitating change than any set of techniques. Parse (1981, p. 4), trying to separate 
nursing from medicine, emphasises how a person must be understood as a “living unity,” not 
a “study of parts.” Nursing ought to focus on “caring and healing,” through this view of a 
person not being a bio-psycho-social sum of parts (Parse, 1981, p. 8; cf. Askew & Byrne, 
2009). For her, nursing’s frame of reference is “patterns of living health” and its “starting 
point” of inquiry ought to relate to the “inter-human” processes of caring and healing (Parse, 
1981, p. xi). Striking phrases which she uses to try to express the sense of a person being 
‘unitary’ and in a constant flow of energy, and choices, are worth noting, for example, a 
person is, “a living unity continuously co-constituting patterns of relating,” “Man is 
transcending multi-dimensionally with the possibles [freedom to choose],” and “Health is 
unitary man’s negentropic [becoming more complex] unfolding” (Parse, 1981, pp. 25-33).  
Watson (2012) takes a step further than Rogers and Parse, by saying she believes we 
all have an eternal soul and that the goal of nursing is to “develop harmony”. Illness is not 
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necessarily disease but can be “subjective...disharmony,” in that “the self is separated from... 
one’s soul” (Watson, 2012, p. 60). Healing can come through “heart-centred caring presence 
and conscious intentionality” (Watson, 2012, p. 75). She supports phenomenology and 
poeticising as research methods since human phenomena such as caring “cannot be studied 
in the manner of objects” (Watson, 2012, p. 95). However, for Watson, in nursing education 
and research, such art and science are now eclipsed by evidence-based practice (Watson, 
2012). For her, caring values of nursing have become submerged by technology and 
bureaucracy (in industrialised countries) (Watson, 2012), while nursing as a human caring 
science restores “unitary notions of beauty, art, ethics, and aesthetics...and even love back 
into nursing practice” (Watson, 2012, p. 24).  
There appears to be something important in these models in so far as the words being used 
indicate that there is something that ‘needs a different language’ about nursing as caring; 
perhaps linked to how there may be something ineluctable in being with certain others who 
are therapeutic, to do with ‘openness’ to the other person. Also, it is interesting to note that 
the idea that there is something intangible about being therapeutic in nursing may emerge in 
the notion of the ‘therapeutic use of self’ in the educational guidelines (Nursing and 
Midwifery Council, 2010). However, to try to define this ‘ineluctability’ through an ‘ideology 
of caring,’ which Watson (2012) does especially, seems problematic. Paley’s (2002) view, 
which will be outlined below, is that attempts to establish ‘care as ideology’ reflects a ‘slave 
morality’. It seems clear that being ‘open’ also involves being open to one’s own motivations 
for wanting to be caring, motivations which may be pathological. When a nurse says he, or 
she, ‘cares’, it can be difficult to know what this means, and this is what Paley (2002) 
addresses. Is the ‘therapeutic relationship’ just a form of covert social control, for example 
(Morrall & Muir-Cochrane, 2002)?  
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Paley (1997) condemns nursing knowledge of caring in the literature as poverty-stricken, 
and a useless pursuit, resulting in lists of word associations which could just as easily be 
found in a thesaurus. It appears to me that he has a certain point here, in that lists of 
‘characteristics’ and attributes tend not to say much about how or what these are like in 
practice and how can they be learned (for example, Lakeman, 2012). Paley (2002) gives a 
cutting analysis of how leading nurse theorists (such as Rogers (1970), Watson (1985), and 
Benner and Wrubel (1989)) have misled nursing through trying to define caring as an 
ideology in order to separate it from, and place it in a morally superior position to, the medical 
model of care. These nurse theorists do this, he claims, through a “caring-phenomenology-
holism axis,” which makes its ideology immune to the rigour of scientific method (Paley, 
2002, p. 26). Trying to define nursing as an ideology of caring, he interprets as reflecting a 
‘slave morality’ (after Nietszche, 1994), in which those who care are weak, or slaves, and 
harbour strong resentments towards those who have power, the nobles (the doctors). The slave 
‘priests’ (nurse theorists), paralleling Nietszche’s terminology, have invented a morality of 
compassion to assert power over the nobles in the only way they can. He argues that nurse 
theorists have therefore misled nursing from its true focus, which is the science (as researched 
through scientific method) of recovery and rehabilitation (Paley 2002).  
There is always the danger that lying beneath any caring ideology, or even an individual 
act of care, is the “unconscious wish to exercise power over others” (Paley 2002, p. 31). It 
seems important to hold in mind such a criticism, at least since it indicates there may be other 
reasons why a nurse may ‘care.’ Coming from a psychodynamic perspective, Teising (2000, 
p. 449) makes a similar point, that mental health nurses’ sometimes exaggerated use of power 
and control may result from denial of “dependency” on and “relatedness” to, their patients. 
Such views could address coercive and violent practice, for example, as documented in 
Cutcliffe, Santos, Kozel, Taylor and Lees (2015). This is perhaps why Peplau (1988; 1994) 
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encourages nursing education to be about the nurse coming to know herself, to know why it 
is she wants to ‘care.’  
Dowling (2004) responds to Paley (2002) by saying he would not hold his view if he had 
personal experience of relationships with patients, and she may be indicating here something 
about the nature of individual acts of care which cannot be described clearly in words. Barker 
(2001), in describing the Tidal Model in mental health nursing, with its focus on narrative 
and meaning, which he and others have given an empirical research base (Barker, Jackson & 
Stevenson, 1999), adds that ultimately the Tidal model provides a medium through which the 
patient may be healed “by Nature or by God” (a reference to Nightingale, 1969 cited in Barker 
2001, p. 221), indicating that the mental health nurse is a catalyst for something more 
mysterious to occur. Stickley and Freshwater (2002, p. 253) in reference to the therapeutic 
relationship in mental health nursing, call for a “re-enchantment of the therapeutic nature of 
nursing” based on a “therapeutic alliance that is founded within love.” This is in response to 
a “technological and a masculine mentality” (the ‘contain and fix’ strand) in nursing, and they 
call for a re-assertion of love as central to human existence (Stickley & Freshwater, 2002, p. 
255). They appeal against technology and the language of technology (when they refer to 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy manuals, for example) to something more intangible, but 
present in the complex dynamics of the nurse-patient relationship. This kind of thought in 
nursing could be seen as a continuation of an expression in nursing of something intangible. 
For example, following de Chardin (1967), Watson (2012, p. 42) is sure that human caring 
and love are “cosmic forces,” the primal and universal psychic energy. It seems reasonable 
to suggest that this kind of intangibility perhaps may serve to make the practice of mental 
health nursing invisible as a treatment.  
It has been noted that mental health nursing is so subject to psychiatry that it becomes 
invisible as being therapeutic in its own right as a ‘treatment’ (Barker, Buchanan-Barker, 
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Rolfe & Cutcliffe, 2005), a characteristic it may have in common with general nursing 
(Alderson, Parent-Rocheleau & Mishara, 2015; Bjorklund 2004; Liaschenko, 1995; Rodney 
& Varcoe, 2001; Walker, 1998). Invisibility may link to something that appears ‘ordinary’ 
about mental health nursing, that is learned through situated ways of living that are not 
necessarily academic (Barker, Jackson & Stevenson, 1999; Beech & Norman 1995; Cutcliffe, 
2000; Cutcliffe, Stevenson, Jackson & Smith, 2007; Hellzen, 2004), along with something 
that cannot be spoken (Dowling, 2004).  
It is interesting to note that the invisibility of nursing therapeutic activity is not entirely a 
negative phenomenon. It appears that mental health nurses can practise therapeutically in 
ways they see best, as long as they keep the patient safe and administer medication, and assist 
in other interventions, according to the dominant biomedical model of psychiatry (cf. Morrall, 
1997; 2006, who would say mental health nurses collude with psychiatry). It may be one of 
the few remaining State-funded disciplines that is not entirely under the sway of 
institutionalised models of the mind, which, under the control of professional psychiatry and 
psychology, define a network of theories and practices which govern how ideas of deviance, 
illness and cure should be understood, the ‘psy-complex’ (Rose, 1985; Parker, 1997).  
Because of its invisibility, it appears to me that mental health nursing may offer a space for 
therapeutic activity that can involve a plethora of creative and idiosyncratic approaches, and 
where a certain a-theoretical freedom is still possible, in which the particularity of being a 
person can be given primacy. What is more, it appears that some mental health nurses may 
also ‘escape’ the dominant paradigm of psychiatric medicine, including other methodologies, 
through an openness to the person which is itself therapeutic.  
2.3  The therapeutic as the art of healing 
I will follow Cutcliffe (2000) here, who separates mental health nursing practice in 
terms of two different mentalities, or attitudes, to mental health: the ‘contain and fix’ and 
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‘personal process’ attitudes, which involve understanding of the therapeutic either as a cure, 
or as something more like an art, respectively. The ‘contain and fix’ mentality in mental health 
nursing essentially enables the biomedical model of psychiatry to function since it provides 
the containment and safety necessary for medication, or other medical intervention, to take 
effect. The role of mental health nurses in this strand is to ensure the safety of the other person 
and compliance with medical treatment (Gournay, 2000). This thinking in mental health 
nursing is in line with the dominant view of orthodox psychiatry that mental disorders are 
probably genetic in origin, resulting in chemical imbalances in the brain, requiring drug 
treatments in order to be ‘cured’ or managed (Barker, Buchanan-Barker, Rolfe & Cutcliffe, 
2005). The therapeutic element of such interventions relates to that branch of medicine which 
is concerned with the remedial treatment of disease, and there is a commitment to this view 
in practice. Medication and its management comprise the therapy in this case. The 
management of medication, involving encouraging patients to comply with medication 
regimes, and monitoring side-effects, as well as training in cognitive behavioural skills to 
encourage compliance, is seen as a mainstay of therapeutic practice in the ‘contain and fix’ 
strand (Gournay, Curran & Rogers, 2006; Grant, 2009; Gray, Wykes, Edmonds, Leese & 
Gournay, 2004; Gray, White, Schulz & Abderhalden, 2010; Hamrin, & Pachler, 2007; Jones, 
2009). Gray, Wykes, Parr, Hails and Gournay (2001) are critical of community psychiatric 
nurses for not ensuring medication compliance. Gray and Gournay (2000) see a critical role 
for mental health nurses in detecting side-effects of medication. Jones’ (2009) study may 
illustrate the pressure mental health nurses are under to become ‘evidence-based’ and aligned 
with the medical model. He evaluated the effects on mental health nurses, in an in-patient 
setting, of training to implement evidence-based cognitive behavioural therapy for psychosis, 
as well as psychosocial interventions and medication compliance. Staff burnout and stress 
increased and morale decreased. Jones (2009) considered that these effects were due to the 
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more complex nature of the evidence-based work with no corresponding remuneration. It is 
interesting to note that Jones (2009) did not consider such effects as perhaps being due to the 
lack of recognition of what staff were already doing through their existing practice, and 
neither that the nature of therapeutic practice in mental health nursing may not conform to 
evidence-based methodologies (see Section 2.6.1, this chapter).  
However, this does not mean that those mental health nurses who work more in the 
‘contain and fix’ way do not experience working with mental distress and do not try to 
develop therapeutic relationships with patients (Moran, Cocoman, Scott, Matthews, 
Staniuliene & Valimaki, 2009). It is more that in following established orthodox psychiatric 
theory and practice, the primary emphasis is on medication as cure (accompanied by 
cognitive behavioural strategies (Jones, 2009)) rather than other factors. This approach in 
mental health nursing is becoming increasingly dominant, as it coincides with a corporate 
mentality in which the “centrality of relationship to healing… is dissonant with the outcome 
driven... philosophy of managed care and contemporary biomedical psychiatry” (Coleman & 
Jenkins, 1998; Wheeler, 2005, p. 152).  
The ‘personal process’ attitude in mental health nursing is more likely to allow uncertainty 
and ambiguity, seeing mental distress in terms of ‘problems of living,’ a term first used by 
the psychiatrist, Harry Stack Sullivan (Barker, Jackson & Stevenson, 1999), emphasising 
more interpersonal and psychotherapeutic approaches, and widening what is conceived of as 
evidence (McKenzie, 2007). Mental health nurses in this strand may be more attuned to 
working in the “fundamental personal processes” that characterise “human-to-human spiritual 
connection” (Cutcliffe, 2000, p. 633). This strand draws from a diverse range of therapeutic 
knowledge from other disciplines, principally counselling, psychotherapy, and 
psychoanalysis, as well as from the practice of mental health nursing itself (for example, 
Cahill, Paley & Hardy, 2013). The boundaries between these two strands in mental health 
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nursing are not clearly defined. It appears that a mental health nurse may work in both ways 
at times. The question remains open as to how much a mental health nurse who firmly 
believes - or ‘lives’ -  the biomedical approach (‘contain and fix’) can be open to, and provide 
openness for, the client or patient in other ways.  
There is a multiplicity of approaches put forward in the literature to guide practice 
with respect to how mental health nurses may be therapeutic with the other person in the 
‘personal process’ strand. These can be summarised here, with indicative references, as: 
- Integrated models and theories focusing on the therapeutic relationship and intersubjectivity 
(Armstrong & Kelly 1995; Browne, Cashin & Graham, 2012; Carlyle, Crowe & Deering, 
2011; Dziopa & Aherne, 2009; McCrae, 2011; O’Brien, 2001; Pierson, 1999; Walker, 1996; 
Wilshaw, 1997; Wheeler, 2011)  
 
- Relational, embodied, situated learning, practical wisdom; practice-based evidence, against 
generalised systems of knowing, and for ethical practice in the moment, intuition and tacit 
knowledge (Bjorklund, 2004; Borthwick, Holman, Kennard, McFetridge, Mesruther & 
Wilkes, 2001; Crider & McNiesh, 2011; Cutcliffe & Koehn, 2007; Koehn & Cutcliffe, 2007; 
Eriksen, Dahl & Karlson, 2014; Hewitt 2009, Welsh & Lyons, 2001; Wright & Brajtman, 
2011; Yadav & Fealey, 2012)  
  
- Empirically validated knowledge, through qualitative research based on existential 
principles, including hearing the person’s story, deriving new meaning, commitment and 
choice (Barker, 2003; Parse, 1981). 
 
- Emotional labour, care and love, primarily as practice prior to knowledge or theory (Codier, 
2010; Como, 2007; Dowling, 2004; Jacono, 1993; Mann & Cowburn, 2005; Stickley & 
Freshwater, 2002;) 
 
- Emotional intelligence, empathy and poetry, involving complex and rhizomatic thought 
(Holmes & Gastaldo, 2004; Roberts, 2010) 
 
- Interpersonal, psychotherapeutic and psychoanalytic theory (Cameron, Kapur & Campbell, 
2005; Crowe, 2004; Evans, 2007; Feely, 1997; Franks, 2004; Gallop & O’Brien, 2003; 
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McSherry, 2013; Merritt & Proctor 2010, Nyström, 2007; Peplau, 1988; Stockman, 2005; 
Winship, Repper & Hinshelwood, 2009) 
What these approaches indicate is the importance in mental health nursing practice of 
communication with the other person, through language and sometimes touch, the making of 
meaning, and emotional availability. Communication in these ‘personal process’ ways is not 
often a straight-forward process, and may involve complex, rhizomatic thought (Holmes & 
Gastaldo, 2004) akin to the development of wisdom (Nussbaum, 1986). This is complex and 
its complexity is perhaps reflected in the variety of approaches that mental health nurse 
academics put forward as good therapeutic practice; each one coming from varying 
conceptual backgrounds. What is not so clear in this body of literature is any focus on how to 
be in contact with another who is in mental distress in a way that is ‘open’ to the person, or 
how this might be learned, if at all. It is interesting that being open was valued by Peplau 
(1952/1988) almost 70 years ago. In their review, Cutcliffe, Santos, Kozel, Taylor and Lees 
(2015, p. 380) noticed that what service users wanted most from mental health nurses as 
‘treatment’ were “practises of being open, offering human attention, and unrestrained respect 
of human dignity,” including being listened to and taken seriously. While saying this sounds 
clear and straight-forward, learning what it actually may entail in practice, and including how 
one comes to learn to be this way, it will be argued here, are different matters.  
2.3.1 Openness to others and one’s self 
It will be argued here that being ‘open’ (also to one’s self) appears to be key in relation 
to the therapeutic and learning, but in a way in which ‘openness’ has something to do with 
the being of a person. Learning and the therapeutic may then be linked, since, I would say, ‘if 
I cannot learn from you how can I be open to you in a way that does not already close you 
down.’ Arendt (2005, p. 8 cited in Murray & Holmes, 2013, p. 343) shows that since Plato 
thinking has been regarded as “a soundless dialogue between me and myself.” Following 
Arendt (2005), Murray and Holmes (2013, p. 343) ask what happens when, for example, “the 
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mediating terms of one’s self-understanding become increasingly narrow.” The difficulty is 
that “we can neither know nor feel with certainty that we are doing wrong… knowledge and 
feelings measure one’s social conformity or non-conformity to received principles, rules, 
codes, behaviours and mores. These are always situated, social, historical, and bound up with 
the world in complex ways” (Murray & Holmes, 2013, pp. 343-344). ‘Openness,’ therefore, 
is not viewed here as a modular characteristic that can be ‘learned,’ as if it is something 
malleable that can be manipulated and formed through an education, for example, when 
Swami, Persaud & Furnham, (2011) indicate that the personality characteristic of ‘openness 
to experience’ can make a person more amenable to accepting psychiatric diagnoses as real 
disorders; or when Strickhouser, Zell & Krizan, (2017) find that it is a predictor of health and 
well-being. 
 I would argue that the kind of openness that is more open to “getting outside the 
mediating terms of one’s self-understanding” (Murray & Holmes, 2013, p. 343) may be found 
more in certain ways of being in phenomenology, as well as some psychoanalytic and 
meditative practice, which Adams (1995) outlines, yet would not have to be ‘classified’ in 
any way at all in these terms. It is like Keats’ (1817, p. 261 in Adams, 1995, p. 474) “Negative 
Capability” – “when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any 
irritable reaching after fact and reason.” This sounds similar to Cutcliffe’s (2000) idea of 
mental health nurses in the ‘personal process’ strand being able to tolerate ambiguity and 
uncertainty. This kind of ‘being with,’ and ‘listening,’ is close to Freud’s (1912, p. 114 in 
Adams, 1995, p. 475) “open mind, free from any presuppositions.” A certain discipline is 
needed for this kind of phenomenology, which, for Laing (1967, p. 11 in Adams, 1995, p. 
475) is “an intensive discipline of unlearning…necessary for anyone before one can begin to 
experience the world afresh, with innocence, truth and love.” This is like Bion’s (1970) 
radical eschewal of memory and desire (Adams, 1995, p. 475). It is interesting to note how 
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Medard Boss (1975, pp. 109-114 in Brooke, 1993, p. 158) speaks of a relative openness or 
closed-ness of existence, and for both Boss and Carl Jung “openness softens and brightens 
the face of the world” (Brooke, 1993, p. 158). The sense here that the difficulties of living 
can be somehow ameliorated by an ‘openness’ in certain others seems particularly important, 
and is in tune with my own experience of certain others. Making presumptions of knowing 
can even be unconsciously “omniscient,”  
It is difficult to overestimate the role unconscious omniscience plays in deadening the capacity 
to experience. If one knows what is going to happen ahead of time, one does not have to 
experience it… Our sense of knowing has a way of spreading through our mental field and 
acting like an anaesthetic. What we know may lead to or block the new, it may heighten or 
dull experience (Eigen, 1993, pp. 245-246 in Adams, 1995, pp. 476-477).   
 Indeed, one’s own language (mother tongue) tends to have an “anaesthetic effect” 
(Hawkes, 1977, p. 30). As Adams (1995, p. 477) notes, new perceptions are often “foreclosed 
unconsciously in favour of our sedimented certainties and presuppositions, all that we think 
we already know.” Speaking as a phenomenologist, Adams (1995, p. 477) is aware that 
culture, history and language “influence every perception,” which shows why a 
phenomenological attitude - in the sense of the reduction as ‘leading back out of oneself’ as I 
use it here - is required to at least catch sight of some of the effects of this. This is the attitude 
of certain kinds of counsellors and psychotherapists influenced by phenomenological 
philosophy (Cayne & Loewenthal, 2007; Lee & Prior, 2013; Snell, 2012), the artist, analysts 
and meditative people (Adams, 1995), and perhaps indicates a way of being that some mental 
health nurses may have. T. S. Eliot attests to this “perennial wisdom” for Adams (1995, p. 
479), 
 “Knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, 
 For the pattern is new in every moment”  




This is not to say that mental health nurses are, or must become, ‘psychoanalytic’ in 
some way. The ‘art’ of the analyst may involve “suspending the subject’s certainties until 
their final mirages have been consumed” (Lacan, 2006, p. 209/251). The therapeutic ‘art’ of 
a mental health nurse may be more concerned with accepting such ‘mirages,’ and being open 
to their experience of these in the other person. This leads into Husserl’s phenomenology in 
terms of the asymmetry in the subject-subject relation which will be explored in the 
Methodology chapter (Zahavi, 2003).  
There are other ways to think about this ‘openness’ that are pointing towards a similar 
place, namely, in the Open Dialogue movement (Seikkula & Olson, 2003; Seikkula, 
Aaltonen, Alakare, Haarakangas, Keränen & Lehtinen, 2006) and McNamee’s (2015, p. 373) 
idea of “radical presence” as an “alternative to the therapeutic state” (the psy-complex). The 
Open Dialogue approach to psychiatric care emerged in Finland, and focuses on problems of 
language and dialogue, particularly with respect to psychosis (Seikkula & Olson, 2003, p. 
407). It developed through a confluence of influences (see Seikkula & Olson, 2003, pp. 404-
405), including Bateson (1962) on paradox, and Bakhtin (1984) on meaning, into a practice 
in which a patient’s family (including the patient) and the psychiatric practitioners work 
together in a reflective way in a group, so that everyone’s voice may be heard, and decisions 
made together, aiming towards “joint understanding… rather than striving for consensus” 
(Seikkula & Olson, 2003, p. 410). It reveals the role of speech and language in a psychotic 
crisis. There is “tolerance of uncertainty” (Sekkula & Olson, 2003, p. 408), and these authors 
note that the process is like what Rilke (1984, p. 42) meant in the words, “live your way into 
the answer.” It is interesting to note that this sounds phenomenological, as something is 
‘allowed’ to emerge in a dialogue. There also appears to be the consistent theme of ‘staying 
with uncertainty’ (see Cutcliffe, 2000; Philbin, 1997). An aspect of the phenomenological 
background can be seen in Brown (2012), in her reflections on the Open Dialogue approach, 
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who draws on Stern’s (2004) work on the present moment in which he closely follows Husserl 
(see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.7). There is a movement towards reducing isolation 
so that the person can build a communicative relationship with those around him (Seikkula 
& Olson, 2003, p. 409). For Seikkula and Olson (2003, p. 410), the “therapeutic ingredient 
comes from the effect of dialogism on a social network as new words and stories enter the 
common discourse.” Seikkula & Olson (2003) believe that any professionally trained person 
can acquire the skills involved in Open Dialogue. However, I would argue that these skills 
are premised on ‘being open’ which is more a ‘way of being’ and needs to be ‘sheltered and 
developed’ rather than taught, since it may be that it cannot be taught like a skill.  
McNamee’s (2015, p. 373) idea of ‘radical presence’ offers another way of thinking 
about diagnosis and treatment, shifting the focus to “broader relational and institutional 
contexts.” She follows Rose (1985; 1999), who in turn is largely implicitly “in debt” to 
Foucault (see Rose, 1999, p. ix), in proposing that how we conceive of ourselves is 
constructed by ‘science’ and in particular the psy-disciplines (psychiatry, psychology, 
psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, sociology and anthropology). The psy-disciplines regulate 
what is ‘normal’ (McNamee, 2015, p. 375). It is interesting to draw attention here to how 
Husserl also noticed that what is ‘normal’ in society is judged to be so only by those accepted 
as ‘normal,’ resulting in language having a seductive power through tradition and idealisation 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.2). We are all caught up in this ‘normalisation,’ as we “offer 
ourselves to the surveillance of experts” (McNamee, 2015, p. 375). She argues that a “move 
beyond” this would “open space” to reflect on how our society and institutions create isolation 
and competitiveness, and “how we collaborate” with this which can make a person unwell 
(McNamee, 2015, p. 376). She speaks of there being “no technique” to radical presence 
(McNameee, 2015, p. 377), and cites Stewart and Zedicker (2000, p. 232) to show how this 
is about taking a certain position in the world, “letting the other happen to you while holding 
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your ground.” She gives several examples of how this kind of presence does not jump to 
conclusions, and pays attention to the person’s relational environment. Perhaps what is most 
striking is her example from Holzman’s (2015) study, asking ‘ordinary people’ what they 
would advise regarding emotional distress and mental health diagnoses. The answers were 
that the person should have a talking therapy of some kind, as well as talking to family and 
friends, and interacting with others through hobbies and activities. McNamee (2015, p. 381) 
asks whether the focus should not shift from diagnosis and treatment to “how ‘problems’ 
might actually be logical responses” to “broader social conditions.” She concludes that the 
psy-disciplines simplify a world that is complex, and it is time we shifted our focus to the 
complexity, a lot of which is about how social institutions and structures, and “ways of living 
in community,” produce difficulties in living, as opposed to problems being ‘in the mind’ 
(McNamee, 2015, pp. 381-382). I would conclude from this that ‘radical presence’ then is an 
openness to new ways of seeing things, although it may not necessarily imply an ‘openness’ 
to the other person in that I envisage that ‘giving ground’ may be part of making room for 
someone else.  
2.4 Openness to oneself and others through method 
 What will be explored in this section is the sense that openness to others often occurs 
through a theory or method of some kind, even if this theory is one of ‘care,’ for example, 
regarding the 6Cs (Cummings & Bennet, 2012). What is outlined here are approaches 
informed by psychodynamic, existential and humanistic ‘theory,’ not to promote these but to 
draw attention to how we often rely on a ‘theory’ through which to orient ourselves with 
others. The argument is working towards how being open to another is therapeutic, but 
‘method’ or theory, however it may at times be helpful, may also get in the way of this.  
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  2.4.1 Peplau’s psychodynamic nursing model 
Peplau’s Interpersonal Relations in Nursing, first published in 1952, is considered the 
origin of modern mental health nursing theory (Barker, 1998; Haber, 2000). Certain aspects 
of her views from this book are outlined here, because of her insistence throughout her career 
that the kind of person the nurse becomes has a therapeutic effect on the patient (Peplau, 
1994), “rather than the mechanism of the therapy” (Winship, Bray, Repper & Hinshelwood, 
2009, p. 511). The idea that the nurse herself is therapeutic rings ‘true’ in my own experience 
of being with some mental health nurses, and connects with how I first noticed mental health 
nurses being with extremely distressed patients in what I felt was a therapeutic way, and yet 
their practice was not seen as a ‘treatment.’ Peplau was an American psychiatric nurse, who 
was strongly influenced in her training by Harry Stack-Sullivan’s work on early therapeutic 
communities and his focus on the importance of interpersonal processes in infancy (as 
opposed to Freudian drives) (Winship, Bray, Repper & Hinshelwood, 2009). She was also 
strongly influenced by Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (Eric Fromm’s ex-wife) through regular 
meetings, her unconventional approach, and her lectures on “dreams, myths and symbols” 
(Winship, Bray, Repper & Hinshelwood, 2009, p. 510). In a letter to Winship in 1998, Peplau 
described Frieda as “an Avant-garde humanistic therapist” (Winship, Bray, Repper & 
Hinshelwood, 2009, p. 510). Peplau worked in a military hospital in England from 1943 to 
1944, where she introduced group therapy, and social activities as opportunities for 
therapeutic time with patients, and was influenced by British psychiatry especially through 
attending seminars by John Bowlby. Although she was a psychiatric nurse, she felt her model 
was relevant to all nursing (Winship, Bray, Repper & Hinshelwood, 2009). She believed that 
being therapeutic has something to do with the nurse through acquiring theoretical 
knowledge, and also through intuition, life experience, learning from and with the patient, 
and wanting to help, with an attention to the patient’s words (without imposing a meaning). 
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Her views have been influential in the mental health nursing literature (Armstrong & Kelly, 
1995; D’Antonio, Beeber, Sills & Naegle, 2014; Haber, 2000; Nyström, 2007; Stockman, 
2005), but are becoming absent from educational curricula, with the decreasing focus on 
interpersonal relationships (Jones, 2012).  
 It appears that Peplau’s (1952/1988) book, at least in part, was a formal expression of 
pre-existing practices which can be traced at least to the work of the attendants in the early 
public and private asylums (O’Brien, 2001). It is interesting to note that perhaps her emphasis 
on a psychodynamic understanding was the only way to get her book published, which 
although written in 1948, was not accepted for publication until it was endorsed by a doctor 
in 1952 (Barker, 1998). Peplau (1988) holds the view that exploration of the patient’s 
experience is facilitated by the nurse who is continuously open to new learning about herself 
in each interpersonal relationship. Including references to myth and intuition, she places 
primacy on exploration of feelings and experience in the present. This kind of nursing is open-
ended, and attempts to not “impose… values on others” (the values mediated by culture and 
the idiosyncratic values of the nurse), but aids the patient in arriving at his own judgement 
(Peplau, 1988, p. 144). Peplau (1988) indicates that being open to new learning in relation to 
the other person has an essential reciprocal aspect which defines it as being therapeutic - both 
the nurse and the patient learn in this process, participating in the relationship, and being 
affected by it. This leads her to believe that, 
“It is likely that the nursing process is educative and therapeutic when nurse and patient can 
come to know and to respect each other, as persons who are alike, and yet, different, as persons 
who share in the solutions of problems” (original italics) (Peplau, 1988, p.9).  
For Peplau the main task of nursing education is to enable the nurse to understand and 
become “a person who is aware of how she functions” in interpersonal situations. This 
involves promoting a maturing and development of the nurse’s personality, as well as learning 
interpersonal skills and methods to encourage such change. Such a process of personal 
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development allows the nurse to be capable of being interested in others in difficulty (“release 
of human interest”), to have greater capacity to be more ‘freed up’ (“liberation of emotional 
and intellectual capacity to make choices”), and reach an “enlightened self-interest” which 
can only result in productive relationships with others (Peplau, 1988, p. x). A nurse who has 
gone through such an educational process would then have the developed capacity to be 
therapeutic. The basic aim of nurse education for Peplau should be the gradual development 
of each nurse into a person who wants to nurse patients in a helpful way (Peplau, 1988, p. xi). 
She seems to think this is possible.  
For her, a nurse learns to attend to the patient in a psychodynamic way, tolerating 
anxiety and exploring feelings, by “working through her own problems and concerns that 
arise in her relations with others” (Peplau, 1988, p. 124). She also links anxiety and creativity, 
following May (1950), where the tension between expectations and one’s experience in 
reality can lead to new understandings. She discusses guilt and its links with anxiety, 
following Menninger (1942), Symonds (1946), Reik (1941) and Fromm (1941), and self-
punishment, masochism and suicide. She is making the case for a nurse being able to work 
with these kinds of ways of relating, and being, through understanding and tolerating her own 
anxiety. Identifying what the nurse may “actually feel” as opposed to what she is instructed 
she should feel is an important part of this work (Peplau, 1988, p. 141).  
Peplau (1988) believes that a nurse first attends to knowing what might be happening 
for a patient through a hunch, or an “intuitive impression,” garnered from the nurse’s previous 
experiences in life - “her feelings, ideas and other evidences” (Peplau, 1988, p. 265). Also, 
after Langer (1942) and Dunbar (1949), Peplau advocates for attention to the literal script of 
a patient’s speech. This is because words can disclose meaning which could be missed by a 
nurse who takes them to mean what she thinks they mean. By sticking with the patient’s actual 
words there is more room for opening up a dialogue that can lead to further meanings which 
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are pertinent to the patient. The language the patient is using (“the language of [his] illness”) 
needs to be interpreted with the patient; the words used to connect with other events or 
meanings in the patient’s life (Peplau, 1988, p. 295). She emphasises that attending to the 
patient’s words is an ability that the nurse needs to develop, in order to recognise the multiple 
meanings and actions to which the words may refer. This involves the nurse not acting from 
a presumption of clear meaning, but tentatively clarifying the words of the patient to arrive at 
new conceptualizations that may be helpful to him (Peplau, 1988). Following Fromm (1951), 
Peplau advocates that nurses attend to “non-rational” symbols, as expressed in dreams, as 
well as the meanings that patients attach to such experiences. She includes the emphasis that 
patients may place on meaning carried in folk tales and myths. These may convey meanings 
that cannot be expressed directly which may reveal hidden wishes and longings, emotional 
ideas and desires. After Symonds (1949), she notes the significance of gestures, and bodily 
symptoms, as representing a form of communication, to which the nurse can be sensitive 
(Peplau, 1988).  
The ability to stay with the experience of the other person in distress is particularly 
significant to mental health nursing (Barker, Reynolds & Stevenson 1997). I argue that this 
‘staying with’ involves an openness to learning from the other person, which involves a 
reciprocal learning as Peplau (1988) indicates, through her attention to the importance of the 
client’s words, how the nurse may affect the client, learning from the client, and being 
intuitive. However, although her approach points towards an openness to being with others, 
in my view she tends to see this through a psychodynamic and existential ‘method’ so that 
there is a closure, an end-point, to how a nurse comes to know how she ‘functions,’ comes to 
‘know’ herself and another person. Peplau’s way of being open to the other person is 
‘contained’ through the theories she uses, which, while helpful at times, may also ‘close 
down’ the other person, framing their chaotic experiences (as well as the nurse’s) in an 
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imposed (given) language or idea. This may be necessary at times perhaps (Teising, 2000; 
see this chapter, Section 2.4.2), and perhaps unavoidable (Kristeva, 1982; see this chapter, 
Section 2.4.4), yet the restriction imposed through this closure, may not allow him (or the 
nurse) to be in other ways. Nevertheless, Peplau’s view is to encourage learning from the 
patient, and openness to that person using ideas, and so she is pointing towards a way of being 
with others that puts the mental health nurse under question regarding how she has come to 
be a person, which appears to me of utmost importance. 
2.4.2  Openness to the other person in distress 
 If the mental health nurse is ‘open’ to the other person, then this openness may involve 
being open to specific forms of traumatic distress the other person may be experiencing, such 
as a loss of meaning and coherence, extremely distressing emotions, a sense of being wounded 
and unsure of one’s sense of self; living with horror, emptiness, feeling estranged, guilt and 
shame (Holm, Bégat & Severinsson, 2009; Pierson, 2009). These forms of distress can also 
be spoken of in terms of more psychiatric language such as depression, anxiety and delusions 
(van Dusseldorp, van Meijel & Derkson, 2010). For a mental health nurse to ‘care’ for the 
other person, therefore, this involves direct ‘contact’ with these forms of distress. This 
encounter with the other person in distress and emotional pain, who may also be feeling 
deeply hurt and humiliated, has been considered as the foundation for, and the beginning of, 
healing by some (Holm & Severinson, 2008; Holm & Severinsson, 2011). The other person 
may have deep vulnerabilities, marked by confusion, despair, self-destructiveness to the point 
of being a danger to themselves and others, self-harm, a wish to die, and an inability to explain 
their inner pain (Holm & Severinsson, 2008). The other person can have pervasive feelings 
of fear of others, fear of being invaded, hurt, rejected, beliefs of having failed as human 
beings, afraid of trusting anyone, including himself, but desperately in need of trusting 
someone (Holm, Berg & Severinsson, 2009). For Holm and Severinsson (2011, also citing 
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Benner, 1994), to respond adequately to the nature of such distress the mental health nurse 
must be deeply intuitive, with a foundation of life experiences, who acts as a catalyst for the 
other to begin their own healing process. There is a need for the mental health nurse to shed 
the guise of technical expert, and to accompany the other towards a healing experience, the 
nurse being open to her own vulnerabilities also (Cutcliffe, Hummelvoll, Granerud, & 
Eriksson, 2015; Wilkin, 2006).  
It appears that such openness involves listening, engaging through words, and being 
available affectively to the other person (McAndrew, Chambers, Nolan, Thomas & Watts, 
2014). While McAndrew (2013, p. 375) points out that the mental health nurse needs the 
ability to “assimilate experience” and to “accept and validate” the experience of the other in 
distress, she acknowledges that this distress may be manifested in such a way that “one’s own 
security becomes challenged.” When this happens, it may be extremely difficult to be open 
to the experience of the other person, and the mental health nurse can feel helpless, become 
defensive and retreat into orthodox psychiatric views (McAndrew, 2013, p. 375). Indeed, 
being subject to violence and aggression is a complex problem in mental health nursing 
practice (Cutcliffe, 1999; Cutcliffe, 2013; Cutcliffe & Riahi, 2013). In psychosis, there may 
be a loss of sense of self, experiences and feelings of losing control over oneself – causing 
harm to others or oneself, being controlled by outside powers, being killed – creating high 
levels of fear, anxiety, anger, tiredness, exhaustion, sleeplessness and physical pain (Koivisto, 
Janhonen & Vaisanen, 2003). Barker (2001; 2003) and Barker, Jackson and Stevenson 
(1999), strongly influenced by Peplau (1988; 1994), indicate that the interpersonal interaction 
between the mental health nurse and the other person involves hearing the other’s experience, 
and arriving at a meaningful narrative that makes sense for the patient. But, it seems evident 
that being ‘open’ may involve reducing one’s own defensiveness, as well as a reluctance to 
be open to something that may be threatening.  
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Teising (2000) regards the work of the psychiatric nurse as providing a cohesive 
relationship in containing the ‘raw material’ of the patient’s psychosis through a process of 
empathy. This results in a cohering narrative of meaningful connections with the patient’s 
inner world which ‘seals up’ the chaos of the psychotic world. The nursing relationship forms 
a “sort of virtual membrane which is a point of intensive and accelerated change” (Teising, 
2000, p. 449). For Teising (2000) the psychiatric nurse does this through the ability to 
denominate – apply words to experience – and the complex ability to contain: 
“…the nurse gave me a bath with many words of comfort, like a child, after I felt neglected 
for weeks in my psychotic state” (Ruhl, 1998, p. 227 in Teising, 2000, p. 451).  
It seems that the importance of the right words here is significant in that they provide an 
anxiety-relieving ‘making sense’ with a reference to the outside world. The right words may 
provide a triangulation that prevents the development of uncontainable anxieties developed 
in a fusional dyad between the patient and the other person, especially in psychosis. Such 
effects can be shown in nursing practice, while the language of triangulation and ‘dyadic 
fusion’ comes from psychoanalysis (Kipp, Unger & Wehmeier, 1996 in Teising, 2000).  
The meaning of engagement can be understood in a more ordinary sense as a process of 
being able to hear and tolerate emotional and psychological distress, through ‘caring’, 
empathy, or ‘being with’ (as opposed to ‘looking on’ (Bowles, Dodds, Hackney, Sunderland 
& Thomas, 2002, p.259); see also Cutcliffe & Barker, 2002).  But the difficulty and danger 
of assuming full empathy, especially in relation to psychosis, is illustrated by Teising (2000):  
“A nurse accompanied an acutely ill patient on a walk and, contrary to the agreement of the 
team, was tempted into going into a café with the patient because the nurse felt he had 
become especially close to the patient. The nurse was convinced that he had shared a deep 
elementary experience of the patient and gained an especially intensive insight into his 
emotions. The nurse was horrified to witness that this patient set his room on fire shortly 
after returning from the walk… The nurse felt ejected from the patient in a volcanic 
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eruption. Only much later the nurse understood that the patient had sensed the closeness as 
being extremely threatening and had to reject it vehemently” (Teising, 2000, p. 452).  
Teising (2000, p. 452) notes how relating to someone with psychosis often involves 
engaging with the person’s confused and bizarre language and behaviour which may be at 
first incomprehensible. Such language and behaviour has to be ‘contained’ by the nurse: 
There is an interplay between maintaining both empathy and distance, while also processing 
through words everything the nurse “receives” from the patient, including feeling helpless:  
“The function of receiving everything inferior, confusing and threatening is only possible if the 
nursing personnel manage to digest the remarks thrown at them… this also means that, as certain 
feelings and behavioural patterns cannot be understood, nurses must bear the helplessness 
resulting from this” (Teising, 2000, p. 452).  
Again, the ideas from a method, or theory, are helpful in orienting a mental health nurse 
in ‘knowing what to do,’ however, they also may close down the experience of the other 
person, in the senses of in both making oneself ‘unavailable’ to that person, and/or 
‘receiving’ his meaning through one’s own meanings imposed upon him.  
2.4.3  Openness to an uncertain encounter in mental health nursing 
A case study example may illustrate to some extent the nature of the kind of encounter 
between the mental health nurse and the other person which is more ‘open,’ less bound by 
theory. The following is part of Hem and Heggen’s (2003) published abridged version of an 
interview of a mental health nurse’s experience of working with a difficult patient: 
“It seemed to be more and more difficult for me to be myself when I was with him… my 
communication with him became more and more difficult. He was psychotic and anxious…  I 
managed to calm him and give him a sense of security… He was always studying me closely… It 
was as if all of me was being closely observed, he was trying to find out who I was… and he yelled 
at me day after day…’Shut your mouth, you fucking cow.’… …  Every day all of this negativity 
directed towards me... … I suppose he used me as a shock absorber. I tried not to let it get to me. 
I tried to just put up with it and act normally… It would have been easy for me just to trade insults 
with him. I felt I was being affected, I became insecure because I was continually provoked. My 
communication with him became unclear and incongruent. I was becoming more and more 
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unclear… I felt that I was side-lined, and that I lost my grip over him and others. I experienced 
something of an identity crisis… 
But sometimes we communicated very well… We told each other stories… And I saw 
something in him, that he was a vulnerable boy who was carrying a lot of pain. I don’t think that 
his parents ever really saw him. I don’t think he could bear to sit alone with all that suffering… 
…but he also said, ‘We mustn’t talk about it’, ’I don’t want to be looked at in that way while I’m 
here’, ‘Don’t dig too deeply – I can’t handle it.’ He simply couldn’t tolerate that we tried to pierce 
his defences. I said that this was alright, that it was enough… … there was understanding and 
contact between us - …” (Hem & Heggen 2003, p. 103).  
Hem and Heggen (2003) point out the paradoxical nature of the encounter, in that the 
mental health nurse sees the dignity of the person and through her vulnerability gains insights 
into his problems, but this is deemed unprofessional by her, and her colleagues. She is 
uncertain what to do, and despite feeling like a “shock absorber,” she retains a “stubborn 
empathy” for the patient (Hem & Heggen 2003, p. 104). She thinks it is unprofessional for 
her to feel out of control with the patient, and to lose her perspective on what is happening, 
yet it is these characteristics that may have facilitated communication with him. Significantly, 
she is exposed to a situation where she is expected “to be both intimate and distanced” (Hem 
& Heggen, 2003, p. 106).  
The mental health nurse’s openness here is the premise of any interaction with the patient. 
Openness and the ability to tolerate the “inconclusiveness” this brings, is demanding 
emotionally, and intellectually (Eriksen, Arman, Davidson, Sundfør, & Karlsson, 2013; 
Eriksen, Dahl, Karlsson & Arman 2014, p. 715). But this nurse’s openness also exposed her 
to an experience that eroded her sense of self and integrity. This resulted in the loss of her 
ability to communicate clearly, and she became unsure of what she wanted to say. As Hem 
and Heggen (2003, p. 104) emphasise, she becomes ‘uncertain,’ ‘unclear,’ and ‘split.’ She 
also feels isolated from her colleagues and others, as if she is doing something that is 
unprofessional and misguided in how she is with this patient. Her colleagues are wary of her 
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approach, perhaps with good reason, and encourage her to gain some distance from this 
patient. While she is the one who probably knows the patient best and has been working 
therapeutically with him, she is not included in discussions with the psychologist (who it is 
likely would be coming from a conceptual position following the guidelines in the ‘psy-
complex’ (Rose, 1985; Parker, 1997)), and so she feels excluded and marginalised both by 
her colleagues and her patient.  
There is a sense here that she has touched on something repellent, and is cast out because 
of it, that she is bordering on the margins of language and the margins of meaning. She 
manages to stay with this experience only through a ‘stubborn empathy,’ and a belief that her 
patient’s problems are rooted in his vulnerability as a young boy and can be healed through 
communication with him at this level. It could be argued that she is providing just what 
patients have said they value most: ‘the human touch,’ the ability to be compassionate, being 
treated kindly and respected, being attentive and engaged (Gunasekara, Pentland, Rodgers, & 
Patterson, 2014). As Barker (2001, p. 238) has emphasised, for many mental health nurses, 
working with “disturbance (whatever we call it)”, involves “extraordinary acts of courage and 
compassion.” It seems important to go further than this, as the language of ‘courage and 
compassion,’ for example, as advocated in the 6 C’s (Cummings & Bennett, 2012) does not 
do enough justice to the experience of working therapeutically with the ‘disturbance’ of 
mental distress. Although not wishing to exclude such language, its use may tend to dissipate 
and devalue the complexity involved in being actually attendant to the other person, through 
thoughtful presence and speech, in particular as it is difficult, sometimes impossible, to 
express conceptually (see Introduction Chapter, Section 1.4).  
It is possible to speculate that other therapeutic approaches advocated in mental health 
nursing would encourage her to interact in a different way. But what stands out is that the 
experience of the nurse was indicating that she was approaching something abject, or rejected, 
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side-lined, both in herself and the other person. Maintaining a tension between intimacy and 
distance, empathy and confusion, and disappointment with herself and others, as well as 
feelings of rejection and disintegration of the self, conveys the sense that the nurse is finding 
it difficult to manage and make sense of her experience, as well as the other’s experience. It 
appears that it is this struggle that mental health nurses - those who try to be therapeutic - are 
exposed to on a daily basis and offers the opportunity to become therapeutic in a way that is 
more to do with an art of healing. How a mental health nurse responds to such a situation may 
be very loosely framed in theory - or outside of theory altogether apart from the theory of the 
‘human touch’ - and depends on the nurse’s ability and capacity to respond in the moment, 
moment by moment, to the patient in a way that maintains contact with him (Carlsson, 
Dahlberg & Drew, 2000), or perhaps, I would argue, openness to him (as ‘contact’ may be 
linked to a confused understanding of empathy which may oppress the person, as in the 
example above, in which the person set fire to his room). I would argue that theory being 
approached with some scepticism and taken lightly is significant, as otherwise it comes with 
“heavy tread” (Rabaté, 2002, p. 1); not being adhered to too rigidly allows space for more 
pre-reflective, tacit, and embodied knowledge, or something else, to come into play that may 
have something to do with the person of the nurse (or anyone). The theory of the abject in 
psychoanalysis may provide one way to think about the difficulties that mental health nurses 
face in the encounter with the other person in distress, especially extreme distress which could 
be described in psychiatric terms as psychotic. It will be discussed here, without implying it 
needs to be ‘the theory’ of mental health nursing, but seen more as providing some more 
‘words’ to help articulate what is involved in the art of healing in mental health nursing, and 
to what the nurse may be open in this art.  
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 2.4.4 Openness to abjection in mental health nursing 
 According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2015), abjection is the state or condition 
of being cast down or brought low; humiliation, degradation; dispiritedness, despondency. 
To abject is to cast off or away; to cast out, exclude, reject, especially as inferior, unworthy, 
or repugnant; to lower, degrade, debase; to subject, subjugate. That which is abject is cast 
down, brought low; of low status; downtrodden or desperate. There is an ordinary sense here 
that abjection involves pushing something away that is repugnant or unacceptable. As noted 
in the Introduction, it is what the mystic embraces (Kristeva, 1982; Chapter 1, Section 1.2).  
The psychoanalytical sense of abjection (Kristeva, 1982) is framed with a similar sense: 
 “…what is abject… is radically excluded and draws me towards the place where meaning 
collapses… A weight of meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and 
which crushes me. On the edge of non-existence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I 
acknowledge it, annihilates me (Kristeva 1982, pp. 1-2).  
Kristeva (1982) adapts Lacanian psychoanalytical theory to propose that, in 
‘accepting’ language for the infant there is a shift from a feminine signifying system of the 
semiotic to a masculine system of the symbolic. For her, abjection is a universal phenomenon 
associated with the effects of the symbolic order (the rules and norms of society mediated 
through language) upon the fusional “archaic dyad” of infant/mother (Kristeva 1982, p. 58). 
No matter what the symbolic order defines (specific cultural rituals, social norms and 
practices), its effect upon the child/mother dyad produces abjection. Accepting of the 
symbolic by the infant involves abjection, or exclusion, of the fusion with the other, which 
cannot be returned to except through “madness, holiness and poetry” (Sarup, 1993, pp. 123-
124), the ‘other side’ of social and cultural codes. One encounters abjection, 
“as soon as the symbolic and/or social dimension of man is constituted, and this throughout 
the course of civilisation. But abjection assumes specific shapes and different codings 
according to the various “symbolic systems”” (Kristeva 1982, p. 68).  
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Kristeva’s notion of abjection has been discussed infrequently in the nursing literature. 
The current literature review found only three papers on this subject with respect to nursing, 
all of which include reference to mental health nursing. For Holmes, Perron and O’Byrne 
(2006b) speaking of the abject in mental health nursing is breaking a taboo, which is an 
emancipating act that will advance understanding of the nature of nursing work, the 
therapeutic relationship, the uniqueness of nursing, and some nurses’ hardiness and 
endurance. They discuss abjection in public health nursing, community nursing and forensic 
psychiatric nursing. They regard abjection as fruitful in understanding nurses’ reactions to 
distressing situations which people normally shy away from. But the abject is something that 
nurses find difficult to discuss despite being exposed to it in different ways on an everyday 
basis. The nurse is supposed to be able to sublimate negative feelings such as disgust and 
repulsion. In forensic nursing (Holmes, 2002 in Holmes, et al., 2006b), some nurses referred 
to patients as “dog,” “rats,” and “pieces of pigs.” Holmes, et al. (2006b) write how Lupton 
(1999) believes that such terminology serves to unconsciously establish an impermeable 
barrier between the self and the contemptible Other. When dealing with the mentally ill, 
Holmes, et al. (2006b) suggest that nurses may feel the need to separate themselves from their 
patients in order to reassert their own integrity and subjectivity. Contact with “abject matter” 
- psychical and physical - may invoke disruption of their own boundaries, placing them at 
risk of being perceived, and self-perceived, as abject themselves Holmes, et al. (2006b, p. 
313). Jacob, Gagnon and Holmes (2009) used abjection to explore the experience of forensic 
nursing, a sub-speciality in mental health nursing. Evocation of feelings of empathy as well 
as feelings of disgust, repulsion and fear caused conflict for nurses in this setting. What was 
particularly important were the effects of abjection on the therapeutic relationship, which if 
unrecognised leads to breakdown of psychical boundaries. Kristeva’s (1982) description of 
what she calls the abject appears to hold true regarding the kinds of mental distress that mental 
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health nurses encounter, in the other person in extreme distress, and/or psychosis, and the 
effects of this upon themselves, but I regard it as illustrative rather than prescriptive. 
Similarly, Peplau (1988) is talking about how a nurse may become therapeutic, through 
knowing herself and learning from the other person, or patient; how a nurse may come to 
want to be helpful, and is helpful. Similar thoughts could be applied to the other approaches 
outlined in this section (Section 2.4), whether through humanistic, existential or 
psychoanalytical ideas, but there is something about ‘ideas’ that, I argue, misses the point 
about being with another person which is also linked to learning from the other.  
2.5 Openness to one’s self and others through speaking and ‘being with’ 
There is an indication so far that there is something about nursing as ‘care,’ or perhaps, 
‘being with,’ that cannot be put into written words that is expressed in speech, and speech 
fails too sometimes, so that there are elements of mental health nursing - perhaps any 
interaction between people that is therapeutic -  which fall outside language and thus cannot 
be represented, yet are vital to the art of healing. That which is brought into language is done 
so through speech mainly, and not writing. This may link to a failure in ‘written words,’ in 
theory, to represent the person and the therapeutic (Heaton, 2010). Heaton (2010, p. 33) 
broadly defines the fundamental practice of psychotherapy as an activity in which people 
speak and listen to each other, trying to be truthful. It can be seen from the mental health 
nursing literature that such a definition - speaking, listening, and trying to be truthful - would 
also hold true for mental health nursing in its therapeutic practice. While in most 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapies there has been the filtering of speech through the 
development and application of written theory, it is interesting to note that for mental health 
nursing this is far less so, such that mental health nursing could be thought of as closer to an 
oral tradition than a theoretical, written, one, for example, drawing on personal knowledge 
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from other nurses (Dowling, 2004; Eriksen, Dahl, Karlsson & Arman, 2014; Yadav & Fealy, 
2012).  
Heaton (2010) outlines how writing, making marks on a page, alters or loses the 
experience of speech, the practise of making meaning that the written is trying to capture. In 
‘the talking cure’ (not necessarily psychoanalysis) the “full resonance of oral utterance, 
imbued with the personality, gestures, tone of voice and physical presence of the speaker is 
at play,” whereas “marks on paper” - writing - reduces this to silence, explanations and theory 
(Heaton, 2010, p. 33). The use of writing in human history was a technological breakthrough, 
a human creation, as opposed to speech which is an innate, evolutionary characteristic 
(Houston, 2004 in Heaton, 2010, p. 34). Writing is not about mere transcription of oral 
utterances - it was a system developed by specialists, and a deliberate attempt at creating a 
new mode of communication using signs. Writing involves a different kind of creativity, 
separate from speech. Alphabetical scripts in particular tend to convey simplistic senses of 
meaning, for example, “This (a word) means that (an object pointed at)” (Heaton, 2010, pp. 
34-35). Theory then, may reduce the other person to the silence of ‘an object pointed at.’ 
Therefore, it is significant that the mainstay of what mental nurses do therapeutically - ‘being 
with’ - cannot be adequately represented in written theory or form. ‘Openness’ as therapeutic 
may involve something that ‘allows’ this speaking and being. This point about language will 
be taken up again in the Methodology chapter (Chapter 3, Section, 3.5.5).  
The following example is a recollection of being a Franciscan novice ‘in formation,’ 
to try to illustrate some of this ‘being with.’ When feeling depressed, or miserable, I would 
often go to the kitchen to be in the company of Brother David. He was very old by then and 
he moved slowly around the kitchen, somehow keeping it in order and preparing food for the 
friary (others would also help). He would also make sure any ‘men of the road’ who passed 
by were fed and could use the bathrooms and showers. I would help wash the dishes or peel 
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the potatoes, and we would make some tea and sit talking for a while about nothing 
consequential. Slowly, being in this man’s company made me feel better, even though he 
never asked me about my problems or tried to give me any answers. He was more concerned 
with talking about the chickens, his childhood, the state of the biscuits, and sometimes his 
health which was always deteriorating. He would tell strange stories that others thought were 
gibberish because they could not understand his Waterford accent. He was the youngest son 
of a farmer and worked as a labourer. He joined the Franciscans because they were the only 
religious order he had approached who would give him his own room. He never gave a sense 
of being a burden, or of complaining, and he would often chuckle to himself about “something 
ridiculous” one of the friars had done. There was something healing about this man, who had 
been ignored most of his life, spending his time doing the menial tasks of the friary. During 
the course of this research, he has sometimes come to mind when certain mental health nurses 
have been trying to describe what it is they do that is therapeutic, or also just being near them, 
or observing how they are with others. It would be always an interpretation to try to describe 
what David did that made me feel better. What comes to mind are acceptance, recognition, 
and warmth, but all of these were something to do with what he was, or had become. He was 
not ‘working on characteristics’ to develop a sense of being a whole, spiritual man, as some 
of the younger friars would do, meditating and seeking awareness. It was nothing to do with 
that, although he perhaps had not always been this way. It is tempting to think of how he was 
therapeutic in terms of ‘grace,’ but not in religious or spiritual terms. It may have been 
something to do with me also, about something that I needed from him that I did not 
understand; perhaps recognition or acceptance. I was sure that if he were asked in an interview 
what it was that he did that was ‘therapeutic’ for others that he would sincerely say that he 
did nothing at all and they should go and talk to one of the other friars.  
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There was nothing of the resentful ‘slave morality’ here. He was not trying either to 
‘connect’ (cf. Murphy, 2013; Pieranunzi, 1997) with me at some deep level, or show empathy, 
and neither could it be framed as ‘spiritual’ (cf. Fry, 1998). There was a space with him, an 
openness that did not confine, and which gave me room to breathe. It was a kind of welcome 
in that he made room for me. Words start to falter for me around about here with respect to 
what was going on. But he did not meet me with a set of ideas, theories, rules for living, or a 
credo - which was a great relief. He was not trying to do anything to me yet welcomed me. 
“A therapeutic alliance founded within love” (Stickley and Freshwater, 2002, p. 253) may 
have nothing or little do with this either, although these authors may be trying to express 
something similar that cannot be written. It was more to do with something that falls between 
the lines of words, and/or linked to a smile, a touch, a way of not speaking - a way of ‘being 
with’ another person.  
2.6  Implications of openness for mental health nursing 
The failure of words - theoretical frameworks, theories, methods - to provide a 
consistent rationale that informs and defines mental health nursing as a discipline may be due 
to a number of factors, and three are noted here. Firstly, its closeness to the limits of language 
and meaning; secondly, its closeness to what is difficult, or sometimes impossible, to bear, 
and describe fully; thirdly, the idiosyncratic and mysterious aspects of ‘being with’ another 
person.  
The ideas, or theories, explored here imply that the effects of an experience like the 
abject on mental health nurses would be found in facing meaninglessness, as well as working 
with a lack of adherence to accepted social codes, including the physical touch this may 
involve. This would involve introducing meaning through naming and delineating what has 
been inexpressible and frightening, and perhaps also involve a certain kind of touch and care, 
as well as “Winnicotian holding” (Winship, 2006, pp. 56-58). Returning to the patient cited 
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in Teising (2000) - “…the nurse gave me a bath with many words of comfort, like a child, 
after I felt neglected for weeks in my psychotic state” (Ruhl, 1998, p. 227 in Teising, 2000, 
p. 451) - it can be seen that speech is being used as well as touch and the acceptance by the 
mental health nurse of what may have been abject (both in the ordinary and the analytic sense) 
in this person. Engaging through words would be a way of introducing meaning and 
establishing a boundary between potentially lethal ‘fusional dyads’ imagined by the other 
person.  
In the case presented in Hem and Heggen (2003), some colleagues warn the nurse 
away from her approach with the patient. It is not explained as to why they do this, but it 
could be speculated that their reasoning resides in experience, in tacit knowledge and 
intuition, or something else, regarding a situation that could potentially harm her. It is 
reasonable to suggest also that these nurses have learned and ‘know’ something about what 
is therapeutic but do not know how to explain it. At the same time, the mental health nurse in 
this case may have learned and ‘know’ something too, allowing her to bear with the 
‘uncertainty, ambiguity’ (Cutcliffe, 2000) and ‘chaos’ (Holmes & Gastaldo, 2004) of the 
encounter with this patient, approaching something like the abject in order to be therapeutic. 
After Teising (2000), the balancing of empathy and distance, and the introduction of a third 
term through language, may indicate what this nurse was intuitively doing to become 
therapeutic. But she was feeling the abrasive effects upon herself of being close to such a 
‘psychical boundary,’ eroding her sense of self and identity through loss of meaning. She was 
also being ‘abjected’ herself, from the ‘mainstream’ way of working with the patient, 
excluded, along with her understanding of the client, from the meetings with the psychologist. 
It is interesting to ask whether she too was being ‘tainted’ with something abject, by being 
different? In another way, the nurse in Teising (2000) felt the effects of assuming ‘full’ 
empathy, not realising that the lack of a boundary to such closeness - the lack of ‘difference’ 
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- was experienced by his patient as a lethal fusion. As noted in Teising (2000), a boundary in 
this case may have been established by the nurse naming and indicating the difference 
between each person involved in this potentially therapeutic encounter. Adding the 
idiosyncratic, ways of being of a person, to this milieu, gives a sense of what kind of situation 
a mental health nurse may be involved in while ‘caring’ for a patient. It is reasonable to 
envisage that there will be a constant process of decision-making, tacit or otherwise, on the 
nurse’s part, in an involved, complex dialogue with the other person. What informs this tacit, 
or otherwise, ‘decision-making’, will be crucial to the outcome of any interaction with the 
other person.  
Rather than pick up any of these approaches as ‘methods’ to become therapeutic, or 
any method, whether psychodynamic, psycho-analytical, existential, humanistic, or in the 
language of care and love, what is followed here is what may be involved in being open to an 
encounter with the other person, as it appears that it is the openness itself, this ‘making room,’ 
which is therapeutic and may involve something mysterious or unknown. It is not that the 
other ‘methods’ are excluded, but that if they only comprise a method then there is something 
about them that will fail as they are not ‘open.’ If we are always trying to “catch the drift” 
(Freud, 1923, p. 239), there will be no room for a different spontaneity or being surprised, a 
certain freedom, and perhaps being human.  
 2.6.1 Situated learning, intuition, emotional labour and tacit knowledge 
Taking into account what may be abject, what presents itself as extreme mental 
distress, and a collapse of, or struggle for, meaning, and what is an individual’s way of 
understanding her world, a picture is emerging here of how a mental health nurse’s 
therapeutic involvement with a patient may be a complex engagement that cannot be 
expressed easily, if at all. I argue that what is therapeutic involves being ‘open’ to the other 
through ‘allowing’ them to be. If something cannot be expressed as a theory, then those 
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mental health nurses who work through being ‘open’ to the other may therefore be drawn 
towards practise first. Mental health nurses appear to favour everyday knowledge gleaned 
from colleagues and from patient contact (Burnard, 2003; Dowling, 2004; Gunasekara, 
Pentland, Rodgers, & Patterson, 2014). This appears to indicate that some mental health 
nurses recognise (perhaps tacitly) that therapeutic practise is prior to acquired knowledge; 
that is, learning to be with someone therapeutically arises from practise first, which appears 
to be reflected in the range of ideas on ways of being with the other person, which are 
complex, sometimes intangible, hidden, sometimes spiritual, poetic, rhizomatic, and 
reflecting practice with others (see Section 2.3.1 above).  
Ways of speaking about things, including being therapeutic, come from practice. But 
language which represents theory distances one from the particular case (Heaton, 2010), and 
crucially therefore from the individual person. Such language that offers representations of 
the mind, or pictures of the mind, is a way of “not being present” to the other person since it 
puts the (re)presentation (not the presentation) first and does not call into question the one 
who is representing (Heaton 2010, p.7). There are links here with Husserlian phenomenology, 
where perception - or ‘givenness’ - is given precedence over representation (Zahavi, 2003). 
The ‘forms of practice’ found in therapeutic interactions in mental health nursing appear to 
involve the ‘human touch’, tacit knowledge, intuition, and emotional labour, along with, and 
without excluding, explicit, theoretical or representational knowledge, and perhaps something 
to do with ‘mystery’ (Barker, 2001) or being open and ‘not knowing.’ There is something 
intangible here, to do with ‘being with,’ that perhaps is reflected in the diversity of approaches 
to being therapeutic in the mental health nursing literature, since the diversity itself seems to 
indicate that there is no one way of coming to ‘theorise’ this.  
This may have something to do with how a mental health nurse has learned from 
experience as a child, through life experience, what may have brought her into nursing, and 
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what she considers to be ‘therapeutic.’ The child ‘learns’ through actions and situations, 
responding to certain roles - responding to the particular human world of which they are a 
part; the ‘community of practice’ to which they belong (Lave, 1991). Lave (1991) cites 
Jordan’s (1989) study of apprenticeship of Yucatec Mayan midwives: 
“Apprenticeship happens as a way of, and in the course of, daily life. It may not be 
recognised as a teaching effort at all…. Girls in such families, without being identified as 
apprentice midwives, absorb the essence of midwifery practice as well as specific 
knowledge about many procedures, simply in the process of growing up…” (Jordan, 1989, 
p. 932 in Lave, 1991, p.71).  
For Lave (1991, p. 71), Jordan (1989) has described situated learning, which occurs 
through “peripheral participation in ongoing activity.” A key part of this kind of learning is 
that knowledge and skills develop as a process of participation, and of becoming like “master 
practitioners within a community of practice.” Learning is not primarily through formal 
avenues but through gradual and increasing participation, including with peers who are less 
and more adept at practice. This is a gradual, community-based process, involving the 
development of an identity. Mental health nurses may develop therapeutic practice in a similar 
way, although the cohesive sense of community described by Jordan (1989) may be absent 
or not so pronounced in psychiatric settings, while they may have been in the nurse’s other 
life experiences. This also makes mental health nursing therapeutic practice vulnerable to 
‘communities of learning’ that pass on knowledge that may be somehow pathological 
(Cutcliffe, 2009b; Hazelton, Rossiter, Sinclair & Morrall, 2011). Situated learning is poorly 
documented in the mental health nursing literature (Crider & McNeish, 2011).  
Lave (1991) is close to describing what Polanyi (1983) has demonstrated in a more 
formal way regarding tacit knowledge, which in turn links to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty 
(Fuchs, 2007). In addition, the intimately intricate process of forming an identity as part of a 
community appears to show how embodiment, language and knowledge become inextricably 
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linked in a social process (Lather & St. Pierre, 2013, p. 630) so that “language, the human 
and the material [are] not… separate entities mixed together but… completely imbricated.” 
There is an implication that words themselves are ‘situated’, perhaps in a landscape (see 
Merleau-Ponty, 1968). Embodiment is not intended to mean something that is therapeutic 
necessarily, involving a ‘connecting’ with oneself or others (for example, Finlay, 2005; 2006; 
Seikkula & Trimble, 2005; Laitinen, Ettorre & Sutton, 2007; Virtbauer, 2016), although this 
can be the case, but to refer to also what has come to be embodied as ‘pathological,’ or in 
other ways, which may be ideological (Zizek, 1989), or a way of confusing love with hate, 
for example (Heaton, 1999). 
Also, as noted above (Section 2.3), what happens when, for example, “the mediating 
terms of one’s self-understanding become increasingly narrow” (Murray and Holmes, 2013, 
p. 343 after Arendt, 2005). The difficulty is that “we can neither know nor feel with certainty 
that we are doing wrong… knowledge and feelings measure one’s social conformity or non-
conformity to received principles, rules, codes, behaviours and mores. These are always 
situated, social, historical, and bound up with the world in complex ways” (Murray & Holmes, 
2013, pp. 343-344). Tacit knowledge, therefore, could also get in the way of being therapeutic, 
being open to the other, and indeed, Polanyi believed it could be responsible for the 
perpetuation of “thoughtless”, embedded practice (Gill, 2000; Sennett, 2008, p. 51). The same 
could be said for situated learning (see Cutcliffe, 2009b).  
Tacit knowledge is acquired through the kind of learning involved in learning a craft, 
learning from the ‘master’, through a process of repetition and mimicry until one ‘knows’ 
(Gill, 2000). Polanyi’s (1983) exploration of the tacit mode of knowledge shows the 
importance of focal and subsidiary awareness, and embodiment. When one is focused on 
reading, for example, the focal activity is following the meaning of the words, while there is 
a myriad of subsidiary activities that make this possible, which are embodied. Polanyi drew 
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on the work of the phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty, who in turn drew on Edmund Husserl 
(Gill, 2000), in developing his ideas on ‘embodiment’; in particular, Husserl’s (2001) notions 
of passive syntheses, and reflective and pre-reflective awareness (Zahavi, 2003), developed 
further by Merleau-Ponty through the idea of operative intentionality (Fuchs, 2007; see 
Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.4). Polanyi (1983) named the interaction of the body 
with the particulars of which one is subsidiarily aware as indwelling: the key point being that 
one reacts as if one understands at first without fully understanding. Learning to speak one’s 
mother tongue is an example of such a process (Gill, 2000).  
Initiation into one’s mother tongue is not like teaching and learning a second language 
because the infant cannot know what it is to learn. The infant is “bathed in speech” - learning 
what to say involves joining in with others spontaneously: “It involves particular people, who 
are familiar, to whom it responds as an authority” (Heaton, 2010, p. 104). The infant follows 
this initiation blindly and only “much later in life… may be able to look back and see her 
initiation was perverted in some ways” (Heaton, 2010, p. 104). Therefore, how a person may 
‘know’ about the therapeutic may be about believing they are being therapeutic when in fact 
they are not. The child learns to speak by taking part in the adult’s activities, not by mapping 
words onto perceptual experience (Heaton, 2010). For example, an infant has to learn the 
language-games of requesting and wanting based on gestures, such as pointing, that are part 
of a cultural practice. This early learning of language is idiosyncratic, concrete and particular: 
“There is individuality and concreteness everywhere, signs of broad-based rules nowhere” 
(Tomasello, 1992, pp. 264-265 cited in Heaton, 2010, p. 106). Therefore, meaning-making 
involves coming to understand how this particular individual was initiated into language, how 
she mastered “sense making through the use of signs” (Heaton, 2010, p. 107). Drawing on 
Lave (1991), it might be added that the meanings which she has been ‘given’ are ‘situated’. 
An example from a Japanese psychoanalyst and linguist may illustrate how this can go wrong: 
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A female patient used to write down questions to ask prior to her interviews with me, which made me 
feel a little uncomfortable. She would even ask me how to phrase … answers when she tells her 
sister. This patient thought that words were meant to be memorised and repeated word for word. She 
could not speak with her own words. She believes that there is always a right answer to everything. I 
understood why her sister, who is her only family, has been refusing to live with her (Takemori, 
2006, p. 64).  
This woman was diagnosed with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (Takemori, 2006). 
It could be envisaged that if this woman were being cared for by a mental health nurse in the 
‘contain and fix’ mentality she might be encouraged to take prescribed medication for the 
disorder, and perhaps be referred to Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder. In contrast, a mental health nurse oriented to a ‘personal process’ 
mentality might encourage her to find and ‘speak with her own words.’ It is likely that this 
latter approach, however, in the field of mental health, would be ‘invisible’ as a treatment, or 
therapy, and would be seen as ‘nursing.’ 
Polanyi (1983) demonstrates how even when one is learning through imitation of the 
‘master’ one is learning tacitly what the master does not know he knows, and as such one 
cannot fully know what one knows explicitly. This is because the ‘master’ has embodied tacit 
knowledge such that he could not tell fully how he ‘knows.’ In this way, one has always 
learned to know more than one can tell (Gill, 2000). The interaction of subsidiary awareness 
and bodily activity gives rise to tacit knowing: 
“As one immerses oneself in the various disassociated particulars of subsidiary awareness 
by indwelling them through repetitive imitation, at some point they come together in a 
holistic pattern of meaningfulness” (Gill, 2000, p. 46).  
Separate particulars come together as embodied skills through an ‘integrative act.’ 
Learning to ride a bicycle or to swim demonstrates this phenomenon (Gill, 2000). Tacit 
knowing comes ‘before’ explicit knowing which is represented by focal awareness and 
conceptual knowledge. References to the tacit in mental health nursing literature include a 
wide range of references to intuition, embodied knowledge and emotional labour, as well as 
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the tacit knowledge implied in notions such as compassion (McAndrew, 2013; Carlsson, 
Dahlberg & Drew, 2000). Intuition, as described by Claxton (2000) and Bastick (1982), 
appears to be closely linked to the tacit. 
Claxton (2000) notes that a principal characteristic of the intuitive way of knowing is its 
contrast to abstract, logical or analytical thinking. He cites Bastick’s (1982) comprehensive 
review of the psychological and philosophical literature regarding intuition. First, there is 
consensus that intuition is a different way of knowing that does not rely on fluency of 
articulation. Second, in contrast to analytical thinking it grasps a sense of the whole which 
may be greater than the sum of the parts. Third, intuition involves a reorganisation of the 
conceptualisation of the problem, often as a result of breaking through an unconscious 
assumption blocking a solution. Fourth, intuition draws creatively on a wealth of tacit 
knowledge from experience – paradoxically, knowing too much, due to consequent 
entrenchment, can block this creativity. Entrenchment here, in my view, is one way of being 
‘closed down’, not open. Fifth, the knower is emotionally affected. Sixth, intuition relies on 
mental processes that are not conscious and are impeded by efforts to bring them under 
conscious control (which may link to Merleau-Ponty’s operative intentionality; see Chapter 
3, Section 3.5.4; Freeman, 1993). Seventh, intuition is coupled with a subjective feeling of 
‘rightness’ on a scale of certainty. It is important to note that intuition however is not 
infallible. It is considered best to regard it as providing a working hypothesis (Claxton, 2000).  
In cognitive psychology, intuition has been categorised as belonging to “naïve,” or “folk” 
theories by some, getting in the way of “more accurate, scientific theory” (Boynton, 2016; 
Gasparatou, 2010; Shtulman & Harrington, 2016, p. 119). However, in an extensive review, 
Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox and Sadler-Smith (2008, p. 11) conclude that intuition involves “a 
complex interplay of cognitive, affective and somatic elements.” Nevertheless, these studies 
reflect a dominant view of the mind as a kind of ‘information processor’ comprising two 
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‘systems’, one linked with the tacit and intuitive, and the other linked with analytic and 
explicit reasoning (Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox & Sadler-Smith, 2008). It seems important not 
to think of the mind as an ‘information processor’ as this thinking leads away from the 
complexity of situated, embodied ways of ‘knowing’. This will be addressed in more detail 
in the Methodology chapter (Chapter 3, Section 3.6).  
The forms of distress particular to mental health nursing practice involve a high degree of 
emotional labour, for example, in being with people who are suicidal or who self-harm (Mann 
& Cowburn, 2005; Hogg & Warne, 2010; van Dusseldorp, van Meijel & Derksen, 2010). 
Emotional labour is about regulation of emotional expressions and feelings as part of the paid 
work role, and managing emotions in situations to the benefit of that situation or the patient 
(Hochschild, 1983). There are two aspects to emotional labour: Deep Acting and Surface 
Acting (Hochschild, 1983). Deep Acting means the person can recognise his or her own 
experience and feeling, and is able to manage and express the related emotions according to 
preferences. In Surface Acting, control of emotions and behaviour is more important than 
expressions of personal feelings. Surface Acting and stress are positively correlated, and so 
Deep Acting appears to be more beneficial to mental health nurses (Mann & Cowburn, 2005; 
van Dusseldorp, vanMeijel & Derksen, 2010, p. 560). The claim that emotional labour 
involves acting - through suppression of feelings - raises questions as to genuineness, or 
congruence (Rogers, 1961). Yet, being able to bear with one’s own distress appears to be a 
significant feature of being therapeutic for some mental health nurses (Jones & Cutcliffe, 
2009; Moran, Cocoman, Scott, Matthews, Staniuliene, & Valimaki, 2009), and therefore may 
involve elements of emotional labour. It appears to be largely implicit and invisible, and goes 
unrecognised in educational curricula (Mann & Cowburn, 2005). It also has a quality of being 
sustained over long periods of time (Gray, 2009; Smith, 1992). The nurse in Hem and Heggen 
(2003) appears to have learned tacitly in that she is struggling to say what she ‘knows.’ It may 
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also be likely that intuition and emotional labour are in play in how she is with the patient, 
but for her to put words on this ‘activity’ is difficult.  
In addition to the emotional labour involved in ‘being with,’ it is possible that mental 
health nurses in situations analogous to that in Hem and Heggen (2003), engage potentially 
in a complex interaction involving understanding ambiguity. Taking Wittgenstein’s example 
of the function of a rule - “A rule stands there like a sign-post” (Wittgenstein, 2009, ¶85 in 
Heaton, 2010, p. 207) - it can be seen that there is always an ambiguity involved in judgement. 
The sign-post is a pointer but that does not mean it has to be followed. It takes discernment 
and judgement to know what to do, and perhaps, ‘not to follow rules’ (see Introduction, 
Chapter 1, Section 1.4; Barker, 2006).  
Alongside this, words can be gestures, which take a certain sharing in a form of life - an 
understanding of how they have been assimilated - to interpret or make sense of (Heaton, 
2010).  
“Just think of the words exchanged by lovers! They’re loaded with feeling. And surely you can’t 
just agree to substitute for them any other sounds you please, as you can with technical terms. 
Isn’t this because they are gestures? And a gesture doesn’t have to be innate; it is instilled, and 
yet assimilated… For the signs of assimilation are that I want to use this word, that I prefer to use 
none at all to using one that is forced on me, and similar reactions” (Wittgenstein, 1982, ¶712 in 
Heaton, 2010, p. 204).  
This word, a particular word, means something to the ‘lover’ that no other word can 
replace, showing how much it is embodied, unique and individual, perhaps ‘situated.’ This 
throws light on the tacit knowledge and intuition involved in Cutcliffe’s (2000) observation 
that mental health nurses work with ambiguity and uncertainty, and Barker’s (2003) 
insistence that the patient is encouraged to come to terms with his difficulties in his own 
words. It is possible that Barker’s (2003) careful attendance to the other person’s words, and 
Cutcliffe’s (2000) emphasis on tolerating ambiguity, indicate a certain tacit understanding 
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that words do not only signify how meaning has been assimilated in individually unique ways, 
but also how they may have been assimilated as unique gestures. Even in Wittgenstein’s 
(1982, ¶712) observation on words as gestures, there is perhaps a tacit acknowledgement that 
something else is ‘spoken’ in speech which cannot be represented. As MacLure (2013, p. 
660) puts it, referring to speech, “language cannot achieve the distance and externality that 
would allow it to represent, that is stand over, stand for and in for.” MacLure (2013) is 
following a theory of language developed by Deleuze and Guattari (2004), and others (for 
example, Barad, 2007), which will not be taken up here, although it appears significant.  
Each of these factors, as well as what may be understood through theory, or concepts, 
involves judgement, also tacit, and personal accountability. How tacit knowing, intuition, and 
language may emerge (also ‘pathologically’) as embedded ‘meanings’, will be taken up in 
the Methodology and Method chapters through Husserl’s phenomenology and as particularly 
developed by Merleau-Ponty in his treatment of operative intentionality (Methodology, 
Chapter 3, Section 3.5.4).  
 2.7 The therapeutic as openness to others 
If something cannot be spoken of then it cannot be symbolised, or written, and so it 
cannot be encoded; if meaning is collapsing, and a person is struggling to understand his 
world, himself and others; and if he, is idiosyncratic and individual, it can be envisaged that 
such a person may require a certain ‘openness’ from the other. Responding to what is abject, 
for example, may require something beyond tacitly embedded knowledge, depending more 
on intuition and emotional labour, and perhaps something else, more like a radical openness 
to the other person, and a refusal to impose a meaning on that person. Working with this kind 
of distress perhaps cannot be prepared for by learning tacitly, but may be more analogous to 
responding to an encounter through openness. How is it possible to be prepared for such an 
encounter? Holm and Severinsson (2011) suggest that intuition and sensitivity on the part of 
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the nurse are the best strategies for engaging in the encounter with deep emotional distress 
and pain. Elements of care that remain outside of language, akin to Kristeva’s (1982) idea of 
the semiotic, may be in play here also, and may perhaps be what is indicated by language 
such as Watson’s (2012) when she refers to a ‘flow’ between two people. As Heaton (2010) 
has shown, speech is an embodied phenomenon, far removed from writing. Whatever the 
elements of this therapeutic encounter are, they appear to be embodied phenomena, just as 
speech is, and are different to what is represented in writing.  
If working with mental distress involves an encounter, this places an extraordinary 
onus on the individual mental health nurse to respond ethically in the moment, perhaps 
through tolerating what cannot be spoken. Sjöstedt, Dahlstrand, Severinsson & Lützén, 
(2001) regard the first nurse-patient encounter as a moral commitment in which the unique 
humanity of the other person is confirmed, and he is encouraged to enter into relationship 
with the nurse. The concept of an encounter also indicates that it is the individual person of 
the mental health nurse who is therapeutic in the first instance, rather than the knowledge 
frameworks she may favour, since the encounter with the other may come before ‘knowledge’ 
that is even learned tacitly. Being able to be in such an encounter is here thought of as 
‘openness.’  
 
In summary, this chapter set out to explore what it is that mental health nurses know 
and do that is therapeutic, and this may be learned, regarding the nature of the therapeutic as 
the art of healing. It appears that how mental health nurses practice therapeutically is difficult, 
if not impossible sometimes, to say or write, and this has been the experience in writing this 
chapter. In current nursing educational guidelines, mental health nurses are supposed to work 
therapeutically with those in mental distress through the ‘therapeutic use of self’ (apart from 
communication, and evidence-based, skills). How being therapeutic may happen has been 
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explored through reflecting on nursing models, as well as the literature on the ‘personal 
process’ strand of mental health nursing practice, contrasting this against the background of 
a ‘contain and fix’ mentality more aligned to standard psychiatric medicine. The main thread 
that has been followed has led to the sense that ‘openness’ to the other person, through which 
the other person is ‘allowed’ to be, is the premise for the therapeutic as healing, and is 
therapeutic in itself. There are many theories to inform practice suggested in the mental health 
nursing literature, the diversity of which has been taken to indicate that mental health nurses 
work idiosyncratically with the other person, reflecting the diverse ways in which people may 
come to be. The focus on practice-based learning in educational guidelines, as well as how 
practice is often based on being with another person, appears to affirm this idiosyncrasy. It 
has been argued that theory, or method, while sometimes pointing towards an openness to the 
other person, ultimately closes down the other person (as well as the mental health nurse 
‘working’ from theory). What appears therapeutic is an openness to the other person in a kind 
of encounter, where the mental health nurse can be affected, and learn from the other person, 
but this may involve the nurse facing a threat to herself and her identity. How this encounter 
can be traumatic and difficult has been explored through examples, and has been illustrated 
through Kristeva’s (1982) view of abjection (not intending that her theory is ‘a theory’ of 
mental health nursing practice but rather to facilitate thinking about everyday situations which 
a mental health nurse may face).  
Learning appears to involve situated knowledge, tacit understanding, intuition, and 
emotional labour (rather than emphasising explicit knowledge of theory), along with being 
able to stay in ambiguous situations, and tolerating uncertainty and chaos. Above all, being 
able to remain open to an encounter with the other person that can affect the mental health 
nurse, which may also involve deeply disturbing distress in the other, and herself, rather than 
cutting off from the possibility of such an encounter, appears key to being therapeutic. The 
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tacit, situated aspect of the therapeutic, as the art of healing, particularly points to an 
understanding of ‘knowing’ as to do with one’s situation in the world; that we are embodied 
and embedded in the world in such a way that we are not ‘objects’ functioning against a 
background of the world, but rather we are situated in an intersubjectivity, and what we know 
may be intricately a function of this inter-relationship. Learning then would not be primarily 
about acquiring theories, although these may be helpful, but through a learning community, 
and process, where how one has come to be with others is allowed to be revealed in such a 
way that one does not block the other’s potential to be healed, and indeed, can facilitate it. 
This kind of openness may be innate and perhaps cannot be taught. It is argued that such 
openness involves ‘being with’ another person so that space is made, room is made, that is 
like a welcome, or a ‘salve’ in the sense of something restorative or healing.  
How this experience can be researched through phenomenology will now be discussed 






This research has arisen from the experience of working as a mental health nurse. It is 
phenomenological in nature as it was felt that something had been revealed directly about 
mental health nursing that was given pre-reflectively in perception, although it took some 
time to trust this experience as opposed to beliefs about meaning in life linked to having been 
a Franciscan friar. Having read some of Husserl, I realised that it was this kind of ‘direct 
revelation’ that he was talking about when he spoke about a return to ‘the things themselves.’ 
So, it struck me quite clearly that this experience was more congruent with something ‘in me’ 
than any belief I held which may have given meaning to my life. However, as will be argued 
in this chapter, following Husserl, and also Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, experience and 
belief may be impossible to separate also, arriving like a credo. This chapter in a significant 
sense is about trying to think about how something may be ‘given’ in experience as a meaning 
that affects us and persists as if it were a ‘truth.’  
I will follow Husserl primarily, because in my view, he gives a better sense than 
Heidegger does, of how we can become captivated by ideas, so that they become as if they 
were eternal essences. But I could not have thought through the sense of ‘being captivated’ 
without reading Merleau-Ponty. ‘Givenness’ in Husserl seemed of primary importance to any 
research, and I was interested in how Giorgi (2009) made room, or not, for this in his method 
which he based on Husserlian phenomenology, in which he focuses so much on the reduction 
and the epoché.  
The research question, “What is the need, if any, for therapeutic education in mental 
health nursing?” arose from a revealing experience of being a mental health nurse, which 
indicated that, while some mental health nurses were clearly ‘therapeutic,’ their work was 
ignored in terms of being recognised as ‘formally therapeutic’ in psychiatry or clinical 
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psychology. What I am trying to say here reflects a difficulty in defining what is ‘therapeutic’ 
and the kind of words that come to mind are, ‘the art of healing,’ but where this art and this 
healing can link to almost anything that comes to be ‘given,’ of being of some meaningful 
help to a person. It has been a struggle to arrive at having the confidence to purposefully show 
that trying to define ‘therapeutic’ would not be helpful, to go around in wandering paths when 
it comes to definition here, because what I think may be therapeutic could be the simplest 
thing like a touch at the right moment, or something more complex which may even be 
mysterious. To try to define what might be therapeutic and turn that definition into the product 
of a technique would be to miss the point, and I believe this ‘missing the point’ is what much 
of the ‘psy-complex’ gets caught up in (Parker, 1997; Rose, 1985; 1990). Some mental health 
nurses avoid this net, as I am sure, other people do also. And phenomenology, to me, offers 
a way to cut through the net.  
Husserl’s original idea of trusting the experience which is ‘given’ in perception, for 
me, took precedence over how I might give meaning to that experience, but again this is 
complex, and I hope to throw some light on this complexity in this chapter referring to some 
of Husserl’s writings and commentators. I do not mean to reify Husserl. I think of him as 
someone who, while working towards a goal of trying to reveal consciousness as 
transcendental, discovered numerous ideas which he left for others to follow (Zahavi, 2003). 
But I seem to feel a certain sympathy for him, as I feel he was overshadowed by Heidegger’s 
gift with words, and I imagine he was like an eccentric explorer in the wilderness who 
continually finds interesting things which he sends back home for further work but is not 
credited with his discoveries. In trying to understand some of his writings it has seemed 
clearer that phenomenology is nothing but an exploration, an openness, a noticing of things, 
of being curious and wondering. I am sure I am biased, but this is very much like field work 
as a geologist in that all that there is to do is notice things, be curious, and be open to seeing 
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things differently, rather than constrict what is found into a theory. There was no question in 
the geological field that this kind of observational work was not science. But it is in stark 
contrast with how Giorgi (2009), and his tradition, views science, which is so contradictory 
as Husserl was so critical of scientific method being the only way of knowing validly (Zahavi, 
2003). 
This chapter addresses how the research question may be explored then through 
Husserl’s phenomenology, in which he often followed threads of innovative ideas and then 
moved on from those, sometimes returning to them many years later (Zahavi, 2003). I tried 
to read Husserl in this way, tracing an idea that ‘speaks’ to me, and touches on my own 
difficulties in understanding experience, including also my experience of others. Reading 
Husserl was a struggle also because his style can be so arid and his thinking so intricate 
(Sousa, 2014). There was also the sense of a slow realisation that there was something missing 
in his views which I read, which I then found in Merleau-Ponty, and then found that those 
ideas Merleau-Ponty had found in Husserl and so I returned to Husserl. I began to get the 
sense of what Zahavi (2003) had spoken of, of how Husserl moved quickly through ideas, on 
a constant search to find an ultimate ground of knowing. So, there was a movement back and 
forth between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, which helped me in coming to understand, to an 
extent, some ideas on intentionality and meaning, which I will try to outline here. Viewing 
Husserl in this way, which does not define his work too tightly, for me, allows his work to 
stand up to the post-structuralist critique (of the de-centred subject) and the critique, rooted 
in Heidegger, that accuses him of continuing a philosophical tradition of a ‘metaphysics of 
presence’ (Sass, 2014).  
As discussed in the Theory chapter, it appears that when mental health nurses are 
being therapeutic they are working in complex ways with mental distress, deciding on what 
to say and do, sometimes where meaning has collapsed, involving tacit knowledge, intuition, 
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emotional labour and complex decision-making, including having a crucial openness to their 
own experience and openness to others. It has been suggested that this openness itself enables 
a response to an encounter with the other person that is therapeutic, while it may also draw 
the mental health nurse into an encounter with abjection. The literature indicates that while 
there are many approaches to being with another therapeutically, including a dominant idea 
of ‘caring,’ mental health nurses primarily learn through practice, which includes learning 
from peers and mentors or more experienced practitioners.  
This chapter is organised so that firstly, there is an exploration of why Husserl has 
been chosen over Heidegger, regarding methodology, linked to how appearances ‘captivate’ 
us. Secondly, some of the philosophical background to Husserl’s ‘breakthrough’ into 
phenomenology is outlined, in order to trace how scientific method is like separating being 
and knowing, and the background includes alternative strands in philosophy such as 
Montaigne’s scepticism, as well as how Husserl can approach a kind of Platonism at times. 
There is a movement towards how we may come to live in our descriptions, or how we have 
come to be situated in the world, which links with the Theory chapter and how nurses may 
learn through situated learning. How we come to know anything may be linked to what we 
already know, and this is followed from Plato, which gives some credence to the idea that 
therapeutic openness is perhaps innate, beyond learning. This may indicate that in response 
to the research question, there is no need for therapeutic education at all. Thirdly, against this 
background, a discussion of Husserl’s phenomenology is outlined. There is a focus on the 
following interlinking aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology: 
1. The epoché and the reduction, which are complex, intuitive processes, partly 
involving imaginative free variation, aimed at establishing what is essential to a phenomenon.  
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2. Constituting subjectivity and intersubjectivity; empathy as ‘self-alienation;’ self-
reflection as being ‘always too late’ so that how meaning, or an experience, is revealed may 
not be reflected on, but is ‘felt’; ideas of ‘normal’ and ‘anormal.’ 
3. The ‘experience of truth,’ which relates to truth being situated and in context, is 
linked to subjectivity. The ‘experience of truth,’ one’s own, and another person’s, may 
become distorted through methods that impose ‘meaning’ through language, and further still 
with Giorgi (2009), through psychological language. An experience of truth is one which is 
at least partially intersubjectively ‘acquired’ and found within oneself, through language, but 
which then may be imposed upon the other person’s attempts to communicate (also 
unknowingly) which blocks that person’s meanings from being revealed.  
4. The effects of intentionality, in that the researcher ‘targets’ what is ‘given’ as a 
phenomenon. ‘Act intentionality’ is linked to how a method may be applied, such as a 
hermeneutic analysis of language, for example. Operative intentionality is something that is 
‘always already’ active in any such process, so that how a phenomenon might be examined 
contains within it an ‘already’ which cannot, if at all, be noticed (at least beforehand). There 
is also the non-intentional, such as feelings. Husserl’s ‘functioning intentionality,’ as 
operative intentionality in Merleau-Ponty, offers a way to understand how meaning may be 
like a gestalt that ‘captivates’ a person.  
5. Husserl’s idea of givenness, linked to Merleau-Ponty’s idea of an intentional arc 
that situates us in the world. This section further looks at how the present moment has a 
‘width’ in a horizon of the world that is prereflectively given. It was Husserl’s considerations 
on inner time consciousness which gave rise to his idea that meanings become ‘sedimented’ 
into a pre-reflective associative consciousness (Sousa, 2014, p. 53). This has implications as 
to how, if at all, the effects of anticipation and recollection can be removed from data analysis, 
and also the interview, when similar factors are ‘built-in’ to the present moment. In this way, 
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some considerations on how meaning arises from spoken speech, and speaking, as a gestalt, 
are discussed.  
Linking to the above, the conclusion of the Methodology focuses on how meaning 
may be revealed as a gestalt - one which conveys an ‘experience of truth’ - one similar to 
meaning in perceptual experience, but now informed also through language. This draws on 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) final work, The Visible and the Invisible, in attempting to understand 
the link between language, thought and perception. It will be explored to an extent how 
language, as a system of differences, after Saussure, conveys meaning as a pattern (Shaw, 
2014). Meanings can exist as patterns in sedimented language, after Husserl (Sousa, 2014), 
of a culture, but new meanings can also emerge in speech, after Merleau-Ponty (1964), as an 
embodied pattern of differences. Finally, I argue that what may come to stabilise meaning is 
an effect of sedimented experiences, and appearances, and so we can be made captive (after 
Wittgenstein) in a picture of reality. In this way, we might believe that we can describe a 
persistent reality, as can be seen in the persistence of credos in life. These considerations are 
carried forward into the Method chapter in order to throw light on what Giorgi’s method 
attempts to do, what its shortcomings are, and what it actually does.  
3.2 Arriving at a research methodology 
 As discussed in the Introduction Chapter (Section 1.2), arriving at a research 
methodology emerged from an experience that was ‘given’ as a mental health nurse, and 
taking this experience seriously. In this way, a phenomenological methodology appeared to 
coincide with experience, as it was to do with description, as disclosing something “into 
words for the very first time” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 362/315). Choosing a descriptive rather 
than a hermeneutic approach is linked to exploring what the former may reveal, as my own 
experience as a mental health nurse appeared to strike me as something that was ‘given’ once 
and for all, which would not change.  
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3.3. Descriptive and hermeneutic approaches to phenomenology  
Husserl’s and Heidegger’s expressions of phenomenology will be broadly outlined 
here, and then Husserl’s approach focused on in more detail. While it is a tautology to call 
phenomenology descriptive (Heidegger, 1962, ¶ 7, §35), phenomenology as a philosophy and 
guiding a psychological science can be divided broadly into those approaches which are 
descriptive, following the Husserlian tradition, and those which are interpretive, or 
hermeneutic, following the Heideggerian tradition (Hein & Austin, 2001). For Husserl, the 
phenomenological researcher tries to set aside his presuppositions and biases, including any 
previous knowledge of a phenomenon in order to investigate it, in order to see it as if for the 
first time. This is called the phenomenological reduction and involves rigorous self-reflection. 
The first step in this reduction - although this step is really an ongoing activity (Zahavi, 2003) 
- is the suspending of the ‘natural attitude,’ or what is taken for granted in one’s life, such as 
one’s theories and assumptions (Giorgi, 2009). This step is also called the epoché, a term 
borrowed from Pyrrhonian scepticism, meaning a cessation, or suspension of judgement 
(Moran, 2000). Husserl believed in the possibility of a presuppositionless perspective through 
rigorous self-reflection. However, others, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, believed 
this an impossibility because one is always in the world and cannot break with it entirely - 
meaning that one is always subject to ‘interpreting’ what a phenomenon is, rather than as 
Husserl believed was in theory possible, being able to reveal a phenomenon in its 
completeness through rational attention (Hein & Austin, 2001; Gadamer, 2004). From this 
distinction emerge the two strands of phenomenological research, the empirical stressing the 
possibility of grasping a situation directly, and the hermeneutic stressing the importance of 
interpretation in understanding a situation (Hein & Austin, 2001, p. 8). A Husserlian 
procedure may aim at an ‘essential structure,’ while a hermeneutic procedure will aim at a 
provisional interpretation (Moran, 2000). It is important to note that there is no single, correct 
way to conduct phenomenological research and the distinction between empirical and 
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hermeneutic approaches is not absolute (Davidsen, 2013; Finlay, 2014; Hein & Austin, 2001). 
In addition, Merleau-Ponty occupies a place closer to Husserl than Heidegger, in that he does 
not move towards hermeneutics but rather an understanding of the pre-reflective revelation 
of the world and its links with language (Moran, 2000).  
Hermeneutics is concerned with studying texts, and in phenomenological research 
results are texts that are regarded as interpretive accounts offering insights into the 
phenomena rather than replicable structural analyses (Hein & Austin, 2001). This approach 
resists a set method of research and assumes there are many possible perspectives on a 
phenomenon. The etymology of words in the data may be investigated extensively, and a 
wide range of sources such as literature and art may be used to throw light upon the data. 
There is an acknowledgement that researchers cannot bracket their history or themselves from 
the data so there is a strong emphasis on finding one’s horizon, or vantage point, as a 
researcher with respect to the phenomenon in order to acknowledge it. Results are a fusion of 
several horizons that the researcher attempts to draw out, situated within his ‘being-in-the-
world’ (Gadamer, 2004; Von Eckartsberg, 1998). ‘Being-in-the-world’ is Heidegger’s term, 
signalling a philosophical emphasis in hermeneutic phenomenology where understanding is 
intimately and intricately linked with being in the world - understanding is only possible 
because of a “clearing” of being which is the individual person (Heidegger, 1962, ¶133). 
Being is understood in terms of temporality, and understanding is the fundamental 
characteristic of the being of human life (Gadamer, 2004). Hermeneutic work is an open-
ended process of drawing out meanings in context rather than searching for fixed ‘essences’ 
of a meaning. Human activity in all its forms can be seen as a “text analogue” open to and in 
need of interpretation, the horizons of the text and the interpreter fusing in one or more 
possible interpretations (Von Eckartsberg, 1998, p.51).  
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Heidegger’s (1962) interpretation of presence as temporal rests on the Greek word 
parousia, which is associated with the word for being, ousia (Inwood, 2000, p. 64). While 
drawing on this association to show how tradition links being with temporal presence, 
Heidegger goes on to critique this tradition, through showing how human being, Dasein, links 
the present moment with the future and the past, reaching back and running ahead of itself 
(Inwood, 2000). Heidegger was addressing the problem of how human beings are aware of a 
temporally enduring world, the past and the future, if awareness is only ever given in a 
moment of time - a problem that occupied Aristotle, St. Augustine, Kant and Husserl (Inwood, 
2000). We tend to lose ourselves in the present, forgetting we are coming from somewhere 
and going towards something (Polt, 1999).  
The hermeneutical problem has been stated by Gadamer (2004) as one dealing with 
understanding: 
“Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we 
understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. 
The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only 
a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the 
individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.” 
(Gadamer (2004, p. 278) original italics)  
This needs to be held in tension with how Heidegger (1962) describes how interpretive 
understanding occurs through the hermeneutic circle. In Being and Time, Heidegger (1962, 
pp. 192-195 [151-153]) addresses how is it that interpretation can lead to knowledge that is 
not already circumscribed in the investigation itself because interpretation occurs with 
concepts that restrict it. His solution to this ‘vicious circle’ is the hermeneutic circle: 
“In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be 
sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have 
understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, 
and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to 
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make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things 
themselves” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 195 [153]). 
 It is interesting to link Heidegger’s (1962, p. 195 [153]) “hidden… positive 
possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing,” that which breaks a ‘vicious circle,’ with 
Husserl’s ‘givenness’ in the reduction (Zahavi, 2003). Is this not what learning may be - a 
break from what one already ‘knows’ through something that is ‘given’ phenomenologically?  
In hermeneutics, every revision of meaning projects new possibilities for further 
revision. Every “correct interpretation” will put aside prejudice and “direct its gaze on “the 
things themselves”” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 269). The ‘constant task’ of putting aside one’s 
prejudices to get to the things themselves comprises a “process of new projection 
[constituting] the movement of understanding and interpretation” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 269). 
In Gadamer’s (2004, pp. 270-271) words, “How do we discover that there is a difference 
between our customary usage and that of the text?... How can we be protected from 
misunderstanding from the start?” This is like Arendt’s (2005) question as to how do we know 
we are doing wrong (Theory, Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1). Regarding meaning, how is it possible 
to know that a misunderstanding has taken place? This questioning is part of the hermeneutic 
task: “This kind of sensitivity requires a fore-grounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-
meanings and prejudices.” Gadamer (2004, p. 270) says that we notice a difference by being 
“pulled up short by the text” by which he means that it either does not give any meaning at 
all, or else it gives a meaning that was not expected. The hermeneutic task, while arriving at 
interpretations, is also in itself a questioning of things and is always defined in this way 
(Gadamer, 2004). My argument here is that if something ‘captivates’ a person - “the 
prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of 
his being” (Gadamer, 2004, p.278 original italics) – then its meaning emerges like a 
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description that is ‘fixed’ for that person, even though for someone else it may appear as an 
interpretation. We may become caught up in appearances.  
Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazis, for example, causing him to side against 
Husserl and others, shows that this ‘captivation’ happens even to the best minds. It appears 
that even Heidegger is in need of a multiplicity of others to come to see things more clearly. 
It could be said that his development of hermeneutic phenomenology still failed to reveal the 
‘now,’ what was right before his eyes in his life at a crucial moment, with tragic 
consequences. The ‘natural attitude’ may encourage closure of the hermeneutic circle in an 
interpretation, to place one’s beliefs, or intellectual discoveries, first, so that openness to the 
experience of what is ‘other’ is lost. It could be argued that Heidegger’s “fallenness” (Polt, 
1999, p. 76) into the everyday world was about being caught up in the ‘natural attitude.’ It 
appears also however, that he was part of something which he did see clearly (see for example, 
Heidegger’s (1933) address, promoting Nazism, “The University in the New Germany” in 
Schneeberger, 1962, cited by Friedman, 1999, p. 528).  
For Heidegger, the most enduring experience of Being is shown by what is there, right 
before us, or “readiness-to-hand” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 98/69). In this he appears to show his 
Husserlian phenomenological roots in that we can trust the ‘givenness’ of objects and our 
relation to them. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s main criticism of Husserl was that he was still 
caught up in categories of thought, such as ‘object’ and ‘substance,’ handed down through 
the history of philosophy and which covered over the essential historicity of Being and the 
‘ready-to-hand’ nature of everyday experience (Moran, 2000). Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
approach attempted to go back to a more ‘originary’ understanding of philosophy, to the pre-
Socratics, which had been covered over by layers of later thought. Influenced by Dilthey and 
others, who applied a hermeneutic method to Biblical texts, Heidegger was applying a similar 
method to the study of Being.  
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Heidegger’s “destruktion” of philosophical texts was an attempt to uncover an 
originary sense of Being (Moran, 2000). But later, Heidegger turned to language, for example, 
in his Letter on Humanism (Heidegger, 1993, p. 217) describing it as “the house of Being,” 
and became influenced by the German idealist poets, especially Hölderlin (a friend of Hegel) 
(Polt, 1999, p. 175). In his essay, On the Essence of Truth, written in 1930, Heidegger speaks 
of ‘letting beings be’ (Gelassenheit) (Heidegger, 1930, p. 129-130, in Polt, 1999, p. 127; see 
also Zizek, 2006), that is, to show themselves as they are, involving an attentive involvement 
rather than passivity, as if faced with an inexplicable mystery (Polt, 1999). This ‘letting beings 
be’ appears to be akin to the openness noted in the Theory chapter (Chapter 2, Section 2.4), 
as being therapeutic. It is an activity, which Polt (1999, pp. 128-129) describes in an example, 
“In order to let the rain show itself to me, I cannot just stare at it indifferently; I have to care 
enough about it, it has to make enough of a difference to me, that I properly notice it.” But 
there is unconcealment and mystery here also and Heidegger (1930) refers to attunement as 
to how beings are disclosed, for instance, “as oppressive or uplifting” (Polt, 1999, p. 129). 
For Heidegger, we tend not to notice the mystery of how things reveal themselves to us in the 
first place, and therefore lose ourselves in making catalogues of facts, for example, missing 
out how the mystery of being reveals itself as both hidden and open (Polt, 1999).  
Heidegger’s inaugural lecture at the University of Freiburg in 1929, What is 
Metaphysics? marked his turn to language, and was understood by Wittgenstein as indicating 
he was trying to express something beyond the limits of language (Critchley, 2001). What 
appears clear is that Heidegger (1930) is talking about an experience to which we can easily 
close down, and it is possible to imagine someone who is closed in this way to others, not 
allowing the other person’s being to be. As noted in the Introduction Chapter (Section 1.2), 
‘closedness’ may account for a ‘fixed’ sense of ‘meaning,’ the oppressive sense, of the 
‘repeat’ of a dogma, for example, or how an individual may not be “constantly compelled to 
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face the possibility of disclosing an even more primordial and more universal horizon from 
which we may draw the answer to the question, ‘What is “Being”?’” (Heidegger, 1962, § 
49/26-27; Polt, 1999, p. 41). For Heidegger (1984, p. 185 in Polt, 1999, p. 92), “the 
misunderstanding of human existence in general” is the setting up of a universal ground of its 
meaning (Polt, 1999, p. 92). I agree with this. However, the reality is that people set this 
universal ground in place all the time, and therefore this may emerge as something that 
repeats, albeit possibly in a ‘pathological’ way at times. It seems clear then that the insistence 
that we can describe a person’s meanings in a fixed way, that can be repeated and relied on, 
may well be a pathology reflecting a pathology. This is clearer if I imagine an example of 
someone insisting another is ‘bipolar’ and occluding other ways of thinking and relating to 
them as a result. The pathology in the belief is imposed on the person as a real pathology (the 
imposition is the pathology) that then repeats in the descriptions of that person.  
A way of looking at how descriptions become pathological, using Husserl’s work, is 
how language reflects tradition, ‘sedimented’ in culture, and as having major effects on 
intersubjectivity, and therefore subjectivity. Husserl’s main concern was about revealing what 
he felt to be the transcendent (essential) structures of consciousness, a project he never could 
complete (Zahavi, 2003). But on the way, he developed certain ideas which will be explored 
here which, I believe, are helpful to show how ‘meaning’ becomes ‘stuck’ or repeats, 
developing into a credo which feels like an ‘experience of truth’ (Husserl’s term, see Section 
3.5.3, this chapter). Phenomenology, and especially Husserl’s phenomenology, have been 
subjected to post-structuralist critique, from thinkers such as Lacan, Althusser, Foucault and 
Derrida (Sass, 2014). The central points are that we are de-centred, through language, and 
that when we think we are ‘in touch’ with some form of “self-presence,” we are in fact, not 
(Sass, 2014, p. 326). To take Foucault as an example, he strongly rejects phenomenology as 
a “theory of the knowing subject” and prefers instead “a theory of discursive practice” 
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(Foucault, 1966, p. xv in Sass, 2014, p. 331). For Foucault, we are caught in an era of post-
Kantian “transcendental narcissism” (the subject is both the basis and object of knowledge) 
(Foucault, 1969, p. 203 in Sass, 2014, p. 331), following after “divinely ordained” ways of 
being in the Renaissance and the “purely objective order” of the Enlightenment (Sass, 2014, 
p. 331). What Sass (2014) tries to show here is that Foucault is working like a Heideggerian 
phenomenologist, trying to trace out how being is revealed through temporality, “disclosing 
forms of disclosure” (Sass, 2014, p. 333). Sass (2014, pp. 331-332) cites Foucault’s (1966, p. 
48) way of expressing how something could be ‘known’ differently in the Renaissance, with 
the words “raw being” of language (as words held a link to the essence to which they referred). 
It can also be read between the lines, perhaps, that Foucault could not have thought through 
‘forms of disclosure’ if he had not experienced his own disquiet in the world which was 
‘given.’  
I would draw attention to the point that I have to start from my own uncomfortable 
subjectivity and work from there. If not, I suddenly will find myself in a room, for example, 
of theorists, talking about how they may be obsessives or hysterics, when clearly most of 
them are not admitting they are lonely (and it might be nice to feel they belong somewhere). 
It is this simple point that I think is important, that ‘discursive practices’ may encourage a 
person to take leave of himself, or herself, missing out what is ‘given’ in the moment, or being 
closed to it. Husserl was not good at describing his own experience and perhaps this may have 
made his writing style so arid, while clearly Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, along with other 
phenomenologists, were. For example, one listener reported, “…I was speechless…. I felt as 
if I had had a glimpse into the ground and foundation of the world…” on attending 
Heidegger’s famous 1929 lecture on “What is Metaphysics?” (Polt, 1999, p. 122). This also 
goes to show how we can be captured by the talents of a great wordsmith, or another person’s 
words. Finding one’s own words is a different matter. It has gradually dawned in me, in a 
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tentative stuttering way, that I cannot start from someone else’s subjectivity, although later 
on I might discover that my ideas are confused and my subjectivity is a mirror of the beliefs 
of others, and it is then that personal despair is important (what is ‘given’ in the moment). If 
I am not open to that despair, in terms of my own experience as ‘given’ then how will I start 
to know what it is to be at all, in the sense that I am closing down on something? It appears 
so important then to defend Husserl’s basic idea that we take what is ‘given’ in experience 
seriously, without having to reify it.  
3.4 Philosophical background informing the research methodology  
The aim of this section is to draw attention to Husserl’s work regarding some aspects of 
philosophy and indicate the importance of his phenomenology with respect to ‘knowledge’ 
and ‘being.’ Knowledge linked to familiarity and acquaintance is seen as most relevant to 
mental health nursing, and I have argued that this is linked to the person of the nurse (her 
being). It appears clear from the Theory chapter that this knowledge is not only 
representational (following a theory, for example) but is also situated, involving tacit and 
intuitive knowing, and has to do with a person’s being. Coming to ‘know’ something, it has 
been argued in the Theory chapter, also involves a crucial openness to ‘not knowing’ so that 
the other person is not confined and restricted by one’s ideas or theories, and is ’allowed’ to 
be (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1). A question arises as to in what way being and knowing may 
‘interlock’, or ‘become’ in a person, and this section looks at some background to this 
philosophically, which is then followed in more detail through an exploration of some aspects 
of the phenomenology of Husserl and of Merleau-Ponty. I will also try to trace some aspects 
of the background to Husserl’s (1970b) view of the crisis of the European sciences here, in 
order to throw light on where Giorgi (2009) may be coming from when he tries to make 




3.4.1  Husserl’s view of the ‘crisis’ of science 
Husserl’s view of the crisis in the European sciences reflects a view on how 
knowledge for Husserl, what could be validly known, had become static. The crisis for 
Husserl was that there was no crisis, in that science and technology had become unassailably 
the only legitimate means of gaining knowledge of the world as phenomenon, as correlative 
of intentional experience (Moran, 2000; Zahavi, 2003).  
In an unpublished text of Husserl’s from the 1930s, Moran (2000, p. 183) shows how 
Husserl admired the achievements of science, and saw the scientific as motivated by a playful 
curiosity: 
Special motives are required in order to make the theoretical attitude possible, and against 
Heidegger, it does appear to me, that an original motive lies, for science as for art, in the 
necessity of the game (Spiel) and especially in the motivation for a playful “intellectual 
curiosity”, one that is not springing from any necessity of life, or from calling, or from the 
context of the goal of self-preservation, a curiosity which looks at things, and wants to know 
things, with which it has nothing to do. And no “deficient” praxis is at stake here (Husserl 
Archiv B 1 32 Nr. 17 translated by Moran, 2000, p. 183). 
 He observed how empirical scientific successes and theories gradually became 
absorbed into the everyday language and became unthinkingly ‘true,’ with no questioning of 
the premises, or assumptions, upon which such knowledge was founded (Zahavi, 2003). 
Husserl believed the claims that the scientific world-view originated with Plato (Moran, 
2000).  
3.4.2 Background to Husserl’s view of the crisis 
 In 1883, a dispute which began in economics over methodology spread to the human 
sciences in general, and became known as the Methodenstreit, or controversy over 
methodology. The dispute divided into two aspects, whether the logic in the human sciences 
is different to that of the natural sciences, and whether the ‘data’ of the human sciences 
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requires ‘understanding’ whereas the data of the natural sciences requires explanation 
(Walker, 1994a).  
Walker (1994a) examines this controversy through an exploration of Jasper’s 
descriptive phenomenology, through the views of William Dilthey, Max Weber, and Georg 
Simmel, all of whom were in the ‘understanding’ tradition. By the early twentieth century, 
German universities were influenced by a neo-Kantian movement, attempting to understand 
the connections between experience and reality through a return to Kant. Jasper’s had an 
enduring respect for his teacher, Max Weber, and an intense dislike for Heinrich Rickert due 
to the latter’s attempts to denigrate Weber’s work (Walker, 1994a). Nevertheless, Jaspers 
would agree with Rickert (1962, p. 32 cited in Walker, 1994a, p. 257) when he describes 
reality as an “unsurveyable multiplicity,” and refers to a Heraclitean view of reality as 
constant flow and change, so that science can only ‘select’ aspects to examine (Walker, 
1994a). Jaspers major work, The Phenomenological Approach in Psychopathology (1912), 
would repeat this theme, so that phenomenology is the appearance of psychic life in 
consciousness, out of which “we make a representation that divides into intuitive content and 
conceptual form” (Walker, 1994a, p. 259). In 1874, two important books on psychology were 
published, reflecting the difference between the ‘understanding’ and ‘explanation’ traditions: 
the first being Wundt’s Principles of physiological psychology, the second, Brentano’s 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Walker, 1994b). Brentano means empirical in the 
sense that it is experiential, deriving from experience, based on direct intuition; Wundt’s view 
involves the experimental and observational (Walker, 1994b). Brentano recognised the value 
of both approaches, but saw descriptive psychology as offering a priori, certain knowledge 
(Walker, 1994b). Brentano saw philosophy as having become stagnant and saw the solution 
to this in it becoming a psychological science. Husserl’s first book, The Philosophy of 
Arithmetic, tried to show how the concept of number was located in empirical facts of 
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experience. However, Frege’s critique – “that there is an irreducible difference between the 
number 4 which has a square root, and the idea of the number 4 which does not” (Walker, 
1994a, p.124) - changed Husserl’s mind as to the possibility of psychology providing an a 
priori ‘science of sciences’ and this invoked his work in Logical Investigations, resulting in 
his breakthrough to phenomenology. Descriptive psychology would be about empirical facts 
such as the square root of 4, but an a priori science (phenomenology) addresses the very 
comprehension of the idea of number (Walker, 1994a).  
3.4.3  Idealised ‘Ideas’ as transcendent in tension with experience  
This sense that Husserl is impressed by the ‘Idea’ of number appears to lead him 
towards a kind of Platonism (Zahavi, 2003). I think this is important for a number of reasons 
that may be worth exploring briefly. One question for Plato was regarding how we come to 
learn anything, and he addressed this through his Theory of Ideas. He felt that we come to 
learn through recollection of Ideal forms from a perfect, divine Ideal reality beyond this one 
(Waterfield, 1987). Such learning is therefore connected to the divine, and can be drawn out, 
maieutically (Socrates being like a midwife) in any person as it is innate. Knowledge and 
‘being’ are here joined through the divine, the ‘Good’ (Plato, 1993). This was not just an 
intellectual debate, as Plato’s search for the ‘Good’ appears to have been motivated by a need 
for social harmony (Waterfield, 1987). It seems clear that this question is still unresolved for 
many, as it can be seen that ‘knowing and being’ are still very much united through credos of 
the divine through various religious ideas, as well as credos in certain ways of thinking, such 
as in scientific method (see, for example, Rawlins (2008)). Whether or not the therapeutic is 
innate then, having to do with one’s being as it appears to be (although perhaps not divine), 
has a long history. Another question is regarding whether we really need ‘Ideas’ to live, as 
otherwise we cannot tolerate the despair involved, as Kierkegaard (2005) seems to imply,  
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“If there were no eternal consciousness in a man, if at the bottom of everything there were 
only a wild ferment, a power that twisting in dark passions produced everything great or 
inconsequential; if an unfathomable, insatiable emptiness lay hid beneath everything, what 
would life be but despair?” (Kierkegaard, 2005, p. 14). 
Method in research then may be reassuring as it may make us feel less despairing in 
our quest to be understood and recognised perhaps. For Zizek (2014), Plato did not fully 
appreciate his own Theory of Ideas as he did not consider that Ideas may not be the hidden 
reality behind appearances, but rather nothing but the very form of these appearances. Plato 
wanted to reconcile the spatio-temporal world of change (Heraclitus’ view) and the eternal, 
unchanging, more substantial world of Being (Parmenides’ view) through his ontological 
theory of Ideas (Kenny, 2012). Instead, Zizek (2014) sees Ideas as virtual and insubstantial, 
but nevertheless significant, appearing fleetingly on the surface of things as if they signified 
a more profound reality. ‘Ideas’ as being virtual also speaks to me in reading Husserl, who 
seems to get caught up in the ‘Idea’ that he will be able to see how consciousness ‘works’ so 
that its ‘functioning’ could be regarded as ‘transcendental’, since ‘knowing how it functions’ 
would define how all knowledge could be ‘apprehended’. I view this as how we can 
‘transcend’ our own consciousness to then understand how ‘knowing’ comes to be known 
(the knower coming to know how she knows seems an impossibility however). Husserl was 
a mathematician, and it could be imagined how he would link the ability to comprehend what 
he might consider an ‘eternal truth’ of Euclidean geometry, with a corresponding 
consciousness able to comprehend such ‘truths.’ These kinds of concern are what preoccupied 
him in Logical Investigations (Zahavi, 2003). One of the ways I connect this to method in 
this current research is that no matter how flamboyantly or disguised we may make a triangle 
(for example), its essential, ‘Ideal’ structure in a Euclidean world is that its internal angles 
always add up to 180⁰, and Giorgi (2009) is trying to find similar types of ‘structures’ in 
verbal descriptions. At the same time, Husserl did not agree with this kind of transposition of 
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mathematics onto ‘nature,’ as can be seen from the following comment in which he sees 
Galileo as being partly responsible for 
“…the surreptitious substitution of the mathematically substructed world of idealities for the 
only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced 
and experienceable - our everyday life-world” (Husserl, 1970b, §9 (H) cited in Welton, 
1999, p. 353).  
It appears that experience tells us something important and it should not be 
substituted by a ‘mathematical’ method.  
3.4.4  Descartes and the origins of the scientific method 
Since Descartes, the history of epistemology has been largely about attempts to fit 
empirical knowledge into a mathematical model (Westphal, 2003), and as Heidegger (1962) 
shows, forgetting the ‘being’ involved in this move, or in Husserl’s (1970b, §9(H) cited in 
Welton, 1999, p. 353) terms, “the experienced and experienceable.”  
Pre-Kantian modern philosophy is traditionally divided into two strands: rationalism, 
of which the main proponents were Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz, 
and empiricism, of which the main proponents were John Locke and David Hume (Copleston, 
1963). Philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz accepted the idea of innate (a 
priori) truths or self-evident principles - we are able to innately understand a truth through a 
particular experience. This truth precedes experience although it takes an occasion of 
perception of this innate truth by means of an experience in order for it to be revealed. 
Logically the innate truth precedes experience of it (Copleston, 1963), just as Socrates (in 
Meno) says he shows when he draws out in the slave boy understanding of a geometrical 
problem (Plato, 1970, § 85a-c). This seems important, as it may imply that we may not know 
we are therapeutic until an experience draws it out in us, with some help from another (like 
Socrates) perhaps also. What further characterises rationalism is the ideal of attempting to 
establish a deductive system, analogous to a mathematical system, which would provide 
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factual information about the world from these self-evident truths (Copleston, 1963), as seen, 
for example, in Descartes’ Discourse on Method. It is widely accepted that the modern notions 
of science and knowledge originate with Descartes (1596-1650), although he was working in 
a cultural milieu that questioned dogmatic notions of metaphysics and the world (Kenny, 
2012). It is worth noting Descartes’ four rules to guide sound reasoning and the search for 
truth in the sciences, outlined in Discourse on Method (published in 1637 as a preface to his 
writings on dioptrics, geometry and meteorology (Kenny, 2012)), summarised by Gill (2000): 
1. Be certain of one’s beginning point. 2. Analyse every idea and proposition into its smallest 
components to discern clearly what is being claimed. 3. Move from one proposition to the 
next in logical order. 4. Number and review each step of the argument. It is interesting to note 
that Giorgi’s (1997; 2009) method also follows similar steps in principle, in what appears to 
be a reflection of his adherence to scientific method (see Method, Chapter 4, Section 4.7).  
Descartes’ great precursor could be said to be Galileo (1564 - 1642) who Husserl 
regarded as the discoverer of physics and “at once a discovering and concealing genius” 
(Husserl, 1970b, §9(H) cited in Welton, 1999, p. 356). The concealment involved here is that 
the mathematization of nature has led to an objectivism which conceals the subject’s 
involvement with (and in) reality, so that questions such as “What is truth?”, “What is 
knowledge?” and “What is a good and meaningful life?” have been lost from sight. The 
uncritical acceptance of the scientific method - stemming from Galileo’s, and others’, original 
insight - is a crisis in that the sciences have become bankrupt ethically and philosophically. 
It is not that Husserl does not recognise that science has something helpful to offer, it is just 
that “its method excludes other forms of knowing” (Zahavi, 2003, pp. 125-126).  
It is interesting to note that one could draw similar conclusions regarding the 
dominance of randomised control trials in the human sciences currently. The mathematical 
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treatment of probability has displaced other forms of knowing (see Guy, Loewenthal, Thomas 
& Stephenson, 2012; also see Rawlins, 2008).  
Descartes was also responding to a revival of scepticism, represented, for example, in 
the works of Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), who noted the unreliability of the senses, 
and inter-dependence and conflicts between sense and reason (Copleston, 1963; Bakewell, 
2010). In his Essays Montaigne proceeded by “heaping up case studies” in a kind of 
cornucopia which illustrated in a benevolent manner how unreliable human reason is, 
including his own (Bakewell, 2010, p. 122). Montaigne was strongly influenced by 
Pyrrhonian scepticism, originating with the Greek philosopher, Pyrrho (died circa 275 BC), 
and further developed by Sextus Empiricus in the second century AD. Sextus Empiricus 
posed the “Dilemma of the Criterion”, which is that we cannot reliably establish ‘first 
premises’ to establish justification of knowledge without an infinite regress to find new 
criteria for those ‘first premises’ (Westphal, 2003, p. 38). Pyrrho found peace and tranquillity 
by suspending judgement on questions of certain truth and knowledge both in philosophical 
and everyday terms. While dogmatic scepticism asserts that certain knowledge is impossible, 
“Pyrrhonian scepticism would also doubt such an assertion” (Bakewell, 2010, p. 123-124). 
This ‘holding back’ or suspension of judgement was further defined as epokhe by Sextus 
Empiricus and expressed in various ways, for example:  
“I now feel in such a way as neither to posit dogmatically nor to reject any of the things 
falling under this investigation” (Outlines of Scepticism 49-51 (Book I: 197) cited in 
Bakewell, 2010, p. 125) 
In stark contrast to Montaigne and the sceptical tradition, Descartes’ fundamental aim 
was to attain philosophical truth by the use of reason, aiming to establish certain ‘first 
premises’ without an infinite regress. Philosophy at this time included metaphysics, and 
physics (natural philosophy) with branches to all the sciences, including medicine, mechanics 
and morals (Copleston, 1963). He did not set out to discover a “multiplicity of isolated truths” 
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but to establish “a system of true propositions” which were “self-evident and indubitable” 
(Copleston, 1963, p. 77). To do this he broke with the past although did not preclude insights 
from previous philosophers. He wanted to work with clear and distinct ideas, and challenged 
those who relied on authority:  
“But as regards all the opinions which up to this time I had embraced, I thought… once for 
all to sweep them completely away, so that they might later on be replaced either by others 
which were better or the same when I had made them conform to a rational scheme” 
(Discourse on Method 2 (vi), pp. 13-14 in Copleston (1963, p. 80)).  
The reference to a rational scheme shows how Descartes wished to proceed from 
truths self-evident to reason and deduce from these further truths. Like Socrates, he was 
impressed by the certainty of the axioms of mathematics and geometry and wished to apply 
a similar process in his new method, which would rest on truths which had intuitive 
immediacy (Kenny, 2010). For Descartes, there was only one kind of knowledge, that which 
was certain and evident, and all other forms of knowledge stemmed from this, so there could 
be only one scientific method for ascertaining such knowledge (Copleston, 1963). His move 
from medicine to philosophy, and the search for certain truth, perhaps was invoked by a 
tragedy of fate, as it coincided with the tragic death of his daughter, aged 5, of scarlet fever 
(Shorto, 2008). I mention this because it may imply that there was a ‘private’ meaning to his 
search for certainty, which is an aspect of meaning that only emerged clearly ‘late’ in this 
study, during the Phenomenology (see Chapter 6). 
Descartes’ major assumption is that all the sciences are “identical with human wisdom 
which always remains one and the same, however applied to different subjects” (Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind 1 (x), p. 360 cited in Copleston, 1963, p. 81).  
For Descartes, there are two capacities of the mind which can be trusted: intuition and 
deduction. His method comprises a set of rules which will allow these capacities to be applied 
so that they are “not misled by factors such as education, prejudice, passion, impatience, and 
102 
 
the desire to attain results” (Copleston, 1963, p. 84). Intuition and deduction are “two mental 
operations by which we are able, entirely without any fear of illusion, to arrive at the 
knowledge of things” (Rules for the Direction of the Mind 3 (x), p. 368 cited in Copleston 
(1960, p. 84)). Intuition is “not the fluctuating assurance of the senses” nor the “fallacious 
judgement of the imagination” but is “the conception, without doubt, of an unclouded and 
attentive mind, which springs from the light of reason alone” (Rules for the Direction of the 
Mind 3 (x), p. 368 cited in Copleston (1960, p. 84)). Intuition is then a purely intellectual 
seeing that leaves no room for doubt (Copleston, 1963). Deduction involves “a certain 
movement or succession” involving inference from already certain facts, as opposed to 
intuition (Copleston, 1963, p. 84).  
Descartes’ fundamental intuition is the cogito: I think, therefore I am. He believed 
that he could not be deceived on this fundamental intuition, as God would not allow it, and 
God also guaranteed that this “thinking substance” (res cogitans) could have reliable 
knowledge of the material world (which included his own body), or ‘extended substance’ (res 
extensa) (Copleston, 1963, p. 129). The ‘I am’ indicates that the ‘I’ is a thinking substance 
only, somehow lodged in the body, which is an unthinking, ‘extended substance’. Descartes’ 
dualism is apparent here, although even for Descartes the relationship between the thinking 
substance and the body was not clear:  
“I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but I am …very closely united to 
it… so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole. For if this were not 
the case, when my body is hurt, I, who am merely a thinking being, should not feel pain, for 
I should perceive this wound by the understanding only…” (Meditations 6 cited in 
Copleston, 1963, p. 130). 
 
In contrast to rationalists, for empiricists innate truths refer only to relations between 
ideas and do not give factual information about the world. Generally, what characterises 
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empiricism is the belief that facts about the world and reality can only be found through 
experience, which is “a combination of sense-perception and introspection” (Copleston, 1963, 
p. 36-37). Such knowledge is induced from experience and can only ever be true in terms of 
probability and never certainty. Relations between ideas give certainty but yield no factual 
information about reality (Copleston, 1963). David Hume (1711-1776) represented 
empiricism brought to its logical conclusion in that the argument goes that causality can never 
be induced from experience, but can only at best be regarded as a conjunction of events, which 
results in scepticism. Hume held that practical, everyday life and thus knowledge, “rested on 
beliefs” (Copleston, 1963, pp. 40), and “conditioning” (Gill, 2000, p. 21). One can think of 
this in terms of causal links resulting in an infinite regress, or else the process is stopped by 
deciding on an arbitrary point of cause (Gill, 2000).  
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) responded to Hume’s scepticism by attempting to show 
that sensory perceptions and the structure of the mind form human cognition. Categories such 
as space, time and causation form the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Kant called 
that which can be known by the structures of the mind the “phenomenal world”, and that 
which cannot be known as the “noumenal world” - the actual “thing itself” remains noumenal 
for Kant, because ‘existence is not a predicate’ - saying that something ‘is’ does not mean 
that it exists (Gill, 2000, pp. 22-23). Husserl believed that Kant has missed out that being can 
be revealed intuitively - “categorial intuition” - which was an idea of Husserl’s that captivated 
Heidegger (Moran, 2000, p. 121). But for Kant knowledge of the world was valid because the 
objects of our representations conform to the concepts we have about them sufficiently. The 
empirical world is real but this is because consciousness unites intuitions of it under concepts. 
Kant also wanted to unite understanding (epistemology) with reason (ethics), a project that 
can be understood as trying to unite theory and practice, “uniting the formal structures of 
consciousness with human freedom” (Critchley, 2001, p. 19). Critchley (2001) writes how 
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Kant was criticised immediately by his friend, Johann Georg Hamann (1730 - 1788), for over-
emphasising the formal character of knowledge, as well as thinking that reason could be 
separated from experience; that is, Hamann believed that understanding comes with 
experience and cannot be known beforehand. Hamann also uncannily predicted the 
importance of language here by saying that reason and experience could not be separated 
since all thought depended on language which came from a mixture of both (Critchley, 2001). 
It is interesting to note that Hamman is said to be “the only author by whom Kierkegaard was 
profoundly influenced” (Lowrie, 1938, p. 164 cited in Grimsley, 1973, p. 115). Hegel 
departed from Kant by asserting that categories of knowledge are not static, that human 
cognition is rooted in human action, including affect, and not only the intellect; for example, 
using Sophocles play, Antigone, to demonstrate that self-understanding, at an affective and 
intellectual level, was necessary to know and judge rightly, and also depended on what others 
knew in the social world, including linguistic tradition or ways of understanding concepts 
through ordinary language (Westphal, 2003).  
3.4.5  Living in descriptions 
Reading Husserl, and trying to understand the ‘roots’ of his ideas, as indicated to an 
extent in the above section (Section 3.4.4), began to have the effect of a picture emerging 
from a background of conflicting thought, that ‘thinking, understanding and meaning’ are 
interlocked in some way, which would include that which is therapeutic. What may come 
close to summarising this is Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life,’ which reflect an interlinking 
between language and being, so that it is like we live in our descriptions (Heaton, 2010). 
Wittgenstein’s (2009, ¶115) insight, “A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get outside 
it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably,” states 
this ‘state of affairs’ while giving a sense that it is possible to get out of this captivity.    
105 
 
How the philosopher lives his life might reflect more about his ontology and 
epistemology (interleaved) than what he says about those subjects. That is, what we say, or 
write - what we think we think - can become, and may be, removed from what we are. As 
discussed in the Theory chapter, the tacit, the intuitive, openness, and the openness to make 
decisions in a complex setting, function as embodied and intersubjective actions, events and 
processes which cannot really be defined but can be ‘seen’ perhaps in actions. Would this not 
imply perhaps, that going for a walk with somebody, or simply talking together, would be a 
better way to understand how they are therapeutic than asking them about their ‘philosophy’ 
in an interview? As Critchley (2001, p. 62) notes, “…a philosophy fuses with a way of life.” 
The ordinary term, ‘a way of life’, points towards how coming to be is situated in 
communities of practice (Lave, 1991; Lave & Wenger, 1991). This has implications as to how 
to understand any data, or findings, in psychological research (MacLure, 2013) and will be 
addressed in the Method chapter as to the limitations of method. For example, Giorgi’s (2009) 
method presents a meaning in words but based on an “intuitive accomplishment” 
(Applebaum, 2012, p. 49; see also Cloonan, 2012a; b) that is not fully demonstrable. I would 
argue that phenomenology ought to lead us out of the captivity to which Wittgenstein refers, 
because the emphasis is on ‘what hits us’ and what we may try to ‘cover over’ from that 
experience, but for this to happen it appears a certain openness is involved.  
3.5  Husserl’s phenomenology 
Phenomenology could be said to be a rejection of a “realistic and naturalistic 
objectivism” that claims that the nature of meaning, truth and reality can be understood 
without taking subjectivity into account (Zahavi, 2003, p. 52). Husserl is interested in the 
strictly invariant and essential nature of consciousness (any consciousness, not necessarily 
human) and therefore he believes he must proceed from the first-person perspective just as 
consciousness is given. Phenomenology should therefore reflect a faithful description of what 
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appears, or is given in consciousness in the first-person (Zahavi, 2003). This sounds very 
simple, but as indicated above, it appears to require a certain openness to allow something 
previously excluded to come through, which in Husserl’s terms may be akin to a return to 
“the things themselves” (Husserl, 1984, p. 10 in Moran, 2000, p. 93).  
What Husserl means by ‘things’ can be what “words may be found to signify when 
their significations are correctly intuited by the right kind of Anschaaung” (footnote by 
translators Macquarrie & Robinson in Heidegger, 1962, p. 50). Anschaaung is “an intuition 
immediately given in experience” (Smith & Woodruff Smith, 1995, p. 86). The ‘things 
themselves’ however have different meanings, as it may be a direct perception or also an ideal 
state of affairs such as a mathematical equation or a logical relation (Welton, 1999, p. 367). 
Here is Husserl, in the Crisis of the European Sciences talking about the ‘thing itself’ given 
as an experience of the ‘self-givenness’ (self-evidence) of the world around us: 
The life-world is a realm of original self-evidences. That which is self-evidently given is, in 
perception, experienced as “the thing in itself,” an immediate presence, or, in memory, 
remembered as the thing in itself; and every other manner of intuition is a presentification of 
the thing itself (Husserl, 1970b, §34 cited in Welton, 1999, p. 367 italics added).  
These intuitions are the a priori structures of meaning-intending, distinct from an 
empirical meaning or logic (Moran, 2000). This meaning-intending is not only linguistic 
interpretation as there are also forms of “pre-linguistic meaning” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 150). 
Macquarrie and Robinson’s (1962) comment (a footnote in their translation of Being and 
Time) indicates their intention that only that which can be represented in words is what 
Husserl is interested in; however, this is not the case. Husserl gives perception - that which is 
immediately intuited, or given - primacy over representation (re-presentation), although the 
intuition can be “fulfilled” - ‘full’ - if described linguistically (Zahavi, 2003 p. 18). Describing 
an intuition linguistically is not an easy task (Moran, 2000), and it is argued here that it is not 
possible in a ‘full’ sense, and it is perhaps for this reason that signitive intuitions can be 
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thought of as “empty” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 28). What appears to be implicit here in Husserl, is 
that language has to be ‘connected’ to the world, or in other words, ‘situated’, in order for it 
to have purchase on what is given in perception. For Husserl, the ‘things themselves’ which 
he is mainly concerned with are the “conditions of the possibility for appearance” (Zahavi, 
2003, p. 94).  
The influence of Descartes on Husserl may be that intuition can be trusted to give 
certain knowledge (Zahavi, 2003). In contrast to Descartes however, for Husserl the link 
between the mind and the world has no need of a guarantee by God, as instead it is intrinsic 
to consciousness itself that consciousness gives reliable information about the world. For 
Husserl, “the world appears, and the structure of this appearance is conditioned and made 
possible by subjectivity” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 52). The “nature of meaning, truth and reality” 
depends on understanding subjectivity which is intrinsically linked to “that which shows itself 
and actually appears” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 52). Crucially, Husserl came to believe that this 
subjectivity is also linked to intersubjectivity (Zahavi, 2003).  
Husserl’s thought evolved through his lifetime. He was concerned with how objective 
truths (such as a mathematical formula) could be known in subjective acts of knowing 
(Zahavi, 2003). There is a movement from the analysis of mathematics and logic to intentional 
phenomenology, to transcendental phenomenology to a dynamic phenomenology, although 
he revisited and reworked earlier themes throughout (Zahavi, 2003).  His first major work, 
Logical Investigations, published in 1900-1901, founded the discipline of phenomenology, 
and attempted to “go beyond the alternatives in philosophy of realism and idealism, 
subjectivity and objectivity” (Welton, 1999, p. ix). What is meant by “idealism” is that the 
only entity existing is the internal, intra-mental one, and by “realism”, that mental 
representations correspond to an extra-mental and mind-independent reality (Zahavi, 2003, 
p. 71). The former posits that subjectivity can exist without the world; the latter that the world 
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can persist without subjectivity. Husserl rejects both of these views (Zahavi, 2003). For 
example, Husserl noticed that we see objects in perspectival profiles. I see a book at a certain 
angle and ‘fill in’ those perspectives I cannot see so that it is grasped as whole; but the 
‘givenness’ of the perception of my own consciousness does not work this way. On reflection, 
I do not become aware of my consciousness in “profiles” (although there is a temporal 
incompleteness to reflection) (Husserl, 1982, p. 94 in Zahavi, 2003, p. 16). Merleau-Ponty 
was to develop this direction in Husserl’s thought, so that we neither construct the world 
(through an intra-mental idea) nor represent it (through a passive ‘registering’ of it in sense 
‘data’) (Shaw, 2014).  
What will be explored in this section is how intentionality has a re-presentational 
aspect and a pre-predicative aspect (act intentionality and operative intentionality 
respectively) and both of these ways of ‘thinking’ about how anything comes to ‘mean’ 
something is an intricately interwoven experience of language, perception and embodiment 
(or the sensual). Merleau-Ponty developed this in his work on perception:  
We uncovered, beneath act or thetic intentionality - and in fact as its very condition of 
possibility – an operative intentionality already at work prior to every thesis and every 
judgement; we discovered a “Logos of the aesthetic world,” [after Husserl in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, p. 292] or a “hidden art in the depths of the human soul,” [after Kant 
in Critique of Pure Reason, A141/B180] and that, like every art, only knows itself in its 
results (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 453/492).  
Husserl considered Logical Investigations (1900-1901) as his ‘breakthrough’ to 
phenomenology; it includes a detailed analysis of intentionality and a rejection of 
psychologism (that psychology as an empirical project established the ‘foundations’ of 
knowledge) (Zahavi 2003). In Logical Investigations, he is not concerned with whether, or 
how, consciousness can attain knowledge of a mind-independent reality, as for him these are 
“metaphysical questions” with no place in epistemology (Zahavi 2003, p. 8). In his later 
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works he would insist that there was a relationship between consciousness and the world, 
through intersubjectivity and the cognitive act itself, and defended himself against the 
accusation of solipsism (Zahavi, 2003). Husserl’s Ideas I (1913) was his next major 
publication (volumes II and III were published posthumously) and marked his turn to 
transcendental philosophy (Zahavi, 2003). Amongst other concepts, in Ideas I he introduced 
the concepts of noesis and noema as a priori correlatives of the intentional act. In his lecture 
manuscripts at this time he was also developing the transcendental reduction, focusing on 
transcendental subjectivity (his Cartesian way to the reduction), and as a result, to “counter 
accusations of solipsism”, he developed the concept of transcendental intersubjectivity in the 
Fifth Cartesian Meditation (Welton, 1999, p. x-xi). He is trying to get beyond empiricism, 
and this seems important for this study, as it indicates that there is ‘something else’ at work, 
for example, in being therapeutic.  
In this respect, in an article appearing in 1927 in the Encyclopaedia Britannica he 
speaks of the relation between psychology and phenomenology: 
… psychology… remains a “positive science,” as science operating within the natural 
attitude, in which the simply present world is the thematic ground…. Phenomenological 
reduction serves as psychological only to the extent that it gets at the psychical aspect of 
animal realities in its pure own essential specificity… it is merely related to possible real 
worlds… Even as eidetic phenomenologist the psychologist is transcendentally naïve: He 
takes the possible “minds” (“I”-subjects) completely according to the relative sense of the 
word as those of men and animals considered purely and simply as those in a possible world 
… The theme of transcendental philosophy is a concrete and systematic elucidation of those 
multiple intentional relationships, which in conforming with their essences belong to any 
possible world whatever as the surrounding world of a possible corresponding 
subjectivity… Like every meaningful question, this transcendental question presupposes a 
ground of unquestioned being, in which all means of solution must be contained. This 
ground is here the [anonymous] subjectivity of that kind of conscious life in which a 
possible world, of whatever kind, is constituted as present. …this ground presupposed as 
beyond question is not confused with what the transcendental question… puts into 
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question… the realm of this questionability includes… every possible world claimed in the 
natural attitude (Husserl, 1927(19, II, 8) in McCormick & Elliston, 1981, cited in Welton, 
1999, pp. 329-330) (my italics).  
Husserl appears to be saying that the subjectivity he wants to understand is not one 
which ‘reflects’ upon itself (see Section 3.5.2, this chapter also). It is rather an ‘I’ that ‘acts’ 
- that ‘constitutes’ the world as present. This subjectivity is the ‘ground’ of any possible 
further understanding of the world, and others. He appears to be saying that the project of 
phenomenology is to describe how consciousness acts, knowing that ‘who’ is acting is a 
consciousness that paradoxically is ‘anonymous.’ Doing an empirical study would not be able 
to uncover the ‘anonymous I’ of the researcher’s consciousness at work and it is the latter that 
is the interest in transcendental phenomenology. I would argue that the empirical researcher 
cannot escape this ‘anonymous I’ and it informs a multiplicity of tacit (or perhaps 
‘anonymous’) decisions throughout any method. Being therapeutic may be informed also in 
such a way perhaps.  
In his writings, there is a movement from this kind of “static” phenomenology, or 
description of how consciousness acts, to a “genetic” one; a movement from static analysis 
of concepts like the noema towards the interconnected relationship between subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, tradition and culture (Welton, 1999, p xii).  
In Logical Investigations, Husserl distinguishes between the object of knowledge and 
the act of knowing. The act is a psychical process that elapses in time (subjective experience 
with a temporal duration), whereas the object of knowledge in logic, or mathematical 
principles, refers to something atemporal, objective and eternally valid. For the latter, we 
remain conscious of something ideal that is irreducible to and different from the real 
psychical act of knowing. This distinction between the ideal and real is fundamental to 
Husserl, and at times approaches a kind of Platonism (Zahavi 2003). For Husserl, if ideality 
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were susceptible to the temporal, real, and subjective nature of the psychical act then it would 
be impossible to repeat or share meaning, just as it is impossible to repeat a concrete psychical 
act the moment it has occurred (never mind sharing it with others). He therefore concludes 
that there is something essential to consciousness that allows ideality to be comprehended 
(Zahavi, 2003). It is interesting to note that he has not yet appealed to language as being like 
a ’carrier’ of these ‘idealities’ (see Zahavi, 2003).  Husserl, in the tradition of Plato, Descartes 
and Kant, is attempting to establish foundational knowledge (Gill, 2000), to place knowledge 
on a sure and certain footing, or ground, the conditions, or essential acts of consciousness that 
allow knowledge to be known at all. His final published work, The Origin of Geometry 
(1936), shows that he continued to struggle with this theme of how ideality is maintained in 
subjectivity, or how meaning can be stable (Shaw, 2014). This work in particular will be taken 
up by Merleau-Ponty to reveal the importance of language (Shaw, 2014). The sense of how 
meaning can be ‘stable’ is important for this research, as what an empirical method like 
Giorgi’s (2009) is implicitly saying is that meaning can be stable enough to be validated by 
others.  
3.5.1  The epoché and the reduction   
Husserl was also concerned with how our everyday assumptions ‘form’ experience. 
The main assumption that Husserl focuses on is the ‘natural attitude,’ that is, the implicit 
belief that there exists a mind-independent, experience-independent, and theory-independent 
reality, that can be accessed objectively (Zahavi, 2003). This assumption is particularly 
misleading when it is made in reference to subjectivity. The founding principle of 
phenomenology is to “let the originary giving intuition be the source of all knowledge” 
(Zahavi, 2003, p. 45 - after §24 of Husserl’s Ideas I). For this reason, the ‘natural attitude’ 
has to be suspended - a procedure he called the epoché, after Sextus Empiricus - in order to 
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perceive the originary givenness, and to address any dogmatic attitude towards reality by 
taking a neutral stance to any such attitude (Zahavi, 2003).  
In Ideas I (§ 35 in Moran, 2000, p. 153) Husserl gives an example involving 
perception of a sheet of white paper. Consciousness reveals the white paper in a special way, 
intending it in different modes of givenness, for example, as visual perception and not as an 
hallucination. In addition, it is surrounded by a “halo of background intuitions” (Husserl, 
1977, p. 62 cited in Moran, 2000, p. 153) both of other entities around it (the table, books, 
etc) as well as other conscious acts. And even if the sheet of paper does not exist it is still 
being comprehended in a conscious act. Husserl is trying to demonstrate here how ‘paying 
attention’ by means of the the epoché shows that there is a difference between perception and 
imagination, and “this shows there is an essence to the conscious”, as consciousness is 
distinguishing between two modes of giveness (Moran, 2000, p. 153-154). This is complex, 
however, as it appears here that he is trying to ‘get behind’ (or ‘above’ as he notes in the 
following excerpt) his own thinking to see it ‘working.’ 
What must be shown in particular and above all is that through the epoché a new way of 
experiencing, of thinking, of theorizing, is opened to the philosopher; here, situated above 
his own natural being and above the natural world, he loses nothing of their being and their 
objective truths (Husserl, 1970b, p. 152 cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 45).  
The epoché and the reduction are dynamically linked in one movement. I see this as 
making a kind of ‘clearing’ for something else to emerge, as in the example of the piece of 
paper, instead of latching onto the ‘realness’ of the paper, Husserl sees it could just as easily 
be an hallucination. The reduction - from the Latin, re-ducer, to lead back - leads back to the 
essential, or transcendental, “foundation of the correlation between subjectivity and the 
world” (Zahavi, 2003, p.45).  
113 
 
There is disagreement as to what Husserl meant by the reduction (Sass, 2009). Sass 
(2009, p.173) notes how Husserl’s writing style, characterised by “arid, at times almost 
bureaucratic tedium,” gives the impression that the vitality of experience is being removed in 
the reduction. Max Scheler, who was Husserl’s contemporary, and developing his own 
phenomenology “of the heart” (Lehmann & Klempe, 2015, p. 478), saw the reduction as an 
impoverishment of the reality of experience (Cutting, 2009; 2016). However, Sass (2009) 
argues that Husserl did not intend the reduction to remove anything of the ‘being of the 
world.’ For Merleau-Ponty, the reduction allows us to ‘catch sight of ourselves’, and be in 
““wonder” before the world” (after Fink (1970, p. 109) in Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xxvii/14), 
hence implying that far from making experience abstract, it rather sharpens and heightens it. 
This certainly seems to be the case from the following excerpt. 
‘The’ world has not been lost through the epoché – it is not at all an abstaining with respect 
to the being of the world and with respect to any judgement about it, but rather it is the way 
of uncovering judgements about correlation, of uncovering the reduction of all unities of 
sense to me myself and my sense-having and sense-bestowing subjectivity with all its 
capabilities (Husserl, 1973, p. 366 cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 46).   
For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction (or transcendental reduction) is nothing 
but the “thematization of the correlation between subjectivity and the world” (Zahavi, 2003, 
p. 46). The subjectivity that Husserl is referring to here is his own – that which is given in the 
first person (Zahavi, 2003). It appears that the reduction involves a complex and intuitive 
process, partly involving imaginative free variation, and can be approached through attention 
to subjectivity (the Cartesian way, starting with subjectivity), objectivity (the Ontological 
way, starting with objects), or a third way, the psychological reduction (Zahavi, 2003). This 
latter reduction is what Giorgi (2009) employs, in that it does not ‘reduce’ acts of 
consciousness but focuses on the objects of experience through eidetic reduction. Imaginative 
variation is a method involved in eidetic reduction, or variation, and comprises a conceptual 
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analysis in which one attempts to “imagine the object in different ways” so that eventually 
what is essential to the object emerges (Zahavi, 2003, p. 39). It is this eidetic reduction, made 
by means of imaginative variation, that Giorgi (2009) employs in his scientific method as 
though the descriptions from the research are ‘objects’.  
I would link the reduction with therapeutic ‘openness’ in the sense that ‘not homing 
in’ on one aspect of an ‘intuition given’ allows other aspects to ‘come through’ and allows a 
real space to open up for the other person who may be struggling to speak or understand her 
experience. An empirical scientific, or psychological attitude, employs a ‘natural’ reflection, 
and provides one with a “constituted, objectified, and naturalized subject, but it does not 
provide” access to the transcendental, constituting aspects of subjectivity (Zahavi, 2003, p. 
49).  
Applying eidetic reduction to the ‘I’ itself is more problematic - Husserl claims one 
can achieve this, revealing structures essential to any consciousness as such, the principal one 
being that of intentionality (Moran, 2000; Zahavi, 2003). For Husserl, the act of 
consciousness comprises the act (noetic element) and ‘what is thought’ (the noematic 
element). While Husserl believed that these two could be separated through the transcendental 
reduction, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty did not share his view (Moran 2000). It appears that 
the latter position is more reasonable, as will be discussed below; subsequently this has 
ramifications for Giorgi’s method, as the act of thinking cannot be separated from the 
‘meaning’ (noema) linked to that act. What I see in this is that ‘thinking’ cannot be removed 
from ‘being’, that is, I cannot think about how I think about an object of thought (at least not 
thoroughly). Again, this might imply that I do not really know what I am doing in a research 
method, and neither if I am being therapeutic. The problem of the link between the act of 
thinking and what is thought links to the concepts in Husserl of constituting subjectivity, 
intersubjectivity, and empathy, which I will try to explore.   
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 3.5.2 Constituting subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and empathy 
The concept of ‘constitution’ in Husserl’s later works (The phenomenology of 
Intersubjectivity) has been problematic in that questions remain as to whether constitution is 
a creative process that ‘produces’ reality as an idea; or whether it refers to how knowledge is 
acquired between the subject and object; or refers only to meaning and not being (Zahavi, 
2003, p. 72). Husserl never gave a clear answer as to whether constitution is “a creation or a 
restoration of reality,” but it appears it is not a causal process (Zahavi, 2003, p. 72). 
Constitution lies in the place between the mind neither ‘making up’ reality nor mirroring it 
(Zahavi, 2003, p. 72 after Putnam, 1978), which certainly appears to fit with the 
unpredictability of others. As in reflection, constitution appears more linked to tacit 
knowledge and disclosure rather than ‘production’ of its themes (Zahavi, 2003, p. 89): 
“When I say ‘I,’ I grasp myself in a simple reflection. But this self-experience is like every 
experience, and in particular, every perception a mere directing myself towards something that 
was already there for me, that was already conscious, but not thematically experienced, nor 
noticed” (Husserl, 1973, pp. 492-493 in Zahavi, 2003, p.89).   
This sense of an ‘already’ seems so important for this research, as it appears that there 
is ‘already’ something going on even when we are trying to be objective, say in a method. 
Heidegger viewed constitution as “letting the entity be seen in its objectivity” (Heidegger, 
1979, p. 97 in Zahavi, 2003, p. 73). Zahavi (2003, p. 73) proposes that constitution is a 
“process” that allows manifestation and signification, finding in Husserl’s unpublished 
manuscripts (Ms C 10, 15b) from 1931, indications that this process has two, inseparable, 
primal sources: the primal ego, and the primal non-ego. So, although subjectivity is necessary 
for constitution, it is not sufficient. Husserl identifies the non-ego, the transcendental non-ego 
(Ms C 7 6b) with the world, and therefore Zahavi (2003, p. 73) proposes that he is positing 
an inseparability between the ego and the world, so the constituting process “involves several 
intertwined transcendental constituents” of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the world. 
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Constitution includes a “passive pre-givenness” of an element of facticity (Zahavi, 2003, p. 
73 after Husserl, 1973, p. 427); Husserl is close to Merleau-Ponty (2014) here, or vice versa 
perhaps:  
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project 
of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the 
subject itself projects. The subject is a being-in-the-world and the world remains 
“subjective” since its texture and articulations are traced out by the subject’s movement of 
transcendence (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 454/493; see Zahavi, 2003, p. 73).  
It appears that as a person, one is completely inseparable from the world, which 
appears to mean the whole way one has come to be, know and think amongst, and from, 
others. While Husserl focussed on the first-person experience of subjectivity in his early 
works, he became increasingly occupied with how each person - each transcendental ego - 
lives in a shared world, in intersubjective relations with others, sharing “meanings”, language 
and an environment (Moran, 2000, p. 175). In his Fifth Cartesian Meditation, he changed the 
problem of understanding others to one of how the other enters into consciousness, or how is 
the other “constituted” by one’s subjectivity (Moran, 2000, p. 176). The other as such is a 
kind of modification of oneself, yet there is something about the other that cannot be known 
- “there is an apprehended gap, or emptiness in my experience of the other” (Moran, 2000, p. 
176).  
This seems to be a crucial point for research, as well as the research question, in that 
how one comes to respond to another depends on how one ‘constitutes’ (discloses) that other 
person through one’s own subjectivity. But this subjectivity, or the transcendental ego, has 
gone through a ‘genesis’ in which it has acquired fixed and abiding properties through habits 
that become convictions, and is given in temporal profiles so that it has a history (after 
Husserl, 1991a, pp. 100-101; p. 179 in Moran, 2000, p. 173-175). But even if this subjectivity 
is in relation to a ‘transcendental intersubjectivity’ it still apprehends this intersubjectivity 
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through its own transcendental subjectivity (Zahavi, 2003, p. 123) - “the world is continually 
there for us, but in the first place it is there for me” (Husserl, 1974, p. 249 cited in Moran, 
2000, p. 178, original italics). The circularity here between subjectivity and intersubjectivity 
appears to make it likely that we fall into credos that are intersubjective.  
 In addition, while the body of the other is originally given, the experience of the other 
is not; the experience of another is known in an analogous way through the experience of 
one’s own subjectivity, as something ‘indicated’:  
The character of the existent “other” has as its basis in this kind of verifiable accessibility of 
what is not originally accessible… Whatever can become presented, and evidently verified, 
originally – is something I am; or else it belongs to me as something peculiarly my own. 
Whatever, by virtue thereof, in that founded manner which characterises a primordially 
unfulfillable experience – an experience that does not give something itself originally but 
that consistently verifies something indicated – is “other” (Husserl, 1991a, p. 144 cited in 
Moran, 2000, p. 177 italics added).  
It is interesting to note that Husserl’s view of ‘constituting subjectivity’ opens up 
questions as to the constricting aspects of such a ‘constituting subjectivity.’ This leads to the 
difficulties in assuming ‘that the other is like me’ – it appears that part of the natural attitude 
in our ‘everydayness’ is to assume this but such an attitude may need to be suspended in order 
to practice phenomenologically, to give leeway to the “apprehended gap and emptiness in my 
experience of the other” (Moran, 2000, p. 176). In one sense, this means remaining open to 
an experience that one knows nothing about, and which may only at most be partially known, 
not constricting the other into one’s own view or subjectivity. This links with the idea of 
‘openness’ in the Theory chapter as being therapeutic (Section 2.2.2). Its opposite, pretending 
the ‘gap’ is not there, or being blind to it, is perhaps linked to a kind of despair, which perhaps 
is what Kierkegaard was registering when he wrote in his journal, 
“I have come just from a party where I was the moving spirit. Witticisms streamed from my 
mouth, everybody laughed and admired me - but I went out, and, yes, the dash should be as 
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long as the radius of the earth’s orbit - and wanted to shoot myself” (Journals §53 in Dru, 
1938, cited in Grimsley, 1973, p. 15).  
This ‘apprehended gap’ invokes complexity it appears, which bears on Giorgi’s 
(2009) method, or any method, as to how such an experience can be researched. Some of the 
complexity may link to Hegel, in that we depend on others for recognition (Borch-Jacobsen, 
1991). What comes to mind is a question as to what kind of recognition was Kierkegaard not 
finding at the party. For example, an immediate question arises as to whether it is possible to 
be recognised without becoming like the one who recognises. Will the one who recognises 
only do so if that recognition is based on a kind of self-recognition in the other through 
‘constituting subjectivity’? In research, does the researcher only recognise that which is 
familiar, or is already ‘found’ by his ’constituting subjectivity’ in the participant’s speech? It 
appears that at least therapeutically it may be better to ‘not know’ at all if one wants to ‘know,’ 
which is a contradiction.  
3.5.2.1 Empathy and knowing the other 
The above discussion relates in certain ways to empathy. Husserl never came to a 
definitive position on empathy, and it occupied him throughout his philosophical life (Zahavi, 
2014. p. 124). One aspect which Husserl developed was how empathy involves an 
interruption to the “temporal flow of consciousness” of the subject (Zahavi, 2003, p. 124) and 
this interruption involves “self-alienation” (Husserl, 1970b, p. 189 in Zahavi, 2003, p. 124). 
Empathy then directs the subject towards alterity, an openness towards the other, which 
involves the asymmetry between self-experience and other-experience as a “necessary and 
persisting existential fact” (Zahavi & Rochat, 2015, p. 544). This is in direct contrast to views 
of empathy, for example, as a merging of self and other, of emotional contagion, mimicry, 
imaginative projection and sharing the other’s affective experience (Zahavi, 2001; Zahavi, 
2014; Zahavi & Rochat, 2015). Some considerations on empathy will be explored here, as it 
is a fundamental factor involved in Giorgi’s method in finding meanings in descriptions and 
119 
 
it is important to note that Giorgi takes his version of empathy from the therapeutic tradition, 
after Spiegelberg (1995 in Giorgi, 2000; Giorgi, 2009), something Husserl was careful to 
avoid (Zahavi, 2003).   
The issue of empathy appears to be a central question in phenomenology, one which 
preoccupied Husserl and has significant relevance to how research can be conducted that aims 
to know and understand the other (Zahavi, 2014). It relates specifically to intersubjectivity, 
the relation between self and other, involving tradition and culture. Along with Husserl, his 
student, Stein (2008), saw empathy as a special form of intentionality, and is the basis for 
apprehending others and their experiences (Zahavi, 2014, p. 125). Husserl’s most intensive 
work on empathy is to be found in the research manuscripts on intersubjectivity, Husserliana 
13-15, written between 1905 to 1937 (Zahavi, 2014, p. 124). He never settled on a definitive 
view on empathy, and the one presented here mainly follows Zahavi (2014). That Husserl 
never settled on a definitive view of empathy perhaps shows the difficulties in play regarding 
‘knowing the other.’ Husserl is not concerned with empathy as something we have to ‘work 
on’ to develop as a skill, for example as in Rogerian therapy (Rogers, 1961). Husserl is 
concerned with empathy as a phenomenon in itself, or a kind of intentionality that allows us 
to ‘know’ the other experientially. How is it that we come to ‘know’ others at all? Empathy 
in Husserl’s writings is treated in different ways, and these will be briefly outlined here, in 
order to highlight some difficulties involved in researching others’ meanings.  
(Zahavi, 2014, p. 124) notes that Husserl was interested in empathy “because 
intersubjectivity is involved in the very constitution of objectivity”, which I read as how 
others come to understanding and agreement involves how we come to ‘know’ one another. 
For Husserl, understanding of empathy also involves the other’s subjectivity transcending my 
own; that is, I cannot ‘know’ the experience of another person like I know an object which I 
can perceive in a multiplicity of “profiles” (Zahavi, 2014, p. 129). Husserl makes an astute 
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point when he says, in 1909, that, “All the difficulty disappears if empathy counts as the mode 
of presentation of foreign consciousness” (Husserl, 1973, p. 20 in Zahavi, 2014, p. 129). This 
makes me think of empathy as a presentation of something ‘other’ to me, and therefore 
something I cannot presume I know about, or can know about completely, in any ‘full’ way 
how I might know a rock or a shoe (an object). This comes home in my view when thinking 
of how someone we thought we ‘really knew’ can shock or disappoint traumatically. 
‘Objectivity’ it appears, gets thrown into extreme doubt by such happenings.  
Here we have the only transcendence that is genuinely worthy of its name, and everything 
else that is also called transcendent, such as the objective world, rests upon the 
transcendence of foreign subjectivity (Husserl, 1959, p. 495 cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 115). 
All Objectivity, in this sense, is related back constitutionally to what does not belong to the 
Ego-proper, to the other-than-my-Ego’s-own in the form, ‘someone else’ -  that is to say: the 
non-Ego in the form, another-Ego (Husserl, 1969, p. 248 cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 115). 
It appears then also that the transcendence of the other is necessary in order for me to 
become aware of myself as a separate person or subject; the inability of me to reduce the other 
to an object means I may come to recognise the asymmetry in the relation with the other (even 
though reducing others to objects - things that can be measured, known and ‘dealt with’ - 
seems to be common place). For Husserl, this recognition is not so much an empirical one 
but one that has been originally constituted (because otherwise I could not become aware of 
being separate) - “I experience the Other as experiencing myself” - after which all acts of 
subjectivity are in reference in some way to this Other intersubjectivity (Zahavi, 2003, p. 
117). Husserl implies this in Cartesian Meditations (Husserl, 1960 in Zahavi, 2003, p. 116) 
when he says that even if he were the only survivor of a world-wide plague that his 
subjectivity would still depend on “co-functioning transcendental intersubjectivity”. This 
asymmetry and transcendence is the condition through which I become a subject, as otherwise 
we would be like ‘copies of the same story in a newspaper’ (Zahavi, 2003, p. 116, alluding to 
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Wittgenstein (2009, §265)) and intersubjectivity would not be discernible. For Husserl, this 
is an a priori constitutive relation between intersubjectivity and subjectivity (Zahavi, 2003, 
p. 116). Husserl also sees ‘transcendental intersubjectivity’ at times as ‘built in’ to 
intentionality, and also in “linguistic normality” (Zahavi, 2003, pp. 118-119). From this it 
seems to me that the other could both define us and alienate us at the same time, being defined 
by intersubjective relations, intentionality, and ‘linguistic normality’, but also alienated in 
these.   
Husserl struggled with whether empathy allowed a direct experience of the other, or 
whether it was always mediated (Moran, 2000; Zahavi, 2014). The attitude we have in our 
everyday life towards others, Husserl calls “personalistic,” and for him is more fundamental 
than a ‘scientific’ attitude. In the former, the other is given as whole, and he may be talking, 
laughing or dancing, so that I see him as an expressive unity (Zahavi, 2014, p. 128, after 
Husserl, 1952, p. 228; 235). Sometimes, in empathy, I somehow grasp this wholeness in one 
go, without having to break anything down into component parts. This is Stein’s (2008) 
position also (Lebech & Gurmin, 2015; Moran, 2000). It may also be linked to Heidegger’s 
(1930) idea of ‘unconcealment’ and ‘attunement’ as being mysterious. Husserl compares this 
kind of empathy to how we gather an object in its wholeness even though we only perceive 
it in profiles - we ‘intend’ it as a whole through an intentional consciousness of its absent 
profiles (Zahavi, 2014). The absent profiles are not ‘deduced’ or inferred rationally; they are 
‘filled’ by intentionality, which can be seen as a special kind of interpretation or “meaning-
intending” (Husserl, 1962, p. 183 cited in Zahavi, 2014, p. 129). The experience of the 
‘foreign other’ contains an ambivalence, however. It proceeds on the basis of something like 
an analogy, or memory, but may ultimately be a “phenomenological modification of myself” 
(Moran, 2000, p. 177). Husserl expresses this relation to the other then in three ways, as self-
alienation, a revealing of the whole as an experience of the other, and also as an analogy to 
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one’s own experience. The different ways of seeing empathy appear to be of major 
significance, as it could be that the other’s experience, both in therapeutic encounters and 
research, becomes ‘a modification of myself.’ Giorgi’s (2009) emphasis is on empathy based 
on analogy, which will be addressed in the Method Chapter (Section 4.4).  
Husserl’s arrives at a point where he views ‘constituting’ as an interleaving of 
‘subjectivity-intersubjectivity-world’ (Zahavi, 2003, p. 76) where ‘world’ here appears to 
mean language, culture and tradition. Criticising his own presentation of constitution in Ideas 
I, he begins to speak of “full subjectivity as being a world-experiencing life” (Zahavi, 2003, 
p. 74 after Husserl, 1973, p. 287). Fink (1933; 1988), would write that phenomenology was 
concerned with the “becoming of the world in the self-constitution of the transcendental 
subject” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 75). In a supplementary volume to The Crisis of the European 
Sciences, Husserl writes that “the transcendental subject can only constitute an objective 
world if it is incarnated and socialised” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 75 after Husserl, 1993, pp. 160-
165). Understanding is still based on subjectivity - the transcendental ego - but this leaves a 
question which has not been fully resolved by Husserl. As Merleau-Ponty writes:  
Now if the transcendental is intersubjectivity, how can the borders of the transcendental and 
the empirical help becoming indistinct?  … all the other person sees of me - all my facticity 
– is reintegrated into subjectivity, or at least posited as an indispensable element of its 
definition…. [A]utonomous subjects no longer know themselves to be subjects simply in 
relation to their individual selves, but in relation to one another as well (Merleau-Ponty, 
1988, p. 421-422 in Zahavi, 2003, p. 159).  
 In Husserl’s reflections on inner time consciousness, Merleau-Ponty’s view seems to 
be mirrored, as Husserl reaches a point where the distinction between the constituting and the 
constituted no longer belong to two different dimensions. This becomes evident through 
distinguishing between the prephenomenal, being prior to reflective thematization, and being 
as phenomenon (reflected upon) (Zahavi, 2003, p. 91 after Husserl, 1991b). 
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We say, I am who I am in my living. And this living is a lived-experiencing, and its 
reflectively accentuated single moments can be called ‘lived-experiences’, insofar as 
something or other is experienced in these moments (Ms. C3 26a in Zahavi, 2003, p. 91).  
Pre-reflective awareness is a stream of consciousness before being reflected upon (‘I am in 
my living’), but the act of reflecting means that this reflection “always arrives too late” 
(Zahavi, 2003, p. 92). In On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-
1917), Husserl points to the impossibility of separating subject and object because 
“prereflective self-manifestation” cannot be captured by self-reflection or intentional 
conscious acts (Zahavi, 2003, p. 91). Husserl (1977) frequently speaks of this prereflective 
self-awareness as ‘anonymous,’ in Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures (1925) and in his 
writings on intersubjectivity (Zahavi, 2003, p. 92 after Husserl, 1997, p. 478). It is anonymous 
in the sense that language fails to apprehend it (Zahavi, 2003, p. 93). In the Bernau 
manuscripts (1917-1918), Husserl is describing an ‘I’ that ‘functions’ and any act of positing 
about it in language is not what it is: 
In this sense it [i.e. the I] is not a ‘being’, but the antithesis to all that is, not an object 
(counter-stand) but the proto-stand (Urstand) for all objectivities. The I ought not to be 
called an I, it ought not to be called anything, since it would then already have become an 
object; it is the ineffable nameless, not standing, not floating, not existing above everything, 
but rather ‘functioning’ as apprehending, valuing, etc (Husserl, 2001, pp. 277-278 in 
Zahavi, 2003, p. 93).  
He believes that the ‘core’ of subjectivity remains transcendental (Moran, 2000, p. 190). 
Trying to define the ‘I’ in language misses out the experiencing subject. If such a radical 
‘functioning’ ‘I’ lies at the heart of subjectivity, then this has major implications for research. 
The idea that there is an anonymous ‘functioning I’ appears to imply that when we reflect on 
something that the reflection does something to what has already happened so that our 
reflections lose something vital of what happened (was happening). I will try to follow this 
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here through Merleau-Ponty, who developed Husserl’s thought in a direction in which 
perhaps it was already moving.  
 3.5.2.2 Science as a tradition 
Husserl tried to “delimit the validity of the scientific notion of truth” by showing how 
it is a tradition (Zahavi, 2003, p. 137). He spoke about how language “seduces” and ‘gets 
between’ idealities and constituting subjectivity such that it appears that objectivity can be 
attained (Zahavi, 2003, p. 136). Zahavi (2003, p. 136) notes that this position resembles 
Heidegger’s view of how Dasein becomes ‘lost’ in the publicness of the ‘they’ and idle talk 
(Heidegger, 1962, §35). For Zahavi (2003, p. 138), Husserl, through his discussion of 
‘normality’ and ‘anormality’, brings into question ‘objectivity’ as a static concept, and links 
it to history, when combined with the implications of intersubjectivity. Experiences guide our 
anticipations of normality. If what we experience clashes with these anticipations, then there 
is an experience of “anormality”, which then modifies anticipations (Husserl, 1966, p.186 
cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 133). Normality is based on conventions which are based on 
traditions (Husserl, 1973, pp. 428-429; Zahavi, 2003, p. 134). But crucially it is only 
disagreement between ‘normal’ members of a community that is taken seriously in deciding 
on disagreements; only the ‘normal’ (at first) is “apprehended as co-constitutive” (Zahavi, 
2003, p. 134 after Husserl, 1973, p. 162). It is the disagreement of these ‘normal’ people that 
leads to the motivation for science, that is, an objective way of deciding on truth valid for all 
(Zahavi, 2003, p. 135).  
Husserl views writing in this context of science as linked to two dangers, both of 
which are responsible for the crisis in the sciences. Firstly, that language has a seductive 
power, conveying particular interpretations, understandings and assumptions (Zahavi, 2003, 
p. 136 after Husserl, 1970b, p. 372). Secondly, language separates idealities from their 
subjective-relative origins, that is, constituting subjectivity (Zahavi, 2003, p. 136 after 
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Husserl, 1989, p. 269). Science then is a tradition, a development out of culture over time in 
a community (Zahavi, 2003, p. 137). He also acknowledges his own ‘formation’ as part of a 
historical community: 
What I generate from out of myself… is mine. But I am a ‘child of the times’; I am a 
member of a we-community in the broadest sense – a community that has its tradition and 
that, for its part, is connected in a novel manner with the generative subjects, the closest and 
most distant ancestors. And these have ‘influenced’ me: I am what I am as an heir (Husserl, 
1973, p. 223 in Zahavi, 2003, p. 138).  
 Husserl’s notes on constituting intersubjectivity bring him to a point, in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, where he comes close to the later Wittgenstein (Zahavi, 2003, p. 
138): 
It is high time that people got over being dazzled, particularly in philosophy and logic, by 
the ideal and regulative ideas and methods of the ‘exact’ sciences – as though the In-itself of 
such sciences were actually an absolute norm for objective being and for truth (Husserl, 
1969, p. 284 cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 138).   
 In summary, this section on constituting subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and empathy, 
has tried to show how a person may be ‘alienated’ in trying to understand the other, and it 
may be better to think of empathy as trying to understand ‘how my subjectivity constitutes 
him’ rather than ‘trying to understand or grasp the other.’ This leaves a ‘gap’ between the 
other and me that cannot be crossed, although I imagine attempts to cross it result in ‘closing 
down’ of some kind. This relation is made more complex as intersubjectivity also plays a role 
in constituting subjectivity. Husserl sees the importance of language in forming meanings 
that circulate as tradition, but he does not appear to consider that there may be a 
‘transcendental’ (to use his terminology) role of language as informing the ‘functioning I’. 
Nevertheless, the implications that could be drawn from the ‘functioning I’, as well as 
empathy as self-alienation, would appear to indicate that there will be a failure in any method 
that ‘tries to understand the other,’ or ascribe ‘objective’ meaning to what is spoken as 
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Giorgi’s (2009) method does, as the researcher will only find himself - his own subjectivity - 
in the process, and /or a ‘normalised’ sense of meaning, such as in a tradition or sedimented 
field of language. This is a complex problem, and may reflect how Husserl noticed that 
language distances us from our ‘originary experience,’ that is, our embodied experience of 
what it is to be the ‘I’ referred to above. This will be explored further here through Husserl’s 
and Merleau-Ponty’s views on intentionality, and through the work of Merleau-Ponty on 
meaning as a gestalt, and the differences between speaking and spoken speech. The idea being 
explored here is regarding how we can be struck by an experience that resonates with us as a 
‘truth’ yet another person’s truth may be quite different. This has implication as to what ‘truth’ 
might be in a method of research.  
3.5.3  The experience of truth – the truthfulness of experience  
In Logical Investigations (Husserl, 1970a, § 51 in Welton, 1999, p.21) Husserl asks 
how ordinary experiences have “authority”. “What gives such a special feeling authority?” 
when it is understood, for example, that 2+1=1+2, or one knows one is in pain when one is 
burnt. How does such a special feeling manage to “proclaim its truth?” Against Hume, and 
empiricism, Husserl is saying feelings and perceptions can be trusted, that they mean 
something about the ‘truthfulness’ of experience. For example, “Two persons… have the 
same sensations but are differently affected in their feelings,” would show that “inner 
evidence is nothing but the “experience” of truth.” For Husserl, “Truth is… only experienced 
in the sense in which something ideal can be an experience in a real act.” It is worth noting 
here that Wittgenstein says something similar - that while a ‘truth’, for example, a proven 
mathematical formula, can be stated by someone, that someone can only say that ‘truth’ in 
‘truthfulness’ if he understands the formula through and through, and likewise about his own 
truth (Heaton, 2010):  
“One cannot speak the truth; if one has not yet conquered oneself.  One cannot speak  
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it – but not because, one is still not clever enough” (Wittgenstein, 1998 in Heaton, 
2010, p. 32) 
There appears to be real complexity here. How can anyone come to know his, or her, 
own truth? I have often spoken something, feeling it to be ‘mine and true,’ only to realise 
later on that it was something someone else said, and I have acquired it somehow. This would 
be how intersubjectivity ‘constitutes’ subjectivity perhaps. How does one find one’s own 
words to speak? Are the research participant’s views just a ‘product’ of the times as Husserl 
implies regarding tradition? Is the research method itself not just a product also? How can 
one get around this? It appears to me that phenomenology has something to offer here if it 
privileges what is ‘given’ in experience, without reifying that experience, while one difficulty 
is to say what one’s experience may be.  
In Logical Investigations, Husserl refers to how something adequately perceived 
offers a givenness that reveals something of truth: “Truth is an Idea, whose particular case is 
an actual experience in the inwardly evident judgement” (original italics). This “inwardly 
evident judgement is… an experience of primal givenness” (Husserl, 1970a §51 in Welton, 
1999, p. 21). The experience of ‘primal givenness’ may need to be then linked to Husserl’s 
view that subjectivity is always linked to intersubjectivity, that subjectivity cannot be 
displaced from ‘objectivity’ (of traditions, for example) - so that what is revealed in the act 
of consciousness also says something about the intersubjective world (Zahavi, 2003). One’s 
experience of truth then is probably entangled with the ‘experiences of truth’ of others.   
The feelings of abjection as a mental health nurse could be understood as one of 
‘primal givenness,’ and so in these terms, approaching ‘truth’ and ‘truthfulness,’ but also in 
terms of an ‘experience of truth’ that says something about my ‘constituting subjectivity,’ 
linked to intersubjectivity. What is being researched then methodologically is an ‘experience 
128 
 
of truth’ but the ‘primal givenness’ of this experience for the research participants, informed 
by constituting subjectivity, and intersubjectivity.  
3.5.4  Intentionality and operative intentionality 
Husserl pays particular attention to a group of experiences that are characterised by 
object-directedness, and this attribute is called intentionality:  
“One does not merely love, fear, see, or judge, one loves a beloved, fears something fearful, 
perception, thought, judgement, fantasy, doubt, expectation or recollection, all of these 
diverse forms of consciousness are characterised by intending objects and cannot be 
analysed properly without a look at their objective correlate, that is, the perceived, doubted, 
expected object” (Zahavi 2003, p. 14).   
From this phenomenon, it can be seen that consciousness is not cut off from the world 
but is intrinsically directed towards and embedded in the world (Sass & Parnas, 2003). 
Intentionality is a Scholastic term, rooted in Aristotelian metaphysics, and was taken up by 
Franz Brentano (1838-1917) to indicate the immanent object (the content) of mental 
phenomena such as thoughts. The data of consciousness for Brentano are of two kinds: 
physical and mental phenomena. Physical phenomena are things like colours, images and 
smells (Morrison, 1970). The word ‘intentional’ has to do with mental phenomena and as 
Brentano meant it is derived from the verb ‘intendere’, used by the Scholastics, which means 
to pull a bow string as one aims at a target: an intentional object then is related to the target 
of a thought (Kenny, 2010, pp. 815-816; Von Eckartsberg, 1989). Husserl felt that Brentano’s 
greatest contribution was to show the intentionality of consciousness, that consciousness was 
always ‘consciousness-of’ (Morrison, 1970, p. 5). When we say ‘it is raining,’ for example, 
normally the focus is on this fact (that it is raining), but Husserl, after his teacher, Brentano, 
is interested in the act of consciousness that allows this fact to be revealed as a fact. This 
feature of consciousness that bestows meaning - it is raining - is called ‘intentionality’ 
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(Moran, 2000, pp. 96-97). Meaning is understood in terms of how something is constituted 
for us, however, where subjectivity constitutes the object ‘in consciousness’ ((Zahavi, 2003).  
It appears that the heart of a Husserlian approach to research, or any method, is what 
it is that allows identical and stable objects to be apprehended by consciousness - or how 
meaning comes to be ‘stabilised’. But how can there be stability when perception involves 
living through a changing manifold of sensations (vision, touch and so on)? These sensations 
are non-intentional experiential elements, moments that make up part of the perceptual act. 
Note also that other experiences besides sensations are non-intentional, for example, anxiety, 
happiness, fear (Zahavi, 2003). The act of consciousness is conscious of the object (intends 
it) but the sensations are not intended: The act and its immanent component are lived through 
“unthematically and prereflectively” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 26). Sensations are then interpreted, 
“To see a pen is to group a manifold of sensations with an objectifying and synthesising 
interpretation” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 27). So, the core of intentionality involves interpretation 
which ‘constitutes’ the objects of consciousness - something is interpreted “as something” 
(Moran, 2000, p. 234). But the intentionality being addressed here is intentionality as thematic 
or reflective (Sass & Parnas, 2003). As Husserl writes in Logical Investigations: 
“[T]he objects of which we are “conscious”, are not simply in consciousness as in a box, so 
that they can merely be found in it and snatched at in it; … they are first constituted as 
being, what they are for us, and as what they count as for us, in varying forms of objective 
intention” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 385 in Zahavi, 2003, p. 27).  
For example, looking at a friendly dog, I can tell someone who is scared of dogs that 
it is friendly because I can see its tail is wagging and other aspects also. But I already knew 
it was friendly without having to ‘thematise’ it in my mind. I may have to thematise how I 
might tell someone, to ‘target’ certain phrases and so on. In this way, it slowly ‘dawned 
through’ to me that there must also be an intentionality in our pre-predicative encounter with 
the world, which Husserl developed in his later works, for example, in Experience and 
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Judgement (Zahavi, 2003, p.30), which Merleau-Ponty (2014, p. xxxii) developed as 
operative intentionality (Freeman, 1993). It appears it can also be found in the above excerpt 
from the Bernau Manuscripts, on the anonymous ‘I’ that apprehends the world (Section 
3.5.2.1). In Husserl’s (1969) discussion of evidence, in Formal and Transcendental Logic, he 
speaks about the fundamental mistake of those looking for absolute certainty (“the usual 
theorist”) as imagining that a validating ‘mental process’ can be ‘torn’ from the lived mental 
world: 
“Thus it happens that evidence is usually conceived as an absolute apodicticity, an absolute 
security against deceptions – an apodicticity quite incomprehensibly ascribed to a single 
mental process torn from the concrete, essentially unitary, context of subjective mental 
living. The usual theorist sees in evidence an absolute criterion of truth… being unable to 
explicate evidence as a functioning intentionality…” (Husserl, 1969, §59 cited in Welton, 
1999, p. 262).   
It seems important to emphasise here that Husserl is saying that ‘meaning’ cannot be 
‘torn’ from the context of ‘living.’ It appears that this is precisely what ‘method’ tries to do, 
both regarding research and being therapeutic, and perhaps learning. What he appears to be 
saying is that ‘evidence’ is found through a ‘functioning intentionality’ which appears to be 
a kind of ‘anonymous’ activity of subjectivity.  
Merleau-Ponty (2014, p. xxxii/18) takes up this ‘functioning intentionality’ in his 
development of phenomenology, calling it operative intentionality. This form of 
intentionality does not refer to ways of speaking about meaning and intention in everyday 
language, such as ‘that’s not what I intended,’ or ‘that’s what I meant,’ or as Shaw (2014, p. 
44) puts it, “reflective mental states with representational content”; it refers instead to a 
‘constituting’ that occurs between the subject and the appearance of the world, the “in-
between” space that links the subject with the subject’s experience of the world (Vagle, 2009, 
p. 586). Operative intentionality can also be envisaged as “intentional threads” that connect 
us to the world, which can be tightened or loosened (Merleau-Ponty, 1995 in Dahlberg, 2006, 
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p. 16). Merleau-Ponty emphasises operative (‘functioning’) intentionality as “that which 
produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life” (Freeman (1993); 
Merleau-Ponty (1945), pp. xviii; xiii in Moran (2000), p. 402).  
Operative intentionality is ‘between’ the subject and the experience of the subject 
(Matthews, 2004). As Vagle (2009) writes: 
“… the researcher is always, already in an intentional relationship with the phenomenon 
under investigation… therefore, the researcher can never decide to invoke intentionality nor 
escape it; the researcher can only try to make fleeting sense of it as he or she reflects on it” 
(Vagle, 2009, p. 586).   
As noted above, an aspect that is striking here regarding intentionality as reflective, 
in Husserl’s usual sense of intentionality, and pre-reflective, primarily in Merleau-Ponty, with 
respect to research, is the implication that in a participant’s speech, and in the researcher’s 
involvement, there will be something that is targeted which the researcher can be open to by 
being open to the ‘primal givenness’ of what is apprehended, but at the same time the 
researcher’s intentionality will affect what is apprehended in a way that means perhaps it can 
at best be ‘glimpsed.’ This seems to mean that it cannot really be known what is going on, 
unless through an ‘act intentionality’ we ‘thematise’ a person’s ‘givenness’ and words in, for 
example, an interview, as, I argue, Giorgi (2009) does through his method (see Method, 
Chapter 4).  
Trying to understand intentionality has lead me, not only as someone who is 
researching the experience of the other, but also as a person, to think that coming to 
understand each other is complex, almost always missing the mark, with alternative but not 
necessarily mutually exclusive factors involved. At the same time, understanding is caught 
up in language and unless one comes to understand the other’s ‘language game’ - intentional 
threads perhaps - then one will only ever be guessing at what the other means. Along with 
this, there is something else involved that is beyond representational meaning, namely that 
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sensuous communication does not rely on language but is perception in all its forms, in which 
language is rooted, and ‘shows itself’ in the embodied intersubjective relation between 
people, that language and the sensuous are embodied in such a way that they cannot be 
separated. I will try to explore these aspects further in the following sections. 
3.5.5  Givenness in Husserl, and the intentional arc and gestalt as revealing 
sense in Merleau-Ponty  
In how a phenomenon ‘gives’ itself to consciousness, Husserl comes to privilege 
perception over other forms of articulating experience. But the intended object also comes to 
us in different ways or modes of givenness. Zahavi (2003, p. 31) gives the example of talking 
about his notebook, picturing it in his mind, and actually writing in it. The modes of givenness 
of the notebook here are different to the intentional meaning of the book - it is always still 
meant as his notebook under different modes of givenness - but is now given to consciousness 
in different ways. It is still the same notebook but given in different ways.  
Husserl assigns a hierarchical arrangement to this ‘givenness’: All types of re-
presentation are derived acts that refer to a proper presentation, the latter being the mode of 
givenness in which the object is given directly and as “optimally as possible” (Zahavi, 2003, 
p. 28). Linguistic (signitive) and imaginative (pictorial) givenness are less important than the 
perception itself. Therefore, Husserl believed that linguistic intentions are less original and 
fundamental than perceptual intentions, so that linguistic meaning is rooted in a “prelingusitic 
and prepredicative encounter with the world” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 29). Merleau-Ponty (1968) 
would emphasise this further (Murray & Holmes, 2013). This does not just mean prior to 
language acquisition, but also that “perceptual acquaintance with the world is a permanent 
condition and source of linguistic meaning” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 29). Husserl is saying that 
“sense and the sensuous” cannot be separated, that conceptual thinking and perception are 
intimately linked, but perception comes first (Zahavi, 2003, p.29). Signitive (linguistic) 
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givenness is ‘empty’ in that it is removed from this ‘sensuous’ encounter, while perception 
gives the object in its fullness (Zahavi, 2003, p. 31 after Husserl, 1984, p. 600). ‘Empty’ or 
‘full’ can be regarded as absence or presence of the intended object. Perceptual fullness 
however is still a self-presentation of the object’s being rather than the thing-in-itself (Zahavi, 
2003, pp. 30-31).  
For Husserl every intentional experience, or act, has a quality to it, and a matter to it. 
Quality is what is meant by aspects such as hoping, desiring, fearing, judging, remembering, 
and so on; matter is what this quality is directed towards, for example, a maths problem, a 
cat, a table. In Logical Investigations, the matter of the act also designates the meaning of the 
act (Zahavi, 2003, p. 22), in that it contains an ‘interpretative sense’ (Auffassungssinn) 
(Moran, 2000, p. 116). There is an element of interpretation involved here from the outset. In 
later works (Ideas I), Husserl will distinguish between meaning (Bedeutung) and sense (Sinn); 
the former referring to linguistic meaning, and the latter to a more comprehensive concept of 
meaning that includes prepredicative and perceptual meaning (Moran, 2000, p. 117; Zahavi, 
2003, p. 149). Merleau-Ponty will focus on the latter in Phenomenology of Perception, and 
the former in his later works, The Visible and Invisible, and On Vision, where he recognised 
how language interweaved with perceptual experience (Shaw, 2014). This concept of 
meaning (Sinn) emerged as crucial for this research, as will be discussed in Chapter 6 
(Phenomenology).  
Coming to understand this difference took time in this research, involving struggling 
with how ‘meaning’ at this pre-predicative level perhaps cannot be understood as either an 
interpretation nor a description, but something that simply is: that is ‘constituted’ both pre-
linguistically and linguistically, interwoven more like a gestalt that remains fixed (see Boston 
Change Process Study Group, 2008). In this way, I would argue that ‘constitution’ is 
ontological and is neither an interpretation nor a description but a ‘finding oneself in the 
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world.’ Merleau-Ponty’s ‘being-in-the-world’ emphasises this sensual linking of the world 
and the subject, especially in operative intentionality, where givenness is like a gestalt given 
to perception, whose “very form is the appearance of the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 
62). Merleau-Ponty showed the effects of operative intentionality through an examination of 
the case of Schneider, a German soldier injured in World War One. What Schneider lacked 
was a tacit relation to his ‘body schema’ (a holistic unity in which the body moves and 
functions as a whole in the world). At this stage for Merleau-Ponty this schema does not 
depend on representation in that nothing mediates between moving and deciding to move: 
“the relations between my decision and my body are magical ones” (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 
97/123). Merleau-Ponty develops this much further by seeing that embodiment cannot be 
separated from engagement with the world. For example, when Schneider is asked to draw a 
sketch, he has to verbally describe and interpret to himself the elements of the sketch. But: 
For the normal person, the object is “speaking” and meaningful, the arrangement of colours 
immediately “means” something, whereas for the patient the signification must be brought 
in from elsewhere through a genuine act of interpretation (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 
133/164).   
This ‘genuine act of interpretation’ is the reflective intentionality that Husserl usually refers 
to, in that something is posited in words (Freeman, 1993). This is the intentionality that Giorgi 
(2009) refers to in his method, and as can be now seen it refers to something that is not tacitly 
embodied, that does not grasp the ‘internal’ relation of the subject to his world. This appears 
to be of major importance for research method. 
In contrast, Merleau-Ponty emphasises operative intentionality as revealing a gestalt 
in perception which has to do with the immanent aspect of the ‘meaning’ of the world – the 
‘internal’ relation between the subject and the world which cannot be broken down into ‘sense 
data’ or indeed, ‘linguistic data.’ The ‘meaning’ that is referred to in this operative 
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intentionality is one that reveals meaningful relations of the parts to the whole that are 
inseparable (Shaw, 2014, p. 51).  
 Gestalt phenomena demonstrate how such ‘meaning’ is revealed as a whole in 
perception. For example, the Necker cube (Figure 1) demonstrates how perception reveals 
different aspects ‘passively,’ assigning meaning to these according to how each aspect is 
disclosed.  
 Figure 1 Necker cube (Shaw, 2014) 
 “Each part announces more than it contains, and thus this elementary perception is 
already charged with a sense” (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 4/25-26). The ‘sense’ (sens) spoken 
of here refers to a multiplicity of meanings that the word ‘sense’ can refer to, also in English, 
and directionality is included in French meanings. This kind of sense as a Gestalt is in 
opposition to the approaches (for example, in Hume) that see sense as a kind of stream of 
individual data points, or as a material that is given form through ‘categories’ of the mind (as 
in Kant) (Shaw, 2014) This can also be extended to language, by analogy, whose meaning 
takes up a different aspect if it is removed from its situated ‘game,’ in a community of 
practice, involving the tacit, the gestural and the embodied (see Theory, Chapter 2, Section 
2.4). Merleau-Ponty regards the gestalt as being due to how the human subject is ‘geared into’ 
the world (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, xxxiv/20).  
In the example of the Necker cube, two options present themselves to consciousness, 
two options are ‘given’ in perception, giving a ‘meaning’ of a cube with a lower front face or 
an upper front face. How the phenomenon of language affects such a disclosure of meaning -
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something ‘given’ in intuition in Husserl’s terms - in a conversation between two people, in 
an interview, in a therapeutic dialogue, or in any intersubjective relation, could be considered 
to be like ‘finding’ a gestalt, something that takes shape. This appears to be the direction that 
Merleau-Ponty was moving in before his untimely death (Shaw, 2014). It is interesting to 
note that Wittgenstein was of the same view, that the patterns that Gestalt psychology 
revealed were “precisely a meaning that I see” (Wittgenstein, 1980, §869 in Braver, 2014, p. 
143). Braver (2014, p. 143) notes that Wittgenstein spent much of his final years on this kind 
of analysis, and what is particularly striking is how the noticing of an aspect in perception 
‘dawns’ as a result of possibly seeing it in other ways (Wittgenstein, 1982, p. 169 in Braver, 
2014, p.143), while simultaneously “a concept forces itself on one. (This is what you must 
not forget)” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 215, § 191), and he did not believe this ‘seeing-as’ was 
an interpretation in terms of thinking about something (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 174 in Braver, 
2014, p. 143). It is interesting to note that this is the same problem as how anything becomes 
‘constituted,’ and how language influences ‘meanings’ such that they are so much ‘before’ 
the thinking of interpretation that they appear as if they simply are.  
This taking shape may be much like a ‘repeat’ of what is already found in sedimented 
language, like the Apostle repeats a doctrine, or like a cliché repeats something that belongs 
to someone else and is thus “empty” of vitality (de Botton, 1997, p. 106). But there is also the 
possibility that something other than this will ‘dawn through’ that has more to do with the 
embodied subject speaking and to be responsive and open to such an experience, I argue, 
depends entirely on the researcher being able to ‘allow’ this ‘field of experience’ between the 
researcher and the other person. This also links, again, to ‘openness’ and the therapeutic 
(Theory, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2). This kind of allowing of ‘meaning’ then may be more like 
an art form - a practice -  than a science which can be taught methodically, and I would argue 
that it may involve ‘resisting’ meaning, or not imposing meaning, when with another person. 
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Operative intentionality is the one that provides the text that our various forms of 
knowledge attempt to translate into precise language. The relation to the world, such as it 
tirelessly announces itself within us, is not something that analysis might clarify: philosophy 
can simply place it before our eyes and invite us to take notice (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 
xxxii/18). 
 What seems important here also is how Merleau-Ponty was working on language as 
being intimately intertwined with the world and the subject (Shaw, 2014). In this research, it 
will be argued that it appears, drawing on the later Merleau-Ponty, that meaning which 
includes linguistic meaning, can be found as a gestalt, which ‘functions’ in operative 
intentionality. While perception reveals the world as a gestalt (a meaning), it appears perhaps 
that linguistic meaning too is a gestalt, revealed in a gestalt of language, which may, or may 
not be, open to dynamic change. What I mean to imply here is that perception, the non-
intentional, the intentional of ‘act intentionality,’ and operative intentionality, are intimately 
interweaved with language such that meaning reveals itself like a gestalt. This is already 
implicitly indicated by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception where he describes 
the ‘intentional arc’ that inextricably links the subject to the world: 
The life of consciousness - the epistemic life, the life of desire, or perceptual life - is 
underpinned by an “intentional arc” that projects around us our past, our future, our human 
milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situation, and our moral situation, or rather, 
that ensures we are situated in all of these relationships. This intentional arc creates the unity 
of the senses, the unity of the senses with intelligence, and the unity of sensitivity and 
motricity (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 137/170). 
   
3.6  Speaking and spoken speech, and linguistic meaning as gestalt  
This section will explore how linguistic meaning - in light of the current research - 
may also arise as a gestalt, a pattern of relationships in which the whole cannot be broken 
down into constituent parts. The aim here is to throw light on the problem of the ‘experience 
of truth’ in which the same experience, linguistic and perceptual, can be understood 
138 
 
differently by different people. Coming to understand what another ‘means’ - what experience 
he is trying to speak of - it is proposed here depends on being open to a new pattern, or gestalt, 
of meaning. It is proposed that this openness depends on tacit knowledge, intuition, and an 
operative intentionality which also includes language, as well as ‘act intentionality’ (more 
active, judging, reflecting, recalling, imagining and so on; Freeman, 1993). In the experience 
of trying to understand someone else then something ‘dawns through’ as a perceptual and 
linguistic gestalt.  
It appears also that this experience cannot be separated from empathy as ‘self-
alienating,’ which implies that if the meaning of another’s experience appears clear then there 
may be something of my own ‘constituting subjectivity’ at work which has alienated the other 
through ‘constituting’ him within my own constellation of ‘meanings,’ unless we are both 
talking in clichés perhaps. In this way, it seems to be that what emerges in a perceptual and 
linguistic pattern or gestalt will always ‘have something to do with me’ and the only way to 
do justice to the other is to ‘not know.’ Meaning emerges like a gestalt that ‘speaks to me,’ 
like a pattern that I notice, that draws me to it to ‘see’ it. This gestalt of meaning is something 
then that the researcher is also involved in: I draw the other’s meaning through my own 
‘constituting subjectivity’; whatever ‘dawns through’ is something that ‘dawns through to me 
and through me,’ as a pattern that speaks to me. But crucially I have already been spoken for.  
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty (2014, p. 202/238) distinguishes 
between spoken and speaking speech.  Speaking speech is a creative act of novel thought and 
spoken speech reflects conventional significations of one’s language (Shaw, 2014, p. 104). 
He indicates this tension in his view on what constitutes ‘thought’ in Phenomenology of 
Perception: 
Thought is nothing “inner,” nor does it exist outside the world and outside of words. What 
tricks us here, what makes us believe in a thought that could exist for itself prior to 
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expression, are the already constituted and already expressed thoughts that we can silently 
recall to ourselves and by which we give ourselves the illusion of an inner life. But in fact, 
this supposed silence is buzzing with words – this inner life is an inner language (Merleau-
Ponty, 2014, pp. 188-9/223). 
 
Spoken speech “enjoys the use of available significations like that of an acquired 
fortune”, whereas speaking speech shows a “meaningful intention in a nascent state” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 202/238).  Therefore, to ‘think for oneself’ may often be nothing 
but a repeat of what has already been thought in a reservoir of language.  
We live in a world where speech is already instituted. We possess in ourselves already 
formed significations for all these banal words. They only give rise in us to second-order 
thoughts, which are then in turn translated into other words that require no genuine effort of 
expression from us, and that will demand no effort of comprehension from our listeners. 
The linguistic and intersubjective world no longer causes us any wonder, we no longer 
distinguish it from the world itself, and we reflect within a world already spoken and 
speaking (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 189/224).  
In contrast to spoken speech, speaking speech involves the transformation of 
something originary, something embodied, transforming a “certain silence into speech” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 189/224). He illustrates this through several examples: the child 
who learns to speak, the novelist, and the lover who discovers his emotions (Shaw, 2014, p. 
105). Because this speaking speech emerges from a kind of embodied silence, it ‘shows’ 
something that spoken speech cannot:  
“…it is the body that shows, that speaks” (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 203/239).  
To disarticulate ‘thought’ - as with Descartes - from this embodiment is to become lost in 
spoken speech, to think of the self as an idea: 
  “…myself as an idea, that is not, strictly speaking, my own” (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, 
p. 422/462).  
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It is not ‘my own’ because it has been given through language, intersubjectivity, and 
tradition, perhaps like a credo. In contrast, speaking speech then gives rise to something that 
“cannot be thought, but must rather be revealed” (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 426/466). How 
speaking may give rise to this revelation appears mysterious.  
The relation between acquired significations of spoken speech and the creative act of 
speaking speech is not fully accounted for in the Phenomenology of Perception because 
speaking speech must draw on what is already spoken to express that which is embodied and 
significant for the individual, and it appears that Merleau-Ponty was attempting to address 
this relation in his later works (Shaw, 2014).  
For Merleau-Ponty, in The Primacy of Perception, the speaking subject “lives in his 
language” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 87/152). Speaking speech comes through in the voice 
and reflects the operative intentionality in the subject’s ‘gearing into’ the world. In developing 
these concepts Merleau-Ponty was influenced by Saussurian linguistics which distinguishes 
between la langue (language as a system of signs governed by rules) and la parole, that is, 
language as spoken by the individual subject (Shaw, 2014, p. 116). This current research has 
found few published texts on the relation between language and perception, outside of 
psychoanalysis and cognitive science (for example, Boston Change Process Study Group, 
2008; Zahavi, 2012). It is worth noting Graziano’s (2000) concluding comments from his 
unusual book on operational language (influenced by Sartre),  
“…a life can encyst itself so securely within a maze of words, and operational habits, that can 
become for it an impenetrable matrix, and a shell, that it can prevent itself from happening: 
from operating response-ably... with the lives of others” (p. 449).   
Perhaps those people who do not ‘insist’ (‘encyst’) so much, who are uncertain and open to 
others, are those who are most therapeutic (see Theory Chapter, Section 3.5.2).  
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Shaw’s (2014) conclusions are that Merleau-Ponty’s late work on language and the 
sensible world (ie perception) are concordant with a non-foundationalist understanding of 
knowledge, that the ‘thing itself’ cannot be revealed through a phenomenological reduction 
because language is always already at work, and we are always already situated in the world 
so that we cannot find an ‘objective’ or ‘transcendent’ view. This implies that “meaning, at 
every level, is not imparted to the world in a deliberate act” (Shaw, 2014, p. 160). It can be 
inferred then that meaning ‘emerges’ and it appears that this occurs perhaps like how a gestalt 
appears in perception. Dahlberg (2006) in her discussion of ‘the essence of essences’ in 
phenomenology, notes how a pattern of meanings emerges through active phenomenological 
work (presumably free imaginative variation and the reduction). But then this pattern of 
meaning is watched, “as a figure against other meanings as background”, and it may become 
background again, with a new “tentative meaning” emerging as foreground: 
“In one moment, an explicit tentative meaning is a figure, in the next the same part of the 
text and its meaning is part of the background” (Dahlberg, 2006, p. 14).   
What appears most significant here is how meaning may be disclosed as a gestalt, a 
pattern of significances that reflect how the participant has lived her life, embodied, and 
experienced herself, “overrun with words”: 
“The meaning is not on the phrase like the butter on the bread, like a second layer of 
“psychic reality” spread over the sound; it is the totality of what is said, the integral of all 
the differentiations of the verbal chain; it is given with the words for those who have ears to 
hear. And conversely, “the whole landscape is overrun with words”” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 
p. 155).  
It appears to me that this “integral of all the differentiations of the verbal chain” is a 
pattern, something that emerges as a meaning that is perceived as whole. Since “the whole 
landscape is over-run with words” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 155), it appears that operative 
intentionality may be infused with language, not broken from it, which connects with 
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Wittgenstein’s assertion that meaning emerges from use which is rooted in a form of life, but 
this meaning may ‘force itself’ on us (this chapter, Section 3.5.5). As Husserl noted, meaning 
cannot be ‘torn’ from the living context (this chapter, Section 3.5.4). In an interview then, 
what may come through (if allowed to do so) is the meaning that the participant presents in 
his whole speech and embodied presence, and how this interacts with that meaning which the 
researcher also reveals as an embodied presence in himself, and much of this may remain 
hidden, and unknown, in the tacit and implicit senses.  
 
 3.7 Sedimented horizons of experience  
What has already been anticipated in this chapter, especially in reference to 
constituting subjectivity and givenness, is Husserl’s concept of the horizon to all perception. 
Husserl summarises this as:  
“There belongs to every genuine perception its reference from the “genuinely perceived” 
sides of the object of perception to the sides “also meant” – not yet perceived but 
anticipated” (Husserl, 1991a, p. 82 in Moran, 2000, p. 162).  
The horizon “maps out a set of expectations” linked to already experienced events 
(Moran, 2000, p. 162). Husserl recognised that one’s experience and understanding of the 
world had a ‘genesis,’ developed from an overlapping and sedimented series of horizons of 
the past, present and future, such that one’s subjectivity, constrained by these, also constitutes 
the same lived world (Moran, 2000).  
The concepts of perception of temporal objects (for example, music, or speech), as 
primal giveness involving “protention” and “retention” give a rationale for sedimentation. 
Protention is an anticipation of what is about to come already based on the primal givenness 
of a moment and the retention of that moment (Zahavi, 2003, p. 83-84). The latter is not like 
‘recollection’ which is thematic, nor the former like ‘expectation’ as it too is thematic. 
Protention and retention are implicit and unthematic and form part of a single ‘moment’ of 
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givenness, yet it can be seen that such a moment therefore has a ‘width’ to it. These processes 
build, over time, horizons of experience which become sedimented (Davidon & Cosgrove, 
2003; Sousa, 2014; Stern, 2004).  
While for Husserl, the ‘width’ of the present moment is a ‘structure’ of consciousness, it 
also indicates that there is something ‘implicit’ happening in the moment that influences how 
experience may be grasped. To understand an experience that is ‘built in’ to being present to 
the other then may be beyond reflection - and therefore beyond method. This can be linked 
also to the ‘anonymous’ transcendental ego, that is, that consciousness which resists all 
reflection but rather ‘acts’. 
“When I say ‘I,’ I grasp myself in a simple reflection. But this self-experience is like every 
experience, and in particular, every perception a mere directing myself towards something that 
was already there for me, that was already conscious, but not thematically experienced, nor 
noticed” (Husserl, 1973, pp. 492-493 cited in Zahavi, 2003, p.89).  
 
3.8  Plato’s Ideas and Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity as imaginary 
It is tempting to imagine that the ‘ground’ which Husserl is searching for is an 
imaginary one, an effect of appearance in the sense that Zizek (2014) elaborated for Plato’s 
Ideas. An essence then would be an appearance of one, but nevertheless an appearance that 
may have purchase ontologically and epistemologically, and is ‘felt’ or embodied, as well as 
generating research. Jameson (2006, p. 378) has posited that phenomenology is “a marker of 
the presence of the Imaginary,” a something that ensures “the temporal nature of truth.” What 
only needs to be taken from this - that is, one does not need to become Lacanian to use this 
idea - is that appearances are stabilising and reassuring, and ‘built in’ to the subjectivity that 
constitutes the reality around us. It is perhaps this kind of stabilising experience, emerging in 
credos, that give a sense that something has a timeless presence that can be described. A kind 
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of stabilising experience like this might encourage someone to try to transpose Franciscan 
spirituality into a life as a mental health nurse.  
 
In summary, this chapter has outlined the reasoning and experience behind the choice 
of phenomenology as a methodology. It has outlined how, in my view, epistemology and 
ontology are interdependent. A broad outline of phenomenology has been drawn to locate the 
research methodology against a philosophical background, especially with reference to Plato, 
Descartes and scepticism, in order to highlight what Husserl was attempting to achieve in 
deriving transcendental structures of consciousness. A further detailed exposition of some of 
Husserl’s concepts relevant to the research has been developed, including reference especially 
to the epoché, the reduction, constituting subjectivity and intersubjectivity, empathy and 
intentionality.  
 In doing so it has explored how knowledge, or knowing, is only foundational in the 
sense that it is intersubjectively and subjectively influenced, and may appear as an ‘experience 
of truth.’ This experience can lead to an idealisation of Truth, Knowledge, Science and so on, 
in a quasi-Platonic search for essences, if it does not take into account the effects of how 
language and culture gain purchase on subjectivity. This is linked to meaning, which, it is 
argued, appears as a gestalt influenced by sedimented language and culture, and has been 
explored through the work of Merleau-Ponty. Meaning which occurs to one, say in an 
interview, or in an interaction that is meant to be therapeutic, may be nothing but a meaning 
that ‘forces itself’ upon one as in a gestalt (see this chapter, Section 3.5.5.) so that the other 
person - and perhaps both of us - are ‘made captive’ in the one who is ‘accepting’ such 
meaning. We may also become captivated by credos emerging from such a milieu such that 
they come to be seen as ‘truth’ when they may be more to do with an ‘experience of truth.’ 
To be ‘open’ to the other then, which I have indicated may be what is therapeutic about some 
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mental health nurses (and therapeutic generally) (Theory, Chapter 2, Section 2.7), would 
involve perhaps ‘resisting’ or ‘suspending’ this meaning indefinitely. In this way, a ‘system’ 
of meaning never closes, although, as noted, some may need to close any such ‘system’ 
through anxiety (this chapter, Section 3.4.3). The points made in this chapter will be revisited 
in a discussion of Giorgi’s method in Chapter 4, with the intention of indicating the remit and 







4.  Introduction 
The Methodology chapter has explored how, following aspects of Husserl’s and 
Merleau-Ponty’s work, that what is being researched in this study is an ‘experience of truth,’ 
and the ‘primal givenness’ of this experience is intertwined with constituting subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, regarding how the world has been ‘disclosed’ to the individual person in 
and throughout his life through others, language and tradition. The Methodology chapter has 
indicated how researching this experience may be made more difficult due to how an 
intentionality that permeates meaning may reveal its ‘activity’ in a captivating gestalt. An 
‘experience’ that strikes a person then like a ‘truth’ can captivate him, or her, which shuts 
down other ways of allowing others to be. In contrast to this ‘shutting down,’ it has been 
suggested in the Theory chapter that a kind of ‘openness’ to the other person may be 
therapeutic in the sense that he, or she, is ‘allowed’ to be, and this links with an aspect of 
empathy which is ‘self-alienating.’ Keeping in mind these considerations, the intention of the 
method in this research is to describe “that which shows itself and actually appears” (Zahavi, 
2003, p. 52), without adding to or taking from it, in mental health nurses’ responses to the 
research question. The focus of the research question is on what mental health nurses know, 
and do, that is therapeutic and how have they learned to be therapeutic. Giorgi (1970; 1983; 
1989; 1993; 1997; 2000; 2006; 2009; 2012; 2014 a; b) makes the claim that ‘that which shows 
itself and actually appears’ can be described through an empirical method without 
interpretation, and his method will be examined in this chapter. What emerges from such a 
descriptive procedure will be discussed, as well as how Giorgi’s method consequently 
delimits research findings. Although Giorgi’s method derives from a reading of Husserl, and 
Merleau-Ponty, it principally utilises the Husserlian concepts of epoché, the reduction, and 
free imaginative variation (Giorgi, 2014). The Methodology chapter has looked at the 
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philosophical context from which these concepts emerge, and examined the wider field of 
Husserl’s project. This was important to situate the strengths and limitations of Giorgi’s 
method as will be discussed in this chapter. The chapter is organised so that firstly, an 
assumption about context in psychology is problematised. Secondly, an overview of Giorgi’s 
empirical method is outlined, with reference to why it has been chosen as a research method, 
why a method might be phenomenological at all, and Giorgi’s considerations on description 
versus interpretation, meaning and the empirical. Thirdly, the method of research is outlined. 
Finally, ethical considerations are discussed.   
4.2  An assumption about context in psychology  
In his introduction to existential-phenomenological psychology, von Eckartsberg 
(1998, p. 14) states a principle which he notes largely goes unnoticed and taken for granted 
in mainstream psychology, including phenomenological psychology, which is that “as we all 
do in everyday life, identically named experiences refer basically to the same reality in 
various subjects.”  This has been called an ‘axiom’ by van Kaam (1966, p. 32), which refers 
to all psychology. Von Eckartsberg (1998, p. 15) notices the tension between language and 
experience, in that we can say what we experience but always “live more than we can say.” 
Despite this, he and others, including Giorgi, depend on the assumption that “people in a 
shared cultural and linguistic community name and identify their experience in a consistent 
and shared manner” (von Eckartsberg, 1998, p. 15). What this points to is that 
phenomenological psychological research methods ‘name and identify’ from within a 
‘community’ with agreed, perhaps tacitly agreed, normalised sets of meanings. This applies 
whether the method is hermeneutic or descriptive; the former ‘defers’ meaning in a never-
ending movement linked to being (Braver, 2014), the latter looks for ‘unprejudiced’ meaning 
in context (von Eckartsberg, 1998). This means Giorgi’s method is delimited by such a shared 
‘cultural community.’  He shows this in several references to the “critical other” he is trying 
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to satisfy, that appears as the scientific community, or his peers in psychology (Giorgi, 2009, 
p. 96; p. 134). In this sense, he also refers to intersubjectivity in the analysis (with reference 
to meaning units being transformed into psychological language): 
The researcher is reading the participant’s description, but within the reduction he or she 
awakens the phenomenal characteristics of the description, which in turn makes the sense of 
the described experience more available. This is not as individualistic as it sounds. First of 
all, the researcher is in a research attitude, which means that an intersubjective attitude is 
adopted. The researcher is not responding as an individual but as a member of a community 
whose criticism he or she is well aware will pursue the analysis. That is why one can say 
that in all of these solitary analyses, the critical other is sitting on the shoulder of the 
analyser (Giorgi, 2009, p. 133-134).  
Channelling the psychological descriptions into a form that can be accepted by a 
community in order to gain recognition may therefore delimit the findings, so that what 
cannot be spoken of for that community remains excluded. In contrast, the view which has 
been traced in this research, is in which language, embodiment and culture intersect in such 
a way that meaning, and being alive, for a person is idiosyncratic such that ‘being oneself’ 
goes beyond the fact that ‘we live more than we can say’ and into the realm of a multiplicity 
of ways of finding and being oneself in the world with others. There will always be something 
about us that escapes the ‘community’ of shared understanding. This is complex, as, it appears 
we are ‘subject to’ culture, language and embodiment, yet somehow ‘escape’ culture and 
language also.  
4.3 An overview of Giorgi’s empirical method 
Giorgi’s method draws on certain aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology to attempt to 
derive, using scientific method, essential meaning structures (Giorgi, 1997). Giorgi was a 
founding figure in adapting Husserl’s phenomenology towards an empirical science in 
psychology (Valle, 1998; Wertz, 2005). There are several mainstream methods which draw 
principally on Husserl’s phenomenology (Moustakas, 1994; Valle, 1998). For this research, 
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Van Kamm’s method was rejected because it was an early, ground-breaking method 
developed to attend to a large number of participants, and included quantitative procedures 
such as analysis of the frequency of statements in the data (Moustakas, 1994; Valle, 1998). 
The method proposed by Colaizzi (1973; 1978) was considered, but a difficulty here was that 
an interpretative reading of the ‘data’ is required in order to arrive at a fundamental structure, 
which also involves interpreting implicit aspects with reference to the researcher and the 
participants (Dowling, 2007; von Eckartsberg, 1998). Colaizzi differentiates a fundamental 
description, linked to a readily accessible reflective, reportable appearance, from a 
fundamental structure, linked to a pre-reflective aspect of a participant’s experience. The 
former is an explicit experience, and for Colaizzi is phenomenal. The latter has an implicit 
character, and is revealed through an interpretive reading of the participant’s presentation and 
language, and for Colaizzi is phenomenological (von Eckartsberg, 1998). Colaizzi’s approach 
is Heideggerian in its underpinning philosophy, such that “knowledge is always and 
necessarily contingent, constantly in tension, awaiting further though never completed 
fulfilment” (Colaizzi, 1973, pp. 98-99 cited in von Eckartsberg, 1998, p. 36; see also Giorgi, 
2006), so the implicit meanings in fundamental structures are presumably still subject to these 
hermeneutic conditions. However, what has been argued in this research is that there is 
something that gives ‘purchase’ to meaning which ‘captivates’ us, and it is this that becomes 
susceptible to description rather than interpretation. Therefore, participants’ descriptions are 
coming from something embodied that has purchase, ‘captivating,’ as opposed to being like 
a text that might be interpreted hermeneutically. For this reason, Colaizzi’s method was 
rejected, although the approach is clearly fruitful and of value. Giorgi (2006) notes that 
Colaizzi’s final step of having the participants check the analysis is theoretically unsound, as 
they would be checking from the natural attitude, whereas the analysis was carried out in the 
phenomenological attitude. Giorgi (2006) also adds that replication of a phenomenological 
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analysis can only be carried out from another analysis in the phenomenological attitude. It is 
interesting to note that Colaizzi’s focus on implicit meaning may also be an implicit attempt 
to reveal operative intentionality, in order to get ‘outside’ of ‘anonymous consciousness’, and 
embodiment (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2). Von Eckartsberg (1998, p.35) summarises this 
succinctly in more ordinary terms: “Can one ever be present and privy to the pre-reflective 
dimensions of one’s experience?”  
Giorgi’s (1970; 1997; 2009; 2014) descriptive phenomenological method has been 
chosen for this research for three reasons. Firstly, the descriptive phenomenological method 
is part of a strong tradition in psychological research (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003) and claims to 
separate empirically what is essential to a phenomenon or subject of inquiry (Hein & Austin, 
2001; Rennie, Watson & Monteiro, 2002; Wertz, 2005). Secondly, its potential to capture a 
present moment, regarding in particular what is given in perception so that what is given can 
be viewed as a description rather than an interpretation. Thirdly, its claim to isolate essential 
meanings in a transcribed text, derived from recordings of interviews, in an empirical, 
scientific way. Some of the “liveliness” of the interview dialogue is evoked “imaginatively” 
in the transcribed text (Giorgi, 2009, p. 126), while at the same time the description is not 
meant to go beyond the ‘given’ (Giorgi, 2009, p. 127).  
It is important to note that, for Giorgi (1997; 2009), scientific knowledge has a distinct 
validity, because it is systematic, methodical, general, and critical. Science for Giorgi is a 
“cultural institution” concerned with ascertaining the “most valid” knowledge of phenomena 
(Giorgi, 1997, p. 246). ‘Systematic’ knowledge is regulated by “laws, concepts, or meanings” 
- that is, patterned - as opposed to “chaotic or random” knowledge (Giorgi, 1997, p. 246). The 
methodical requirement of such knowledge relates to how it has been gained through a 
method “accessible to a community of scholars” (Giorgi, 1997, P. 46). ‘General’ means that 
such knowledge, although it may not be universal, has applications beyond the research 
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situation (Giorgi, 1997, p. 246). Englander (2012, p. 17) notes that ‘general’ here also refers 
to the knowledge resulting from the research, as opposed to the process of finding 
participants. Also, ‘critical’ refers to the activity of the researcher rather than the participants, 
as well as referring to the critical scrutiny of a research community (Giorgi, 1997; Englander, 
2012; 2016). A critique of aspects of this view of scientific knowledge will be discussed in 
the Phenomenology and Discussion chapters (Chapters 6 and 7 respectively).  
What is appealing about Giorgi’s method is that it attempts to give a faithful 
description that is theory-free, and so not interpretative in the broadest sense (Giorgi, 2014). 
Intuitively this seems possible, but there is a complex of ideas that would indicate that it is 
not, most importantly from Husserl’s own view of constituting subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, such that we are always caught up in the views of others, as well as empathy, 
such that we are alienated from others. What has been argued throughout this research project 
is that there is something embodied that is not open to interpretation, that can be described 
effectively, rather than being subject to a sliding interpretation (since interpretation always 
leads on to another interpretation in the hermeneutic circle). This may be linked to Plato’s 
idea of Ideas, and Zizek’s (2014) interpretation of these as an appearance ‘on the surface’ that 
gives a sense of stability and constancy. But the embodied effects of such an ‘ideality’ imply 
that there is something stable that is susceptible to description rather than interpretation. In 
fact, Zizek (2014) may view his interpretation as nothing but a description. Giorgi’s (2009) 
view is not centred on embodiment but rather on how language can give a faithful sense of 
what the research participant is trying to communicate. By choosing this method of research, 
it is implied that the phenomena that the research participant conveys in the interview can be 
‘given’ faithfully in the consciousness of the researcher, so that what is written about it is a 
description rather than an interpretation. But this depends on the ability of the researcher to 
enter into the phenomenological attitude (Finlay, 2008), that is, maintain the process of the 
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epoché and the psychological reduction (Giorgi, 2014). Staying in the reduction is the work 
of the researcher and not the research participant (Giorgi, 2014). This means the researcher 
has to be able to be open to the other person in a radical way, such that he comes to be alert 
to the activity of his own intentionality. This appears to present an impossibility because what 
is being asked is to address a ‘transcendental problem’ through a psychological procedure, 
although Merleau-Ponty (2014, p. xxvii/14) implies there is some room for this happening 
through his use of the metaphor of loosening “the intentional threads” in order to let those 
thread “appear”. It might be helpful to consider that Husserl’s, and Edith Stein’s, view of 
empathy as ‘self-alienating’ (Zahavi, 2003) indicates the kind of attitude the researcher might 
take up, so that something of the ‘between’ of the participant’s subjectivity-world 
intentionality, and the ‘between’ of the researcher-participant intersubjectivity, may be 
intuited (see Methodology, Chapter3, Section 3.4.2).   
Giorgi (2009, p. xii) set out originally to find a method for qualitative psychological 
research based on phenomenology. It is interesting to note that perhaps phenomenological 
psychologists and philosophers may not have developed a method for good reasons, that is, 
that phenomenology as a practice was primarily about cultivating an attitude. For example, 
Inkpin (2016, p. 6) views phenomenological ‘method’ as simply describing “accurately how 
things appear or manifest themselves.” This is not at odds with a view of science as 
observational, which is the basis for natural sciences such as geology, zoology and botany, 
which are founded on field work. The current research comes from a praxis that has developed 
over years of working as a therapist phenomenologically, cultivating the phenomenological 
attitude involved, which is an attitude of radical openness to ‘what is there’; as discussed, this 
involves suspending the ‘natural attitude’, but this takes practise, and can be “painstaking” in 
its “demand for awareness” (Merleau-Ponty 2014, p. xxxv/22). It has been argued here also 
that this involves a long process of coming to know oneself: I cannot attempt to put in 
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parentheses my beliefs, biases and prejudices without knowing what these are. In developing 
a method, Giorgi was trying to make a place for phenomenology in science viewed as method, 
in psychology as a human science (Giorgi, 2009).  
  Giorgi’s (2009) method especially focuses on Husserl’s concepts of the epoché and 
the reduction in a psychological way, as well as the process of imaginative variation to 
describe the essence of the research participant’s meanings in the data. He appears not to have 
engaged with the implications of constituting subjectivity and intersubjectivity, as well as 
Husserl’s view of empathy as involving otherness and Merleau-Ponty’s views on 
embodiment. In light of the methodological considerations already discussed, what Giorgi’s 
method appears to be aimed at is the ‘experience of truth’ of the research participant as 
revealed in the consciousness of the researcher. As indicated such an experience may be both 
epistemological and ontological for the research participant, that is, embodied and lived.  
Empathic understanding has been discussed in relation to Walker’s (1994 a; b; 1995) 
comparison of Jaspers and Husserl, and more recently, Zahavi’s (2001; 2003; 2014) analyses 
of empathy in the phenomenological tradition (see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.1). 
It is argued here that Giorgi’s method of analysis is one that depends on a view of 
phenomenology as empathic understanding as understood by Jaspers (1912), following his 
teacher, Max Weber (Walker, 1994 b; 1995), and developed by Spiegelberg (1964; 1986; 
1995 cited in Giorgi, 2009). In so doing some questions are opened up as to the nature of how 
Giorgi’s method attempts to address the complexity of understanding the other. By 
responding to these questions, an outline of what the method actually does, and what it cannot 
do, will be explored and discussed.  
For me, philosophy, as an idea, remains universal, and in a radical sense, ‘rigorous’ science. 
As such it is science built on an ultimate foundation, or, what comes down to the same 
thing, a science based on ultimate self-responsibility, in which, hence, nothing held to be 
obvious, either predicatively or pre-predicatively, can pass, unquestioned, as a basis for 
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knowledge. It is, I emphasize, an idea, which, as the further meditative interpretation will 
show, is to be realized only by way of relative and temporary validities and in an infinite 
historical process – but in this way it is, in fact, realizable (Husserl, 1989, p. 406 in 
Applebaum, 2012, pp. 36-37). 
In defending Giorgi’s empirical method, Applebaum (2012) uses this passage to 
highlight that scientific method based on Husserl’s phenomenology will yield knowledge that 
is perspectival and contextual, and involves a self-responsibility on the part of the researcher 
to understand in depth what kind of knowledge is being generated. This is one reason why it 
is important for the researcher to understand his own ‘natural attitude’ in that it entails a self-
responsibility to have an in-depth idea of what is understood as knowledge. This self-
understanding is not just to prevent ‘distortion’ to the data analysis epistemologically, but 
also to stay open to the ‘other person’ in research, including the research participant, and 
everyone else involved in the research project. Getting close to the radical implications of 
intentionality, requires this kind of radical openness (Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 2003). 
Applebaum (2012) is arguing that Giorgi is aware of this need.  
 
4.4 How Giorgi sees his method as phenomenological and descriptive 
In defending his method against critics who believe it is a distortion of 
phenomenology (Paley, 1997), or that it is in fact a hermeneutic method (Rennie, 2012), 
Giorgi (2000; 2014) has explicated in detail the connections between his method and 
Husserl’s phenomenology. Giorgi (2000) emphasises that his method is not a philosophical 
one and therefore is not attempting transcendental reduction, is not trying to analyse 
consciousness, but analyses descriptions from others and is not at its core interpretative. In 
theory, there is only a qualitative difference between an interpretation of ‘a present moment’ 
- of something that presents itself - and a description of the same if both are undertaken within 
phenomenology as all biases and prejudices are bracketed insofar as possible (Giorgi, 2014). 
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This can be seen, for example, in Giorgi (2014), where the view is that the reduction makes 
description mandatory (unavoidable). That is, the reduction, if successful, means there is no 
interpretation: If I have removed all my biases and assumptions successfully, then I am in a 
position where what I see is a description. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty thought this kind of 
reduction was impossible (Moran, 2000).  
Rennie (2012) has given strong arguments to indicate that all qualitative research in 
psychology is hermeneutic, including Giorgi’s descriptive method. Giorgi’s (2014) response 
to this accusation is thorough and detailed, insisting that the move in his method from Life-
world phenomena to psychological language is interpretive in one specific sense only, but 
that the core of the method is descriptive. The argument between Rennie (2012) and Giorgi 
(2014) appears to show that description and interpretation are concepts with ‘family 
likenesses’. Giorgi (2014) spends some time exploring the differences between description 
and interpretation and insists on their difference. Description is a predication, denoting that 
“a linguistic expression accurately delineates the non-linguistic state of affairs to which it 
refers”; interpretation, on the other hand, “always implies that something is not entirely clear” 
(Giorgi, 2014, p. 544). Giorgi (2014) believes then that ‘states of affairs’ can become clear 
through a radical and active entering into the epoché and reduction (Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 
2003).  
Giorgi (2014) maintains that description is a discreet and separate entity to 
interpretation; the latter involves ‘theory’, that is, views and beliefs in the broadest sense, 
being applied to experience, and therefore distorts in some way. Drawing on Ricoeur (1971), 
Giorgi (2014) is of the view that hermeneutics at its core involves a ‘personal commitment’ 
and therefore an imposing of a theory in its broadest sense upon the ‘data’ – ‘If I make 
something ‘my own’ then this is what I have done’: 
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If we follow the paradigm of the dialectic between explanation and understanding to its end, 
we must say that the meaningful patterns which a depth interpretation wants to grasp cannot 
be understood without a kind of personal commitment similar to that of the reader who 
grasps the depth semantics of the text and makes it his “own” (Ricoeur, 1971, p. 561 cited in 
Giorgi, 2014, p. 548).   
Following Husserl, Giorgi (2014) believes that phenomena can be described just as 
they present themselves - as presenting to consciousness, not necessarily existing - and that 
this presentation can be described faithfully in all its givenness without being distorted by 
any theoretical attitudes or beliefs. What is presented to consciousness - viewed as the 
participant’s data - is described, and Giorgi (2014, p. 546) uses different verbs to give a sense 
of the effort involved in what happens in this process of description: for example, ‘draws out, 
imagines, clarifies, and highlights.’ Part of this “nitty-gritty” of analysis involves imaginative 
variation (Giorgi, 2014, p. 546). In my view, this aspect of the analysis appears as the point 
where constituting subjectivity especially comes into play, and if the findings of the research 
are to be repeated - repeatability of results being a characteristic which Giorgi indicates 
validates the method as scientific (Giorgi, 2009, p. 83) - then this may have more to do with 
the researcher using ‘sedimented’ language to describe phenomena (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.4.2). Giorgi appears to be aware of this but sets such concerns aside, indicating that his 
method does in fact yield scientific results nevertheless, which, although they cannot describe 
“every aspect of a lived-through event”, are “adequate” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 125). Citing 
Merleau-Ponty (1964, p. 46), he demonstrates that he is aware that expression and experience 
do not simply coincide:  
“In already acquired expressions there is a direct meaning which corresponds point 
for point to figures, forms and established words… But the meaning of expressions 
which are in the process of being accomplished cannot be of this sort; it is a lateral or 
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oblique meaning which runs between words” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 46 cited in 
Giorgi, 2009, p. 125). 
Despite this, for Giorgi, the words of the participant reveal something that is 
‘adequate’, enough to reveal new knowledge of the phenomenon being explored (Giorgi, 
2009, p.125). As can be seen, the difference between interpretation and description is one that 
haunts the method. An example may illustrate this. Participant 9 makes the simple statement 
that she does not think about the therapeutic much:  
I suppose weird because a lot of the stuff I do I just do it and don't really think about it...  so, 
it's a bit weird I'll probably miss loads and loads and loads off because I just do it without 
thinking about it...  and I'll probably go and do something and I will go, oh I could have said 
that... (lines 397-399). 
In the transformed meaning unit, an effort is made to stay descriptive, situated in the 
language of the participant, and not to state what perhaps is glaring out of the text, that there 
is tacit knowledge involved, because this may involve interpretation.   
It is weird talking about what she does that is therapeutic because a lot of what she does she 
does not think about a lot. She thinks she will probably miss out a lot in talking about it 
because she just does it without thinking. She will probably think later that she should have 
spoken about other things also (Participant 9, Transformed Meaning Unit 30 - Meaning 
Unit, lines 395-401) 
There is a difference here which is part of the activity of the reduction, separating 
what appears more explicitly as an interpretation - even if such an interpretation appears 
correct - from the tacit, or ‘constituting’ activity of the researcher. The former can be seen 
more easily, while the latter usually cannot emerge at all, or may do so to some extent with 
some difficulty, perhaps through being open to the ‘critical other’. For this reason, the 
difference between interpretation and description haunts the method. It is interesting to note 
that openness to the other is a critical finding in this research, so that not only can this be 
therapeutic but it also may reflect what ‘good research’ might involve. The decision to stay 
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descriptive then results in the sentence, ‘She does not think about what is therapeutic much,’ 
which summarises this theme in her general synthesis.  
Giorgi (2000) addresses whether description of the experiences of others can be 
viewed as phenomenological (cf. Paley, 1997). Giorgi (2000) drew on Spiegelberg (1964; 
1982) for precedent, who took issue with Jaspers’ claim that describing the ‘psychopathology’ 
of others was ‘phenomenological’, and therefore took up the challenge of addressing how 
such experiences like categorising psychopathology could be said to be phenomenological. 
The difficulty being addressed here is how empathy is possible. Jaspers saw his work as 
employing a ‘descriptive psychology’, mistakenly drawing on the early Husserl, specifically 
in Logical Investigations (Walker, 1994a; b; 1995).  
Spiegelberg (1995 in Giorgi, 2000) believed that a researcher could be 
phenomenological by ‘vicarious experiencing’, which involved “imaginative self-transposal” 
and “co-operative encounter” or “co-operative exploration” (Giorgi, 2000, pp. 4-5 citing 
Spiegelberg, 1995, pp. 35-53). In imaginative self-transposal there is a “shuttling back and 
forth” between the researcher’s “understanding self and that of the other who is to be 
understood” - there is a tension “between constructing the other” and avoiding “imaginative 
license” (Spiegelberg, 1982, pp. 49-50 cited in Giorgi, 2000, p. 4). Something about the other 
in the world is communicated to the researcher through the participant’s speech and behaviour 
(Giorgi, 2000, p. 5); Giorgi (2000) alludes to Husserl’s (1964) concept of subjective 
constitution, and Edith Stein’s (1989) work on empathy here, but does not note that Husserl 
saw empathy as ‘self-alienating’, or examine the full implications of constituting subjectivity 
(see Methodology, Chapter 3, Sections 3.5.2). Indeed, phenomenology can be thought of as 
“not-empathy” (Walker, 1995, p. 255).  
‘Co-operative encounter’ is an exploration, likened to the transference relationship in 
psychoanalysis, and the researcher experiences the participant’s experiences “only through” 
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the latter (Spiegelberg, 1982, pp. 50-51 cited in Giorgi, 2000, p. 5). Giorgi (2000) strongly 
agrees that the research relationship (that between the researcher and participant) is like a 
therapeutic relationship, and appears to follow Spielberg’s reference to a psychoanalytic one. 
He is saying that something of the other can be known through a therapeutic-like process of 
research, involving empathy and imagination. This is his first point, in defending the move 
from philosophical phenomenology to a scientific phenomenology. Regarding the therapeutic 
relationship, he does not appear to acknowledge that different ‘therapies’ will engage 
differently with the other in therapy, so there is an implicit assumption that the ‘therapeutic 
relationship’ is somehow a uniform concept. For example, to name just three ‘therapies’, 
Lacanian psychoanalysts do not see their practice as a therapy (Parker, 2008), Kleinian 
analysts interpret the transference according to a rigid theory (Malan, 1993), and person-
centred counsellors will focus on providing the ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ required 
for personal development (Rogers, 1962). Each of these forms of ‘therapy’ involve numerous 
assumptions as to what it is to be a subject, a human being, or a person, and what is empathy. 
Scientific scholarship has its own style, which Giorgi (2000, p. 5) says he also 
experienced as a “critical other” (the wider scientific community) which demanded he did not 
address only his own experience as the phenomenological philosopher would, but explore the 
experiences of others. He came to believe that he could practise phenomenologically while 
exploring the experience of others through the following argument (Giorgi, 2000, p. 5):  
1. “Individuals who are research subjects describe situated experiences of interest to the 
researcher from the perspective of the natural attitude.”  
2. “The researcher analyses the description from within the phenomenological reduction 
and specifically for its psychological (or nursing) meaning.” He is saying here that there 
is a phenomenal field of meaning that applies to separate areas of interest (nursing, 
psychology, etc.) For example, if I am a geologist and I want to know what kinds of 
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rocks were on the moon, I would not ask the astronaut how he felt on the moon but what 
he saw. This appears to imply that a different language game is to be applied to the 
‘data’ depending on the area of research.   
3. As the researcher is in the attitude of the reduction, he makes no claim as to the 
existence of the phenomenon that appears, but only that it appears faithfully in the 
consciousness of the research participant as it was reported by her.  
4. The focus being on the “human science meaning, rather than on the facts as such” 
indicates that the “the intentional objects and the signitive or fulfilling acts are given in 
linguistic experience” (as much as they would have been in direct experience). He 
assumes here that meaning can be given full expression in words (‘fulfilled’ in Husserl’s 
terms). As has been noted (Chapter 3, Section 3.5 and 3.4.4), signitive intentions are 
fulfilled by categorial intuitions, and it is to this correlation that Giorgi is referring. 
However, there is the basic assumption on Giorgi’s part, that the language being used 
belongs to a linguistic community in which meanings are already known (van Kaam, 
1966). Therefore, the meanings involved already refer to a set of meanings (tacit or 
explicit) in circulation in a linguistic community. Giorgi does not dispute that the results 
of his analysis are always contextual (Giorgi, 2000).  
Giorgi is aware that meaning arrives as part of a ‘figure-ground’ as in a gestalt (Giorgi, 
2009, p. 125) so that descriptions will always fall short of expressing this phenomenon. He is 
more interested in meaning as defined by the words of the research participant. Again, what 
this appears to do to the words used by the participant is to make them mirror an already 
received view of a phenomenon, something that is already to do with ‘spoken speech’ rather 
than speaking, in Merleau-Ponty, or sedimented language in Husserl. Giorgi is aware that 
linguistic description cannot express a lived-through experience fully. Citing Merleau-
Ponty’s Signs (1964, p. 46 in Giorgi, 2009, p. 125), “acquired expressions” have a “direct 
meaning” in “established words” but “the meaning of expressions which are in the process of 
being accomplished” have an “oblique meaning which runs between words”. The direct 
161 
 
meaning that Merleau-Ponty is referring to here appears to be what he would later call ‘spoken 
speech’. The relationship between speaking and spoken is ambivalent, as discussed (Chapter 
3, Section 3.6), where meaning may emerge as a gestalt against a ground of tacit and 
embodied knowledge. Giorgi’s claim is that descriptions can be adequate enough however to 
convey new knowledge drawn from this figure ground (Giorgi, 2009, p.125). Implicit 
meanings can also emerge for Giorgi (2009, p. 134) against a contextual ground, which may 
be articulated if possible.  
4.5 Meaning in perspective 
Giorgi (2014, p. 542) has indicated that he prefers the descriptive method of research 
over the hermeneutic method because it is, in his view, “more faithful to the data”, that is, 
what the research participant has said or indicated. As discussed in the Methodology chapter, 
it appears that the hermeneutic method imposes a theory (in the broadest sense) upon the data, 
and this has distorting effects (Giorgi, 2014). The only aspect of his method which Giorgi 
concedes as interpretative is the overall positing of the ‘lifeworld’ data in psychological 
terms, but the actual core of the data analysis is descriptive (Giorgi, 2014). It would appear 
that for Giorgi (2014) a description is a faithful representation of what the research participant 
meant and this can be ‘given’ to the researcher such that he only needs to describe it just as it 
is given (possibly attainable if he can stay in the epoché and reduction).  
Giorgi is aware that the process is complex (Applebaum, 2012). A major difficulty 
with Giorgi’s method - or any ‘method’ that involves ‘meaning’ - is that Husserl’s view of 
intentionality does not refer to meaning in the ordinary sense. Intentionality refers to how the 
subject’s consciousness ‘constitutes’ the objects in the world (things, states of affairs and so 
on) and this is not only the activity of a self-reflecting, autonomous consciousness (standing 
back reflecting on the world) but is also the activity of an ‘anonymous’ consciousness, pre-
reflective and ‘constituting’. How then can we catch a glimpse of the anonymous 
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consciousness of the research participant as it constitutes the world without our own 
anonymous consciousness getting in the way? 
The careful description that Giorgi’s method attends to is not one that addresses this 
anonymous, constituting consciousness, but one which tries to describe faithfully the 
language the research participant uses in reference to meaning. What Giorgi’s method 
provides is an account of what meanings appear but appear in a process of speaking and 
interaction between two people, where one is trying to remove his own meanings from the 
conversation.  
It appears that ‘living in our descriptions’ is an important concept to note here; that it 
is important to develop an attitude that questions our firm ‘beliefs’ (‘beliefs beyond beliefs’) 
about the world (see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.4). An interpretation can become 
a description if it is embodied enough to be ‘beyond interpretation’ - that is, if it is 
‘constituted’ rigidly, perhaps in the Husserlian sense. In this way, what is taken for granted 
as how the world is, how others are, and how oneself is, are beyond discussion. This would 
be the opposite to a radical openness that the reduction implies, and indeed to the ‘openness’ 
that has been identified as therapeutic in the Theory chapter.  
4.6 Giorgi’s move from transcendental to empirical 
Giorgi and Giorgi (2003) indicate that in order for Husserl’s method to be described 
as scientific, as opposed to philosophical, it has to be modified, in that the researcher now 
adopts an attitude of scientific phenomenological reduction with a psychological perspective. 
This is not the transcendental reduction of the philosophical method, but rather a 
psychological reduction whereby what is experienced is understood to be an experience given 
to the person experiencing the object but no existential status is given to the phenomenon.  
“To be taken as a phenomenon means that everything that is noticed with respect to the 
given is taken to be worthy precisely as a presence in the manner it is present, but one does 
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not have to say that the given is the way it presents itself to be…This aspect of the reduction 
is devised to help overcome the natural human bias of stating that things are the way we 
experience them to be without critical evaluation” (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003, p. 249).  
The difference between transcendental phenomenology and empirical 
phenomenological phenomenology is clear when one considers that, as noted above, what 
Husserl means by ‘things’ are what “words may be found to signify when their significations 
are correctly intuited by the right kind of Anschaaung” (Macquarrie & Robinson, 1962, p.50), 
where an Anschaaung is “an intuition immediately given in experience” (Smith & Woodruff 
Smith, 1995, p.86). For Husserl these ‘things’ refer to the meaning-intending structures of 
consciousness (Moran, 2000, p. 93), while for Giorgi (2009) they refer to coincidence 
between words and a given intuition within the psychological reduction (not the 
transcendental reduction). However, as discussed in the Methodology chapter, there may be 
a blurring between the transcendental and the empirical, as both are rooted in intersubjectivity 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.1).  
A scientific analysis obtains descriptions of experiences from others as opposed to 
oneself. This is largely in response to traditional scientific practice and its accepted ideas of 
validity (Giorgi, 1997; Giorgi, 2009), something towards which Husserl took issue, who 
thought of science as more to do with a playful curiosity (Husserl Archiv B 1 32 Nr. 17 
translated by Moran, 2000, p. 183; see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1). Giorgi’s version of science 
can be traced back to Galileo and Descartes, where something is being measured in the world 
(in the former) and then analysed through a deductive procedural process (in the latter). Giorgi 
(2000, p. 5) speaks of having to engage with the problem of how to reconcile philosophical 
(phenomenological) practice, in which the first-person perspective is paramount, with the 
demands of the scientific community in order to arrive at a “scientific phenomenological 
practice.” Strictly speaking, from the phenomenological perspective, the researcher is meant 
to analyse his or her own stream of consciousness (Giorgi & Giorgi 2003). Giorgi (2000, p. 
164 
 
5) notes that scientific research has a “certain style, one that turns towards the world or others 
as the basis for its interrogations” and that if he had persisted with the phenomenological, 
first-person stance, then he would have had to defend himself against the accusation that his 
research would be “in the service” of his own personal theory.  
Giorgi came to believe that meaningful psychological results, mediated through the 
consciousness of each participant, are all present to the consciousness of the researcher and 
this fulfils the phenomenological requirement (Giorgi, 2000; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). There 
is an emphasis on signitive giveness, or linguistic meaning, as the data is written words, but 
Giorgi (2000, p. 5) insists these are not just ‘marks on a page’ but are worked with 
imaginatively in the data analysis to attempt to be true to the participant’s experience. There 
appears to be something missing here in Giorgi’s method in that Husserl gave precedence to 
perceptual givenness (Zahavi, 2003, p.  28). In what way can Giorgi’s method do justice to 
givenness that is non-linguistic if it focuses on transcriptions? Words that convey linguistic 
meaning, or signitive intentions, are modes of givenness of being (Zahavi, 2003, p. 30-31) so 
in this sense something of the ‘being’ of a situation is being given in Giorgi’s analysis. Giorgi 
(2009, p. 134) appears to recognise this when he indicates that an “implicit psychological 
meaning” can be intuited as a “background presence” in a description. But as indicated it 
would appear to be a mode of givenness that has been filtered reflecting a linguistic 
community of ‘psychological language.’  
Giorgi (2000) draws on this connection to make claims that the researcher can know 
what the participant means through signitive fulfilment or intuition: by you saying something 
I know what you mean. This appears to draw on the van Kaam (1966) ‘axiom’ in psychology 
that there is a common language which we can rely on for meanings that are consistent. Giorgi 
(2009, p. 133) states that in order to fulfil the phenomenological requirement “the intentional 
object of the researcher’s experience” is being discerned, and presumably that this variation 
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is faithful to the participant’s situation in the world also. In addition, the researcher bears in 
mind the intersubjective requirement of his descriptions. Therefore, the results of the data 
analysis will reflect what the researcher has already found to be in the world, or at best, this 
reflection will coincide with what the participant’s speech appears to mean about the 
participant’s situation in the world assuming the participant is already part of the situation of 
the researcher. It cannot escape notice here that the speaking speech of the subject is given 
less relevance in Giorgi than the spoken speech of the subject.  
Giorgi (2014) emphasises that what is given in the data is not to be analysed in a way 
that imposes theory, or any kind of view, and maintains that this is possible. Giorgi’s view of 
theory is in line with my own ‘natural attitude’ regarding theory in that theory imposes a way 
of thinking about the other that is potentially violent to the other person, but we are always 
caught up in ‘theory’ to an extent.  
4.7 Giorgi’s empirical descriptive method 
Giorgi’s method, developed over many years (for example, Giorgi, 1970; 1997; 
2009; 2014), comprises eight steps or stages, listed here: 
1. Interviewing (data collection) 
2. Transcription of each interview  
3. Division of each transcription into meaning units 
4. Transformation of each meaning unit into psychological language 
5. Synthesis of transformed meaning units into general or situated structures, or themes, 
with key constituents 
6. Synthesis of themes into a general synthesis, or structure, for each participant 
7. General synthesis, or structure, comprising all the general syntheses of all participants, 
along with identification of key themes, or constituents, across all the participants.  
8. These key themes, and their constituents, facilitate an understanding of the variations in 
the interview data.  
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These steps will be elaborated in this section, illustrated with actual data from this 
research. Note that ‘stage 5’ is a transitional move from transformed meaning units to the 
general synthesis. Giorgi sometimes gives examples of this movement (Giorgi & Giorgi, 
2003) but the transition is so complex, involving imaginative free variation, and the reduction, 
that it is difficult to illustrate. An attempt has been made in this research through listing 
themes which emerge, and an attempt has been made to preserve the situated character of the 
participant’s words, or meaning of those, as much as possible. The final step, Giorgi’s 
“poststructural analysis”, involves a return to the data from each structure, or synthesis, to 
facilitate an understanding of the variations on themes in the data, “reducing myriad details 
to their essential components” (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003, p. 256). The ‘life-world’ language of 
the participants can be viewed again through the essentialising lens of the structure for all 
participants, to understand the data in a “systematic and methodical way” (Giorgi & Giorgi, 
p.255). In this way, “the ultimate outcome of phenomenological scientific analyses is not just 
the “essential structure” but rather the structure in relation to the varied manifestations of an 
essential identity” (Giorgi, 1997, p. 242; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). It was found in this research 
that this final step was one which was integral to the arrival at a synthesis, and it is hard to 
see how this would not be so in every case, since the syntheses emerge from the data (and not 
the other way around).  
4.7.1 Two principles 
Giorgi (2009, p. 69) sees two principles from Husserl which he considers key with 
respect to a phenomenological approach to science.  The first is the ‘principle of principles’ 
which is that the ‘givenness’ of phenomena can be trusted within limits, so that 
“…every originary presentive intuition is a legitimising source of cognition, that everything 
originarily (so to speak, in its ‘personal’ actuality) offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted 
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simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented 
there” (Husserl, 1983, p. 44 in Giorgi, 2009, p. 69).  
 
As Giorgi (2009) puts it, 
“Husserl is respectful and trusting with respect to experience. It is not the case that 
experience cannot be illusory, it is just that illusions and others sorts of error are also 
corrected by experience” (p. 69).  
 The second principle is that of imaginative free variation. The use of imaginative free 
variation within the attitude of the phenomenological reduction, aims to result in the 
emergence of the essential psychological characteristics of the phenomenon under study, 
without which, or beyond which, the phenomenon would ‘collapse’ (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003, 
p. 246). Imaginative free variation is a key move in Giorgi’s method and is present throughout 
the process. In terms of the phenomenological reduction, Husserl gives the example of 
looking for the essence of an act of perception (Moran, 2000, p. 154):  
Starting from this table perception as an example, we vary the perceptual object, table, with 
a completely free optionalness, yet in such a manner that we keep perception fixed as 
perception of something, no matter what. Perhaps we begin by fictionally changing the 
shape or the colour of the object quite arbitrarily… In other words: Abstaining from 
acceptance of its being, we change the fact of this perception into a pure possibility, one 
among other quite “optional” pure possibilities – but possibilities that are possible 
perceptions. We so to speak, shift the actual perception into the realm of non-actualities, the 
realm of the as-if (Husserl, 1991a, p. 104 cited in Moran, 2000, p. 154-155).  
In this way, contingent and essential characteristics of a phenomenon are derived, by 
varying the characteristics imaginatively. If the ‘meaning’, or ‘meaningfulness’, of a 
phenomenon collapses when an aspect is removed imaginatively then this aspect may be an 
essential characteristic (Giorgi, 2009, p. 69). It is important to note that practising imaginative 
free variation is a process that occurs throughout the analysis of the transcribed interview, 
and happens within the attitude of the epoché and the reduction.  
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Imaginative free variation, or eidetic variation (see Andrews, 1985; Levin, 1968), 
highlights the complexity of the kind of decisions that the researcher must make in defining 
what is and is not essential to a phenomenon. It would appear that the kind of process involved 
here is analogous to the complex decision-making employed in responding to an encounter, 
as well as being open, and being able to be open, to viewing the situation differently, as 
discussed in the Theory chapter. Some of the complexity here is also indicated by Moran’s 
(2000, p. 155) comment, that “it is one thing to intuit an essence and quite another to express 
that intuition in words.” This may link to tacit knowledge, in that one can have an intuition - 
in the perceptive sense of Husserl - and be unable to formulate this in words (‘signitively 
fulfilled’). Some of this complexity will be illustrated below (Section 4.7.4), and discussed 
further in the Phenomenology chapter (Chapter 6).  
4.7.2 Sampling and sample 
 The choice of participants in a phenomenological study centres around those whose 
“lives involve a revelatory relationship with the subject matter under investigation” (Wertz, 
2005, p. 171). The sample aims at ‘representativeness’ with respect to the subject of research 
(Englander, 2012, p. 18). Participants are those who are likely to be in a situation to elucidate 
the overall phenomenological focus of ‘What is it like?’ with respect to the research question 
(Englander, 2012, p. 18; Giorgi, 2009). However, the findings from a sample of people, who 
ostensibly may know something of the phenomenon the researcher is exploring, may not be 
representative of what the researcher already knows about the subject, and this only emerges 
during the latter stages of the analysis (Englander, 2012, p. 19). In other words, the findings 
may transcend what is already known of the subject of research (Englander, 2012, p. 19). 
Englander (2012) makes these points because the focus in a phenomenological method with 
respect to ‘representativeness’ is the phenomenon itself, rather than a population, as may be 
the case in quantitative methods. While it is obvious that the participants will have something 
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to say about the research question, sampling in phenomenological research is based on a 
“depth strategy” rather than a “sampling strategy” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 198). Morse (1994) 
recommends that phenomenological research focussed on determining the invariant, or 
essential structures of a phenomenon include around six participants. However, the size of a 
sample in phenomenological research is not always predictable from the outset of the study 
(Denscombe, 1998). In addition, the logistics in interviewing participants, and the time 
involved in transcription and data analysis, limits the number of participants that can be 
involved (Englander, 2012).  
The researcher set out to interview qualified mental health nurses working in NHS 
adult in-patient mental health settings and NHS adult community mental health settings. The 
study was approved ethically by the NHS Trust involved, after which permission was granted 
by the appropriate ward and team managers to approach mental health nursing staff regarding 
the study. Participants in the study are those who responded to global emails, with the research 
question information sheet attached, sent to mental health nursing staff on two acute mental 
health adult wards and two community mental health teams. There were 10 participants in 
total, nine interviews lasting from 55 to 70 minutes, and one lasting 46 minutes. Those who 
responded were clearly interested in the study, and so findings may perhaps represent the 
context of those mental health nurses who place a particular value on their practice being 
therapeutic. Seven of these worked as community mental health nurses across two separate 
teams, and three worked on in-patient acute wards.  
4.7.3 Interview procedure  
Descriptions of experience were gathered by means of recorded interviews, which are 
the main data collection tool in qualitative human science research (Englander, 2012). Before 
the interview each participant had read an information sheet summarising the research project, 
and this is also summarised verbally before the interview. Each participant also signed the 
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information sheet agreeing to participate (Appendix 2). The interviews for this research were 
digitally recorded, and the interviews carried out in different quiet office locations on NHS 
Trust sites which were amenable for the participants.  
Englander (2012) notes that Kvale (1994, and 2009 with Brinkmann) provides the 
most extensive commentary on how to conduct an interview in general qualitative 
methodology. However, as Giorgi (2009) observes, there is nothing published with reference 
to phenomenological interview criteria. Englander (2012) means to remedy this to an extent 
by clarifying some difficulties. In particular, Englander (2012) draws attention to the source 
of the research question, as it will be this which needs to inform a philosophically consistent 
research method, including the approach to the interview. What stands out as most relevant 
for this research is the need to remain in the phenomenological attitude of describing ‘what 
is’ as opposed to interpretation, since it is being claimed that something can be known from 
phenomenological experience that can be described (Giorgi, 2009), that holds true as an 
‘experience of truth’, for example. In the interview the interviewee describes his or her 
experience of the topic the researcher is investigating in as detailed a manner as possible. The 
participant is speaking from the natural attitude, while the researcher is within the attitude of 
the epoché and reduction (Giorgi, 2000).  
Prompts and questions endeavour to open up a space where the participant can find 
his or her own voice on the topics that arise, while at the same time the researcher tries to 
maintain the activity involved in the epoché and reduction. As Giorgi (1997, p. 247) notes: 
“The phenomenological approach is “discovery oriented,” and in order to discover meanings 
in the data, one needs an attitude open enough to let unexpected meanings emerge.” This 
applies as much to the attitude of the researcher in the interview as to his attitude during 
transcription and analysis of descriptions.  
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An approach to questioning that reflects back what the participant said may be more 
amenable to staying with the phenomenological attitude throughout the interview (Findlay, 
2008). Interviewing phenomenologically, it is acceptable to direct the participant to the focus 
of the study if he or she has strayed away from this, but unacceptable to lead the participant 
(towards a view of one’s own, for example) (Englander, 2012; Giorgi, 2009, p. 124). What is 
paramount for the researcher is to attempt to stay in the epoché and reduction throughout the 
interview, withholding judgement in responses, and suspending assumptions about what the 
participant may mean, attempting to draw out more detailed descriptions of phenomena being 
described if they appeared to be relevant to the research question. The emphasis is on 
description and it is important to be aware of any drift towards interpretation (Giorgi, 2009). 
This is a demanding activity, similar to what happens in the analysis of the transcriptions but 
perhaps more complex because it involves an embodied relation between two subjects, as 
opposed to a subject-object relation in the natural sciences (Englander, 2012, p. 34). It was 
an activity with which the researcher had some familiarity through practising therapeutically 
from a phenomenological perspective in his work as a therapist for some years now. However, 
a balance has to be struck between developing a rapport with the participants and directing 
them towards the focus of the research (Giorgi, 2009).  
In this research in some cases, it was clear that the participant was trying to figure out 
what the researcher wanted from them, and there was a tension between whether this attitude 
may represent something of what the participant felt was therapeutic - to put the other first - 
or to do with something else. In one case, the participant said she had been “thrown a curve 
ball” because she did not realise that the interest was in her own experience and thoughts 
regarding the research question, and the copious notes she had prepared from text books and 
journals were not the focus. In this case, it seemed important for her to be allowed to have 
space to speak about these notes also, and it came across in the interview, reflecting her 
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studious approach to the interview, that she wanted to ‘get it right’ for others, and was able 
to be open to the experience that her own ideas may be ‘wrong.’  
 
 4.7.4 Transcription and analysis of the data 
 The data from each interview is then transcribed. This is a time-consuming process, 
but allows a thorough immersion in the data as it may involve repeatedly listening to different 
aspects in order to catch the exact words used, along with tone of voice, embodied effects, 
and implicit meanings that emerge from a background to the words being spoken. The method 
requires that the focus is on the words spoken, although there is room for implicit meaning to 
also be registered (Giorgi, 2009). One then reads the entire transcription of the interview as a 
whole because the phenomenological perspective is holistic. There is a positioning of the data 
in the mind of the researcher as a whole body, rather than a fragmented collection (Giorgi, 
2009).  
Meaning units are then demarcated, based on where meaning appears to change. This 
step is largely to make the data manageable. All researchers would not have to have identical 
meaning units for the procedure to be valid as this is an intermediary stage of the method 
(Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). Meaning units “are constituted by the attitudes and activity of the 
researcher” (Giorgi, 1997, p. 246). Often, several separate themes may be found in one 
meaning unit, so it is not a question of finding a consistent meaning in each unit.  
The researcher then analyses each meaning unit through free imaginative variation to 
derive invariant or essential descriptions within each meaning unit. This follows the following 
procedure: The researcher transforms the initial meaning units into psychological language 
through free imaginative variation. This involves the researcher “interrogating each meaning 
unit to discover how to express in a more satisfactory way the psychological implications of 
the lifeworld description” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 131). It is interesting to note that Giorgi is aware 
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that “the phenomenological psychological attitude of the researcher” is to an extent 
constitutive of the findings in this procedure (Giorgi, 2009, p. 131). Psychological meanings 
are “teased out” of the participants’ descriptions and the process of imaginative variation is 
lengthy and complex but cannot be fully shown. Descriptions are revisited over again until 
invariant psychological meanings emerge (Giorgi, 2009, p. 132). The psychological 
phenomenological reduction at work here is a partial reduction for Giorgi, as what is being 
reduced - through imaginative free variation - are the objects of consciousness and not the 
acts, such that these objects are the participant’s descriptions linked to his or her “worldly 
subjectivity” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 135). Giorgi is interested in what can be discerned of the 
“intentional activities of individual subjectivity” in relation to each participant as revealed 
through each description (Giorgi, 2009, p. 135). The meanings researched in this project are 
those related to the therapeutic and learning in mental health nursing, and the language 
employed in this step was focused on staying as true as possible to the participant’s words, or 
‘situated,’ but in the third person. There is an assumption then that the reader will see the 
descriptions as reflecting the ordinary language of the mental health nursing milieu, and not 
for example, a language game from psychoanalysis, or cognitive psychology.  
For example, as can be seen from the table below, Participant 3 is wondering about 
an aspect of what she finds to be therapeutic, and this meaning unit is embedded in an overall 
fragment of conversation about tender loving care. She has just criticised the Crisis Team for 
not caring but then has backtracked, as their job is to assess and manage risk. While the word, 
‘care,’ is not in this meaning unit, it is implicit in the context of what is therapeutic being 
linked to care (‘the Crisis Team did not care’). What is striking also here is how she wonders 
whether empathy is always helpful, and whether the therapeutic is a personal value rather 
than a universal factor. These aspects are not quite explicit, nor quite implicit either, but it is 
like she is ‘feeling’ her way towards discovering something. Indeed, her wondering and 
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questioning indicate an openness to learning that is implicit here while made more explicitly 
clear elsewhere. ‘Openness’ is therefore emerging as a key constituent for her.  
 
Meaning Unit 6 (Lines 133-148 of Transcript) 
P3: Yeah, but I suppose that's where the therapeutic 
thing comes in, but it's just that's my personal values 
then isn’t it? 
R: Yeah 
P3: Thinking about it…  
R: And what happens there? Yeah… it is your personal 
values. 
P3: How I, I suppose I've always treated people how I 
would want to be treated, so if I was in their position… 
Is it over-empathetic, I don't know? I don't know…  
R: I don't know either… So it's as if the other person, if 
you were in their position what would you want? 
P3: Yeah and what would they need… and 
Transformed Meaning Unit 6 (TMU6) 
She feels that to have the personal value of 
caring is therapeutic. She sees this caring 
as treating people the way she would like 
to be treated, but is concerned she may be 
being over-empathetic.  
 
   
There is a balance between over-contextualising a participant’s experience and the use 
of “theory-laden terms” to diminish the relevance of this experience (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003, 
p. 253). This process attempts to distinguish which parts of the transformed data are essential 
to the phenomenon under study and which are not (Giorgi, 1997). The researcher is seeking 
the essence or structure of the phenomenon but because of the nature of the data this is always 
context-bound so that what one arrives at in the research in terms of findings is always in the 
context of the field being researched and of the data sampled (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003; Wertz, 
2005). Giorgi (2014) concedes that this part of the analysis is interpretative because it is 
imposing a psychological language upon the description, however he still maintains that the 
imposition of psychological language remains true to the original description. Such 
‘psychological language’ refers to a broad understanding that reflects an “atheoretical 
psychological attitude such as is often assumed by practising clinicians and therapists every 
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day” as opposed to, for example, the specialist language of psychoanalysis, and other 
therapies (Giorgi, 2009, p. 135). Giorgi’s (2009; 2014) views on this transformation into 
psychological language are ambiguous as he admits that there is no agreement yet as to what 
‘psychological language’ means since psychology is not yet “authentically established” as it 
has not yet been “theoretically unified” as a science, in his view (Giorgi, 2009, pp. 134-135). 
Indeed, on this subject he argues that psychology is “the study or science of subjectivity” 
(Giorgi, 2013, p. 250), which would imply that ‘psychological’ language belongs to the whole 
field of what it is to be human. Extrapolating from Malebranche (1638-1715), following 
(Gurwitsch, 1966), Giorgi (2013) posits that such a ‘study’ as psychology addresses error, 
strangeness, what deviates from norms, or the “difference between the lived and the known”, 
and that aligning psychology with a ‘natural’ science’ such as physics is a mistake rooted in 
Cartesian methodology (Giorgi, 2013, p. 254; Giorgi, 1993). The term ‘study’ sits more 
congruently with my view on subjectivity. In view of this ambiguity as to what ‘psychological 
language’ may be, Von Erckartsberg (1998, p. 41) has been followed here, who states that a 
transformed meaning unit is a “third person summary statement” of the dominant meanings 
in that meaning unit. This appears congruent with Giorgi’s views as outlined above.  
In the next step, the researcher again applies free imaginative variation, this time to 
the transformed meaning units to arrive at what is an essential structure of the phenomenon 
under study: “One carefully describes the most invariant connected meaning belonging to the 
experience, and that is the general structure” (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003, p. 253). This process 
involves determining which elements of the transformed meaning units are essential to the 
phenomenon under study and which are not (Giorgi, 1997). This step was carried out by 
placing the transformed meaning units into themes, making the arrival at a general synthesis 
for that participant more manageable, and the process more transparent. As Giorgi (1997) has 
noted, some themes may be redundant in that they do not refer to the phenomenon under 
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study, but nevertheless these themes are allowed to emerge, although are excluded from the 
findings. Several transformed meaning units may refer to the same theme running through 
the data. These themes can be termed situated structures, which represent the essential 
description in the concrete terms of the data; or general structures, which are removed from 
the concrete terms of the data, and can be trans-situational, that is, they can apply across 
different aspects of the same theme (Von Erckartsberg, 1998). These themes are specifically 
outlined in this research, in order to show how the key constituents in each converge into final 
themes in the general structure of each participant. The flow of the key constituents as they 
converge or diverge into themes is illustrated below, but note that the process over multiple 
participants involves repeated immersion in the data and cannot be illustrated fully (Giorgi & 
Giorgi, 2003, p. 255).  
For example, Figure 2 (below) illustrates the synthesis of three transformed meaning 
units for Participant 3 contributing to the partial development of Theme 1 (Figure 3). Apart 
from the three transformed meaning units listed here, five other transformed meaning units 
also link with this Theme 1 (as indicated in brackets). 
Figure 2 Transformed Meaning Unit synthesis Participant 3  
P3 Transformed Meaning Units  
TMU2: 
Her patients were all on the Care Program Approach who had serious 
mental illnesses and felt abandoned because services had not been in touch. 
Mental health services had an 18-month waiting list just for assessments.  
TMU3: 
At first, P3 thought she was going to cure her patients through tender loving 
care, and through helping them manage their illness and associated 
problems. But she sees this hope of curing them as naïve now. She began to 
feel helpless and sometimes depressed that there were so many people 
asking her to talk with them, sharing their problems with her. She felt she 
had to be available for each person as she was often the only person in their 
world who actually cared enough to sit and listen to them. She did not want 
to feel she was letting them down by not being available and she thought of 
this as counter-transference. She feels she is put on a pedestal by her 
P3 General/situated structure or Theme 
Th1 
P3 can feel sad and helpless because people 
are not cured, including by tender loving care. 
They still want time with her nevertheless and 
she can instil realistic hope (TMU2, TMU3, 





patients, as their Community Psychiatric Nurse, and her anxiety is about 
wanting to do her job properly for them and to be helpful. She does not 
think she is emotionally involved with her patients.  
TMU35: 
P3 personally wonders whether a lot of medication is effective because she 
sees it does not work for many people, especially regarding anti-
depressants. She is unsure about how much is placebo effect. She thinks 
medication gives psychiatrists something to hold on to that is practical.  
 
 
Figure 3 P3 Theme1: Illustrative changes in free imaginative variation and reduction  
Patients felt abandoned by the community mental health team due to lack of contact (TMU2) 
It is naïve to think that tender loving care is enough to cure people (TMU3)  
She can feel helpless and depressed as so many people do not get better (TMU3, TMU35)  
People want to talk to her and share their problems with her (TMU3) 
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She is often the only one who cares enough to sit and listen (TMU3)  P3 can feel sad and helpless because people are not  
cured, including by tender loving care. They still want time with her nevertheless (Theme 1, partial) 
 
Without needing to explore this topic here, as it will be addressed in the Findings 
chapter, it can be seen that it is problematic to separate themes from what appears to be an 
integrated activity of this mental health nurse. The sense she has of her ‘patients feeling 
abandoned’ she addresses by giving them time, so that in this theme, ‘time’ subsumes 
‘abandonment’. What is essential to the therapeutic aspect of her work, without which the 
meaning of what she is conveying might collapse, is ‘time.’ The factor of ‘hope’ is integral 
and tacit to her activity and comes through from other transformed meaning units. The 
tender loving 
care













people do not 
get better
P3 can feel sad and 
helpless because 
people are not cured, 
including by tender 
loving care. They still 




example given is intended to illustrate the process of arriving at a theme, and ‘hope’ has not 
yet been included. The arrows in Figure 3 are skewed to indicate the to-ing and fro-ing 
interchange of deciding what is essential  
The following example illustrates the development of the general synthesis for 
Participant 3. 
Figure 4 Development of general synthesis Participant 3  
P3 General synthesis 
Spending prolonged time with people is therapeutic because she becomes personally involved, genuinely listens and is interested, feels 
for, is open to, and learns from, the other as an equal, and is cautious about identifying herself with the other or giving advice. She 
shows understanding and makes her commitment to the person explicit. Being able to feel and tolerate emotional distress is part of 
being therapeutic.  
She has learned from being open to patients and colleagues, and her own reading. No formal training was offered in university on how 
to be therapeutic outside the medical model of cure. Being caring and compassionate cannot be taught, and are more like personal 
qualities.  
Her work is split between applying models of care to do with risk management and the medical cure (encouraging compliance with 
medication, the recovery model and the Care Program Approach, and NICE guidelines), and spending time with patients, which is  like a 
‘prescription of humanity’. The split in her work causes her distress as she feels responsible across both aspects.  
 
P3 General/Situated structures or Themes 
Th1: P3 can feel sad and helpless because people are not cured, including by tender loving care. They still want time with her 
nevertheless and she can instil realistic hope (TMU2, TMU3, TMU5, TMU11, TMU18, TM20, TMU35, TMU38) 
Th2: Because of her role, she feels she must not disappoint anyone who relies on her, and she commits herself to them so they know 
she keeps them in mind (TMU3, TMU4, TMU7, TMU44, TMU45, TMU46) 
Th3: She is not emotionally involved with patients although she feels wanted and needed (TMU3, TMU17) 
Th3i She appears emotionally involved, either through the personal importance of being a professional nurse, and/or a personal sense 
that no-one should be abandoned (TMU2, TMU3, TMU17) 
Th4: High caseloads create imbalance between required documentation and time with patients, causing her physical distress (TMU20, 
TMU21, TMU22) 
Th5: She works using what she has learned from practice and she teaches students by showing (TMU1, TMU2, TMU31, TMU49)  
Th6: Developing a therapeutic alliance is expected but no training was given on this in university. She learns from the person as an 
equal by being open to them, using humour and being friendly (TMU1, TMU15, TMU18, TMU34, TMU49, TMU50) 
Th7: Responsibility involves overseeing medication, referring to others, and documenting risk, as well as spending time with a patient 
(TMU5, TMU13, TMU15, MU16, TMU26, TMU34, TMU36) 
Th8: Treating others how she would like to be treated is itself caring as therapeutic, but it might be too personal (TMU6) 
Th8i: It is therapeutic to not identify too much with someone (TMU6i) 
Th9: P3 feels a responsibility to the other person and gives too much, as she may be for that person an only friend, a best friend, 
confidante and sounding board (TMU8, TMU13, TMU17, TMU38) 
Th10: Nurses listen. Actively listening and the person speaking with trust is therapeutic somehow (TMU9, TMU17, TMU25, TMU27) 
Th11: She does not show that it is tiring to be non-directive and available, and thankless as it is expected (TMU10, TMU17, TMU44) 
Th12: She shows solidarity with people and offers understanding (TMU11, MU20) 
Th13: She becomes part of a person’s life in a close, personal way, and she enjoys this aspect as it is therapeutic (TMU12, TMU14) 
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Th14: Part of her role is to transfer received advice and guidelines about illnesses to patients (TMU12,  
Th15: She involves colleagues in the person’s care, also to feel less alone and learn (TMU15, TMU50) 
Th16: Talking and being with patients is like a prescription of humanity in a medicalised and model-driven environment (TMU16, 
MU20, TMU36, TMU37) 
Th17: There is a tension between intimate trust and professional assessment, which affects her emotionally (TMU19, TMU20, TMU33)  
Th18: She feels privileged that people confide in her because she is a nurse (TMU23, TMU24, TMU25, TMU29, TMU32)  
Th19: A lot of nurses are caring and compassionate (TMU28) 
Th20i: She may not see her personal experience as being worth knowing (TMU30i) 
Th21: She values formal training (TMU31, TMU33)  
Th22: She explains her role to patients to delimit expectations as she is anxious they expect so much (TMU33) 
Th23: She is unsure about the efficacy of medication (TMU35) 
Th24: Psychiatry is not always only the medical model, although prescribing medication can make psychiatrists feel effective (TMU35, 
TMU46) 
Th25: Reducing time with the patient increases relapse rate (TMU39) 
Th26: Ethical ideas show themselves with experience (TMU40) 
Th27: Models of care can structure planning and relieve anxiety about explaining her practice to authority (TMU38, TMU41) 
Th28: Her training had no modules on mental illness. She read about it herself, and learning from others on placements (TMU42, 
TMU43) 
Th29: She gauges a student’s suitability based on genuine interest in the patient (TMU 47) 
Th30: Important topics to know are care planning, risk, medications and depo injections (TMU 48)  
  
This general synthesis has two elements which have to do with what is therapeutic, 
and how this is learned, which are directly relevant to the research question. A third element 
has been included also, as it has to do with a major theme that emerges across all participants, 
namely the tension in nursing between risk management, along with care coordination and 
the medical aspect, and being therapeutic. It is felt that to not indicate this tension would be 
to misrepresent the context of the therapeutic in mental health nursing and so it is included.  
Synthesising thirty themes into three short paragraphs indicates how this process of 
arriving at a general synthesis is complex, as it also requires staying in the epoché and the 
reduction, using imaginative free variation. On reading through the themes within the 
phenomenological attitude, however, certain aspects begin to repeat and emerge, such as 
‘spending time’, ‘being open’, and ‘learning from’. As well as this, certain aspects which 
appear significant, for example, ‘instilling hope’ (in Theme 1) have been subsumed into a 
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deeper meaning, for example, ‘commitment’ in the general synthesis. This particular decision 
was made through returning to the original transcript, and noticing that hope is given through 
explicit commitments to the person, where Participant 3 said, for example, “you’re not on 
your own” (Line 171), she has “got their back”, (Line 504), and (speaking of herself) “you 
just keep being there… because that’s all you’ve got left” (Line 602) - this indicates that 
perhaps commitment instils hope and so is more essential to the therapeutic. Characteristic 
features, or key constituents, of the phenomenon being investigated, emerge in this process 
of arriving at a synthesis of the data -  key constituents are the main elements that form 
structures, or themes, in the synthesis (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003, p. 256). ‘Commitment’ is an 
example of a key constituent for Participant 3 here.  
The diagram below illustrates the movement of the analysis for one participant. 
Themes 1, 2, 3, and so on, of the General Synthesis for this participant are essentially 
‘sentences’ which are parts of a description which Giorgi (2009) calls the ‘structure’ of the 
phenomenon being researched. Note the more one-to-one correspondence between meaning 
units and transformed meaning units, while transformed meaning units can refer to one, or 
multiple themes, developing in the intermediary stage of forming the themes in the general 
synthesis. The themes under the heading of ‘general/situated structure or themes’ are variants 
on what will become the themes in the general synthesis. For example, themes 2 and 3 here 
combine to form theme 2 in the final general synthesis for this participant.  
 
Figure 5 Illustrative diagram of the analysis for one participant  
Individual Synthesis      
Meaning Unit Transformed Meaning Unit Situated Structure or Theme   General Synthesis (for one 
Participant) 
 




MU2   TMU2  Th2                Theme 2 
 
MU3   TMU3  Th3                Theme 3 
 
MU4   TMU4  Th4                Theme 4 
 
etc   etc   etc   etc 
 The arrival at a “structure”, or general synthesis, that comprises all the data from the 
participants, is a question of “efficiency or convenience” rather than “theoretical necessity” 
(Giorgi, 2009, p.103). Giorgi (2009, pp. 103-104) discusses how one general synthesis to 
include the syntheses of all participants is possible, but depends on the “variability” in the 
data, and whether it is needed is basically a “judgement call on the part of the researcher”. 
Giorgi (2009, p. 154) notes that “integrating results across participants is by generalizing” 
although this may not be possible if the “concrete descriptions are highly varied.” Along with 
this, a “heightened articulation” of each meaning unit is required, and is a creative, intuitive 
process that does not involve condensation into labels. The researcher’s experience and 
intuitive activity is paramount in this process (Giorgi, 2009, p. 154). In this research, 
overarching key themes, or structures, have been identified at this stage.  
 Giorgi and Giorgi (2003) show how themes for two participants converge, which are 
then summarised as key constituents.  In this research, it was felt that each participant required 
an individual synthesis in order for the findings to be represented adequately (Giorgi, 1997; 
Giorgi, 2009). It was considered that in order to do justice to each participant, and to keep the 
data in its “biographical integrity” (Von Erckartsberg, 1998, p. 39), a synthesis for each 
participant was necessary, as well as an arrival at a general synthesis for all participants. The 
arrival at a general synthesis for one participant, through the reduction, is a lengthy process, 
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and involves re-checking the themes identified in the original data in order to identify what 
each phenomenon is, as well as how it is being revealed here in any particular instance (Von 
Erckartsberg, 1998; see Figure 4).  
  It was considered helpful in this research group, because of variability in findings, 
to follow this process across individual syntheses to arrive at a general synthesis for all 
participants to show where the findings both converge in consistently occurring themes, and 
diverge in other themes. This process involved cross-checking again the transformed meaning 
units and themes, or structures, for variations from one participant’s analysis to the next 
(Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003; Giorgi, 2009). The final general synthesis, addressing all the data, 
was thus split into two parts, the first comprising where the data converges for all participants, 
and the second being where the data shows variation across participants. Arrival at a general 
synthesis for all the data is illustrated in Figure 6.  
Figure 6 Illustration of structure of General Synthesis 
Individual General Syntheses   General Synthesis (for all participants)  
   Convergence/divergence of themes 
   S1 
P1   S2     Structure1 (Theme 1)   
   S3 
   etc 
 
 P2   S1    Structure2 (Theme 2) 
   S2 
   S3 
   etc 
 
P3   S1    Structure3 (Theme 3) 
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   S2 
   S3 
Figure 7 shows an example to illustrate this development (from Participants 4 and 5): 
Figure 7 Example of development of General Synthesis 
 
 
I'm on first name terms 
with your dog and cat, 
you know… (laughs) … 
things like that… and 
then you just start having 
these quite general 
conversations because… 
you end up having to get 
to that point where it isn't 
just well, I'm going to talk 
to you about something 
you know about now, 
you've done that part, 
now it's just staying with 
you…  
P3 lines 300-303 MU12 
(fragment) 
TMU12 
When P3 first qualified, 
she kept her work close 
to what she had learned 
in training, following 
NICE guidelines, and 
giving practical advice 
about symptoms, 
including educating the 
person about their 
illness, recognising 
individual symptoms 
and relapse signs. 
During this process, 
she comes to know the 
patient on a personal 
level, knowing the 
family, and pets, and 
she becomes part of 
their life.  
Th13 
She becomes part of a 
person’s life in a 
close, personal way, 
and she enjoys this 




































I would try to get a family 
member and then if they 
didn't have any family 
member I would get a 
support worker to go but 
you've also 
got...  activities so you're 
looking at what they're 
doing in their life...  are 
they sitting at home all 
day I'm not being washed 
or dressed did they used 
to like things   
P4 lines 185-188 MU14 
(fragment) 
TMU14 
She finds this 
information by spending 
time with the patient, at 
home if they are not 
risky, or in the office. 
She would try to get a 
family member or 
support worker to help 
with attending 
appointments if 
necessary. She would 
suggest activities - 
especially if they are 
depressed, not getting 
washed and dressed 
and out of the house - 
they used to like, such as 
knitting, or woodwork, 
Th9 
Practical work help 
bonds the 
relationship and 
contains a wide 
variety of aspects, 
from encouraging 
people to get dressed, 
to health checks, risk 
assessments, and 
financial matters. She 
talks to the person at 
length and over time 






Getting to know a 










perhaps go to men-in-
sheds.  
 
Meaning Unit Transformed 
Meaning Unit 







What is happening here is that Participant 3 notices that she starts to ‘get to know’ a 
person by being with them, firstly through her role, and then something else starts to happen. 
She is involved in the everyday of a person’s life. Participant 4 notices something similar, 
that through her care plan she becomes involved in discussing with a family member, perhaps, 
how to get someone out of bed. In both cases, there is a sense of getting to know, personal 
involvement, and through being with the person, and family, as opposed to, for example, 
reading case notes or devising theories. Both meaning units converge on the constituents, 
‘being with’ and ‘getting to know’, while there is perhaps a more idiosyncratic element to 
‘personal involvement’ and ‘family’, and so these come under the constituent, ‘personal 
aspect’. All of these are preserved in the General Synthesis (for all participants). For example, 
‘getting to know’ as a constituent, comes under the key theme of ‘Therapeutic activity is 
‘being with’ clients over time.’  
In summary, within the activity of the epoché and reduction along with imaginative 
free variation throughout, there is a movement from the raw data, or the speech of the 
participant as transcribed, to meaning units which are then transformed into ‘psychological 
language,’ although in this case language more aligned to the therapeutic milieu of mental 
health nursing. Common themes are then identified across these transformed units to arrive 
at a number of themes, which are then synthesised into a general synthesis for each 
participant, and these in turn into a general synthesis for all participants. Key themes, or 
structures, emerge in developing the general synthesis for all participants, which overarch a 




4.8 Ethical considerations 
 No major ethical problems were found in the planning and development of this study. 
The NHS Trust ethical committee, and the University ethics committee, had no objections to 
the study, given that ethical guidelines had been followed to address risk and protect 
confidentiality as far as possible. Every effort was made to protect confidentiality through 
eliding any references to client or staff names, as well as places. If particular situations were 
described which may have made a client, or staff member, identifiable, then some of the 
material was elided or altered, without altering the general meaning of what was being 
researched. If information arose during an interview which was upsetting for the participant, 
there was an understanding that he, or she, could have time to speak privately to the researcher 
in a therapeutic capacity; if this was not sufficient, a plan of action would be agreed, for 
example, to refer on for individual counselling, psychotherapy, or psychological support if 
necessary. Before each interview, participants signed a consent form, agreeing to participate, 
and agreeing to allow the interview material to be used for publication. Copies of a sample 
consent form, information sheet, and ethical approval letters are provided in Appendix 2.  
To summarise this chapter, Giorgi’s descriptive phenomenological method of 
psychological research, rooted in Husserlian phenomenology, has been described, including 
details of the steps involved in the data analysis and examples. These steps involve finding 
suitable participants, and within the phenomenological attitude, interviewing, transcribing the 
interviews, and undertaking the analysis of these transcribed descriptions. The descriptions 
from transcripts are transformed from meaning units, to third person summary statements, 
into themes and then to general, essential descriptions which intend to give the invariant 
characteristics of the phenomenon being researched. Key constituents of the data are then 
outlined. Certain crucial aspects of the method have been problematised, including 
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psychological context and language, what may constitute description and interpretation, the 
importance of Giorgi’s view of empathic understanding to the method, and how the method 
meets the demands of a scientific scholarship. In addition, ethical, participant and sampling 










This chapter describes the findings from the interviews and how these emerged 
through the stages of Giorgi’s (2009) analysis. The research addresses the question, “What is 
the need, if any, for therapeutic education in mental health nursing?” The focus is on what 
mental health nurses know, and do, that is therapeutic and how have they learned to be 
therapeutic. The Methodology chapter has shown, following Husserl that what is being 
researched is an ‘experience of truth’ and the ‘primal givenness’ (Husserl, 1970a, ¶ 51 in 
Welton, 1999, p.21; see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.3) of this experience is 
intertwined with constituting subjectivity, and intersubjectivity; how the world has been 
‘disclosed’ to the individual person in and throughout his life. It has been explored how this 
‘disclosure’ may occur as a meaning, or gestalt, following Merleau-Ponty (1968; 
Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.6). As Husserl (1970a, ¶ 51 in Welton, 1999, p.21) has 
noted, two people may live the same situation but register it differently as ‘truth’ in their 
experience, so what is being researched here is not some Ideal truth, as in a mathematical 
equation, but how ‘truthfulness’ appears to a person. As has been discussed, this is also in 
relation to how Husserl (1973 in Zahavi, 2003) views the claims of scientific method as 
accessing ‘Truth’ as being nothing but a tradition in which experience is no longer trusted 
(Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.2). But yet experience can be trusted, and as Giorgi 
(2009, p. 69; see Method, Chapter 4, Section 4.7.1) puts it, “Husserl is respectful and trusting 
with respect to experience”.  
As I see this, Husserl is critical of scientific method setting up its own ‘criterion of 
truth’ (after Sextus Empiricus; Westphal, 2003, p. 38; see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 
3.4.4). Coming to understand one’s experience then, appears to be about a dialogue that may 
189 
 
not have an end-point, and suspending one’s assumptions, more in the spirit of a Montaigne 
than a Descartes, as we can become so ‘captive’ to ideas and concepts that they ‘appear’ like 
a Truth (see Zizek’s (2014) critique of ‘Truth’; Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3). The 
intention of the method in this research is to describe the appearance of experience, “that 
which shows itself and actually appears” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 52), without adding to or taking 
from it. Giorgi (1970; 2014) makes the claim that this can be done through an empirical 
method without interpretation.  
The findings in this chapter are a result of the application of Giorgi’s method (after 
Giorgi, 1970; Giorgi, 1997; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003; Giorgi, 2009; Giorgi, 2012; Giorgi, 2014). 
In the analysis, within the activity of the epoché and reduction along with imaginative free 
variation throughout, there is a movement from the raw data, or the speech of the participant 
as transcribed, to meaning units which are then transformed into ‘psychological language,’ 
although in this case language more aligned to the therapeutic milieu of mental health nursing. 
Common themes are then identified across these transformed units to arrive at a number of 
themes, which are then synthesised into a general synthesis for each participant, and these in 
turn into a general synthesis for all the data. As part of this process, key constituents are 
identified. 
Each transcript is first split into meaning units. Then the use of free imaginative 
variation, within the attitude of the phenomenological reduction, aims to result in the 
emergence of the essential psychological characteristics of the phenomenon under study, 
without which, or beyond which, the phenomenon would ‘collapse’ (Giorgi & Giorgi 2003: 
246). As a result, transformed meaning units and themes emerged that began to delineate a 
structure relevant to the question. A single individual synthesis for each research participant 
was necessary, as well as a general synthesis to include all the participants. Thus, an attempt 
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is made to preserve the variations in the data of each participant, as well as biographical 
integrity, through individual syntheses (Von Eckartsberg, 1998).  
The interview transcript, as well as the stages of analysis, from meaning units to 
transformed meaning units, and transformed meaning units to themes, for Participant 3 are 
presented in Appendix 3, along with her general synthesis. Participant 3 was chosen as she 
seemed to embody most of the themes discussed in the findings, and it was particularly clear 
how she embodied the ‘being with’ aspect of the therapeutic which is at the heart of the 
findings both with respect to the therapeutic and learning. As discussed in the Method chapter, 
findings in the empirical phenomenological method are contextual, so no universality is 
claimed (Giorgi, 2009). The findings are presented with reference to the general synthesis for 
all participants, and examples of key constituents are traced from the original interview data, 
meaning units, to transformed meaning units, and themes. The findings are presented through 
key themes, or structures, along with the key constituents in that theme, in order to link with 
variations in the data, since “the ultimate outcome of phenomenological scientific analyses is 
not just the “essential structure” but rather the structure in relation to the varied manifestations 
of an essential identity” (Giorgi, 1997, p. 242; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003).  
The chapter is organised so that, firstly, there is an introduction to the general 
synthesis for all participants. The general synthesis for each participant is presented in table 
form in Appendix 4. Secondly, themes relevant to the research question, subsumed under the 
headings of key themes from the general synthesis for all participants, are presented with 
links to the original interview transcripts with an accompanying discussion, which is an 
essential part of presenting the findings. Five key themes, or structures, related to the research 
question have been identified, which address key constituents and variations across the data. 
These themes are, firstly, that therapeutic activity is subordinate to administrative and medical 
activities, secondly, therapeutic activity is ‘being with’ clients over time through idiosyncratic 
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ways, which, thirdly, depends on innate personality characteristics; fourthly, learning is 
through practice and openness with others, including patients, and finally, learning is 
facilitated by a therapeutic environment. Within each key theme, examples of particular 
constituents, such as empathy, are discussed, including variations in the findings, as well as 
links to other themes, in order to keep in touch with the whole context in question.  
 
5.2 Introduction to the general syntheses for each participant  
The variety of themes across the interviews made it necessary to have a single 
synthesis for each participant and these are presented in Appendix 4. It seems significant that 
the interviews with some participants seemed to ‘flow,’ so that what was discussed appeared 
in line with variations on my own position in many ways, while also being revelatory, in 
particular with regard to ‘something about’ the participants. For example, sincere personal 
commitment to the other person, seemed to emanate from the person of the mental health 
nurse in some instances, such as Participant 3. With others, for example, with Participant 10, 
the way in which the other person was spoken of seemed incongruent with respect to the 
participant’s way of being. This will be discussed under the aspect of ‘being with’ in this 
chapter. The variety of views on what the therapeutic may be, and how it is learned, was 
striking, and reflected the wide variety of discussions in the literature. A basic, overarching 
finding indicated that as long as mental health nurses perform their administrative and 
medical duties, then if they wish to try to be therapeutic in the remaining, or interleaving time, 
how they do this is largely left up to their own judgement, and so they practice in idiosyncratic 
ways. They can practise therapeutically in their own ways. What is remarkable is that each 
mental health nurse reported that their practice was therapeutic, and their descriptions 
generally appeared congruent with this, while at the same time they often clearly worked in 
a multiplicity of different, and sometimes opposing, ways. This may indicate something to do 
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with being a human being rather than any fatal incoherence of thought, so in this way, 
idiosyncratic and individual ways of being therapeutic are part of the synthesis.  
The method of analysis is aimed at elucidating what essential structures, or themes, 
may run through these ways without losing touch with the context and variations across 
themes. The key themes which have been identified relating to the therapeutic are about ways 
of being with another person, and the various personality characteristics mentioned cannot be 
removed from the context of this ‘being with.’ None of these ways of ‘being with’ were overly 
influenced by theoretical models (while there was some influence) and have been learned 
mainly through observing others and responding to the other person, as opposed to practising 
under the view of a formal, academic environment following particular schools of thought. 
‘Being with’ is also a way of learning about how to be therapeutic. The clear implication is 
that mental health nurses are therapeutic based on how they have learned to be with others 
throughout their lives, and during their training this may be developed, or affected otherwise, 
by other nurses, colleagues, and patients. The implication is that mental health nurse training 
ought to focus on what is therapeutic about ‘being with’ others, but it appears that the 
therapeutic is not what mental health nursing is about primarily.  
There was a clear dissonance between how the mental health nurses in this study (all 
but one) had to practice, through administrative and medical demands, and how they wished 
to practice, through being with others therapeutically, which caused some distress. From this 
study, it appears that mental health nurses are being prepared in university, and on placement, 
to be ‘administrators’ of the medical model of psychiatric care, while on a personal level 
nurses wish to spend time with patients in order to be therapeutic in their own ways. Most of 
the participants expressed an uneasiness about the focus on the dominant administrative and 
medical duties, while one said she would leave the profession if she could as a result 
(Participant 5), and another mentioned that her colleagues were leaving ‘in droves’ because 
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of the situation, adding that she herself would leave if her remit was so narrowed that she 
could no longer care for patients by being with them (Participant 7). Even the apparently 
progressive recovery model of care, which aims to challenge stigma, emphasise a person’s 
strengths, and promote independence, in practice appears to have been subsumed under the 
medical model (assess, treat, discharge), which was noted especially by Participants 5 and 9.  
Because of the amount of data involved, key themes from the general synthesis for all 
participants will be presented and discussed, and illustrated through key constituents, such as 
empathy, as well as from vignettes that show the interlinking of themes and their constituents 
between participants. In this way, a picture will be drawn of the findings without it being an 
exhaustive one. This is to illustrate context to an extent, and is in line with Giorgi’s (1997, p. 
242) method, in which, “once the structure has been delineated, one has to go back to the raw 
data and render intelligible the clusters of variations that are also contained in the data.” As 
noted in the Method chapter (Chapter 4, Section 4.7), attention to variations have already 
given rise to the themes emerging from the data. The structure delineated here then relates to 
each individual participant’s general synthesis, containing a number of structures, or themes, 
and to the general synthesis for all participants, containing a number of structures, or themes.  
Aspects of each synthesis will be discussed in this chapter. If all the individual 
syntheses were to be presented visually, the constituents of each synthesis would overlap to 
varying extents, but with other aspects, of no less significance, ‘outlying’ these. One ‘outlier’ 
would be the need for a safe, reflective environment to promote openness and learning about 
what is therapeutic, which was introduced only by Participant 4, yet it seems of vital 
importance. She was a very experienced nurse, semi-retired, yet she showed a similar 
‘openness to learning from the other’ to Participant 9, a newly qualified nurse. ‘Openness to 
learning from the other,’ then, seemed to be a personal characteristic, which could further 
develop in the right circumstances perhaps. ‘Openness’ came across in other ways, for 
194 
 
example, Participant 4 was the only one who mentioned that she needed to feel she was doing 
good and helping people, while adding, with humour, that it was said all nurses were damaged 
in some way (Transformed Meaning Unit 52). Similarly, and with a disarming openness, 
Participant 3 said that in this “thankless” job, what she receives is to “feel wanted and needed” 
(Transformed Meaning Unit 17). This openness itself invoked a sense of ‘trusting’ in her.  
  
5.3 Key themes of the general synthesis for all participants 
The key themes from the general synthesis are presented and discussed in this section, 
along with the key constituents of these, for example, empathy, and openness to learning from 
the other. These key themes, or structures, need to be thought of as being in relation to each 
other (Giorgi, 1997), and will be linked to individual syntheses and variations across themes. 
Five key themes, or constituents, related to the research question have been identified, which 
address key constituents and variations across the data. These themes are, that therapeutic 
activity is subordinate to administrative and medical activities, therapeutic activity is ‘being 
with’ clients over time through idiosyncratic ways, and depends on innate personality 
characteristics; learning is through practice and openness with others, including patients, and 
learning is facilitated by a therapeutic environment.  
5.3.1 Overview 
It is significant that none of the participants identified the therapeutic with the medical 
model in itself, and spoke in terms of the therapeutic having to do with being with people in 
various ways. Medication was seen as being a cure in certain cases, if used idiosyncratically, 
that is, tailored to suit a person’s individuality (Participants 7 and 10). For all participants, it 
was seen as potentially stabilising for a person in order to enable therapeutic work. Reflecting 
the current emphasis in psychiatric care on recovery, the analogy of the ‘broken leg’ - that 
mental health problems can be managed in the same way as a broken leg, and follow similar 
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medical pathways (assess the condition, treat the condition, then discharge) - was given by 
several participants, and used to signify opposing opinions (Participants 5 and 7). For 
example, Participant 5 was dismayed at this analogy which her service managers advocated, 
and although she thought medication was essential to certain people, and helped remove 
distressing symptoms, those people who were then discharged as ‘cured’, or ‘recovered,’ 
could be seen in her home town shuffling along the streets, unemployed and friendless 
(Transformed Meaning Unit 31). She saw a major part of her work as being with those people 
in some way to improve their lives, and removing this aspect of her role - in her view, the 
therapeutic aspect - was distressing for her, making her want to leave the profession. 
Participant 7 was more optimistic about the ‘broken leg’ analogy of recovery, but was of the 
view that medication was not enough, and that some people would never be ‘out of the 
system’ (Transformed Meaning Unit 11).  
Participant 6 said he had thought carefully about the research question, saying that the 
therapeutic was hard to define, but whatever it was, it was being side-lined by the focus on 
risk management. He was glad to be leaving mental health nursing, as it was so repetitive 
(Transformed Meaning Unit 43), and was glad to be changing career to a more medical role. 
He was the only participant who did not particularly want to ‘be with’ patients over time as 
it encouraged dependency, for him, although he regarded the therapeutic as something to do 
with how a person was treated respectfully in a relationship. He thought it was important for 
someone to be ‘resilient’ to life’s general problems, just as everyone had to be, and he 
encouraged this, for example, by not calling to see someone if they phoned him. His 
comments, transformed below, in one instance (TMU7), appears to sum up the dominant 





Figure 8 Transformed Meaning Unit reflecting Recovery Model Participant 6 
Risk can go up and down, and people can come to rely on him as he knows them very well, but he 
would tend to focus more on risk. With some people, there is a danger that they can become too 
dependent on the community psychiatric nurse. Following the recovery model, the focus is to 
promote individual skills and strengths in order to develop resilience to everyday problems (P6 
Transformed Meaning Unit 7).  
However, he spent some time in his interview talking about a nurse consultant who 
had inspired him once, because he treated patients like equals, and created such an 
environment that often patients would come back to ‘hang out’ after they were discharged. 
There was a sense here that those patients were acknowledged, recognised and given a sense 
of belonging perhaps, in an environment that was creative and playful. When probed a little 
in the interview as to why he thought dependency was such a bad thing, he noticed he began 
to “fiddle” with things, and he wondered whether it was some personal ‘oddness’ of his that 
he did not want anyone depending on him. He seemed closed to exploring this any further.  
R: Do you not want them to feel something there or is it like...? Are you trying to protect them from 
something? Because you said that a couple of times that you could get moved [away]...  
P6: It might be about protecting me... 
R: Protecting yourself? 
P6: Yes maybe... (long pause) … It's just how I've always been I suppose... perhaps I've an odd 
personality, I don't know... I'm fiddling with things now (laughs) …  
 
 
What emerges is that the central role of mental health nursing is to ensure that key 
documentation (for example, to do with care plans and risk assessments) is up-to-date, and 
that psychiatric care is safe and managed (including restraining and/or secluding a person if 
necessary), along with administering medication and assisting in procedures such as electro-
convulsive therapy (including forcibly if necessary). The significance of the nurse’s uniform, 
only recently re-introduced on in-patient units after an absence of years, perhaps indicates the 
commitment to the medical model of recovery. The uniform is seen as a means of establishing 
a professional boundary by some of the in-patient mental health nurses in this study, 
indicating their alignment with a certain medical aspect (Participants 9 and 10), although all 
in-patient nurses in the study were ambiguous regarding its effects. The uniform was seen as 
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narrowing the relationship with the patient to a primarily medical one (Participant 8). Once 
this central role is taken into account, there is very little time left for what some participants 
view as what mental health nursing is in itself, that is, therapeutic practice (Participant 8), or 
caring (Participant 5).  
The therapeutic aspect is a non-essential side-line to the main role, yet most 
participants were personally involved in this side-line and it appeared to be the reason they 
were mental health nurses. Links that were made with respect to why they were mental health 
nurses varied, from being spiritually ‘called’ (Participants 8 and 10), to having always been 
caring (Participants 3 and 10), to perhaps being damaged and hence the need to ‘do good’ 
(Participant 4), to needing to feel wanted (Participant 3), to gaining something therapeutic 
from being with others (Participant 7), and linked to an unwell parent in childhood 
(Participants 2 and 5). More implicit links were also present, including parents not caring in 
childhood (Participant 1), and to perhaps needing to ‘connect’ with others (Participant 8). 
Every participant spoke in terms of the therapeutic as ‘being with’ the patient in some form, 
including listening, talking and getting to know the other person, through idiosyncratic ways, 
and this has been defined as a key theme. The personal involvement of the mental health nurse 
might be summarised as ‘I will be with you in ways that I find to be therapeutic,’ and these 
ways stem from idiosyncratic learning experiences throughout life, as well as mental health 
nursing practice, ‘which have impacted on me.’ The ‘experience of truth’ of the mental health 
nurse is that these ways are therapeutic, and have been tested through trial and error as well 
as observing other mental health nurses. These therapeutic ways are linked to personal 
characteristics of the mental health nurse which imbue this ‘being with’. These personal 
characteristics have been defined as a key theme, and it is important to view them as living 
ways of being in context, that have to do with the person of the mental health nurse and his, 
or her, responsiveness to the other person. These characteristics are sometimes explicitly 
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mentioned as ‘words spoken,’ and at other times emerged implicitly. ‘Being with’ is 
sometimes also spoken of at times in terms of the relationship, that something in the 
relationship itself is healing (Participant 5).  
The key theme regarding learning was that it took place through practice with others, 
and this learning may have taken place since childhood. This theme was found in each 
participant’s interview except for participant 6. A theme closely linked to it, but mentioned 
explicitly only by Participant 4, defines another key aspect of learning, which is that it takes 
place in a therapeutic environment. This was implied in various ways with other participants. 
Both of these aspects indicate that learning in mental health nursing is especially vulnerable 
to other nurses and the environment of practice settings which they create. For example, 
Participant 2 spoke of working on a dementia ward in her training, many years ago, and the 
environment of fostering respect, and dignity, and treating each person as an individual, was 
strikingly ‘new,’ and still resonates with her (she is semi-retired). But it could also be 
imagined that the therapeutic ways of a mental health nurse could become impaired in an 
adverse environment.  
 
5.3.2 Key Theme 1     
Therapeutic activity is subordinate to administrative and medical duties  
This theme was spoken of in the context of not having time to be with clients. It is 
included in the final analysis because it sets the scene, or is the background, for the rest of the 
research findings. The explicit and implicit meaning is that the role of mental health nursing 
is to provide the administrative and medical framework for the medical cure. For example, 
Participant 5 enjoys the medical side to an extent, seeing it as providing stability, and relief 
from distressing symptoms, for some patients:  
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… I mean my area has always been with the clinic and Lithium clinic and the Lithium patients... (P5 
MU 23-24 lines 207-222) 
Also, the use of medication to attempt a cure was viewed by most as something that 
should be idiosyncratic, that is, considered on an individual basis. For example, Participant 7 
(Theme 10), explains to a patient that medication is different to what is therapeutic about 
mental health nursing:  
we work hand in hand with medicine… but medicine isn’t just the answer, is it? You know our 
medications are good but my message to my patients is that medication just isn’t the answer we’ve 
got no magic pill that’s going to go poof and everything’s going to go back to normal what we have 
to do is find ways for you… to make things better… (P7 MU18 extract 324-343)  
It is this ‘finding ways’ which is subordinate to the administrative and medical side, 
and which is expressed in different ways by participants. However, for each participant, in 
different ways and to varying degrees, this administrative and medical role, which one 
participant described as “soul destroying” (Participant 8, MU13) undermined therapeutic 
activity because it took priority and so much time, causing distress for most. The rest of what 
follows in mental health nursing then is subordinate to this role. Extracts from Participants 5, 
6 and 8 demonstrate the kind of meaning unit that has informed this theme in the general 
synthesis, from ‘short, sharp interventions,’ to ‘risk management trumps everything’, to 
‘make it look like a business is running smoothly’: 
Figure 9 Administrative and medical dominance of roles  
Yeah… they want it to be...  they're trying to make it more...  short sharp interventions and I don't 
think that works with the type of clients we're talking about... because they've got a long-term mental 
illness that's going to be there... [gap]... and they're going to need help, support, to manage these 
problems for a long time... [gap]…yes...  I find that really hard I find it so hard that I almost want to 
give up nursing if there was an option to give up nursing I probably would right now (P5 MU26 
extract 234-251) 
With regard to therapeutic...  you mean I mean I think when I looked at what you're proposing some 
of the things that stuck in my mind is the worry that...  risk management trumps everything 
else, doesn't it?   (P6 MU2 extract 15-22)  
the time that should really really matter doesn't get picked up because obviously the CQC or 
whatever don't look at that...  then you look at all the stuff that hasn't been done then you look at what 
the ward looks like on paper… [gap]… it's soul destroying… [gap]…I would say soul 
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destroying...  it's not what I came into nursing I came into nursing to make a difference... not to 
make it look like a business is running smoothly... (P8 MU13 extract 196-210) 
 
A confluence of variations on the theme may be demonstrated in a number of meaning 
units. For example, Theme 4 for Participant 3 is linked below with its relevant meaning units 
(Figure 10). She experiences the demands of the administrative and medical roles, along with 
high caseloads, as clashing directly with her sense of how she wants to be there for the person, 
often in intractable situations for patients (repeated suicidal thoughts, for example), and gets 
a “knot in her stomach” because she cannot concentrate fully, or give her time properly, due 
to other pressures. It is interesting to note that if she did not ‘care’ she would not be feeling 
this anxiety, and that she conveyed a sense of reassurance, commitment and security in the 
interview (to me). The experience of ‘reassurance’ made her words feel congruent when she 
spoke of commitment to the other person, and later on, bringing something of herself to the 
person, which I defined as ‘humanity’ as she had used the word ‘humanise’ regarding her role 
in the medical approach, which would indicate she had a positive view of this humanity:  
You’re trying not to medicalise people, are you? You’re trying to humanise them, in a 
medical environment… because, you know, their identity becomes a mental illness… … 
and you’re reminding them I don't see you as just a schizophrenic or a manic depressive… 
(P3 Meaning Unit 16 (411-461) 
Such terms as ‘humanity’ have to be held in the context of the whole synthesis and 
the interview. Note that each meaning unit is not fully exhausted by Theme 4, and is relevant 
to other themes also.  
 
Figure 10 High caseloads impair time with patients Participant 3 (Theme 4) 
High caseloads create imbalance between required documentation and time with patients, causing 




P3 Meaning Unit 20 extract 
(563-622) 
P3: It's horrible knowing that 
there’s people who are 
struggling, and as I said before, 
your role is to try make them 
feel better. These can be 
chronic, chronic… issues 
… 
P3: For a long time... and then 
you get to a point where you 
try and problem solve and 
you try and maybe change 
medication… because that 
might cause nightmares. Or 
you might try lift their mood, 
and moods become chronic… 
… 
P3: X---… who was having the 
nightmares and the suicidal 
thoughts… and two and a half 
years later you get to the point 
where you don't give false 
hope, you just say, ‘Right, 
well this is how it is then 
right now.’ 
 
P3 Meaning Unit 21 extract (623-
699) 
P3: But then when you get big 
caseloads… you start to 
compromise your admin time or 
your training time because I 
suppose again it's down to your 
personal way of working… you 
prioritise what you’re there to 
do… then that person… an 
increasing number of people still 
deserve that service… 
… 
P3: I don't know if it's quality but 
you try and give them what you 
perceive is the best you can give 
them, you know, that’s… if you've 
been given that responsibility to 
work with that person… And 
then you start to feel really 
stressed… 
… 
P3: I think it's just, you know, you 
start to squeeze people in… and 
try and see 7 people in a day… 
and then you get a knot in your 
stomach because you might get 
the phone ringing and you don't 
want to answer it but you have to 
and you haven't got time for 
that… 
P3 Meaning Unit 22 extract 
(700-726) 
R: So, that sounds like 
something to do with your 
value, your own values, that 
you know if the phone is 
ringing somebody is ringing 
you… You don't want to let 
them down… 
… 
P3: Yeah… I mean, obviously, 
you get great, great days, 
maybe weeks, and you think 
I'm getting on top of it, but it 
doesn't take much to get 
really… just needs a few 
people in crisis… Or…. And 
then you’re back to chasing 
yourself again… 
… 
P3: And it's that old familiar 
feeling, I'll get sorted… and 
then you have your own hope 
just like your patients do, 
you’ll have your own hope that 
you’ll get organised and get on 
top of it all… 
 5.3.3 Key Themes 2 and 3 
 Key themes 2 and 3 relate to ‘being with,’ and personality characteristics, 
respectively. The phenomena to which these key constituents refer are intimately linked in 
practice, and it is perhaps artificial to separate them; however, separating them is what the 
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method does as they reflect the descriptive way the participants use these terms as if they 
were separate to their person.  
  5.3.3.1 Key Theme 2 
Therapeutic activity is ‘being with’ clients over time 
As already noted, this theme was consistently present, with many variations; even for 
Participant 6, who saw the main role of mental health nursing as facilitating the medical as 
therapeutic cure. Participant 8 saw being with the person as what mental health nursing was 
in itself as a discipline, “…to me it is all about that interaction and having that rapport with 
someone...  and building on that kind of relationship with that person…” (P8 MU14 line 217).  
‘Being with’ involves a whole complex of ways of being, along with characteristics, 
and significantly this takes place according to the idiosyncratic views, capacities, and 
character of the mental health nurse. There is the view, sometimes explicitly spoken, that ‘if 
I don’t suit the person, then one of the other nurses will’ - indicating that what is therapeutic 
is seen as idiosyncratic, based on the person of the nurse and the person of the patient. In the 
research method, these ways of ‘being with’ comprise ‘listening to,’ ‘talking with’ and 
‘getting to know,’ the person, although always in relation to the wider context of other themes. 
Before illustrating this key theme and its relations as part of the whole synthesis, some 
examples of how this is expressed across different participants are listed below, as well as a 
confluence of key constituents from one participant. Examples of key constituents are 
‘closeness,’ ‘making them feel important,’ ‘she gets on with me and accepts me,’ and ‘talking 
about their innermost thoughts and feelings’. 
 
Figure 11 Examples of key constituents of 'being with'  
Yeah but I think because you've developed closeness in a weird way, not in a personal 
way… [gap]…Or… you know, it's understood that I can talk to you about my personal 
problems within our appointment time, however, you've got a closeness where you're 
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allowed into their world and you know about their abuse, all the relationship problems, or… 
the dark things that they think… or the suicidal thoughts they have that have don't tell 
anybody… or the nightmares… and that's really personal… (P3 MU19 extract 536-561) 
well I know...  for me it involves a lot of listening and a lot of conversation... talking a lot of 
listening and stuff and sometimes that in itself works... …do you know what I mean...  when 
I speak to someone giving me an idea of who they are where they come from their life 
story...  kind of building on that...  developing on that really making them feel important... 
(P8 MU2 extract lines 16-22) 
No, I don't think I have, no. It's not CBT it's not... no, no, it’s nothing at all… it's just… 
(long pause) … Perhaps it's both of us - she gets on with me and accepts me… …I 
suppose over the years we have discussed other things, you know, like my dog. I suppose 
she knows a little bit about me… Because… yeah, and X, she isn't someone who you'd be 
doing, setting the CBT. She's got chronic schizophrenia really… she’d tell you where to 
shove it… (P2 MU7-8 extract lines 77-95) 
You know with nurses you’ve got to have some time to build up a therapeutic relationship… 
you know they’ve got to trust you because they’re talking about their innermost thoughts 
and feelings… things that you know you we wouldn’t want to divulge really… (P7 MU5 
extract lines 82-100) 
A confluence of meaning units with key constituents relevant to ‘being with’ are 
outlined below for Participant 3. This theme, which is included in Participant 3’s general 
synthesis, as ‘prescription of humanity,’ comes from her description of how she manages 
when medication ‘fails’ (although it gives the doctor a way to “feel helpful”). “Talking to that 
person and giving them that time” becomes the ‘prescription’ that she can make; other factors 
also come into play here, regarding how she is as a person, how she commits herself, no 
matter what the struggle may be: “… you just keep being there… because that's all you've got 
left…”. Her ‘being there’ however, involves a sense of reassurance and commitment, so that 
she will try all avenues to help, along with something to do with her own self. 
 
Figure 12 Examples of 'being there' Participant 3 
P3 Theme 16: 
Being a community psychiatric nurse is more than just overseeing medication and risk. If it were not, then 
paperwork would always be up-to-date and nurses would not be so busy. Talking to the person, giving them 
time, is like a prescription of humanity in a medicalised environment. By visiting patients personally, P3 
means to show them that she does not just see them as a psychiatric diagnosis.  
 
P3 Meaning Unit 16 (411-461) P3 Meaning Unit 20 (563-622) P3 Meaning Unit 36 (994-1007) 
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P3: But, you know, if a CPN is just 
to oversee medication and to 
oversee risk, well then all that 
sitting with somebody for an hour 
every two weeks is not necessary, 
it could be a phone call, couldn’t 
it? 
… 
P3: ‘Are you alright? Everything 
ok? Meds ok? Any side-effects…? 
I’ll ring again in a couple of weeks 
to check there’s no changes.’  
… 
P3: It's more than that. It has to be, 
or else what’s the point of all these 
visits? 
… 
P3: I think it has to be… to know 
that person… that therapeutic 
side… it has to be… Because 
talking to that person and giving 
them that time… is the 
prescription in itself, I suppose, 
or that’s what it feels your role 
has become… I don’t know. 
… 
P3: You’re trying not to medicalise 
people, are you? You’re trying to 
humanise them, in a medical 
environment… because, you 
know, their identity becomes a 
mental illness if they’re seeing a 
mental health nurse and you’re 
reminding them I don't see you as 
just a schizophrenic or a manic 
depressive…  
P3: For a long time... and then 
you get to a point where you try 
and problem solve and you try 
and maybe change medication… 
because that might cause 
nightmares. Or you might try lift 
their mood, and moods become 
chronic… 
… 
P3: X---… who was having the 
nightmares and the suicidal 
thoughts… and two and a half 
years later you get to the point 
where you don't give false hope, 
you just say, ‘Right, well this is 
how it is then right now.’ 
… 
P3: yeah… I suppose I do… you 
just keep being there… because 
that's all you've got left… well, 
you know, well we've got a really 
strong rapport now and you can 
tell me that, so I can't make it go 
away but at least you can talk to 
me and we can have a coffee 
and… and I've understood… 
… 
P3: When you break it down it 
sounds difficult…  you just do it 
because it's… 
… 
P3: It’s what you have to do…  
 
P3: And to feel helpful because 
that’s their area… and has a 
nurse, ok, you've got all the 
talking, but the practical side of 
nursing is, I can fill out your 
benefit form for you, we can go 
for a coffee, we can get out of 
the house, I can get you a 
support worker, or I can refer 
you to therapy… but that's not 
enough for you… let's review 
your medication and let's talk 
in that medical way and then 
you feel like this is normal, 
what's going on, because maybe 
a tablet will help as well… 
 
The variations across this theme, involving, getting to know, listening and talking, 
show the idiosyncratic ways in which mental health nurses are with others therapeutically. 
The themes of listening to, and talking with, were best exemplified in Participants 9, 3 and 4. 
Participant 9 in particular, appeared to have thought carefully about how she listened to 
others, and wished to ‘make space’ to enable the other to speak. This was remarkable as she 
was one of the youngest nurses, with the least experience, yet there was something about her 
that made the atmosphere of the interview ‘open.’ She said that conversations could be serious 
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or like a chat, and she revised her suggestions and ideas in response to how the patient 
responded, accepting if she was getting it wrong. She tried to be honest, but not in an invasive 
search for transparency. This gave the sense that she was open to learning from the other 
person, whether patient or colleague, and it came across in how she was in the interview. A 
whole range of themes are here which span her synthesis, and the general synthesis, 
emanating from the theme ‘being with.’ She is also aware that sometimes what she thinks has 
helped (has been therapeutic) may not have done, and she is open to thinking about this rather 
than being dismissive of the other person:  
Figure 13 Example of openness to the other person Participant 9 
There are times when a person has told her that talking has helped, but equally, with personality 
disorders, the person has self-harmed even though she thought the conversation had helped. 
Sometimes, the person with a personality disorder has said that the conversation has helped and then 
have done something like self-harming afterwards. This is difficult for her, as the team then feel they 
are not doing much to help and the behaviour escalates. Trying to understand why the person is in 
need of a certain kind of attention, but cannot communicate that well, is important (P9 TMU14) 
 
Participant 3 also had a particular, noticeable, way of ‘being with’, which came across 
in the interview. As noted, strangely, what was ‘given’ in her company, during the interview, 
was a sense of safety or being reassured. She spoke about the importance of being genuinely 
interested, and listening carefully, being open and treating the other as an equal. There is 
something in common here with Participant 9, where she is willing to review her ideas and 
learn from the other. Participant 3 said she would become personally involved, and make 
commitments to the person that she would keep. She is neither optimistic about psychiatry, 
nor “tender loving care” (her words), as offering a cure for a person, and will do what she can 
by being with them: 
Figure 14 Ways of 'being with' a person Participant 3 
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At first, P3 thought she was going to cure her patients through tender loving care, and through 
helping them manage their illness and associated problems. But she sees this hope of curing them as 
naïve now. She began to feel helpless and sometimes depressed that there were so many people 
asking her to talk with them, sharing their problems with her. She felt she had to be available for each 
person as she was often the only person in their world who actually cared enough to sit and 
listen to them. She did not want to feel she was letting them down by not being available… (P3 
TMU3 extract) 
 
Being a community psychiatric nurse is more than just overseeing medication and risk. If it were not, 
then paperwork would always be up-to-date and nurses would not be so busy. Talking to the person, 
giving them time, is like a prescription of humanity in a medicalised environment. By visiting 
patients personally, P3 means to show them that she does not just see them as a psychiatric diagnosis 
(P3 TMU16)  
P3 treats her patients as equals. P3 feels she is a sounding board, a best friend and confidante to 
her patients. It is a thankless job because it is expected that she is this way. The feedback she gets is 
that she feels wanted and needed. Patients always say they feel better after talking to her. P3 believes 
it is cathartic for them (P3 TMU17)  
 
This ‘being with’ however, appears to depend on the person of the mental health nurse, 
as well as including what he, or she, has been caught up in throughout life, and has been able 
to learn through this. For example, working in two similar situations in different settings, 
Participants 4 and 10 show markedly different ways of ‘being with’ a person while both 
understand what is happening to be therapeutic. Both recount different scenarios in which a 
patient is thinking seriously of strangling or hanging themselves, and respond through ‘being 
with’ but in different ways. Participant 4, akin to Participants 3 and 9, shows patience and a 
willingness to learn from the other, while Participant 10 shows impatience and a desire to 
uncover the ‘real’ problem ‘underneath’ for the patient. With Participant 4, the situation may 
be somehow resolved through speaking about what has triggered this event, or by being with 
the person and allowing them to talk as they wish: 
Figure 15 Speaking and listening Participant 4 
…I would try and get them to talk about how they are feeling why they are feeling like that, why are 
they feeling hopeless and helpless, what happened what's triggered them off  to make them feel like 
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that and then because you know that patient, you know, what would work in the beginning, you 
know, what would what has helped in the past like, and so you might be thinking that in your 
head but you might just have to let them actually just talk and just be there with them you may 
not even have to say anything you may just have to let them talk to you (P4 Meaning Unit 33 
lines 409-415) 
The transformed meaning unit reads: 
In the example of someone threatening to hang themselves, she would stay with the patient, and ask 
them to talk about how they were feeling, why are they hopeless and helpless. She would be 
interested in what triggered them to feel this way and how they had managed before when this 
happened. But she may also not ask anything, and just be there with them, allowing them to talk. It 
can be about listening, hearing and being there with somebody (P4 TMU33) 
This example shows that there are other aspects also in play. There is a real sense that 
Participant 4 is thinking in complex ways, being responsive and open, making judgements as 
to what is the best way to respond for this person, which links with other themes in her 
interview and individual synthesis. From the tone of voice in her interview, as she recounts 
this, it is clear she is showing positive regard (perhaps from her person-centred counselling 
experience), as well as self-containment, genuineness and commitment (all constituents of 
the general synthesis). She has spoken about each of these factors also elsewhere in the 
interview. There is a sense that these characteristics are genuine and embodied in her way 
with others, including with me.  
 In contrast, Participant 10 responds in a different way to a patient (who was sexually 
abused by a neighbour) who wants to strangle herself. She firmly holds her paient’s hands 
while sitting on the floor of her room, and after a while, asking her ‘what is this really about,’ 
at which the patient, after some time, breaks down in tears, sobbing about the death of her 
father. This cathartic expression leads the patient to not ‘dissociate’, which is another way 
she has of coping with the trauma of other losses. After some time, sobbing, she tells the 
mental health nurse that she never cries. Participant 10 sees this as a breakthrough for the 
person, which it certainly appears to be. She spent two hours with her sitting on the floor of 
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her room. However, there is an incongruence in the way this account is related, as what 
triggered the event was the news that the person’s pet rabbit had died, and Participant 10 
recounts: 
…and I'm holding her hands and trying to stop her doing anything and she started to cry and she 
started to talk - first of all about the rabbit and after a bit I thought this is nothing to do with the rabbit 
this is not about a fucking rat! - you know what I mean? …there's something else, so I said to her, 
“What's this really about?” (Meaning Unit extract lines 699-722) 
 How Participant 10 recounted this gave the impression that the rabbit did not matter, 
and what really mattered was getting to something ‘underneath’ (another theme in her 
individual synthesis). As she recounted this, it felt as if her attitude was not therapeutic yet 
her actions had been. It appeared that she felt that the therapeutic depended on full empathy, 
fully understanding someone in this case, and so for this reason, it could not be about the 
rabbit as she had no time for the pet, calling it a ‘rat.’ She appears to view the connecting to 
unexpressed feelings, and connecting with a ‘hidden’ experience, as cathartic, and 
therapeutic, yet she seems somehow out of touch with herself and the other person.  
At the same time, perhaps there was something about how she was willing to stay with 
the person in distress, holding her hands to prevent her harming herself, sitting on the floor 
for two hours, and wanting to be of help, that made a difference. In this way, her actions have 
also been placed under ‘idiosyncratic and personal ways,’ and ‘something in the relationship 
is therapeutic, through the healing of past trauma’. It is interesting to note that a key theme 
for another interviewee, Participant 5, was that a mental health nurse had to ‘want to be of 
help,’ so that even if they were in a learning process, and misguided in their efforts, that 
somehow a genuineness would come through in their efforts which was therapeutic.  
As can be seen from these two examples, ‘being with’ may involve contrasting 
attitudes, and beliefs about what is therapeutic, as well as embodied ways of being with the 
other person. As such, it appears to be highly personal and idiosyncratic, as to what is 
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therapeutic about ‘being with’ a person. A range of examples of this include the following: 
Participant 10 prays with a fellow patient who finds this therapeutic; Participant 1 gives a 
woman a manicure, based on how she feels when she sees her own hairdresser; Participant 2 
goes for a coffee with a woman she has known for years; Participant 5 listens patiently to a 
person recounting the same problems which have repeated over many years in different 
guises; Participant 9 and Participant 8 find time to sit with a patient on a busy ward. These 
perhaps ‘ordinary’ activities are motivated by a certain thoughtfulness to be available to the 
other person, and emerge in idiosyncratic ways which appear to suit the moment. One 
implication is that a lot of this depends on tacit knowledge through life experiences, tacit 
ways of having learned through practice, and ‘being with.’ When questioned about whether 
she is using skills with a particular person, Participant 2 says she is just getting on with 
someone:  
No, I don't think I have, no. It's not CBT it's not... no, no, it’s nothing at all… it's just… (long pause) 
… Perhaps it's both of us - she gets on with me and accepts me…. [gap]…I suppose over the years 
we have discussed other things, you know, like my dog. I suppose she knows a little bit about 
me… (P2, MU7 extract lines 86-92) 
As discussed, there is something here about reciprocity that is implicit. Again, with 
Participant 2, a relationship has developed over time with another client, and she engages 
with her in quite ‘ordinary’, or idiosyncratic, and playful ways (illustrated in Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16 Ordinary and playful ways Participant 2 Theme 1 
Being therapeutic does not require educational skills, as it can be to do with listening, talking, being playful 
and genuine, giving someone time, and getting to know somebody (TMU1, TMU2, TMU3, TMU4, TMU5, 
TMU8, TMU22, TMU23, TMU26, TMU27, TMU35, TMU55) 
 
P2 MU4 (lines 48-59) 
R: So what helped then with you? Is it because you knew her for 8 years? Is there something there about the 
relationship with her…? 
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P2: Probably… because I have known her for 8 years and… you know and if I ever see her outside Y I 
always go and have a chat with her…  
R: What's the chat? What's in the chat?  
P2: Nothing much… (she laughs) 
R: Like what? 
P2: Well she usually says something like, ‘you look gorgeous,’ she's a real character… she's a real 
character… and it's not like her to be prodding and… so I think we need to make sure she's getting her meds 
now.  
R: So do you say things back to her, then?  
P2: Yes, I’ll say back, ‘Oh you look pretty gorgeous too.’ 
R: And what else do you talk about then?  
P2: Her family, her brother, just general general… 
 
This personal touch, and friendly way of being with a person, is similar to how 
Participant 3 talks about spending time with someone. If she prescribes anything, it is perhaps 
this time spent ‘being with’ the other person:  
I think it has to be… to know that person… that therapeutic side… it has to be… Because talking to 
that person and giving them that time… is the prescription in itself, I suppose, or that’s what it 
feels your role has become… I don’t know (MU16 extract 436-438) 
In a similar vein, Participant 1 (Theme 1) may work with women by doing their nails, 
and the whole context of this, which also involves touch, is therapeutic. This meaning unit, 
as a transformed meaning unit, becomes one aspect of Theme 1. Meaning Unit 2 touched on 
several aspects of the relationship and here what is being traced is the importance of touch, 
and sensory experience being shared (while other aspects also combined to form Theme 1). 
Participant 1 has learned from being with her hairdresser that this kind of interaction is 
therapeutic. How this aspect becomes part of her general synthesis is illustrated in Figure 17. 
Key constituents that can be seen as part of the synthesis are ‘transparency…by checking’, 
and ‘sharing sensory experiences’ (surprisingly, she emphasised using her “senses” with a 
person). 




The therapeutic use of self includes body language, sharing sensory experiences with other females and 
offering practical activities such as a manicure, often combined together. It also includes checking 
carefully with the other person what has been helpful (TMU1, TMU2, TMU10, TMU11, TMU37, TMU45, 
TMU47, TMU49, TMU50) 
Transformed Meaning Unit 2 
Manicures and hand massage activities are therapeutic, only with women, and develop trust, allowing 
the other person to talk and interact, which is therapeutic. P1 checks with a person first if they would like a 
manicure. P1 finds talking with her own hairdresser therapeutic, sharing her private concerns with her; she 
feels the same therapeutic effect happens between her and her patients when she does a manicure. It also 
conveys a sense of belonging and familial support. She also can assess the other person’s levels of anxiety. 
P1 Meaning Unit 2 extract lines 71-85 
P1: I sort of identify different things which are important to those people which I can talk about so 
emm if I noticed that a lady does actually use nail varnish, or she has particularly nice nails, whatever, or 
she doesn't… you know, we get chatting about that… then I can say I'll tell you for next time I'll bring 
me nail polish with me and you know we can do your nails and what you think of that?... and straight away 
they go, oh no, no, I don't bother with anything like that then I know I’m going down the wrong track, but 
generally you’ll find once you've got that trust with someone they’re quite happy…  
R: And is there something therapeutic about that? 
P1: Absolutely 
 
Perhaps the most flamboyant of all the participants, Participant 7 was confident about 
speaking about how being with patients made her “feel alive”, and as such, being with patients 
was therapeutic for her (Figure 18). This reciprocity appears to indicate something indefinable 
about the therapeutic aspects of being with another person, and was an implicit theme 
throughout all the interviews.  
 
Figure 18 Reciprocity of the therapeutic Participant 7 
She loves nursing because of the patients. The challenges and the range of feelings she gets 
working with people makes her feel alive. She feels honoured and privileged at times to be part of 
people’s lives, that people let her into their lives for her to help improve things for them (P7 TMU13, 
MU13, lines 256-265) 





In what ways learning was occurring and to what it was addressed in the mental health 
nurse and the patient was idiosyncratic. Participant 7 said at the start of the interview that she 
had been depressed for some time after her mother died, that she was unable to leave her 
house and had never experienced anything like such anxiety. She said that she shared this 
with some of her depressed clients sometimes to show they could recover too. However, later 
in the interview, as she was speaking about having had a very caring mother in the context of 
how she had learned to be therapeutic, I asked her if perhaps she was being like her mother 
to her clients. Her voice became sharp and aggressive momentarily. 
R: So, are you a bit like your mum with your patients? 
P7: What do you mean? [sharply] 
R: I mean you have had a very good mum and it sounds like you've picked up stuff from her, you've 
learnt from her...  
P7: Yeah, I think subconsciously I have... 
R: Are you are you doing the same with your patients then, are you being like a very good mum...? 
P7: Oh no, not like a good mum, I'm certainly not like that 
R: ok 
P7: Because I think sometimes they hate me...   
 
She does not think she is like her mother with her patients as her patients sometimes hate her 
(Transformed Meaning Unit 7). 
The transformed meaning unit here is a description whereas the possible meaning of 
her sharpness, that she perhaps had difficult, or aggressive, feelings towards her mother, is an 
interpretation. Yet such an interpretation would have been worth exploring for her. This 
fragment gave a sense that there was something ‘closed off’ for her about being available to 
others, and it crossed my mind that perhaps this was why she had a bubbly approach with 
patients, where she ‘got things done’, which was not especially reflective. I wondered whether 
Peplau’s (1988) sense of the nurse learning from the patient, and the therapeutic being 
reciprocal, may be hampered by this ‘closed’ feeling.  
5.7.3.2 Key Theme 3 
Therapeutic activity is linked to innate personality characteristics 
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 These characteristics were spoken about explicitly, or were sometimes implicit. This 
section will present some examples of these characteristics and how they emerged from the 
interview data through the method. To varying degrees, they are repeatedly referred to by 
participants, and sometimes imply a tacit understanding and with varying meanings. For these 
reasons, it is felt that is it useful to discuss them in context, which will overlap with other 
findings, as they emerge in context. The following characteristics were found across all 
participants: being enabling, genuineness, respectfulness, reliability, responsiveness to the 
other person, being reflective, accepting, caring, compassionate, attentive and empathic. In 
addition, other characteristics that participants found to facilitate being therapeutic were: tact, 
affection and inclusiveness, resilience, self-containment, openness to learning from the other 
person, self-confidence, commitment, equality, individuality, and being able to tolerate in 
others, and feel in oneself, physical and emotional distress. These characteristics are 
interwoven with the ‘being with’ of the mental health nurse.  
A striking factor was the view that these characteristics are all innate, or have been 
developed in childhood under individual circumstances, and although cannot be taught, they 
can be ‘brought out’, or developed further through practice. Due to lack of space, only some 
of these characteristics will be discussed here in detail, through examples, of how these are 
integral to the person of the mental health nurse, as well as some incongruence as to how they 
are spoken about and conveyed.  
Participant 1 divides competencies, which can be ‘brought out,’ from skills which 
can be learned (P1 MU13 lines 263-276) (Figure 19). Competencies are innate, but may 
have been stunted in childhood.  
Figure 19 Competencies versus skills Participant 1 
P1: …when I'm having conversations with people now, so I think that sort of… those competencies if you 
like as opposed to… they have to be in you and they’re brought out, I think.  
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R: You mean they were in you already before you were in X----? 
P1: Yes, because - 
R: And someone just brought them out? 
P1: Yeah. Cos you’ve got, I think competency and skill are two different things. Skill for me is something 
that you can learn but a competency is something that you have in you.  
R: You have in you? 
P1: Yes. Yeah.  
R: How does it get in there?  
P1: Ehh, I think it's just… I don't know...! But I think how does anyone’s personality get in there really? 
 
 Immediately after this, she goes on to say how the researcher’s personality is that of 
a “shrinking violet” (implying this was caused by some kind of damage in childhood):   
P1: Yeah. So, you've got somebody who’s… Let's face it, you're a shrinking violet, but I believe 
but then… You see I believe, this is what I believe, that everybody… when they’re born, has the 
ability to develop and communicate and hone their skills and I believe that the only reason that that 
doesn't happen with people is because they’re stopped from doing it…  
R: Right… by who? By what? 
P1: By the parents, by society, by… You know, there but for the grace of God… there are a lot 
of… you know, instances, you know, when you think about what and how…  
Although this was an accurate insight, her delivery of it was somehow misguided, in 
that it seemed to be coming from somewhere ‘hurt’ to do with ‘faulty communication from a 
parental figure’ perhaps. It is clear that my ‘constituting subjectivity’ is at work here in 
describing her response in this way, and it is an interpretation. Nevertheless, it is ‘given’ 
phenomenologically. A later topic in the interview seemed to align with this ‘givenness’ 
(MU39: 594-603, extract 602-603):  
P1: In that emm…  I suppose from an early age it was quite accepting that I would have to look 
elsewhere… for support and love, I suppose… to from perhaps… my own father and mother… 
[gap]… In that, and that was given most definitely by my maternal grandmother 
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This also comes through in her insistent speech, and way of being, which was like a 
kind of vulnerable objection to something. She spoke about how her problematic family had 
made her resilient, yet it came to mind that by being ‘resilient’ she may be ‘blocking’ 
something which would actually make her vulnerable. The meaning of ‘resilience’ is 
immediately put under question here, yet she saw it as a positive characteristic. The 
transformed meaning units try to stay with the descriptive aspect, and focus on ‘developing 
stunted competencies’, and the characteristic of resilience which she felt was therapeutic, as 
opposed to the possible characteristics of being somehow ‘needy’ and overly caught up in 
herself in her views. In arriving at the research findings, a judgement has been made as to 
what is interpretative and what is not, so that an aspect of what the researcher’s constituting 
subjectivity ‘found’, has been taken out of the findings. The transformed meaning units 
therefore have dropped the sense of ‘she is coming from somewhere hurt’ in the ‘between’ of 
her words, to arrive at: 
P1 sees part of her therapeutic work as drawing out competencies and developing skills in the other 
person, including the ability to communicate well, which have been blocked or stunted due to 
family and societal circumstances (Meaning Unit 14: 277-286 to Transformed Meaning Unit 14) 
Alcoholism in her family made her resilient in the sense that she realised she could not look to her 
parents for love and support, and needed to look elsewhere (Meaning Unit 39: lines 594-603 to 
Transformed Meaning Unit 39) 
It is interesting to note that after this interview, she asked if she could come and talk 
occasionally about difficult patients. I readily agreed but she never followed through even 
though I approached her twice in the weeks afterwards to make time for her. The 
competencies she spoke about were resilience and the ability to challenge others, while 
elsewhere she also saw herself as being independent of psychiatry in her therapeutic practice, 
and was self-taught a lot through her own reading. The picture emerging tentatively in the 
interview was that she did not find it easy to ask for help from others and it seemed reinforced 
by her later reluctance to meet, perhaps with a figure who represented a neglectful parent. 
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These aspects, viewed as interpretative, were not included in her synthesis. Yet they indicate 
how a certain form of therapeutic education might be helpful for her, where she could learn 
to look safely at some of these possible difficulties.  
Caring is perhaps synonymous with nursing in general, and all participants spoke 
about it as being essential to mental health nursing. It is here outlined in some of its varying 
meanings in this study, as mentioned above, with respect to how idiosyncratically the idea of 
caring is conceived. All participants felt caring was an innate characteristic, although 
Participant 1 believed one could be caring without being therapeutic. What she meant by this 
was that she could ‘do her duty’ as a mental health nurse, in providing information, or 
administering medication, even following the 6 C’s (Cummings & Bennett, 2012), but 
without actually being able to be therapeutic with that person. In this case, she was referring 
to an alcoholic, and she had no wish to be available for him, due to her childhood. Caring for 
her was separate to being therapeutic.  
For Participant 5, caring was what was therapeutic about mental health nursing and 
did not involve skills, such as cognitive behavioural therapy. Participant 5 described how 
her ability to care developed through her mother being unwell as a child (P5 MU17-18 
extract lines 142-166) (Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20 The influence of childhood Participant 5 
P5: to be honest with you I think I remember now why I went into nursing what made me...  because 
my mum was very ill all through my childhood and a lot of my...  carers that came in some were 
brilliant…  again… but we had some pretty miserable ones… that as well… and I remember as a 
teenager watching them treat her and I didn't think it was good enough you know and I think that's 
made me want to be a nurse that I can go with and maybe do something a bit better and I think yeah … 
[gap]… 
P5: yeah… I think that shaped for me a lot how people should be cared for...  and...  I think what I'm trying 





At the same time, it took some time for her to start to speak this way in the interview. 
Her voice was faltering for some time, as if she was waiting for me to show her what I wanted 
so that she could try to ‘care’ for me by providing it. I wondered about this to myself in the 
interview, until finally I told her that I was interested in what she thought more than anything. 
Caring then for her might be about ‘putting the other first’. Her voice changed after this and 
she said how she always ‘spoke up’ for patients, and would defend their wishes, despite being 
under pressure to conform to what a psychiatric team thought was best. In this case, she 
referred to preventing a woman being given electro-convulsive treatment by strongly 
representing her in a meeting. Indeed, the tone of her voice changed when she touched on 
this, opening up to show a self-assuredness that up till then had been hidden.  
She thinks being an advocate is a really important part of the mental health nurse’s role. In a few 
Care Program Approach meetings, she has made herself unpopular with the consultant by stating that 
if a patient does not want a treatment they should not be having it (P5 TMU47, MU47: 485-489)  
This becomes in the reduction and free imaginative variation, ‘She is an advocate for 
people who are not heard’ in her general synthesis. There seems to be something here about 
her mother not being heard, not being cared for properly when she was a child also perhaps, 
as her voice carried a new conviction when she spoke about it. 
As discussed above, Participant 2 links the motivation she has to be a mental health 
nurse with her father, which was touching for her in the interview (P2 MU14 extract lines 
189-204) (Figure 21). 
Figure 21 The influence of childhood - Participant 2 
P2: …but I think that the thought my dad could have been there… that's what I want to do… 
and I think I've always tried to do… I've always felt I want to be as if it was my dad… anyone 
that I knew having treatment I wanted to… hopefully give what I would want them to get… and 




She connects this with how impressed she was in her training on an elderly ward when 
a senior nurse allowed patients to get out of bed at their own pace, or have breakfast in bed, 
treating them as individuals with respect and dignity (P2 MU13 lines 163-187):  
P2: Yeah. Dignity, and you know if you've been in hospital all your life 6 years or whatever, you do 
want a lie in, don't you? So 9 o'clock, I thought that was a lovely way of doing it… and there was no 
pressure on to have everyone up and dressed, you know, what will be will be… so that was nice and… 
[gap] … Dignity… 
From Participant 2, Meaning Unit 14 has contributed to the theme of ‘affection’ while 
Meaning Unit 13 has contributed towards that of ‘respectfulness’ in the general synthesis for 




Figure 22 Respect and affection Participant 2 
P2 Th10 
Caring to respect a person’s dignity is therapeutic 
(TMU12, TMU13, TMU15i, TMU34, TMU36) 
P2 Th11 
Treating a person like someone she loved is 
therapeutic (TMU14, TMU16, TMU17) 
 
In the subsequent meaning unit (Figure 23), she is not sure of the effects of her father 
on her decision to be a nurse, and she says there is also something innate in her that wants to 
care. 
Figure 23 Wanting to care may be innate Participant 2 
She is not sure whether mental health nursing is linked to her father. It struck her later on that he had died 
so young and so suddenly. He was the senior engineer at XY and within 6 months of stopping work he died. 
The onset of his illness was very sudden. It is shocking to think about it and how many years she has 
outlived him. She had not thought that perhaps being a nurse comes from all those years before. But she 
thinks that that is how one is also. She has always thought that if someone were in hospital she would want 




 These transformed meaning units have been reduced to ‘treating a person like 
someone she loved is therapeutic’, while there may be perhaps more to this, as indicated 
above, to do with complex feelings towards her father. For her then, caring was about 
affection, although she also saw that sometimes it was not enough in order to be therapeutic, 
when speaking about a client who tried her patience. What she meant was that being 
therapeutic sometimes had to involve thinking through an approach with somebody, which 
the psychologist had helped her do, as well as being a parent, and some training she had 
completed (Figure 24). In this instance, she meant keeping a consistent ‘boundary’ (her word) 
with a particular person who was derogatory towards her. 
  
Figure 24 Thinking through with others Participant 2 
She completed some degree modules in personality disorder at university, which taught her skills 
such as keeping boundaries. She already had some idea because as a parent, boundaries also create 
security for the child. The psychologist and P2 were keeping boundaries with the patient. Before 
there were psychologists on the team, she would not have known about it as much. People with 
personality disorder only came into the service after the Mental Health Act, as before that they were 
excluded. In her nurse training, she had not learned about personality disorder. She is not sure if it is 
a skill or not, but she thinks she got on well with this patient (P2 TMU40, MU 40 lines 617-639) 
 
In all cases, being therapeutic had to do with enabling others, and this was emphasised 
to varying degrees by different mental health nurses. The variations in this characteristic was 
shown across Participants 4, 5 and 6. Participant 5 wanted to have a longer term, caring 
relationship because she felt her patients needed this, while Participant 6 was somewhat 
personally averse to any kind of dependency being developed. Participant 4 was somewhere 
in between these poles, feeling she should be ‘caring without disabling’ (Figure 25). 
Figure 25 Enabling others - Participant 4 (Theme 8) 




P4: I think it's just you've got to show that you are you are caring and enabling rather than being caring and 
over the top if you know what I mean it's difficult to explain… [gap]…you've got to make sure I 
think that you don't disable the person … [gap]…and by seeing what their strengths are you can work 
with them so they feel empowered …[gap]…rather than…  you sort of doing everything for them… 
[gap]…so it's about getting that relationship whereby you are enabling them to fulfil their 
potential rather than everything you can't do for them… (P4 MU9 extract lines 92-108) 
 
Participant 3 shows resilience, in her case, the ability to ‘stay with’ someone in 
distress, and self-containment in the following extract, while also indicating she is committed 
to the person, as noted above (P3 MU20 extract 563-622). Self-containment here is about 
‘being able to feel and tolerate emotional distress, including her own.’  
yeah… I suppose I do… you just keep being there… because that's all you've got left… well, you 
know, well we've got a really strong rapport now and you can tell me that, so I can't make it go away 
but at least you can talk to me and we can have a coffee and… and I've understood… 
 
Commitment to the other person, for Participant 3, is illustrated in Figure 26.  
 
Figure 26 Theme 2 Commitment to the other person Participant 3 
Theme 2 
Because of her role, she feels she must not disappoint anyone who relies on her, and she commits herself to 
them so they know she keeps them in mind (TMU3, TMU4, TMU7, TMU44, TMU45, TMU46) 
Transformed Meaning Unit 7 
When P3 first meets a patient, she tells them what she can offer them, explaining her role and that of the 
community mental health team. She makes unsaid promises to the patient. She explains that the patient 
is not alone now, that she will be there for the patient until things settle down, someone the patient 
can call on. She knows she is making commitments to the person that she will keep (TMU7) 
Meaning Unit 7 
P3: Well, I think as a cpn… it's different now which is another thing… when I have been doing the 
community nursing the first few sessions you can see there’s a pattern every time, you get to know each 
other so you start off the first few sessions you put your stall out - this is what I can do for you - you make 




P3: Yeah, we're going to, you know, this is what I do, this is my role, this is what the team does. You might 
have met them in hospital so someone's coming now, come to see you when you leave hospital… you're 
not on your own -  somebody's going to be here, aren’t they? 
…. 
P3: To help them to… until you feel better until you settle down… I'll be your named nurse, someone 
you can call (P3 MU7 extract lines 149-189) 
 
In Figure 27, Participant 9 listens in a way that facilitates the other to speak, by being 
attentive and responsive to the person, opening up a space to speak. 
Figure 27 Listening and being open - Participant 9 (Theme 17) 
Listening, and allowing the other person to speak, is essential to being therapeutic (TMU17, TMU18) 
 
P9: Yeah quite often she asked she'd asked for certain nurses... so... I was doing something right if she 
asked for me when she needed to talk...  
R: What do you think you were doing right? 
P9: I think in that case it was listening...  because she did struggle to talk to people she had X...  so it 
was...  I think it was the listening in that case...  I don't I don't think everyone like sits quietly for a 
while like if someone is not talking they'll say something in the gap...  often not saying anything to 
someone will then say something and fill the gap in for you...  
  
 She demonstrates openness to the other person, genuineness, and treating the patient 
as an equal, developing trust, in an ordinary way (Figure 28).  
Figure 28 Developing trust and openness Participant 9 
P9 Transformed Meaning Unit 26 (TMU26) 
She will say she has got something wrong and ask what she can do in the future to help. She does not see 
the point in being any other way, that is, closed off. She has to build a level of trust and cannot do this 
unless she is completely honest.  
 
P9: yeah if I'm wrong I'll say I got that wrong I'm sorry...  what can I do in the future to help rather than 
saying the wrong thing… [gap]…yeah well...  I don't see the point in...  in being closed off about stuff 
like that... [gap]…because you've got to build up a level of trust and you're not going to build a level of 




 The characteristic of ‘openness to learning from the other person’, is something that 
Participant 4 shows in different and contrasting settings. For example, she speaks about 
learning from students in an everyday setting: “I think that you can learn a lot from 
students...  it was a teaching ward that I ran…” (P4 MU49 extract). She also learns from 
patients in extreme distress (Figure 29).  
Figure 29 Learning from others - Participant 4 
P4: Yes I think I have... I mean... I mean...  you've got somebody sitting with a rope in front of you saying 
that you know you're in the house and they wanted to die and you know perhaps you've done quite a lot of 
work with them and they're still doing that… [gap]…what do I do there and then? I think I would try and 
get them to talk about how they are feeling why they are feeling like that,  why are they 
feeling hopeless and helpless,  what happened what's triggered them off  to make them feel like that and 
then because you know that patient you know what would work in the beginning you know what would 
what has helped in the past like and so you might be thinking that in your head but you might just have to 
let them actually just talk  and just be there with them you may not even have to say anything you 
may just have to let them talk to you 
 
 What is also shown in this extract from Participant 4 is that other factors are in play, 
such as how she has already ‘got to know’ this person, as well as being able to ‘allow the 
expression of feelings,’ and ‘being able to tolerate in others, and feel in oneself, physical and 
emotional distress’ (see General Synthesis). These are all themes also found elsewhere in her 
interview (Themes 2, 3, 6, 10, 19, 20, 25).  
 Empathy is understood by all participants as being important to being therapeutic, but 
it is conceived of as being about a transparent understanding of the other person with most 
participants, while it is treated with caution by others, where it is more about recognising 
difference. For Participant 1, empathy has to do with acknowledging difference: 
 Figure 30 Empathy as difference Participant 1 
To try and empathize… and…[gap]… And try to accept that… that what… It's like culture… isn't it? 
It's accepting that there are people that are different and have different lives from us (P1 MU18 
lines extract 332-347) 
223 
 
For Participant 3, she is wary of empathising in a way that makes assumptions that 
the other person is like her: 
 Figure 31 Empathy and assumptions Participant 3 
Yeah, but I suppose that's where the therapeutic thing comes in, but it's just that's my personal values 
then isn’t it? …[gap]…Thinking about it… [gap]… How I, I suppose I've always treated people how 
I would want to be treated, so if I was in their position… Is it over-empathetic, I don't know? I 
don't know… (P3 Theme 8, MU6 lines extract 133-148). 
In contrast, Participant 8 looks for empathy as transparent understanding, based on his 
own experience. He is anxious to ‘identify’ the person’s real problem. This seemed linked to 
his own story, where he said he struggled to ‘identify’ what kind of life he wanted to live, and 
stumbled upon it by becoming depressed and working as a health care assistant. For this 
reason, he is more comfortable working with patients with depression than other diagnoses. 
His own experience gives a sense that he can truly know where someone is coming from, 
what they are feeling, and this makes him feel he can be more therapeutic (Figure 32). 
Figure 32 Empathy as transparent understanding Participant 8 
when a patient says to me ohh … you know my job’s not happy with me or my mother is not talking 
to me or this person is...  I can understand actually these could be some of the reasons why... I can identify with 
actually you know...  I kind of say it to the person obviously not kind of say it about my depression ...  it's not 
you it's the illness…you know and just remember the symptoms you get with depression so I can kind of relate 
a lot more to the experience I have had... (P8 MU27 extract lines 476-495)  
as nurses… it's having a genuine genuine empathy for people... [gap]… that whole feeling of I 
know where you are I can empathize I can understand where you're coming from... of your mind 
(P8 Theme 6, MU9 extract lines 119-140) 
to work with people, know how to identify with people you need to feel that sadness for people 
sometimes as well you need to feel someone's pain feel what actually is someone's the stress … 
[gap]… not take it home with you… you need to have some kind of truly got what that person 
is coming from (P8 Theme 6, MU41 extract lines728-743) 
He struggles to work with people with diagnoses which he cannot ‘identify’ with: 
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and then on the other end of the spectrum if I'm honest with myself you've got a lot of people like 
personality disorders and stuff... people you know like that kind of find it more difficult to work with 
or relate with... (P8 MU26 extract lines 448-475) 
Participant 10 qualifies ‘full’ empathy, saying she has at least some sense of what the 
other person is going through based on her own experience: 
Figure 33 Empathy qualified - Participant 10 
All I'm telling you is I've been through all that, you know, I've had mental health problems 
myself so I do know, a lot of the time, I do know at least a portion of what they're feeling (P10 
MU12 lines 228-229) 
She thinks that because she has been through mental health problems herself that she at least knows 
to some extent what a person is feeling (P10 TMU12 extract) 
Having had mental health problems oneself enables empathy as understanding, at least to some extent 
(General Synthesis) 
As can be seen in this section, it is difficult to separate characteristics as if they could 
be thought of as something to be found in a dictionary or thesaurus, or looked up in a manual, 
to understand their full meaning. However, some have been listed here to give a sense of how 
the method tends to isolate these as ‘key constituents,’ although Giorgi (2009) is aware there 
is a figure-ground aspect. It was a struggle to write this section, as meaning is always situated 
in a form of life (Heaton, 2010, p. 155), as discussed in the theory chapter, and so, listing 
characteristics was like removing them from the ‘form of life’ in which they made a particular, 
idiosyncratic sense. It was decided to stay with the struggle to demonstrate the difficulty of 
isolating elements from a meaning situated in a life.    
5.7.4 Key Theme 4 
Learning is through practice with others  
Education in nursing has become a university-based discipline in an attempt to 
improve the status of nurses, however, the academic requirements to enter a nursing course 
are far less than those for medicine or psychology. This emerged explicitly on two occasions, 
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but was implicit throughout in that the medical and administrative aspects of the work took 
precedence (Key theme 1).  
Participant 9 mentioned she did not get the grades to be a medical doctor or 
psychologist, and was interested in the brain (transformed meaning units 2, and 3), so it was 
as if mental health nursing was her last chance to work in the field of the ‘brain’. Yet she 
showed an ability to ‘make room’ for the other person, which came across immediately as 
therapeutic in some way in her interview, which in the method was reduced to the 
characteristic of ‘being open’, and ‘listening’. In fact, some months previously, a major 
distressing incident, a suicide, occurred soon after she was replaced as the main nurse for a 
fragile patient with whom she had engaged therapeutically for months. This ‘administrative’ 
decision, due to staffing shortages, may have been contributory to the incident perhaps. This 
mental health nurse was particularly affected by the event and depended on a lot of support 
from her colleagues - a therapeutic environment perhaps - to recover. It appeared that the 
subordination of her therapeutic relationship to the administrative and medical framework 
may have caused the fatal and tragic consequence for the patient. In all participants, there was 
mention of the university-based courses being geared towards recovery, that is, the medical 
and administrative view of recovery as the removal or management of symptoms and 
encouragement of independent living.  
The second occasion where the implications of the standard of education emerged 
explicitly was towards the end of Participant 4’s interview. She mentioned, without any 
apparent chagrin, that nursing knowledge is “side-lined” because they are not as well educated 
as doctors. This fact of academic achievement delineates power and pay structures in the 
working environment of mental health nurses. It indicates that the learning involved in mental 
health nursing is already seen as subordinate to another kind of learning, which is a finding 
of this research also. Nevertheless, this ‘subordinated’ learning is regarded as vital to the 
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practice of mental health nursing for each participant, often being the main reason they 
entered the discipline.  
The problem here for mental health nursing education with respect to the therapeutic, 
is that it is left very much to chance as to whether the right therapeutic environment, created 
by the right therapeutic mental health nurses, are in place. There is an implication that the 
psychiatric nursing system is geared towards provision of the ‘right kind of people’, those 
with characteristics that satisfy the requirements of the 6 C’s, for example, in order to service 
the medical model. There is little difference then, in principle, between current mental health 
nursing and the attendants of old who were chosen based on character rather than academic 
or critical ability or leanings (see for example, Nolan, 1993).  
Only one interviewee, Participant 1, was critical of university training. Her argument 
was that high grades could be achieved through ‘regurgitation’ of material taught, and linked 
to this, she was disappointed there was no room for critical thinking. She was also the only 
participant who was critical of the 6 C’s. The three mental health nurses whose original 
training had been over eighteen years ago noted there once had been an emphasis on 
humanistic skills (Participants 2, 4 and 6), while one of these regarded such skills as too ‘soft’ 
for acute psychiatric nursing, for which skills in de-escalation and cognitive behavioural 
therapy were more practical (Participant 6). Yet, Participant 6 viewed the therapeutic as 
linked to engaging in a complex of person-centred, flexible, playful and supportive ways, 
largely based on the attitude and charisma of a nurse consultant with whom he once worked 
(Theme 12). Perhaps what can be seen here is the contrast between psychiatric, medical care, 
as cure and containment, with therapeutic mental health nursing aligned towards the ‘art’ of 
healing. Participant 6 learned through being in the environment that this nurse consultant 
created a therapeutic way and environment with others, and the experience remained with 
him, but which he did not take up in his practice, preferring the medical model.  
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What this section outlines is that mental health nurses appear to learn about the 
therapeutic from other nurses in practice, which places the onus on those nurses who ‘teach’ 
through practice, informally, and tacitly, as they go about their work. What goes into practice 
can be drawn from a number of sources, including everyday life, childhood experiences, ideas 
from various training courses, and ideas that come to a nurse while with the patient. Each 
participant spoke about learning from other nurses as their main way of learning about the 
therapeutic. This would indicate that the therapeutic environment created by other nurses, 
and/or their example in practice, is crucial to therapeutic learning. Learning in this way is a 
consistent theme, where practice can be with mentors in practice settings, other nurses, and 
to a lesser extent, with patients. Being open to this kind of learning was also a key 
characteristic that emerged more in some participants than others. If learning in this way 
depends so much on practice, it has major implications for the future of the therapeutic aspects 
of mental health nursing.  
For example, the following extract from Participant 4 (Figure 34) indicates how 
characteristics, and skills, have been developed through training and practice, which are also 
linked to making a right judgement, or complex decision-making (P4 Theme 17, from 
Transformed Meaning Units, 27, 28, 34, 36):  
Figure 34 Complex decision-making - Participant 4 
Theme 17 
Judging what is appropriate for each person is based on the relationship and what happens in the moment 
(TMU27, TMU28, TMU34, TMU36) 
 
P4 MU27 (354-367) 
P4: and knowing what 
you can and can't do I 
think as well is 
important because you 
know sometimes 
P4 MU28 (368-372) 
 
P4: it means you're not 
closed to anything 
P4 MU34 (419-427) 
P4 you've got to be very 
present in the 
moment because...  what 
you gather from that 
information of how they 
P4 MU36 (438-454) 
 
P4 you're making a 
judgement all the 
time  but you're 
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somebody might have 
had horrific sexual 
abuse in the past but 
they may have had quite 
a lot of counselling for 
that and they're living 
with that well it would 
be not good this then 
you come in and you 
start going over that 
again yeah...  so what 
about knowing your 
client knowing what 
can be helpful and 
what can't be helpful… 
[gap]…  I've done quite 
a lot of sexual abuse 
counselling in the past 
mainly in the day 
hospital… [gap]… 
structured 
counselling with proper 
supervision… 
[gap]…person centred… 
[gap]…   
really. I think the 
experiences you 
have as you go 
through nursing 
means you're not 
closed… the things that 
people feel ok to open 
up and tell you 
things and then it's what 
you do with that 
knowledge and that's 
where the skill comes 
in...  and it's knowing 
when to intervene 
when not to...  
are then will depend on 
how you are going to 
react um...  you'd know 
whether this was 
common behaviour you 
know whether this 
was common 
behaviour you 
know your… your 
patient because there 
would be times 
then when you would 
think right there's 
something a 
bit different about their 
behaviour today so today 
I think 
that their impulsivity 
would be high you know 
it's higher than normal 
 
looking for things that 
would alert you 
to things being 
different because you 
know… [gap]… she has 




disorder and it would be 
about an… you don't 
take risks but you have 
to know you have to 
know what is an 
acceptable risks and 
that's the 
difficulty that's when 
you have to make sure 
you have discussed this 
with the patient with 
all the staff with all the 
team, so you're 
your approach to that 
person is consistent, is 
boundaried…  that you 
want the best for that 
person to enable that 
person to reduce their 
distress but you have 




In this theme, Participant 4 indicates there are skills which she has learned through a 
counselling course, linked to knowing what to do (MU27), while there are also capacities 
such as being ‘not closed’ (that is, openness to learning from the other) (MU28) linked to 
practice in mental health nursing (and perhaps counselling). There is a sense here that 
‘openness to learning from the other person’ is something she has developed, and this is 
reinforced by her comments in MU36, indicating how previously she has asked the patient 
and the team about risks, while bearing in mind that she wants to enable this person also. She 
is open enough, able to say she needs help, and confident enough to do this, with a range of 
colleagues. This appears key to learning. Her comments are perhaps crucial. 
It is not too difficult for P4 to be open about her concerns, as she accepts constructive 
criticism, and would welcome suggestions as to other approaches. But she thinks others 
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might struggle with saying they are vulnerable, that they are not sure if they are getting it 
right (P4 TMU 39 MU39: 474-481) 
 
  
 The characteristic of being attentive is shown in how Participant 4 is present to the 
person (MU34). There is also an implicit meaning across these examples that Participant 4 is 
working from a wealth of tacit knowledge (Theme 17i). These themes, as is evident, are all 
relevant to ‘being with’ the person also. 
5.7.5 Key Theme 5 
Learning is facilitated through a therapeutic environment  
This key theme is closely linked to the above, key theme 4. However, it differs in that 
it specifically highlights the need for an environment in which the mental health nurse may 
come to know herself safely. What encourages learning to be therapeutic is a safe, self-
reflective environment of therapeutic reciprocity with colleagues. As noted above, Participant 
4 was the only one who explicitly spoke about how being open was facilitated by a reflective, 
structured therapeutic environment. In this kind of environment, she felt valued, which in turn 
allowed her to be able to speak more clearly about her concerns, and to show others that she 
may not know what to do. She needed a safe environment to enable this. This facilitated her 
own openness with colleagues and patients.  
 
 In summary and conclusion, this chapter has presented the findings of the empirical 
analysis according to Giorgi’s (2009) method. An overview of the general syntheses of each 
participant has been presented. Key themes of the general synthesis have been discussed, also 
in reference to each participant. Being therapeutic is to do with the person of the mental health 
nurse, and characteristics that nurses speak about which they see as therapeutic, or appear 
therapeutic, cannot be removed from the situated context, of learning, and of the embodied 
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aspect of being with others. Two notable features of the ability to learn to be therapeutic 
emerged: Firstly, that the capacity to be therapeutic is innate, or learned in childhood, in such 
a way that it cannot be taught, although it can be ‘brought out’ through practice. Secondly, 
that learning to ‘bring out’ the therapeutic is facilitated through practice with others who are 
therapeutic, and in a safe environment, which allows openness about vulnerabilities and 
receiving constructive feedback from others. The dependency on the environment created by 
other mental health nurses, and individuals, to ‘bring out’ the latent therapeutic abilities in 
others, makes the learning environment vulnerable to the kind of mental health nurses 
occupying it. A concluding remark is that the findings presented here are from a method, 
which claims to be phenomenological. However, phenomenology, as can be seen from the 
Methodology chapter (Chapter 3), is a way of being that is open to the ‘things themselves’, 
which method seems to constrict. For this reason, a phenomenology of responses to the 
research question will be presented in the following chapter, to put under question method, 


























This chapter is an attempt to allow the ‘things themselves’ to emerge through a 
phenomenology with respect to the research question. The approach here is 
phenomenological in the Husserlian sense in that what is ‘trusted’ is the researcher’s own 
consciousness, or experience (Zahavi, 2003). As indicated in the Methodology chapter 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.5.3), two people may “… have the same sensations but are differently 
affected in their feelings,” and this implies that “inner evidence is nothing but the 
“experience” of truth” (Husserl, 1970a, § 51 in Welton, 1999, p.21). At the same time, for 
Husserl, the “nature of meaning, truth and reality” depends on understanding subjectivity, 
which is intrinsically linked to “that which shows itself and actually appears” (Zahavi, 2003, 
p. 52). There is a tension then between the ‘experience of truth’ and the ‘facticity’ of the 
reality disclosed in that experience (Zahavi, 2003; see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 
3.5.2). Consequently, this phenomenology attempts to ‘lead back’ (reducere) from this 
experience of truth, in order to throw light on what is happening in the consciousness of the 
researcher in arriving at meanings, the ‘things themselves’, through interviews. What is 
disclosed in this reducere (leading back) are findings that appear as phenomenological, 
underlying the empirical ‘talk’. The reduction has allowed an emergence of the “conditions 
of the possibility for appearance” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 94) of these findings. As a result, the 
differences between the empirical and the phenomenological seemed to clarify during this 
phenomenology (which includes the ‘creative process’ in Appendix 5), and it seemed the 
study had been re-found in a certain ‘truthfulness’ of my own experience. This kind of 
phenomenology attempts to address how responses to the research question are not only 
spoken, but are also implicit, as meanings emerge obliquely, and sometimes ‘shown’ in a 
whole pattern that emerged (Merleau-Ponty, 1968; 2014).  
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Two principle (and unexpected) findings have emerged from this phenomenology 
which seemed to underlie the responses to the research question.  Firstly, that there is an 
irreducible tension between the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’. Secondly, that meaning has both ‘sensual’ 
and ‘given’ aspects. These two findings, shown tacitly and explicitly, inhabit this chapter, as 
well as in retrospect, the entire study from its inception in a ‘feeling’ of abjection. These 
findings reflect considerations in the Methodology chapter (Chapter 3), and link with the idea 
of openness in the Theory chapter (Chapter 2), however, they now appear through a certain 
attempt at ‘truthfulness’ (of the researcher) as opposed to outlining ‘clever arguments’ in 
those chapters. Wittgenstein’s (1998) distinction, highlighted in the Methodology chapter 
(Section 3.5.3), appears now in a clearer light. 
“One cannot speak the truth; if one has not yet conquered oneself.  One cannot speak  
it – but not because, one is still not clever enough” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 41 in Heaton,  
2010, p. 32 original italics).  
 
 What is happening here then is that, in this phenomenology, there has been a 
disclosure (and restoration) of the relation between the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’, both internally and 
externally (to me), which are joined like two sides of the same coin. The same can be said for 
the sensual and the given ‘sides’ of meaning. This emerged through a certain ‘truthfulness’. 
Coming to see these two findings in one’s own truthfulness is crucial, as opposed to in theory. 
The importance of truthfulness (in Wittgenstein’s (1998)) sense has become itself a finding 
of the phenomenology, although it was alluded to in the Theory chapter (Chapter 2, Section 
2.5), and perhaps gives a sense of how being open allows something to ‘unfold’ in a learning.  
The organisation of this chapter is rooted in these two findings, which re-inform at 
times a reflection on methodological and theoretical considerations, but permeated now 
through the unfolding aspect of truthfulness. The two findings are inter-related and have 
234 
 
emerged from the ‘creative process’ of the phenomenology (see Appendix 5). In this chapter, 
the relation between the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’ is discussed first. Following this, the chapter is like 
catching three different aspects of both of these findings as if they have been held up to the 
light, each aspect like a different pattern in the same kaleidoscope. The aspects seen are 
reflections on, firstly, meaning as empirical and phenomenological, secondly, experience and 
deductive rationalisation, and thirdly, scientific language and the sensual. Meaning as sensual 
and given is then discussed. Finally, implications for the research question are summarised.  
6.2 A phenomenology in the tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty 
In relation to the research question, meanings have emerged between the interviewer 
and the interviewee. The interviews, in each line written and each sentence spoken, uneasy 
shifting in seats, anxious and peaceful silences, invoked images, recollections, and words, in 
which meanings seemed to come and go, sometimes the most fleeting one seeming to be the 
most important. Meanings seemed to shift, moving in and out of perspective, and changing, 
and perhaps then stabilising (see Appendix 5). Some of this has been thought of as a landscape 
“overrun with words” in the metaphor from Merleau-Ponty (1968, p. 155), as this seemed an 
appropriate way of describing patterns that emerged, and also fits Husserl’s view of 
“givenness” arriving in profiles (or horizons) (Husserl, 1982, p. 94 cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 
16; see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5).  
 What emerges comes into the consciousness of the researcher, and this ‘experience 
of truth’ is then put under question, in the reduction, to ‘allow’ something else to be disclosed. 
It is worth noting that the experience of the interviews ‘showed’ that the sensual is in the 
breath, air and life-force of the landscape of each interview. Like the sap beneath the bark it 
seemed to ebb and flow, and finding its way into the breeze moving through the leaves. It was 
present as not only the background but also coming into relief at times as sexual, or also an 
affectionate look, a recognition of something like a wild thought, smiled at, something wildly 
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alive (that might even kill). Openness seemed to be linked with this too, as it allowed a 
wildness to be. Meanings have been ‘allowed’ to be disclosed in an uncertain, ambiguous 
relation between the I and the other. Some meanings persist, and some emerge fleetingly like 
a glimpse of a wild animal in a landscape.  
The phenomenology of responses to the research question came to be seen as nothing 
but this attention to a relation and an allowing of whatever words are there to describe a 
landscape in which a wild creature (perhaps both shy and savage) may come near, to watch, 
or be curious, mistaking the other perhaps for a block of colour, or mistaking the other for a 
reflection of itself in a pool. This ‘allowing’ may be the revelation in phenomenological 
‘seeing’, and each section in this chapter reflects this. The hunched figure by the doorway is 
allowed to be, and slowly it may become a coat on the chair as something ‘dawns through’ in 
a “perspectival” way (Zahavi, 2003, p. 15). Something reveals itself in its own time in a 
relation. In the recognition, something happens that seems to change us. There is something 
restoring in the relation established again between this I and this otherness ‘outside’, which 
is found also in the relation of openness with oneself and the other in the ‘I.’ But it seems that 
this uncertain relation can become obscured, or is completely elided, in the reality of violence 
and aggression.  
6.2.1 Openness to another person  
Some considerations from the Methodology chapter are revisited briefly here, 
principally in relation to the reduction. For Husserl, “[w]e should let the originary giving 
intuition be the source of all knowledge” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 45, after Husserl, 1982, § 24). Yet, 
he is also particularly clear that we rely on the other person to ‘know’ anything at all.  
All Objectivity, in this sense, is related back constitutionally to what does not belong to the 
Ego-proper, to the other-than-my-Ego’s-own in the form, ‘someone else’ -  that is to say: the 
non-Ego in the form, another-Ego (Husserl, 1969, p. 248 cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 115). 
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For Husserl, this is an a priori constitutive relation between intersubjectivity and 
subjectivity (Zahavi, 2003). This ‘relational aspect’ has been linked in this study with an 
‘anonymous subjectivity’ (Husserl, 1981/1927 (19, II, 8) in McCormick & Elliston, 1981, cited 
in Welton, 1999, pp. 329-330) which is transcendental in that it ‘functions’ in a pre-reflective 
way, which Husserl also spoke of in the Bernau manuscripts (1917-1918) (Zahavi, 2003) as 
well as Formal and Transcendental Logic (Welton, 1999; see Methodology, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.5). Merleau-Ponty’s (2014, p. xxxii/18) idea of operative intentionality is rooted in 
this (Husserl’s) idea of a ‘functioning intentionality’. In addition, what seems particularly 
important is how empathy may be to do with “self-alienation” for Husserl (1970b, p. 189 in 
Zahavi, 2003, p. 124; see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.1).  
If meaning then arrives like a gestalt, then it may be that what is found is a 
“modification of myself” (Moran, 2000, p. 177), and in order to be open to something of the 
other’s meaning one may need to allow a certain ‘alienation’ to take place, through the 
reduction perhaps, while also, as has been argued in the Theory chapter, a certain openness. 
The reduction and openness may be linked perhaps. The picture is complex because it appears 
that meaning has already been intersubjectively disclosed (constituted) in oneself, and at the 
same time there is an operative intentionality tacitly ‘allowing’ experience in a certain way 
so it is difficult, or possibly impossible, to gain distance from meanings that ‘force 
themselves.’ Combining these aspects then, it can be seen how the interplay between this ‘I’ 
and ‘an other I’ can be so clumsy when trying to catch a meaning. This interplay seems to 
imply that in the field of meaning between people, the full extent of what is really going on 
cannot be said. It has been argued here that by suspending judgement, and allowing the other 
in an openness to her, to him, and resisting meaning, something may ‘emerge’ like the wild 
creature that emerges in a landscape. In a sense, it is a strange uncertainty which distinguishes 
the phenomenology outlined here (see Appendix 5 also). There is no rushing after causal or 
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explanatory links, but rather an attentive waiting that ‘allows’ things to take a shape, without 
grasping at these. It is often unclear what is going on in this ‘allowing’, but something has 
emerged in this analysis (that seems to insist) that has to do with ‘me and the other person’ 
(which appears to point towards a hidden ontological relation). This ‘allowing’ appears to 
link with openness.  
To ‘use’ a lens like a method would be to imagine being able to step back from this 
‘co-constitutive’ relation while forgetting being always within it, just as Husserl (1960 in 
Zahavi, 2003) notes how he is only an ‘I’ in relation to another (see Methodology, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.5.2.1). What this implies is that the experiencing ‘I’ cannot be separated out from 
the ‘analysis’ of the interviews because of an entanglement in an ambiguous, oscillating 
relationship of uncertainty inherent to being open to the other. It seems that it is quite usual 
to turn away from this relation between the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’, and for example, to impose a 
particular language on a meaning. It is crucial that ‘knowing’ this in theory, is different to its 
painful realisation with another, and perhaps it takes time with another, or others, who are 
‘open’ to come to realise this. In this ‘painfulness’ a certain ‘truthfulness’ comes to be as 
one’s own truth emerges. It is also painful for this openness not to be allowed. In waiting and 
listening, what is revealed is an ambiguous relation between the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’. This 
relation seems to be of enormous significance.  
 For example, it seems impossible to remove the ‘I’ from these thoughts in referring 
to what the other is saying, what is being heard, and what ‘dawns through’ in the interviews. 
In starting to ‘notice’, or think, there is a flood of recollections, and images, along with words 
which seem to, as Merleau-Ponty (1968) sees, ‘overrun the landscape’. There seems to be a 
certain ‘truth’ in Husserl’s thought that there is a “reduction of all unities of sense to me 
myself and my sense-having and sense-bestowing subjectivity with all its capabilities” 
(Husserl, 1973, p. 366 cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 46). Removing the ‘I’ appears impossible. In 
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other words, the reduction cannot be complete, which perhaps Husserl did not seem to fully 
realise (Moran, 2000; Zahavi, 2003). It is interesting to note that scientific method (without 
using this terminology) makes the assumption that the reduction can be complete (in terms of 
subjectivity being removed from an analysis).  
In the tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the reduction ‘leads back’ in that it 
veers towards revealing the world and one’s relation in it as if for the first time, and in this 
sense, it may be child-like. Perhaps children may be more able to see the strangeness of the 
world before they have become educated, or entrained into a dogma which acts like a prism 
through which the world is understood, no matter how perverse. But it is not that a child 
would see the world ‘as it is’ either. It is only in this sense that the reduction in Husserlian 
phenomenology changes experience; reality remains the same, so that things “lose[s] nothing 
of their being” (Husserl, 1970b, p. 152 cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 46; see Methodology, Chapter 
3, Section 3.5.1). But it is argued that seeing the world in this ‘magnified’ way, and returning 
to it, would appear to change the person. It opens onto a certain loneliness, and there is a 
certain ““wonder” before the world” (after Eugene Fink (1970, p. 109) in Merleau-Ponty, 
2014, p. xxvii/14). There is a kind of homelessness here coupled with a strange belonging as 
everything is so transient. Perhaps there needs to be a certain trust to allow this way of seeing 
to be spoken of, as it seems so private and perhaps even illusionary. There appears to be a 
dialectic between others trusting in that experience of trust and trusting in others’ experience 
of that experience. Is this not what Husserl may have meant also by a co-constituting “foreign 
subjectivity” (Husserl, 1959, p. 495 cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 115)? This trust allowed the 
creative process of the phenomenology to be less restrictive, more open, compared to an 
empiricism.  
An example regarding Participant 1 may show this relation to an extent perhaps. She 
would close her eyes at times, and it felt like she did not want me to be there, that she could 
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not trust in my experience of her, and I was caught in a meaning of hers that was not mine 
(but neither did I know anything about it). In trying to ‘get out of her way’, to relinquish my 
own meanings about her, to open a space for her to speak, it seemed all the more that she 
needed to close her eyes (see Appendix 5). She would not trust in my experience of her. To 
close down on this relation between the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’ seemed to be harmful to her. She 
could not allow herself to be found in a relation to this other (me, in this case, who perhaps 
represented an ‘other I’ both ‘internal’ and external to her), and it seemed important that I say 
nothing of this to her, to allow her to ‘off centre’ me. This experience of being with her 
seemed to be of more importance than anything empirical she said.  
In this way, it appeared that the relation to the other becomes so important in 
phenomenology because in finding the ‘I’ everywhere one finds the other in oneself, and this 
then has to be taken seriously (because surely the world is not only mine), and suddenly it 
appears clearly that there is a relation to something other, someone other, who cannot be 
ignored, not because of some power relation, but because this ‘other’ is centred in me, off-
centring the ‘I’ at its very centre. Participant 1 ‘off centred’ me and she too was off centred 
by me, but perhaps I knew more about it than she did and thus did not try to impose a meaning 
on her. The relation is both obstructing and holding in place in a kind of clumsy recognition. 
The clumsiness seems important, because it shows there is no schooling and no method. This 
paradoxical and ambiguous ‘relation’ is there, throwing the ‘I’ off-centre. This can be so 
hidden that it has only been possible to sense in a kind of raw vulnerability in a kind of relation 
with the other person (which may not be relational but perhaps ontological). Participant 1 
seemed not to allow an acknowledgement of this (through anxiety perhaps; see Appendix 5).  
As can be seen, this uneasy relation can be fraught with paradox, uncertainty, 
ambiguity, aggression, and anxiety. It is not easy. It is no wonder that it is easier to polarise, 
pretend the relation does not exist, annihilate otherness (an other I), to remove the ‘tension’ 
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so that the other person does not put the ‘I’ under question. This relation appears to be a 
phenomenological fact as opposed to an empirical one.  
Having read through, and listened to, the interviews over again, perhaps what comes 
through as therapeutic may be in the re-establishing of this ambiguous relation with the other 
person. The openness to the other in oneself is restored through another. Logically, the other 
can be god but phenomenologically it must be another person (because one finds the ‘not I’ 
in oneself). Perhaps this is why it was important to turn to Brother David in the Franciscans, 
as there was a welcoming openness that did not impose itself. It seems easy to keep forgetting, 
and missing out on, this relation. The ‘I’ at one’s centre which is ‘not-I’ is a relation which 
creates an uncertainty which is like an invitation. The ‘not-I’ is a relation, or opening out, to 
the other which is constitutive of the ‘I’ in a paradoxical relationship. The closure of this 
paradoxical relationship seems to arrive at dogma and violence. It is not surprising that when 
the ‘internal’ relation with the other, ‘not I’, is reduced to a logical one with a god (or a theory, 
an idea), it results in saints, martyrs and fanatics. Participant 10 seemed to be approaching 
this logical relation, while Participant 8 had a redeeming kindness (see Appendix 5). Merleau-
Ponty (1968; 2014) seems to have given a language to this relation which evokes the 
experience of the world in its sensuality, as well as how meaning may arrive as a gestalt 
(which meaning it has been argued here needs to be resisted, or suspended in uncertainty).  
 
6.2.2 Meaning as empirical and as phenomenological 
This section reflects the struggle to differentiate between an empirical analysis and a 
phenomenology of the interviews. Giorgi (2009) promotes the idea that arrival at a ‘structure’ 
or essential, stable meaning in a description comes through an intuitive process of free 
imaginative variation (see Method, Chapter 4, Section 4.5). However, the problem with free 
imaginative variation is that it seems impossible to intuitively vary an experience until there 
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is arrival at a structure of meaning that is stable without it being a rationalisation. Giorgi 
(2009, p. 154 italics added) provides the rationalisation, as the “intent… is to describe 
carefully the intuitive psychological senses that present themselves to the consciousness of 
the researcher.” The psychological senses then are the rationalisation, and as a result what 
appears is something that is filtering the language into an already known terminology.  
It seems clear that even if we focus less on the psychological and more on the mental 
health nursing meanings (or any empirical field of study) the principal of rationalisation 
remains the same. This has been discussed in the Methodology chapter, with reference to 
Merleau-Ponty’s (2014) distinction between spoken and speaking speech (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.6), where the latter transforms a “certain silence into speech” (Merleau-Ponty, 
2014, p. 189/224). Giorgi’s (2009) method appears to mainly address the former, ‘spoken’ 
speech, so that a way of ‘seeing’ the world is just repeated (see Method, Chapter 4, Section 
4.6). Nevertheless, Giorgi (2009, p. 125) regards the findings through his method as 
“adequate,” although he is aware that a “lateral or oblique meaning which runs between 
words” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 46) is missed out. In addition, it appears that ‘meaning’ here 
is not just what comes obliquely between the lines but is also something that belongs to a 
sensual landscape (Merleau-Ponty, 1968; 2014). Even given these limitations, when does the 
empirical analysis stop? When we have run out of psychological words to describe the 
phenomenon? If a researcher knew more psychological concepts, theories and empirical 
findings, would this mean her findings were simply just more psychological? It could be that 
the more the researcher is ‘expert’ empirically, the more there is ‘closure’ through 
rationalisation. Merleau-Ponty (1964, p. 46) would say, at what point are meanings 
“accomplished.” Can they ever be accomplished, in any way, whether empirically or 
phenomenologically? It seems not, as this ‘accomplishment’ has to do with the sensual and 
language, which will be discussed further (Section 6.2.5).  
242 
 
The “creative process” which Giorgi (2009, p. 154) acknowledges, in order to “get 
the right expression,” is curtailed by the filter of psychological language in which that 
‘rightness’ is expressed. Because the method is empirical, that is, rationalised to a 
psychological way (in this case) of ‘expressing’ something, it constricts the words that can be 
used. Empiricism also gives the idea that there is ‘data’ to be analysed, as in for example, 
how Hume saw the senses as ‘receiving’ data (Copleston, 1963; see Methodology, Chapter 
3, Section 3.4.4). The ‘data’ is ‘decoded’ in some way, for example, through a method. This 
can be put under question by thinking of how Husserl (1970a, §34 cited in Welton, 1999, p. 
367) speaks of ‘givenness’ as “an immediate presence, or, in memory, remembered as the 
thing in itself”, or how Merleau-Ponty, (2014, p. 62) speaks of ‘meaning’ appearing like a 
gestalt whose “very form is the appearance of the world”. The ‘data’ cannot exist as discrete 
units to be analysed (see Gill, 2000). This will be discussed further here, as feeling that we 
‘know’ someone, that we ‘know what someone means’, opens up questions about empathy.  
Empathy as analogy constricts language even more, resulting in findings that are ‘like 
me’ (or ‘mine’). In this way, findings may become what is ‘already known’ and ‘like me’, or 
a “phenomenological modification of myself” (Moran, 2000, p. 177; see Methodology, 
Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.1). This point appears to be crucial. It is argued here that this 
constriction shows that Giorgi’s (2009) method, or any method, cannot be viewed as 
phenomenological. But only because it is a constriction (through a narrow view of language 
and empathy). Empathy as analogy is important at times. For example, coming to see a certain 
healing kindness in Participant 8 depended on empathy as analogy (Appendix 5). But this 
kind of empathy is not the whole picture. 
Crucially, what is also allowed in the phenomenological is empathy as self-alienation 
(‘not mine’). It appears that we can only allow self-alienation by allowing ‘not understanding’ 
to have a place in the landscape, ‘to not know.’ Empirically, this might be ‘forced’, for 
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example, in betrayal (by a close friend) perhaps, and trying to then understand this - a 
‘meaning’ is ‘forced’ that seemed inconceivable (see Wittgenstein, 2009, § 191; see 
Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.5).  
Thinking about Participant 5 might show some of the ‘creative process’ to which 
Giorgi (2009) refers, but in a way which ‘opens up’ the language that can be used so that 
something of the phenomenological can be let through, with less ‘curtailing’ into an empirical 
view. She had looked after her ill mother to an extent as a child. It ‘felt’ like there was 
something not being understood in her interview (as it did in all the interviews) (see Appendix 
5). Just being with this idea, as if it were a cup sitting on the table, another ‘thing’ in the 
landscape, without looking at it, or actively trying to puzzle it out like a mathematical 
problem, seemed helpful. But it could just as easily not have been helpful. There is no 
‘method’. For some obscure reason, in those few moments, without any ‘analytic’ effort but 
with a different effort of ‘allowing’, of a ‘not knowing’, something ‘showed itself’ in the 
landscape. Under a heavy sky, rain soaked flower beds turned into bed-ridden mother not in 
some chain of association or logical deductive process. Linguists (for example, Hawkes, 
1977), and some psychoanalysts (for example, Lacan, 1977), might say there is assonance in 
the words ridden/sodden, and metaphor in the word ‘bed’, which cause associations; however, 
although this may also be the case, this appears to not give due emphasis to the sensual 
relation in words. There is a meaning in the heaviness of the grey clouds, the weight of 
something, the insistent scent of the garden that seemed to come through in the turn sensed 
in the season changing from autumn to winter, the smell itself of the air, the soaked ground, 
and the slow laboured movement of the clouds, the flowers seeming burdened and vulnerable 
but deep rooted and resistant to something, almost defiant. Something conveys a burden. 
Something insistent in the colours and the rain was in between her words, that went beneath 
the complaint that she no longer had time for patients. Seeds seemed to be sown around a 
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bed-ridden mother, life-giving and overburdening, a burden taken on unresentfully in 
kindness, and a sapling having grown strong had now become a weary shelter for others. It 
seemed that she needed someone to cut something back, and open up a space for her instead. 
The burden may have been kindness itself, how branches break under the weight of their own 
fruit.  
All of what is sensual is involved here in informing, or forming perhaps, the word 
associations that emerge in a meaning. The process seemed to be more like in some way a 
subconscious transformation of the image, like a gestalt ‘happens’. The process was perhaps 
like the thoughtless way a child learns while playing - things are tried out, without thinking, 
in a creative ‘trying out’ till something fits or works but not in any pre-thought logical, 
deductive way. There seem to be no rules. As Tomasello (1992) says in relation to language 
learning in children, “There is individuality and concreteness everywhere, signs of broad-
based rules nowhere” (Tomasello, 1992, pp. 264-265 in Heaton, 2010, p. 106; see Theory, 
Chapter 2, Section 2.6.1). Something ‘happens’. Experience ‘corrects’ experience, as Giorgi 
(2009, p. 69) would say. There is nothing logical about it in terms of deductive rationalisation. 
The rationalisation seems to come later through a need to know, a need to take control and 
‘know’ - which may be a way of talking about method - of something that appears ineluctably 
unknowable. Method seems to speak of how ‘knowing’ happens in a presumptuous way as if 
it is not mysterious. The imagery of the overburdened tree seems to be about something to do 
with empathy as a whole impression but the sensual here belongs to me. There appears to be 
something ineluctable about whether the imagery speaks about her or not, although it speaks 
to me. This uncertainty, in a sensual relation, seems vital to allow, as opposed to closing down 
through an experience.  
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6.2.3 Experience and deductive rationalisation  
The “creative process” to which Giorgi (2009, p. 154) refers may appear to be an 
intuitive knowing (Applebaum, 2012), but such an assumption seems to mislead, because it 
links ‘intuition’ with somehow something not clever, not logical, not capable of analytic 
reasoning, something for the simple or “naïve” (for example, Shtulman & Harrington, 2016, 
p. 119; see Theory, Chapter 2, Section 2.6.1). The creative process appears however, to be 
instead an open, mysterious activity involved in learning itself in which imagery ‘explains’ 
experience ‘overrun with words’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1968). Giorgi (2009) seems to know this 
but it appears that he will not fully trust his experience, even though he says experience can 
be trusted, 
Husserl is respectful and trusting with respect to experience. It is not the case that 
experience cannot be illusory, it is just that illusions and other sorts of error are also 
corrected by experience (Giorgi, 2009, p. 69).  
This disjunction in Giorgi’s (2009) approach may be because if experience is really 
trusted then ‘coming to know’ something, in a meaning, may be shown to not be methodical 
after all, and therefore not scientific in terms of how his community defines scientific. 
Trusting his experience might exclude him. Experience from the ‘creative process’ of the 
phenomenology (Appendix 5) appears to show rather that meanings come like hallucinations 
or visions, like dreams appearing out of nowhere, and they need to be left alone rather than 
rationalised after the event. This is a Husserlian way of thinking, linked to the epoché and the 
reduction (see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1). Here is Husserl (1982, p. 51-62 in 
Welton, 1999, p. 61), in Ideas 1, describing something of perception in the natural attitude,  
“Determining presentations, obscure at first, then becoming alive, haul something out 
for me; a chain of such quasi-memories is linked together”.  
Trusting experience allows something to be described with the words that present 
themselves, and left alone. But the next time we look, the whole landscape might have 
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changed. This is a disturbing thought, especially if we are wondering whether someone loves 
us, for example; or perhaps if we need some kind of prestigious recognition. The words of 
Participant 10 come to mind, “I’ll box it, hammer it down” (line 464) (see Phenomenology, 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3). An image of pinned butterflies might fit this, and the professional 
skims through with his expert eye to see which type you are. The illusion of certainty in this 
kind of ‘cataloguing’ may, for some, assuage the anxiety-provoking experience of 
uncertainty. The difficulty of openness, which has been theorised as being linked to the 
therapeutic (Theory, Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1), may come more sharply into focus on meeting 
such a certainty of attitude. Openness catches something in the chest, rather than catching 
something in a net.  
What the example from Participant 5 seems to indicate is that meaning is not a 
message typed out in words, it is not revealed in a chain of signifiers, but is rather about how 
the sensual ‘explains’ the words. Meaning seems to come through a dialect of feeling that 
‘appears’ like a gestalt. Phenomenology seems to invoke this kind of revelation in experience. 
The disclosure (to me) of the sense of ‘burden’ with Participant 5 may be a way of thinking 
of the epoché and the reduction, in that  
“…the epoché… is the way of uncovering judgements about correlation, of uncovering the 
reduction of… my sense-having and sense-bestowing subjectivity…” (Husserl, 1973, p. 366 
cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 46).   
This could also be thought of in terms of the later Heidegger, regarding ‘letting beings 
be’ (Gelassenheit) (Heidegger, 1930, p. 129-130, in Polt, 1999, p. 127), so that they show 
themselves through an attentive involvement - “In order to let the rain show itself to me… it 
has to make enough of a difference to me, that I properly notice it” (Polt, 1999, pp. 128-129). 
This sounds like Participant 5 saying, “people can tell who cares and is interested” (line 96). 
She may have been saying that it takes an ‘attentive and proper involvement’ (Polt, 1999, p. 
128) to be therapeutic. The ‘proper’ here could perhaps refer to being ‘open’. She also appears 
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close to Merleau-Ponty, for whom philosophy (phenomenology) ‘invites us to take notice’ of 
others,  
“The relation to the world, such as it tirelessly announces itself within us, is not something 
that analysis might clarify: philosophy can simply place it before our eyes and invite us to 
take notice” (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xxxii/18). 
 
If meaning ‘explains’ itself in a dialect of feeling, it appears to have its own rhythm, 
‘feel’, sounds (words) and imagery, that ‘speak’ and may captivate. It appears that meaning 
is more than the “integral of all the differentiations of the verbal chain” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 
p. 155). Husserl was aware that “sense and the sensuous” cannot be separated (Zahavi, 2003, 
p.29). Husserl’s later view of meaning (Sinn) included the linguistic, pre-predicative and 
perceptual (Zahavi, 2003, p. 149 after Husserl, 1982, p. 285) and this is what Merleau-Ponty 
was developing (Moran, 2000).  
For Participant 2, for example, something was happening about her father. It was 
difficult (if not impossible) to disentangle this from something to do with my own father. In 
Irish, “Tá sé go h-ána fuar agus fliuch”, was his catch phrase on wintry days on the way 
anywhere. It meant, ‘It’s very cold and wet.’ But the Irish words (the sounds) held an 
exhilarating energy caught up in his look, a certain humorous invitation mixed up with an 
anxious, maybe even vicious, distance. But with those Irish sounds comes a flood of the 
sensual, where rain, green and copper leaf-littered footpaths, soaked leather shoes, the smell 
of jam sandwiches and milk, are just fragments. A strange sense was felt of being part of 
something beloved, but ephemeral, even though his glossy black hair seemed like it would be 
eternal. Something like, ‘A boy loves his father, no matter what’ comes through the Irish 
words like the insistent breeze finds its way through the rain. Coming to see a grief for 
Participant 2 seemed to have to come through this fragmented, sensual gauze of memory.  
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In something like this way, meaning seems to be like a dialect of feeling that ‘appears’. 
The words are “not on the phrase like the butter on the bread” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 155; 
see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.6) but are sounds belonging to a sensual landscape. It 
comes to mind whether this ‘sensuality’ is illusionary, which it may well be as the picture is 
surely always incomplete, a piece of the fabric of memory. But this fragmentation, and 
illusory ‘sense’, does not take away from the experience of implicating meaning in an 
insistent ‘memory’ of the other, and which gives sense to another’s words. In this memory, 
the ‘I’ is revealed as rooted in an intersubjectivity (for example, a son, a father, and the whole 
“halo” (Husserl, 1977, p. 62 cited in Moran, 2000, p. 153) of other people and images) which 
gives ‘sense’ to the experience of the ‘not-I’ (this other person, Participant 2). Acknowledging 
this may allow uncertainty to have a place, for an epoché and reduction - ‘leading back’ so it 
can be seen that ‘this may belong to me, not her’ -  creating openness, to allow the other a 
space where meanings are not imposed.  
 The fragment of Irish above is not part of a network of differences that make up a 
language (Hawkes, 1977), because the mother tongue is English. The Irish words were never 
part of a mother tongue. They are just sounds, a scrap of fabric, and part of a long-gone 
landscape that insists still in the sensual. What appears to be most important for this study is 
that they ‘show’ a fragment of something, a meaning, that is essentially private and unfolding. 
It seems from this that it cannot really be spoken of, how a credo, an identity, gets imprinted 
in the sensual impact and flowers into a meaning. The scraps of that landscape either may, or 
may not, have anything to do with Participant 2, although it felt like they had. It also felt that 
to ask her a question about a grief would be to begin a rationalisation, or alienation, from 
something (and this seemed almost inevitable). Staying in the uncertain ‘may/may not’ seems 
to have something to do with openness. Perhaps, if the imagery has something to do with 
Participant 2, then it is like empathy as analogy, but if it has not then it is like empathy as 
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self-alienation. To try to stay in the place in between these two seems important as it would 
imply an openness. A space is being opened up in which the other may come to see herself 
more clearly perhaps, find her own ‘truthfulness’. But the person who allows the open space 
may know nothing about what happens therapeutically for that other person.  
It appears then that meaning ‘must not’ be removed from the whole ‘sense’ of this 
other person before me, beside me, who is a sensual living being, who invokes a ‘sensual’ 
response in me “overrun with words” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 155). If the possibility of 
feeling the loss in a grief had been closed down, then the gauze of memory and imagery (as 
opposed to imagination) in which the words of Participant 2 were caught may have been a 
different one, a grief perhaps unnoticed. And also, that enigmatic phrase, ‘she accepts me’, 
which came later, may not have caught something else. To be accepted seemed important, to 
belong, and there were sounds of Irish and cold winter days. There seems to be the beginning 
of a credo - of loyalty - here in the look of a father. It seems like something that cannot be 
stepped back from, because there may be no other footing before that footing. To separate 
this meaning from the sensual may be impossible, and shows a stark contrast to meaning 
‘given’ through a ‘sedimented’ horizon of experience (Husserl, 1991a, p. 82 in Moran, 2000, 
p. 162) which “maps out a set of expectations” (Moran, 2000, p. 162), or similarly, spoken 
speech (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 189/224) which “only give[s] rise in us to second-order 
thoughts” (see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.6). Perhaps the sensual meaning is the only 
one that really matters therapeutically.  
If she had been interviewed by someone else, would she have spoken of other things? 
The sensual world revealed in the entanglement of thought, memory, illusion and all the 
‘senses’ revealed this, in this moment, but as ‘something belonging to me’, a “constituting 
subjectivity” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 89) which may try to impose something that has nothing to do 
with her. With another person, or on another day, it felt like it might reveal something else, 
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or nothing at all. Some other creature would emerge from the phenomenological landscape. 
The illusionary aspects of ‘knowing’ appear vital here. Literally vital, in that they return the 
words to something of their original life-giving place in the world of others, and reveal 
themselves as ultimately ‘not mine’ in that they belong in a landscape of others (but still 
private). The sensual ‘meaning’ in the words of the other person can be no more 
comprehended than the Irish words above can be to someone who ‘knows’ no Irish. To think 
of meaning as only ‘the word’ seems to indeed inflict a ‘cut’ (cf. Lacan, 1988, p. 2; see 
Introduction, Chapter 1, Section 1.3); to inflict a cut between the intellect and the sensual, to 
separate “sense and the sensuous” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 29). A cut like this is a false separation, 
a denial of some form, a turning away from what makes the blood flow to the tips of our 
fingers. To inflict such a cut seems to be to inflict indifference itself.  
It seems at least two points can be made from these considerations. Firstly, the 
imposition of ‘scientific language’ appears to involve a move away from the sensual. 
Secondly, meaning, in terms of the therapeutic, appears to be ultimately sensual (and private). 
Both of these points appear interlinked and have implications for learning and being 
therapeutic. Meaning as private might be shown with respect to how participants in this study 
struggled to say what was therapeutic, which perhaps could be rephrased as the struggle to 
say something that is essentially private that happens between people, and neither of them (in 
the case of two) may know anything about what has happened. How could Participant 2 have 
known anything of the imagery and the sensual she invoked as she spoke of her father? And 
conversely, what of her imagery, some hint of which was perhaps revealed in the flickering 
vulnerability in her eyes? How could either of us have known anything of the sensual 
landscape of the other? A vital aspect of what appears to make this kind of interaction 
therapeutic seems to be openness, so that another person’s ‘meaning’ is not closed off, or 
channelled into ‘mine.’  
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6.2.4 Scientific language and the sensual 
As discussed in the Method chapter (Section 4.2), von Eckartsberg (1998, p. 14) notes 
“as we all do in everyday life, identically named experiences refer basically to the same reality 
in various subjects.” Van Kaam (1966, p. 32) has called this an unnoticed “axiom” in 
psychology. Stubbornly, this appears to remain the case in much of the ‘scientific’ literature 
in psychology. Taking Bentall’s (2004) work as an example of this scientific approach to 
language, he writes as if there is a shared reality which is the ‘correct’ one, and he is writing 
from it ‘using’ words as if they are ‘butter to be spread’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1968). The main 
title of Bentall’s (2004) book, Madness Explained, perhaps reflects a kind of persistent 
‘narcissism,’ under the guise of scientific method. Madness has been explained. Using an 
endless series of tables, charts and findings from empirical studies, he puts psychiatry under 
question, drawing on “concepts from psychology and the neurosciences” (Bentall, 2004, p. 
494). But nowhere does he put himself, those concepts, and his own words, under question. 
In this ‘science’ it is as if its method is a “simple return to universal reason”, and there is a 
refusal to take seriously that “reflection… [is]… a creative operation that itself participates 
in the facticity of the unreflected” (Merleau-Ponty, 2014 p. 62/88).  
An image of Narcissus gazing at his own reflection perhaps depicts the narrowed 
approach to understanding exemplified in Bentall’s (2004) book. It is as if there is a certainty 
in this kind of ‘knowing’ that excludes all other kinds, for example, from philosophy, physics, 
phenomenology, art and poetry. This ‘narrowing’ is also found in the roots of the psychiatric 
tradition, for example, in Jaspers (1912), who tried to divide “intuitive content” from 
“conceptual form” (Walker, 1994a, p. 259; see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2).  
Husserl (1970b) was critical of this substitution of the scientific method for experience 
(its origin mainly attributed to Galileo),  
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“the surreptitious substitution of the mathematically substructed world of idealities for the 
only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced 
and experienceable” (Husserl, 1970b, §9 (H) cited in Welton, 1999, p. 353).  
It appears that Bentall (2004) (to take his work as an exemplar of this) is behaving 
like “the usual theorist,” behaving as if there is “a single mental process torn from the 
concrete, essentially unitary, context of subjective mental living” (Husserl, 1969 §59 cited in 
Welton, 1999, p. 262 italics added), that process now his own, which he shares with his 
community, of ‘scientific method.’  
It is interesting to note that Husserl (1960, p. 107) links intersubjectivity to “endless 
openness,” and it appears scientific method instead ‘closes down’ how anything can be 
validly known. The ‘scientific’ way of speaking about reality is dominant now (Rose, 1985; 
1999). Kahnemann (2011, p. 41), for example, speaks of “cognitive load” as if this gives some 
kind of scientific rigour to ‘thinking’ as opposed to day dreaming. A well-meaning, but vain, 
novice in the Franciscans comes to mind, who complained once that his ‘prayer load’ was a 
struggle. It seemed to pass him by that if he were looking for the gentle god he imagined, that 
no special language would be required. The vanity seems to be in the attempt to possess an 
exclusive key to a special knowledge. The way to recognition seems to involve carrying a 
load of some kind in both cases. Giorgi (2009) is firmly in this tradition of the scientific, 
although he feels marginalised within it (Giorgi, 2002). The sense that something ‘objective’ 
can be shown in psychological language could also be understood in terms of a kind of 
‘operative intentionality’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xxxii) at work that makes a person 
insensitive to the tacit assumptions and moves being made. The scientific approach appears 
to have literally lost its senses.  
Husserl (1969, pp. 26-47 in Welton, 1999, p. 235) sees the sciences in this empirical 
tradition as “so-called sciences” which are “cultural formations, going by that name.” For 
Husserl (ibid) reason aims at “genuineness” but this is “what is ”missed” in obscurity or 
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confusion” in the cultural formation of science. Trying to read scientific works in this cultural 
tradition can ‘feel’ like something is ‘not genuine’, and it is no wonder that some people, 
including it appears most of the mental health nurses interviewed, are put off from achieving 
in this field, especially if they interact ‘intuitively’, tacitly, or are sensitive to the sensual, 
private aspect of meaning. This kind of scientific language might leave somebody like this 
feeling quite ‘dead’ and perhaps feeling stupid. It may be that mental health nurses need more 
encouragement to slow down, and take seriously the sensual in their experience of being with 
others. There appeared to be something of a lack of confidence in most of the participants, in 
one sense linked to believing their ‘scientific’ understanding of ‘therapies’ was not developed, 
so that other understandings took a relegated place. And in another sense, the lack of 
confidence seemed linked to trusting in another person to ‘draw out’ what they already knew 
(as Socrates did with the slave boy). There was a mix of frustration, resignation, and 
acceptance of a certain position, which appeared, in different responses, perhaps to be the 
position of ‘servant’ (Bjorklund, 2004).  
6.2.5 Meaning as sensual and meaning as given 
What seems to be emerging here, is that there is meaning that is ‘sensual,’ which is 
approached (by another) asymptotically, so that ‘contact’, so important to those who work in 
‘relational depth’ (for example, Wiggins, Elliott and Cooper (2012)), is never actually made 
(except in the invasive imagination). The ‘contact’ that is made may be more about the 
recognition that contact is not made (something which perhaps belongs to the tacit because if 
it is made explicit it is an attempt to ‘make contact’), so that there is a feeling of openness, of 
a wide space between us where I could throw you a ball maybe.  
There may be a tacit, playful recognition that another’s world of sensual meaning, the 
only meaning that perhaps really matters, is ultimately private. It appears that this meaning 
has its place, from which it grew and in which it remains rooted, in a specific sensual home. 
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To speak about meaning as if it comes from another place (for example, the idea I may have 
of someone else) is to uproot and displace it, to make it alien. This alienation appears to be 
what scientific language, as sub-section of ‘spoken’ language, does when it is applied to 
experience. The meaning we agree on is an imposed one through language in ‘sedimented’ 
horizons, ‘spoken’ for, or ’given’. We agree to agree to get along, and in so doing it seems 
we are alienated from the sensual in this agreement. This is perhaps why Kierkegaard (1938, 
§53 in Grimley, 1973, p. 15; see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2) wanted to shoot 
himself, as he sensed that he was alienated even in the recognition from others. The fanatic 
clings on to this ‘spoken’ word, the dogma, and belief that it is ‘real.’ This kind of meaning 
might be called ‘given.’ This kind of distinction seems close to Merleau-Ponty’s (2014) one 
between ‘speaking and spoken’ speech. Although, perhaps the silence in a landscape may 
need to remain silent.  
The difference in meaning, between ‘sensual’ and ‘given’, appears to be what 
phenomenology shows here. It seems also that to discover the difference is something that 
cannot be taught, even though it may be ‘spoken’ in a text, or a talk. It seems that it instead 
has to be ‘found’ in the difficult, anxious relation with another, and oneself (the ‘I’ and the 
‘not I’). What comes to mind here is how the slave boy discovered a knowledge he did not 
know he had through ‘giving birth’ to it through the help of Socrates (the midwife) (Plato, 
1970, § 85a-c; see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.4.4). It appears that there is a kind of 
operative intentionality here, ‘allowing’ an experience to reveal itself in a particular way, in 
this way, in this moment, but it can alter in time. The experience of the ‘conditions of the 
possibility for appearance’ (Zahavi, 2003) seems to involve a fragmented fabric of memory 
which ‘shows’ how something comes to feel ‘known’, or comes to feel like an ‘experience of 
truth’ (Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.3).  
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The recognition needed perhaps can only be communicated tacitly, so I can breathe 
without having to explain myself (because I cannot explain myself in such a shifting, sensual 
landscape). In the feeling of openness that comes, there is a kind of tacit recognition, the gift 
of that recognition, that I can ‘play’. Different ‘things’ emerge this way - sensual meanings. 
For example, in football, when someone ‘has your back’, it allows you to play more freely, 
knowing that any mistakes will be covered by a ‘friend’, another. Suddenly, Participant 3’s 
comment that she had “got their back” (line 504) seems to link to not just ‘being there’ but to 
‘providing a place in which to be playful’. The recognition that this playful space is needed, 
seems to return, the way you might catch a ball, which is not necessarily thrown lightly. What 
is communicated is the image of a fragment of sensual meaning through the alienating spoken 
word. The fragment of an image is conveyed through the spoken word which is itself alienated 
from the sensual meaning. Violence instead, seems to be the attempt to close the gap between 
this ‘I’ and this ‘not-I’, to ‘make contact’, or define the path of the ball, and thereby harm 
something playful, to ‘close out’ something that must be left alone, because it does ‘not 
belong’ to me, is ‘not mine’. The meanings involved with Participant 3 begin to shift, for 
example; there is a playfulness at work now which was not noticed until months later, and 
which I recall in her expression and smile.  
This changes the understanding of the feeling of the abject as perhaps being more 
about being ‘pinned’, caught, ‘known’, captured in a frame of reference that harms the soul 
as it is ‘not mine’, like being trapped in someone else’s idea. In this case, the idea of 
psychiatry. It is not such a surprise then that mental health nursing also invoked feelings of 
anger. This ‘changing of the understanding’ seems to be what the phenomenological opens 
onto, in that it opens out into an “endless openness” (Husserl, 1960, p. 107 in reference to 
intersubjectivity) which cannot be defined.  
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6.3 Implications of the phenomenology 
It seems important to note that the phenomenology informing this chapter (also see 
Appendix 5) has at times felt like an illusionary experience of some kind. To disentangle the 
‘self’ (or the ‘I’) from the other’s ways and talk seems impossible. However, in the effort to 
disentangle there seems to be a kind of disintegration of something, like a gauze breaking up 
perhaps, through which a different light can then shine through. Things forgotten, or lost, 
forgotten that they have been lost, are somehow found again, like old photographs in a drawer, 
and some living image shows itself like a dream. The ‘things themselves’ show their colours 
and detail like the wing of a dull bird may suddenly shimmer a petrol blue in the light. There 
seems to be a completely unpredictable blossoming of imagery and the senses. Words tumble 
through these images like wild birds screeching and harassing each other. They belong in this 
landscape and no other. This dream-like scenario must mean something. It perhaps has to do 
with how being open to another person, in the effort and ability to do so, allows the 
unexpected to show itself in a kind of therapeutic flowering. The burdens of all the meanings 
imposed on this person are perhaps removed, or at least lessened. And perhaps in so doing, 
the burdens of our own meanings are lessened. Something silenced can speak for itself. There 
appears to be also a finding of one’s own “truthfulness” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 41 in Heaton, 
2010, p. 32) in this engagement which is therapeutic in itself. An understanding of 
truthfulness then is like a finding in itself, which seems to point towards something, an 
“endless opennesss” (Husserl, 1960, p. 107) towards understanding (as sensual and given). 
The importance of others who are ‘open’ to this, to invoke a learning, seems to be 
‘ontologically’ necessary. I cannot come to know any of this without another person who is 
open to it, and to me. Is this perhaps not another way of speaking of the hermeneutic circle 
(see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.3)?  
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What is also emerging here is that the struggle to differentiate between the empirical 
and phenomenological may lead back to a simple distinction relating to language. The 
phenomenological appears to be in ‘allowing’ language to speak freely of the sensual, and the 
imagery that comes to be in consciousness. It ‘opens up’ language. In this ‘allowing’, attempts 
to be methodical, methodological, theoretical, ‘data driven’ and observational, are 
undermined by a sensual ‘givenness’ of words (sounds) which flow freely from a context 
rather than being “torn” (Husserl, 1969, §59 cited in Welton, 1999, p. 262) from it. The 
freedom to allow this ‘opening up’ is a sensual one, which appears to be therapeutic in itself. 
This ‘freedom’ appears to ‘belong’ to a person - as an openness - and perhaps may be nurtured 
and brought out in someone too. It can be crushed by violence.  
As noted in Section 6.1, the disclosure of openness (to a permanent uncertainty) in the 
relation between the I and the not-I, and the difference between sensual and given meaning, 
appear to be the only true phenomenological responses to the research question which 
emerged from the interviews. But the unfolding and transforming sense of ‘truthfulness’ 
permeates these findings and this also appears phenomenological. This is the 
phenomenological in the sense of how Husserl intended, as it appears to transcend (or 
ontologically underpin) every other response. Stemming from this, a number of other 
responses appear which at times seem to blur the phenomenological and empirical, sometimes 
as a kind of photographic negative (see Appendix 5). What appear to be significant aspects 
of these responses will be discussed here.  
Putting the self under question in relation to the other person appears to be of major 
importance, and this would appear to link with challenging the accepted practises, beliefs and 
traditions of psychiatry, the standard treatment. This may be linked to coming to know how 
a person may not be therapeutic even if he thinks he may be, or to not glossing over the 
anxiety in meeting the other, through allowing one’s own self to be put under question as 
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opposed to closing down the other. Exploration of one’s self-understanding in relation to 
others is closely linked to this questioning, but is related to coming to know how a person 
may be therapeutic without actually knowing it. This might be about allowing the tacit to 
somehow emerge in relationships. There may be an interplay between putting under question 
and exploration, that involves an openness.  
A difficulty here appears to be linked to how openness can be taught, or learned, as it 
appears it is like an innate way of being that needs to be cultivated. The problem seems to 
return to a kind of clumsy movement in the ontological relation noted above, between the I 
and not-I, which is like a kind of orbit (that does not close itself in a circle) whose path 
constantly slightly shifts and breaks. What closes itself in a circle appears to be like a dogma 
repeating, forcing itself like a gestalt. We seem to know when this happens in being with 
another. We somehow know when we have been closed out. Learning from the other and 
openness appear to be interwoven. Empirically, most of the participants specifically 
mentioned that caring has to be ‘genuine’ and this appears to point towards this ontological 
relation of being open to learning from the other. The difficulty is that some people think they 
are genuine when they may not be, which indicates a closure of the circle. It may be 
impossible to ‘break in’ to this closed way of being perhaps.  
Some of the participants, if not all perhaps, appeared to have been drawn to mental 
health nursing through some form of ‘injury’ to themselves, something in the relation to 
others was going on tacitly which appeared therapeutic in some but pathological in others. 
Coming to know more about this unawareness appeared to be of major importance, as it 
appeared to guide how each participant acted in the relation to the other person. This kind of 
‘coming to know’ seems to be also about the effects of the burden of kindness for some.  
Drawing these reflections together, it appears then that there is an urgent need for a 
space for mental health nurses to learn about these aspects in play in their everyday way of 
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being with others. This would facilitate a coming to understand, and speaking in, one’s own 
truthfulness, which seems crucial for the therapeutic. A safe environment of openness, a 
forum to speak safely, amongst others who can allow an openness to the other would seem to 
be of enormous benefit. What appears also as missing were critical ideas, other ways of 
perceiving the person apart from mainstream psychiatric and psychological beliefs. There 
seemed to be a certain lack of ideas that might challenge received ones of how being 
therapeutic can be thought about, while there was also a wealth of tacit understanding. It is 
not that these other ideas would be replacements, but would provide other words to put 
psychiatry and psychology under question, to open up spaces for other ways of being to be 
thought about and allowed. New ideas might also allow mental health nurses to find more 
confidence in the wealth of tacit knowledge many already appeared to show, and challenge 
those who were closed to at least hesitate.  
 
In summary, this chapter has attempted a phenomenology in the tradition of Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty. This attempt showed a certain ‘truthfulness’ permeated the experience of 
coming to show what meanings emerge in response to the research question, which appears 
to be a tacit finding. Two main phenomenological findings relate to how there is a 
fundamental relation between the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’ (this other person), which calls each one 
into question. This relation is reflected in, and revealed through, meaning as sensual and 
given, which emerged through an ‘opening up’ of language in the phenomenological. These 
two findings have been explored under different aspects, namely, openness to another person, 
meaning as empirical and as phenomenological, experience and deductive rationalisation, 
scientific language and the sensual, and meaning as sensual and given. Finally, implications 
of the phenomenology have been outlined, in particular with respect to openness, truthfulness, 














 This chapter discusses and concludes the study, indicating also areas for further 
research. The chapter first provides an overview of the study, and then divides into six areas 
of discussion, each one overlapping and informing the others. The first area addresses the 
source of this study, as the experience of abjection. The second addresses how a person may 
come to be therapeutic, as the course of this study seems to show how understanding 
continually evolves and changes over time, but only in an environment of openness (to oneself 
and others). Coming to know about oneself in one’s own ‘truthfulness’ seems to be of 
importance here, with respect to coming to be therapeutic. There has been a circularity to the 
progress of this study, in which captivating ideas, thoughts, and experiences, have been 
changed through openness, in what seems to be an un-ending process of learning. Some 
thoughts on this ‘circularity’ seem to be worth drawing together here. The third section 
addresses the relation to an ‘other’ person. This has appeared throughout the study in different 
forms, and especially seems to be signalled by uncertainty. The other person calls our 
certainties into question, if we are open. The fourth section addresses the difference between 
meaning as sensual and meaning as given, which appears of central importance to research 
on the therapeutic, and being therapeutic. While this difference was already implied through 
other aspects of the study, such as Husserl’s distinction between Bedeutung and Sinn (Zahavi, 
2003, p. 149), it only came to be clarified through the phenomenology. The fifth section 
addresses the empirical findings, regarding these as ‘signposts’ indicating something of where 
a journey may start or diverge, but little of that experience. A final section discusses aspects 
of the study which have not been emphasised, but are important. These are related to how we 
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do come to understand others, which is implicit throughout the study (in the activity of 
writing, for example).  
 
 7.2 Overview  
 This study set out to explore what it is that some mental health nurses know and do in 
their practice that is therapeutic, and how have they learned this. The origin of the study is in 
a feeling of abjection in working as a mental health nurse. Some of this feeling was linked to 
being in a discipline whose activity was clearly at times therapeutic, but this practice was not 
acknowledged as a treatment, or considered as such. Coming to understand something about 
this lack of recognition felt important, and it was also felt that this exploration may throw 
light on what may be therapeutic generally. The therapeutic as the art of healing seemed more 
important than the therapeutic as cure, and this directed the literature review towards the 
‘personal process’ strand in mental health nursing. This way of practising is in contrast to the 
‘contain and fix’ strand, which belongs to a practice that applies a cure that is already spoken 
for, the medical psychiatric one, imposing a ‘given’ meaning on a person. The personal 
process strand seemed to hold the potential to open up other ways of being with people, which 
seemed to be clearly happening in mental health nursing but which were difficult to define or 
speak about.  
 Emerging out of the literature in mental health nursing, and the wider literature on the 
therapeutic, it appeared that therapeutic mental health nurses spent a lot of their time speaking 
with, and being with, others who were in mental distress. The kinds of distress could often be 
extreme, where meaning may have collapsed, and at times the nurse’s own sense of self and  
identity may be threatened. At first, this extreme distress was theorised in terms of the 
psychoanalytic notion of abjection (Kristeva, 1982), and it seemed that mental health nursing 
itself was an abject discipline. Abjection linked to my own experience of working as a mental 
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health nurse. In this milieu, speaking with, and being with, another seemed to be about an 
openness to the other person. Speaking was linked to an oral tradition, in which speech 
involves a whole, embodied experience, in opposition to writing which is a technical 
achievement and may narrow expression (Heaton, 2010). Speaking with others (and mental 
health nurses speaking with others) seemed to involve a certain search for “truthfulness” (after 
Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 41 in Heaton, 2010, p. 32). Being with another person seemed to 
involve ordinary activities, at times also personal care, and there appeared in this ordinariness 
the sense of an encounter with another person. Ways of being therapeutic in this encounter 
were explored in terms of tacit knowledge, emotional labour and intuition. Yet, what seemed 
to characterise both speaking with and being with others was a certain openness that was 
difficult to express. An example from being a Franciscan seemed to show how being 
welcomed and accepted, in a certain kindness, was a great relief, and more important than 
understanding ideas, dogma or credos of any kind. There was a sense of healing in this 
‘welcome’ which involved an openness. Trying to research such an experience of healing 
(which did not lend itself easily to words) through a method seemed daunting.  
 The Methodology (Chapter 3) approached researching such an experience from two 
directions, one aimed at addressing the method chosen (Giorgi’s (2009) method), and the 
other at how we may become captive in an idea, dogma, or theory, a credo, which closes 
down openness. In this sense, the Methodology looks backwards to the Theory chapter, and 
forwards to the Method chapter. Husserl’s view that we can trust experience (Giorgi, 2009) 
seemed fundamentally important, as it was the transposition of the meaning of being a 
Franciscan onto the work of being a mental health nurse that gave rise to a feeling of abjection. 
This feeling, at first, had no ‘truthful’ way of being understood as I did not trust my 
experience, and stayed instead with the separated out ‘ideal’ meaning of being Franciscan 
(what can be seen now as a separated ‘given’ meaning). Experience would have opened a 
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way to seeing something important if I had trusted it. It is only now it can be spoken of in a 
certain truthfulness. The Methodology therefore looks at ways of thinking about how we 
become captivated in meanings, which seem to repeat, or insist. The focus on operative 
intentionality (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 453/492) seemed to show a way into thinking about 
how we may make assumptions tacitly, which undermined the more conscious act 
intentionality, which mainly occupies Husserl (Zahavi, 2003), that may be going on in any 
empirical method, such as Giorgi’s (2009).  It appears that Giorgi (2009) is captivated in a 
meaning, one in which his scientific community has imposed (although he feels marginalised 
within it (Giorgi, 2002)). What appears to offer a way out of such captivation seems to be 
about trusting experience, our own embodied feeling about something, and crucially, 
allowing ourselves to be in relation to another (or others) who may be thoughtful enough to 
invoke a genuine curiosity about ourselves and others. This then began to link with openness, 
because the other person invites a relation to which he or she is open. Crucially again, perhaps 
interlinked with this openness, is the opening up of language, so that speech can come freely, 
and words that present themselves can be appreciated rather than channelled into a credo. 
Husserl’s insistence that the “originary giving intuition” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 45, after Husserl, 
1982, § 24) says something important about ourselves and reality, and Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1968, p. 155) imagery of words ‘overrunning’ a landscape, seemed to say something here 
about words needing to be freed to show something of the ‘truthfulness’ of experience.  
 Seeing this clearly took some time. Giorgi’s (2009) method seemed to restrict 
language, so that words were channelled and tamed into an idea that already pre-existed, and 
so, it seemed that whatever findings were found would belong to an already found 
understanding. It is not any great wonder then that the empirical findings tend to align 
themselves to already spoken ideas about the subject, as indeed, the talk of the mental health 
nurses did also. Findings would be ‘dead’ in a sense, if taken as ‘given’ meanings. This 
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seemed to coincide with Paley’s (1997; 2002) criticism of research in nursing, which often 
uses Giorgi’s (1970; 2009) method, as simply resulting in findings that could just as easily be 
read from a thesaurus. Yet, Giorgi’s (2009) method is widely accepted as applying a scientific 
methodology to research. It seems now that perhaps the greatest strength of his method was 
an incidental one, both in giving time in the interviews to mental health nurses whose voices 
are never heard, and in the careful attendance to the words used which is part of the descriptive 
approach. The findings from the method show that the mental health nurses interviewed work 
therapeutically in various ways, idiosyncratically often, through being open, speaking with, 
and being with, although in the service of psychiatry, and they have learned mainly from life 
experience and practice. These points were already apparent from the literature. What could 
not be shown in his method was what was actually going on through free imaginative 
variation, and the reduction, because there was an obscure ‘creative process’ (Giorgi, 2009, 
p. 154) at work. This seems to indicate that what could not be shown was what was going on 
in the consciousness of the researcher, or what was ‘felt’ in the ‘originary giving intuitions’ 
throughout each interview, and afterwards on listening, and thinking about each.  
 Some attempt has been made in the Phenomenology (Chapter 6) to show some of this 
creative process, and what emerges here is something different. There was a surprising sense 
of the ‘things themselves’ being presented from a landscape, with whatever words happened 
to present themselves. What emerged from this was that being with certain people felt like 
being called into a relation, in which there was a freedom, or openness, which also put me 
under question. Along with this, there began to come clearly a sense that meaning was 
sensual, and it was this sensuality of meaning that restores us to something healing and 
enlivening. The given meanings of words tended to become separated from this sensual 
meaning, a separation that came very clearly into focus as violent and damaging to one’s 
being. For example, I had torn the sensual meaning of being a Franciscan and tried to impose 
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it onto mental health nursing, and this made me feel abject. Such a tearing of the sensual from 
the given was ‘a-bjectifying.’ Coming to know this has been a coming to be in my own 
‘truthfulness’, whose light then shines back across the study and finds its reflections in 
fragments of ideas and the struggle to speak.  
This coming to know, and coming to be, would have been impossible without the 
‘caring about’ and ‘thinking with’ of others. This seems to say that what is therapeutic about 
mental health nurses has nothing to do with ‘mental’ or ‘health’ or ‘nurses’ but all to do with 
being open to another person, in a ‘caring about’ and ‘thoughtful’ way. In this way, there may 
be an ‘opening up’ of language in its sensual meaning for the other person in her own 
truthfulness. In the Phenomenology (Chapter 6), this therapeutic way has been thought of as 
involving recognition of an irreducible relation between the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’, and how 
meaning belongs in a sensual landscape. How such a way of being with others can be learned 
appears to be about it being nurtured through being with people who are already like this.  
 
7.3 Abjection and healing 
 The inspiration for this study was an experience of feeling abject, which seemed 
linked to mental health nurses not being recognised as therapeutic (Introduction, Chapter 1, 
Section 1.1). Coming to understand this experience has taken the time of this whole study, 
and is still emerging. An emerging understanding is that the source of this experience has to 
do with a sensual ‘belonging’ to a psychical landscape rooted in a real, intersubjective 
landscape. This perhaps re-states what Husserl meant in his intuition that our subjectivity 
‘knows’ something of the ‘facticity’ of the world (Zahavi, 2003). There has been a struggle 
to find how this sensual ‘home’ was lost, which at the same time, seemed to ‘show itself’ in 
an obscure way from the outset. The sensual home is of course my own. Yet it seems such an 
understanding, and coming to have such an understanding, has relevance to others also, not 
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least because it depended on others being open to me. Jumping too quickly into explanations 
(and theory) only distanced, or covered over, what was emerging from an obscurity in 
experience. There was a ‘givenness’ to something which was obscure, and this was clarified 
through a dialogue with others, an openness to what was ‘not mine,’ itself reflecting 
something to do with a response to the research question (without any need for interviews or 
even participants).  
Openness, in dialogue with others, and oneself, also ‘allowed through’ a healing in 
relation to others. For this reason, certain senses of ‘salve’ seemed to represent something of 
this healing, in terms of a welcome also. Healing seemed to become like a restoration of a 
meaning that had been ‘torn’ (Husserl, 1969, §59 in Welton, 1999, p. 262) from its context. 
There seems to be a kind of unction here that restores the place of the given meaning with the 
sensual. The salve is like an ointment repairing what has been torn from its living landscape, 
restoring it to its place, at first intuited in a vague way. There is also the sound of the Latin 
word, salve, which speaks of a welcome and a recognition. Perhaps we must be able to be 
this way if we are to be therapeutic. This perhaps seems to be what therapeutic mental health 
nurses do, a restoration of a sensual meaning that belongs to the other person, in a kind of 
welcome and recognition. The words of the patient here now seem to reflect this.  
“…the nurse gave me a bath with many words of comfort, like a child, after I felt neglected 
for weeks in my psychotic state” (Ruhl, 1998, p. 227 in Teising, 2000, p. 451). 
 It could be imagined now that the nurse’s actions here have nothing at all to do with 
being patronising, or providing ‘personal care’, and all to do with recognition (of the ‘I’ and 
‘not I’) and the allowing of a restoration of a sensual meaning to this person. The ‘given’ 
meaning (of psychosis) means something to the patient, but the openness of the nurse 
ameliorates its effects, returning the ‘words of comfort’ tacitly to a sensual meaning (perhaps 
to do with being a child once) that restores. In an unfolding understanding, it seems now that 
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this kind of restorative relation was what Brother David was allowing for me also, without 
either of us knowing it, and perhaps it was reciprocal (see Theory, Chapter 2, Section 2.5).  
As noted in the Introduction (Chapter 1, Section 1.4), Cutcliffe, Santos, Kozel, Taylor 
and Lees (2015) found that the in-patient psychiatric setting is often “devoid of warm 
therapeutic relationships, respectful interactions, information or choice about treatment and 
any kind of formal/informal ‘talk therapy.’” They follow this by saying that the ‘care’ 
environment instead is dominated by “coercion, disinterest, inhumane practices, custodial and 
controlling practitioners, and a gross overuse of pharmacological ‘treatments’” (Cutcliffe, et 
al., 2015, p. 375). Rather than a restoration of a sensual meaning through a relation here, there 
is an imposition of a given meaning, that of psychiatric ‘ideas,’ or indeed, any ‘ideas’, which 
might be termed the ‘disinterest of ideas’. For example, it is as if in the ‘science’ of psychiatry, 
and psychology, being able to sit with someone having tea and biscuits, in a personally warm 
and open environment, cannot be seen as therapeutic because it has no prestige in the 
‘scientific’ view of ‘treatment’. Yet, it can be seen that in an environment of interest and 
warmth, this other person can perhaps begin to feel his own relation to others in the only way 
that seems to matter, the sensual one. Most of the mental health nurses interviewed in this 
study appeared to ‘know’ this tacitly, and in different ways expressed something of it in an 
empirical way, which are outlined in the Findings chapter (Chapter 5; see Appendix 3). The 
mental health nurse being open to the other person seems crucial here.  
7.4 Coming to be therapeutic 
 In this study, there has been an attempt to clarify what is happening with respect to 
how meaning arrives in empirical research and phenomenologically, and how a person may 
come to be therapeutic (not only in mental health nursing). The course of this study seems to 
show how understanding changes over time, but only in an environment of openness to 
oneself and others. How things may come to be understood differently brings Heidegger’s 
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(1962, pp. 192-195 [151-153]) idea of the hermeneutic circle to mind, in which there is 
“hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.” A number of different 
ways of understanding things, which have emerged in this study, through a new ‘givenness’ 
of something, shows that in the return to an “originary giving intuition” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 45 
- after §24 of Husserl’s Ideas I) of something, the starting point has shifted. The circle does 
not seem to close (start from where it began) if there is openness.  
For example, the struggle in the Theory chapter to articulate differences between 
speech and writing (Heaton, 2010) opened a path to Merleau-Ponty’s difference between 
speaking and spoken speech, which then ‘returned’ to Husserl’s distinction between 
Bedeutung and Sinn (Zahavi, 2003). It felt like a discovery to ‘feel’ the difference between 
what has been distinguished as sensual and given meaning in the phenomenology, as if 
finding a rare fossil for the first time for oneself and then noticing that others had come this 
way before. It is like Wittgenstein’s distinction about being ‘truthful’ only if we have come 
by the way of our own ‘truthfulness’ (Heaton, 2010, p. 32; see Methodology, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.5.3). This way of ‘discovering’ seems to have repeated throughout the study in 
different aspects. This appears to have been more like an ‘unfolding of patterns’ from a 
sensual landscape than a rational, deductive process, although it is not that reason and 
deduction are not important. It appears that one’s own truthfulness involves entering into, and 
taking seriously, one’s own sensual landscape in which words are living things (imbued with 
sensual and linguistic ‘sense’).  
 A point made at the start of this study was regarding how certain theories, credos, and 
beliefs never seem to change, but repeat inexorably, so a person may not be “constantly 
compelled to face the possibility of disclosing an even more primordial and more universal 
horizon from which we may draw the answer to the question, ‘What is “Being”?’” 
(Heidegger, 1962, § 49/26-27; Polt, 1999, p. 41; see Introduction, Chapter 1, Section 1.3). 
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The ‘unfolding of patterns’ seems to be blocked for some people, or with respect to certain 
aspects of a person. This has been explored in the Methodology chapter (Section 3.5.5) as to 
do with being ‘captivated’ in something like a gestalt, an “intentional arc” (Merleau-Ponty, 
2014, p. 137/170), or similarly, a picture in which a “concept forces itself on one” 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 215, § 191). It appears that some can extricate themselves from this 
captivity, and some cannot (as shown by the interminable repeat of dogma, credos and senses 
of identity). It does not seem possible, for example, to ‘shed’ the identity in relation to my 
father, the sensual meaning melded into the words “Tá sé go h-ána fuar agus fliuch” (see 
Phenomenology, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2).  
A movement ‘out of captivity’ towards a certain freedom then links back to the Theory 
chapter, where it seemed that openness to an ‘other’ person, and another meaning that was 
‘not mine’ could be learned perhaps while it also seemed innate. A question here is whether 
openness can be learned, or nurtured, only if it is already innate. How do we come to know 
we are not open? And how do we come to care to be open? How could these questions be 
researched? It seems that learning appears to involve a ‘painful’ openness to an ‘other’ person, 
in which we are called into question, and this is a reciprocal movement of asymmetry. The 
asymmetrical relation has been thought of here after Husserl’s view of “foreign subjectivity” 
(Husserl, 1959, p. 495 in Zahavi, 2003, p. 115) linked to empathy as “self-alienation” 
(Husserl, 1970b, p. 189 in Zahavi, 2003, p. 124); although empathy exists in other forms also 
(see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.1).  
 Drawing these two aspects together, that the meaning of one’s own truthfulness 
belongs in a sensual landscape, and that the other person is ‘known’ (at least to some extent) 
through a self-alienation, points towards something mysterious happening in becoming 
therapeutic. It can be imagined that a whole field of meaning exists for another person of 
which I have no inkling, but in which that person will find her own ‘truthfulness’ somehow 
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in relation to me being there as ‘open’ to her. This field of meaning has been shown to some 
extent in the phenomenology (Chapter 6; see appendix 5 also). Both coming to be therapeutic, 
and being healed in some significant way, then appears to involve coming to be in one’s own 
truthfulness. How can truthfulness of something that is essentially alien (to the ‘I’) be 
researched? And why does it seem necessary for another to facilitate truthfulness, of which 
that other may know nothing? These questions appear to indicate areas for future research.  
7.5 The relation to an other 
 The methodology especially attempted to explore the relation between a self and an 
other person in coming to understand anything, through aspects of Husserlian 
phenomenology in particular. Questions arose as to why it was necessary for someone else to 
be there to facilitate what is therapeutic.  Husserl’s way of writing can seem arid at times, his 
thinking is intricate, and at times almost impenetrable, bordering on solipsistic (Sousa, 2014), 
but the question of the other person (intersubjectivity) occupied him all his life (Zahavi, 
2003). It is worth remembering that his initial studies were an attempt to refute psychology 
as being the bedrock of human knowing, and as a result perhaps, he seems to circle round and 
through what psychology may be in much of his writings (Zahavi, 2003). However, on 
reflection, on reading Merleau-Ponty (2014), and Husserl’s privileging of the “giveness” of 
experience (Husserl, 1970a §51 in Welton, 1999, p. 21), something about language came to 
mind in a vague way. This vagueness clarified during the phenomenology, so that what it 
seemed Husserl’s phenomenology was about was something quite simple, in that it was a way 
of speaking. Speech seemed to be ‘opened up’ through taking seriously what Husserl was 
saying, that, put simply, experience can be trusted (Giorgi, 2009), or in Husserl’s terms, “let 
the originary giving intuition be the source of all knowledge” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 45, after 
Husserl, 1982, §24). In the phenomenology (Chapter 6; Appendix 5), it was apparent that the 
‘originary giving intuition’ was a dream-like landscape, where there was a confusion about 
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what imagery was important and what was not, and ultimately, it seemed that meaning that 
counted therapeutically was sensual (and private). This will be discussed further in the 
following section (Section 7.6). This kind of ‘private life’ of meaning seemed to indicate that 
we do not know each other, except through fragments of ‘spoken’ speech which seem to be 
‘pointers’ (see Section 7.7 below). Yet what is also clear is that we need others, to be with, to 
be in relation to, and to put us under question. This ‘needing others’ (also to be healed) 
appears to be an existential fact.  
Phenomenologically, what appeared clearly, was that the ‘other person’ (the not-I) 
called into question one’s own meanings, and attempts to understand these same meanings as 
an imposition on that other person. The necessity of an ‘other’ to understand oneself seemed 
to concur with Husserl’s (1960, p. 125 in Zahavi, 2003, p. 116-117) idea that we are ‘co-
constituted’ through a “transcendental intersubjectivity”. It may be that this kind of relation 
is signalled, ‘signposted’, by simple statements in the interviews like “she accepts me” 
(Participant 2), or “just keep being there” (Participant 3). These statements seem loaded with 
ambiguity, tacit understanding and feeling. The ambiguity, tacit dimension, and feeling, along 
with uncertainty of meaning, ‘showed’ that there was a relation of uncertainty between an ‘I’ 
and an ‘other’ as opposed to seeing the other as a thing, an idea, or an already accounted for 
version of oneself. This has been explored through empathy especially, one aspect of which 
appears to involve openness to self-alienation. Such an openness links to restoration of 
openness, paradoxically, perhaps indicating that being open to an ‘other’ (another person) is 
innate. It appears to be the case that ‘being with’ (as a main theme in the empirical findings) 
simply reflects how this being in relation calls the person back into an openness to others.  
This is a question perhaps for further research, as to how we become, or are, open to 
others. ‘Spoken’ language (Merleau-Ponty, 2014) is misleading here, and it feels like we 
could go around in circles forever trapped within its limits, if it were not for the sensual which 
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breaks through it. Sensual meaning ‘shows’ that there is another dimension to meaning which 
eludes us, is essentially private, but which continuously unfolds as we allow it a place (see 
Phenomenology, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3). Key theme 2 of the empirical findings (see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3.1), seems to reflect this empirical constraint, in that ‘being with’ a 
person is reflected in many ways, yet something of the relation between this ‘I’ and an ‘other 
I’ which emerges in the phenomenology remains hidden.  
 
7.6 Meaning as sensual and meaning as given 
In the phenomenology, (Chapter 6), being open to meaning in the relation between 
‘me and this other person’ opened up the senses of meaning as ‘given’ and ‘sensual’ through 
a creative process. This creative process seems not unlike the process Giorgi (2009) speaks 
of, but he does not seem to take it seriously enough because it gets restricted through his 
method into empirical meanings, ‘spoken’ speech (Merleau-Ponty, 2014), or ‘given’ 
meanings. The meanings become ‘given’, separated from the ‘sensual’ aspect, and there is no 
acknowledgement of the seriousness of the failure of the ‘given’ word (or ‘spoken’ one) to 
“accomplish” a meaning (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 46). The difficulty with a theoretical 
approach, or an idea, is that it may become an imposition of a way of seeing oneself, so that 
the sensual meaning is separated from the given. Heidegger (1985, § 6, p. 56 in Moran, 2000, 
p. 234) perhaps sums this up in his observation that, “We do not say what we see, but rather 
the reverse, we see what one says about the matter.” The ‘given’ overwhelms the ‘sensual’.  
Those mental health nurses who appeared most therapeutic in this study appeared not 
to impose a meaning on the person, which seems to open up a space where the other’s 
meanings can begin to emerge and be spoken (where possible). In this open space, of 
uncertainty, and no imposition, perhaps there is room for a restoration of the sensual meanings 
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for a person, and it may be that this is what therapeutic mental health nurses do. Through not 
imposing a meaning, but opening up a space for the other person to be, perhaps the burden of 
that person’s ‘given’ meanings may be lifted.  
Meanings ‘appear’, linked to a sensual landscape, belonging to it, the way the sea 
defines the coastline and the coastline defines how the sea’s waves will break. The sea, the 
breaking waves, and the coastline change and shift in relation with each other. In another 
metaphor, the ‘meaning’ of the words in a landscape are like screeching wild birds, 
clamouring through the trees. But if those ‘words’ (sounds) are taken only in their ‘given’ 
meaning it is like removing the wild birds to a reserve, an aviary, in which they sit speechless 
and in mourning (the sensual landscape to which they belong having been removed). This 
seems to be what the imposition of a credo, or an idea, does to another person, it separates the 
meaning from the sensual landscape and the person is left (possibly speechless) in an alien 
world, alienated from himself. Separation of the given meaning of a ‘word’ from its sensual 
(private and unfolding) meaning is violent but appears to happen all the time. It appears that 
this separation is ‘a-bjectifying’. For example, when Participant 1 called me a “shrinking 
violet” it appeared that a meaning had been imposed from which there was no escape (see 
Findings, Chapter 5, Section 5.7.3.2).  
The picture is more complex, in that the sensual landscape may also have ‘savage 
creatures’ in it, as indicated in the Phenomenology (Chapter 6, Section 6.2). This complexity 
can be shown through returning to the Theory chapter, regarding openness to an uncertain 
encounter, in Hem and Heggen’s (2003) study (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3). Here, the mental 
health nurse is trying to be therapeutic through communicating with the other person, in her 
view, helping him to understand his vulnerability as a child. However, his responses are 
sometimes violently verbally aggressive. It seems that he is bordering on physical violence 
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with her, and her colleagues warn her to gain some distance from him. But through a 
“stubborn empathy” she keeps trying to communicate with him, so that there will be 
“understanding and contact” (Hem & Heggen, 2004, p. 104). It seems that a difficulty here 
may be that she is not taking into account that her empathy (as analogy to her own experience, 
for example) may be misguided. She may be making assumptions about his ‘sensual 
landscape’, perhaps finding her own landscape in his in a kind of mirror image, rather than 
allowing empathy as ‘self-alienation.’ It could be that he finds her attempts to get to know 
him unbearable, being trapped perhaps in her idea of him (as a vulnerable boy), and his 
aggressive language should be read as a warning.  
Her certainty appears to be problematic, and the lack of exploration of a tacit 
dimension to what is happening seems to be a failing perhaps, because there appears to be a 
lot going on that cannot be spoken about as it is unknown, belonging to a landscape whose 
sensual meanings are ‘private.’ The tacit dimension here may be summed up by Hem and 
Heggen’s (2003, p. 104) comment that she is expected to be “both intimate and distanced”. 
This seems to concur with the phenomenology in which there is an uncertain relation between 
the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’, which needs to be allowed, and acknowledged tacitly, so that the other 
person has space to breathe. We appear to be linked to the other in a relation which is 
asymmetrical and uncertain in terms of trying to define, or ‘know,’ the other, reflecting the 
aspect of empathy as “self-alienation” (Husserl, 1970b, p. 189 in Zahavi, 2003, p. 124). The 
asymmetry between self-experience and other-experience appears to be a “necessary and 
persisting existential fact” (Zahavi & Rochat, 2015, p. 544), but one which we seem to 
repeatedly lose sight of in different ways.  
This asymmetry also appears to be reflected in meaning as sensual, whose meaning 
appears to come to be known by the other asymptotically, never making ‘contact’, as it were, 
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with some ‘full’ experience of knowing the other (see Phenomenology, Chapter 6, Section 
6.2.5). Even one’s own sensual landscape unfolds and its meaning seems to open out onto an 
“endless openness” (Husserl, 1960, p. 107 in reference to intersubjectivity), revealed in and 
through a shifting, sensual gauze of memory.  
 
7.7 Empirical findings and the phenomenology 
What seems to repeat, inexorably, like Wittgenstein’s picture (2009, ¶115) is how 
mental health nursing is in captivity to the psychiatric way of thinking about people. A certain 
degree of ‘self-alienation’ (on my part) seems to be present in trying to understand why 
mental health nurses work in this scenario. And looking into this world now seems ‘self-
alienating’. This captivity in psychiatry especially became apparent in the empirical findings 
and how the language ‘spoken’ was imbued with psychiatric beliefs, but also frustration with 
not being able to have more time with people. It is indeed as if mental health nurses are 
servants to psychiatry (Bjorklund, 2004), and what they do therapeutically in other ways is 
side-lined, seen as superfluous, and they can be left to their own devices as it does not really 
matter. The empirical findings reflect this situation, with the main focus of activity on 
facilitating medical psychiatric care, alongside another, subordinate activity of being with 
clients in various ways.  
Working with others therapeutically, in idiosyncratic ways, seemed to reflect beliefs 
held by those interviewed, but also had to do with the evolving resolution of personal 
difficulties from childhood. In the latter case, it was as if being a mental health nurse was a 
way of ‘working through’ unconsciously active difficulties in relation to ‘an other person’ (or 
others). The ‘working through’ may have been then reciprocal in ‘being with’ others 
(patients). There seemed to be no consistent acknowledgement of this in the literature apart 
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from Peplau’s (1988) emphasis on the nurse coming to understand why she wanted to care. 
Peplau’s (1988) kind of thinking has now been replaced by ‘evidence-based’ nursing 
(Watson, 2012), dominated by the ‘contain and fix’ strand of thinking (Eckers, Dawson & 
Bailey, 2013; Ellis; Gournay, 2001).  
In the decreasing lack of emphasis on ‘personal process’ in mental health nursing, it 
is not surprising that in-patient settings are dominated by indifference (Cutcliffe, Santos, 
Kozel, Taylor & Lees, 2015). Yet, this study has shown that individual mental health nurses 
are therapeutic (both in in-patient and community settings), but this depends on the person of 
the nurse. The struggle to say what it is that is therapeutic, apart from ‘being with’ in various 
forms, seems important phenomenologically. The struggle seems to reflect not only a lack of 
training in ideas about the therapeutic (so that there would be given words to speak about it), 
but more importantly perhaps, points to something ontological in the relation between people 
which is potentially therapeutic (linked to openness). This ontological relation seemed to be 
most clear in the phenomenology. ‘Training’ might simply do to mental health nurses what 
the empirical does to language, constrain and limit it to ‘given’ meanings, and therefore, may 
constrain and limit the person in relation to the nurse to the same meanings. It seems that a 
therapeutic education in mental health nursing ought instead to aim for the mental health 
nurse to come to be in her own ‘truthfulness.’  
Empirical findings seem to be like signposts that point towards sensual meaning but 
do not show it. The findings from the phenomenology show the sensual more clearly. The 
relation between the empirical findings and the phenomenology seem to show that being 
therapeutic has to do with a person finding his own meanings, in ‘truthfulness’, in a landscape 
of given and sensual meanings, and having the openness to the other to facilitate this. 
Openness to an ‘other person’ seems necessary to facilitate such a ‘truthfulness’ and this 
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openness appears to be reciprocal. What the empirical findings seem to show is that they are 
confined by a way of speaking, which may, or may not, reflect a way of being in the person. 
The phenomenological appears to ‘open up’ language, so that the differences between sensual 
and given meaning appear, and the words reflecting the ‘things themselves’ may be expressed 
in a more evocative, playful, and perhaps poetical way. It seems that the way to one’s own 
‘truthfulness’ lies in this ‘opened up’ language so that words are allowed to ‘speak’ from a 
landscape that is sensual. The phenomenological takes seriously the questioning of 
experience - for example, ‘What is it like for me to try to understand this person? What is 
actually going on for me when I am trying to understand what they mean?’ - rather than fall 
too easily into the captivity of ideas and beliefs.  
Giorgi (2009) appeals to method in order to be able to present to the other’s 
consciousness (the critical other as a community) a form of common language (a certain 
empirical language), so that ‘what is going on in the researcher’s consciousness’ can be 
checked and critiqued by that community. By default, this constrains the language used. In a 
sense what Giorgi’s (2009) method reflects is a way people speak in the ‘natural attitude’ of 
a discipline, believing they are being more accurate, more scientific, more informed perhaps. 
This also seemed to appear everywhere in the empirical findings, with reference to the 
‘technical’ (‘spoken’ or ‘given’) language of psychiatry and psychology being ubiquitous. 
But there was something else going on which the empirical findings could not access 
(similarly by default). For example, the struggle for each participant to speak about what 
‘being with’ meant appeared to expose a certain failure of ‘spoken’ speech, or ‘given’ 
meaning in language. Participant 8, for example, spoke about what was therapeutic in mental 
health nursing as “… all about that interaction and having that rapport with someone...  and 
building on that kind of relationship with that person…” (P8 MU14 line 217). But he 
struggled to speak about this much further, as if the words did not come easily, or could not 
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be found in those he had been given or through which he felt he could speak. It seemed that 
he needed a place to find his own truthfulness in this struggle for words, and also to come to 
understand more clearly the ambiguity in words like ‘rapport’, and ‘relationship’. In his 
general synthesis, this struggle is spoken of as ‘the therapeutic is hard to express’ (see 
Appendix 3), and so, this empirical finding seems to stand like a signpost showing that 
another journey is needed. It seems from the phenomenology that this journey is towards 
coming to allow the uncertain relation with the other person who calls us into question, and 
one’s own truthfulness through that relation.  
With respect to the effects of empirical findings, Giorgi’s (2009) lack of insight into 
the tacit assumptions he makes about language appears to be critical. It is as if there is an 
operative intentionality at work for him (and others) which elides the possibility that 
meanings are simply being repeated in an already constrained way. It is worth returning to 
Merleau-Ponty’s (2014) description of operative intentionality here.  
We uncovered, beneath act or thetic intentionality - and in fact as its very condition of 
possibility – an operative intentionality already at work prior to every thesis and every 
judgement; we discovered a “Logos of the aesthetic world,” [after Husserl in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, p. 292] or a “hidden art in the depths of the human soul,” [after Kant 
in Critique of Pure Reason, A141/B180] and that, like every art, only knows itself in its 
results (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 453/492 italics added).  
 
Giorgi’s (2009) method (and perhaps all empirical methods) seems to ‘know itself in 
its results’ and so, the circle is closed, closing out openness to another person. With respect 
to Giorgi (2009) empirical method, there seems to be a ‘logos’ or ‘hidden art’ that appears 
to be a tacit way of making assumptions which is not easily accessible to consciousness (see 
Freeman, 1993). It is not that the phenomenology is immune to this ‘hidden art’ but it 
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acknowledges it and tries to allow its ‘functioning’ to show itself. Another way of saying 
this is the ‘always already’ aspect here (see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.4): 
“… the researcher is always, already in an intentional relationship with the phenomenon 
under investigation… therefore, the researcher can never decide to invoke intentionality nor 
escape it; the researcher can only try to make fleeting sense of it as he or she reflects on it” 
(Vagle, 2009, p. 586).  
 
 The implications of operative intentionality have been discussed in some detail in the 
Methodology (Chapter 3, Section 3.5.4), the main one being that findings in research may 
always have something to do with the researcher’s ‘beliefs’ or credos, functioning to inform 
the findings in a tacit way which cannot be explicated. Operative intentionality has been 
thought of as one way in which a meaning may ‘force’ itself, like a gestalt, so that we feel it 
is a ‘truth’ of some kind (after Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 215, § 191). The effect of something 
like operative intentionality may be one way of thinking about why van Kaam’s ‘axiom’ 
(1966, p. 32) - “identically named experiences refer basically to the same reality in various 
subjects” (von Eckartsberg (1998, p. 14) - is so persistent.  
The phenomenology appears to have shown, perhaps, some of this kind of pre-
reflective intentionality in coming to ‘find’ meanings. Now, looking again at operative 
intentionality, it appears that my focus on it was a way into allowing experience to be taken 
seriously, to trusting the ‘truthfulness’ of my own experience, through another’s experience. 
The focus on operative intentionality showed a way towards something that I knew nothing 
about, or perhaps sensed something tacitly, until experience began to be trusted. Again, in a 
circular movement (that does not close), there is a return to something that came before but 
now in a new light, a trust in the “originary giving intuition” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 45, after 
Husserl, 1982, § 24). And again, this seems to show that in coming to know anything 
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worthwhile that the journey is through one’s own “truthfulness” (after Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 
41 in Heaton, 2010, p. 32), even if others are (it seems without fail) needed to show the way.  
The intersubjectivity involved here becomes clearer, in that understanding depends 
on others, and then a certain confidence in one’s own experience develops from this, but there 
is a constant return to others. We belong in an intersubjectivity. This seems to signal, again, 
what Husserl saw as ‘co-constituting intersubjectivity’ (Husserl, 1960, p. 125 in Zahavi, 2003, 
p. 116-117). In effect, we depend on each other, but also, we can become trapped in another’s 
idea, and another may trap us in that idea. The importance of the asymmetrical relationship 
between the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’ becomes clearer if this ‘entrapment’ is kept in mind. Making 
this relationship symmetrical would result in us all being copies, eventually, ‘of the same 
story in a newspaper’ (Zahavi, 2003, p. 116, alluding to Wittgenstein’s (2009, §265) 
example).  
 In being caught up in a credo (the same story in a newspaper), then we think we can 
describe the world accurately in our words, without realising that the words have already been 
provided by the credo. It seems that ‘knowing’ this is different to coming to know it in one’s 
own ‘truthfulness’. It seems to be that ‘truthfulness’ is what is most important, rather than a 
repeat of words that define the search for that truthfulness. In the phenomenology, what 
seemed to be opened up was a trusting in whatever words came to speak of an experience, so 
that language becomes more fluid, open, and the sensual aspect reveals itself more clearly. It 
appears that this is what mental health nurses who are open to others (and themselves) may 
show, and offer, to others. This kind of openness is like an invitation for the other person to 




 7.8 Understanding the other person 
 This section addresses what has been implicit throughout the study, which is that we 
can come to understand the other and meaning can be communicated in a reliable way. This 
has been addressed explicitly, but not at great length, in terms of empathy as a ‘whole’ 
experience of the other, empathy as analogy, and the ‘sedimented’ meanings in spoken speech 
(see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2). Differentiating empathy as self-alienation was 
important to address the problem of how we can become captivated in ideas, and theories, 
about another person, without seeing this captivation as it is like a meaning has been ‘forced’ 
on us (without knowing it has been forced). Although we may come to understand another’s 
meaning, at least to an extent, it appears that it is likely to ‘close down’ a person if we assume 
we know, if we do not preserve a certain openness towards something that we know nothing 
about.  
This kind of openness was noticed in some of the mental health nurses interviewed 
for this study, and it was clear there was no need for an empirical method of research to ‘find’ 
this. It was clear and obvious, but the question arises on whether it is only clear and obvious 
to someone who is open already to this openness. This ‘noticing’ may be what Husserl calls 
‘personalistic,’ and for him is more fundamental than a ‘scientific’ attitude. In the former, the 
other is given as whole, and he may be talking, laughing or dancing, so that I see him as an 
expressive unity (Zahavi, 2014, p. 128, after Husserl, 1952, p. 228; 235; see Methodology, 
Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.1). This form of empathy communicates something of the other that 
we can trust, but it is important to bear in mind that the ‘whole’ picture may not be apparent, 
as we perceive in profiles, which we then ‘fill’ through ‘assumptions’. We ‘intend’ the other 
person as a whole through an intentional consciousness of absent profiles (Zahavi, 2014, p. 
128). The absent profiles are not ‘deduced’ or inferred rationally; they are ‘filled’ by 
intentionality, which can be seen as a special kind of interpretation or ‘meaning-intending’ 
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(Husserl, 1962, p. 183 in Zahavi, 2014, p. 129). This is why operative intentionality is such a 
crucial concept, as it is a form of intentionality that informs the more ‘conscious’ way we 
intend meanings, and understanding this then calls our judgements into question (as noted 
above, Section 7.7).  
 But nevertheless, it is clear that we come to know and understand what another means, 
although we may not ‘know’ the whole picture. It also seems to be a great relief when 
someone comes to ‘know’ us in some way, and we might feel we belong or are accepted by 
another (as for example, being with Brother David showed). ‘Spoken’ speech seems to 
convey directions, like signposts pointing towards a landscape but never being able to convey 
that landscape. It seems that Giorgi’s (2009) method draws out the meanings of ‘spoken’ 
speech more than anything, translating these into psychological terminology which is like a 
specialist section of ‘spoken’ speech. The way the method does this also seems to only serve 
a need to be seen as scientifically methodical, rather than any special way of revealing 
something hidden or disguised. The reduction in Giorgi’s (2009) method is a psychological 
one, in that it tries to attend to what is essential in a psychological meaning (while the 
researcher attempts to suspend his assumptions about that meaning). The phenomenology 
was also immersed in spoken speech, but such speech became instead like a way of both 
indicating and disguising, so that something else was needed for implicit meanings that came 
through. The ‘something else’ seemed to be the phenomenological reduction, in the sense of 
coming to see how the researcher’s imagery and ‘sense-making’ was like a gauze of memory 
through which the experience of the other was ‘seen’. Ultimately, this led to uncertainty about 
the meanings in play for the other person, and this seemed to lead into openness towards that 
person then.  
In contrast, Giorgi’s (2009) method may make us think that we know something about 
the person’s meanings which can be pinned down and repeated. They can be pinned down 
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and repeated only in the sense that ‘spoken’ speech acts like a reservoir of agreed meanings, 
just as Husserl (1973) noted that only ‘normal’ people define what is normal and that then 
becomes ‘sedimented’ into a tradition (Zahavi, 2003, p. 134; Husserl, 1973, p. 162; see 
Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.5.5.2). For example, a psychiatrist might say of a patient 
who comes to see him, “He is sad because he’s depressed”, whereas the patient may be sad 
because the doctor will not see him in any other light. The reservoir of spoken speech ‘speaks’ 
for him (defining him as depressed) and the psychiatrist (who is spoken for). In this sense, we 
‘know’ someone through spoken speech (both the patient and the doctor here), but as can be 
seen, the words only indicate something (for example, he says he is sad), including possibly 
a closure to the other person (the doctor is closed). Someone in the phenomenological 
reduction might allow a thought such as, “Is he sad because I am trapping him in sadness?” 
This kind of speech seems more to be ‘speaking’ (after Merleau-Ponty (2014, p. 202/238); 
see Methodology, Chapter 3, Section 3.6) now and opens up other ‘profiles’ (to follow 
Husserl’s way of writing), showing that the phenomenological opens up a space for another 
in which he may find his own ‘truthfulness’ in what seems to be an “endless openness” 
(Husserl, 1960, p. 107).  
Concluding this study is difficult because it is like there is no ‘closure’ to it, as if in 
keeping with the main argument for ‘openness’ as healing. Concluding seems to involve a 
certain loss, while also seeing things as if for the “first time” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 362/315). 
There is the coming to know of loss of a life’s journey in one sense, in which credos fall away, 
of coming to know the impossibility of trying to be Franciscan through the framework of 
mental health nursing, and what is left is being a person in the ‘endless openness’ of 
intersubjectivity. It appears that this ‘coming to know’ has to be in one’s own truthfulness, 
and it seems there are no easy ways through to this because we are caught up in credos, ideas, 
endless ways of being (including vanity). What seems to persist as meaning something, that 
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placed no demands, and offered a patient openness, is Brother David’s welcome. The pot of 
tea, the hand pouring milk, a space at a table for someone, a tacit allowing of the other, also 
to speak, speaks of something healing that reminds me of some of the mental health nurses in 
this study who are therapeutic. The sensual landscape here seems impossible to convey.  
What was surprising was the unexpectedness of the findings that emerged from the 
phenomenology of the therapeutic, called here the phenomenology (Chapter 6). In a way, this 
surprise reflected the phenomenological approach taken from the start, trying not to grasp at 
ideas too vehemently, and allowing something to ‘speak’, but staying with the anxiety that 
perhaps nothing would. It was surprising that I came to be able to speak also. It came to appear 
in a kind of truthfulness that not ‘allowing’ the other person was violent in some way, closing 
the other’s meanings into versions of oneself, or given meanings. This violence can be 
reciprocal and seems to silence us. We might not allow the other person to heal us. The 
phenomenology seemed to show more about what the empirical findings had only indicated, 
from the empirical method, that ‘being with’ another person was somehow healing if the 
person was open to the other in a reciprocity. Being open to another without grasping at ideas, 
seemed to open a space where the other could come to be recognised as she was, also in a 
sensual landscape that could not be understood. This paradoxical asymmetry in the relation 
between one person and another seems to be crucial, and appears to open out onto other 





Appendix 1 Public, statutory and professional expectations 
A.1 There is agreement between public perceptions of nursing, the government, and the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council, that nursing is a practise-based discipline involving 
humanistic values, where the nurse puts the patient first. The main expectations of the public 
are that nurses should care, and put the needs and interests of the patient first (Francis, 2013).  
Following a first inquiry in 2010, in February 2013, the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust Public Inquiry reported to the Secretary of State for Health in the Francis Report.  In 
March 2013, the government’s initial response to the Francis Report included the proposal 
that NHS-funded student nurses should spend up to one year working “on the frontline” as 
health care assistants or support workers, before they could receive funding for their degree, 
in order to ensure that people who become nurses “have the right values and understand their 
role” (www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-government-s-response-to-the-francis-report). 
This response goes beyond the corresponding Francis Report recommendation (number 187) 
that student nurses spend at least three months working on the direct care of patients under 
the supervision of a registered nurse, and reflects public perceptions that nursing should be 
about basic caring contact with patients.  
 In response to such poor care highlighted in Mid Stafford and elsewhere, in December 
2012, the Chief Nursing Officer for England, Jane Cummings, and the Director of Nursing, 
Viv Bennett, published Compassion in Practice. This put forward a strategy (to be run over 
three years) for nurses, midwives and care staff to deliver high quality, compassionate care, 
and achieve excellent health and wellbeing outcomes. The strategy was developed in 
consultation with over nine thousand nurses, midwives, care staff, patients and others, which 
asked for feedback on Cummings and Bennet’s idea of organising practice around the “values 
and behaviours” of care, compassion, competence, communication, courage and 
commitment: the 6Cs. They found there was widespread support for their vision and strategy, 
especially amongst frontline staff. The 6Cs are to be embedded throughout all career 
pathways, including training, education and recruitment, organisational culture and appraisal 
and development of staff.   
Compassion in Practice (Cummings & Bennett, 2012) provides the following definitions: 
-  Care: “helps the individual person and the whole community”; people expect care 
to be right for them, throughout their life. 
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- Compassion: is how care is given through relationships based on empathy, respect 
and dignity; it is “intelligent kindness” and is essential to how people perceive 
their care.  
- Competence: all those in caring roles must have the ability to understand an 
individual’s health and social needs and the expertise, clinical and technical 
knowledge to deliver effective care and treatments based on research and 
evidence.  
- Communication: central to successful caring relationships; listening is part of this, 
and essential for “no decision about me without me.” 
- Courage: enables the nurse to do the right thing, to speak up about concerns, to 
innovate and to embrace new ways of working.   
- Commitment: a commitment needs to be made to improve the care and experience 
of patients and populations.  
The values and behaviours indicated here appear to be transparent and clear to the 
understanding of others. For example, to care may mean to give someone a glass of water 
when they are thirsty (this example refers to a common failure to care in the Francis Report), 
and nobody would disagree with this. Providing someone with a glass of water may also 
provide a means for the therapeutic in other ways, perhaps for that person to speak for the 
first time after a trauma, or a means of approaching the abject. There is more complexity to 
the nurse-patient relationship, in which the meanings and implications of commitment to 
strategies like the 6Cs are not so clear. This is noted by the Nursing and Midwifery Council 
(2010: R5.6.2) in terms of meeting the “complex needs of people”, but again there is an 
assumption that there is transparency with regard to ‘need’. The inadequacy of language to 
circumscribe the roles and attitudes of the nurse again point to something outside of language 
with which nursing engages and contains. This may be implicit in the UK government’s initial 
response to the Francis Report in the recommendation that students should spend up to one 
year working ‘on the frontline’ as health care assistants.  
These initiatives indicate that nursing is a public role, whose activities are defined, in part 
at least, by normative ideas (visions and strategies) imposed upon the discipline, also from 
within the discipline itself. It is interesting to note that this places nursing in a peculiar 
position with respect to the currently dominant evidence-based paradigm in healthcare, in that 
reports or opinions from respected authorities (the least reliable level of evidence) takes 
precedence over other evidence (see Muir-Gray 1997). McCrae (2011) has noted that nursing 
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is subject to such directives because of a lack of theory underpinning practice. Edwards and 
Liaschenko (1998) have noted that because nursing is a pragmatic discipline it has no need 
for theory. As noted above, the lack of theory may also be a necessary aspect of nursing 
because of its closeness to the abject.  
 
A.2 Therapeutic knowledge in standards of education and competence 
 The information in this section is drawn from the Nursing and Midwifery Council 
website. The mission of the Nursing and Midwifery Council is to safeguard the health and 
wellbeing of the public as required by the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001. One way of 
achieving this is to set standards of education, training and conduct. Nursing education and 
practise must also be consistent with The Code: Professional standards of practice and 
behaviour for nurses and midwives (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2015). Degree level 
education has been required of all nurses since September 2013. The current standards for 
pre-registration nursing education have been in place since 2010, updating and strengthening 
the 2004 standards (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2013, p. 10) in response to the initial 
Francis Independent Inquiry report (2010) into care provided by Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust (January 2005 – March 2009). These new standards emphasise the 
importance of care and compassion, as well as focusing on safeguarding the public, “so that 
nurses of the future are fit for practice… and are able to meet the needs of patients and the 
public safely and effectively with compassion” (Nursing and Midwifery Council circular 
01/2010). These are also consistent with those recommendations of the final Francis Report 
(2013) which addressed nurse training and education (currently under review).  
For the Nursing and Midwifery Council caring is both an art and a science, requiring 
compassion, and competence in acquiring scientific and technical knowledge, as well as 
holding humanitarian professional values (Nursing and Midwifery Council September 2010). 
Fields of practice in nursing are divided into adult, mental health, learning disabilities and 
children’s nursing. For each field the Nursing and Midwifery Council defines learning 
outcomes for pre-registration nurses in terms of skills. In the Council’s Standards for 
Education, minimum requirements are set out.  
Introduced in 2008 (Nursing and Midwifery Council circular 07/2007), five Essential Skills 
Clusters are defined, and individual educational institutions are allowed to develop their own 
ways of delivering these. The clusters provide a guide for theory and practice learning 
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outcomes, tested using valid and reliable assessment methods. Any curriculum “must reflect 
the application of ethical, professional and legal frameworks… must be evidence-based and 
reflect the very latest knowledge, practice, research and technical requirements” (www.nmc-
uk.org). Programmes must be approximately fifty percent theory (2300 hours) and fifty 
percent practice (2300 hours). Students should also have a range of opportunities to learn in 
practice with, and from, other health and social care professionals.  
Essential content of education programmes must include the following: 
- Theories of nursing and theories of nursing practice 
- Research methods and use of evidence 
- Professional codes, ethics, law and humanities 
- Communication and healthcare informatics 
- Life sciences (including anatomy and physiology) 
- Pharmacology and medicines management 
- Social, health and behavioural sciences  
- Principles of national and international health policy, including public health 
- Principles of supervision, leadership and management 
- Principles of organisational structures, systems and processes 
- Causes of common health conditions and the interaction between physical and mental 
health and illness 
- Best practice 
- Healthcare technology 
- Essential first aid and incident management 
The emphasis here is on medical and pharmacological knowledge, and understanding 
organisational and legal frameworks and technology.  
This content should underpin the following key aspects of practice, enabling the nurse to 
“meet the essential and immediate needs of all people” and the “complex needs of people in 
their chosen field” (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2010: R5.6.2): 
- Communication, compassion and dignity 
- Emotional support 
- Equality, diversity, inclusiveness and rights 
- Identity, appearance and self-worth 
- Autonomy, independence and self-care 
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- Public health and promoting health and wellbeing 
- Maintaining a safe environment 
- Eating, drinking, nutrition and hydration 
- Comfort and sleep 
- Moving and positioning 
- Continence promotion and bowel and bladder care 
- Skin health and wound management 
- Infection prevention and control 
- Clinical observation, assessment, critical thinking and decision-making 
- Symptom management, such as anxiety, anger, thirst, pain and breathlessness 
- Risk management 
- Medicines management 
- Information management 
- Supervising, leading, managing and promoting best practice 
‘Meeting the needs of others’ is the key theme in these key aspects of practice, and there is 
an assumption again that these needs are transparent. There is an emphasis on the activities 
of daily living (after Roper, Logan and Tierney, 1980). The therapeutic effects of 
communication and nurse-patient interactions are given less emphasis. 
A.3 Essential Skills Clusters and Standards for Competence 
 Since 2010, the Essential Skill Clusters form guidance within the standards for pre-
registration education. It is interesting to note that these lay out a framework which is likely 
to come into conflict with the actual interpersonal interaction in the moment which may 
involve some other ‘skill, behaviour or attitude’, or something else, to those defined.  
The five Essential Skill Clusters are: 
1. Care, compassion and communication. 
2. Organisational aspects of care. 
3. Infection prevention and control. 
4. Nutrition and fluid management. 
5. Medicines management. 
The first cluster is most relevant for the current study and is summarised below: 
 Essential Skill Cluster: care, compassion and communication 
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 There is an emphasis on providing collaborative care, person-centred and empowering 
to the patient; showing respect for diversity and difference; being warm, sensitive and 
compassionate, with appropriate use of touch, and the use of active listening skills.  
The Standards for Competence set out the context of the skills and attitudes the student must 
acquire to qualify at degree level. ‘Competence’ is a holistic concept and may refer to a 
combination of knowledge, skills and attitudes required to practise safely and effectively 
without direct supervision (The Nursing and Midwifery Council adapted this definition from 
the Queensland Nursing Council 2009). At times the term, ‘behaviour’ is used instead of 
‘attitude’. The term ‘competencies’ replaces ‘proficiencies’ (although it is not explained 
why). Acquiring competencies lies at the heart of nursing education. The definition of 
competencies is fluid in that the qualifier ‘may refer’ is used, purposefully, perhaps to indicate 
the complex nature of practising competently as a nurse.  
 Competencies cover four domains: 
1. Professional values. 
2. Communication and interpersonal skills. 
3. Nursing practice and decision making. 
4. Leadership, management and team working. 
The context in which the competencies are acquired depends upon the particular field of 
nursing. Each domain has a generic and field specific component reflecting the commonalities 
and differences of the four fields of nursing. All nurses are required to apply knowledge and 
skills based on the best available evidence indicative of safe nursing practice, and these are 
integrated into the competencies.  
 Domain 1: Professional values 
The standard for competence in this domain for mental health nursing is: 
“Mental health nurses must work with people of all ages using values-based mental health 
frameworks. They must use different methods of engaging people, and work in a way that 
promotes positive relationships focused on social inclusion, human rights, and recovery, that 
is, a person’s ability to live a self-directed life, with or without symptoms, that they believe 
is meaningful and satisfying” (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2010).  
 Domain 2: Communication and interpersonal skills 
The standard for competence in this domain for mental health nursing: 
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“Mental health nurses must practise in a way that focuses on the therapeutic use of self. They 
must draw on a range of methods of engaging with people of all ages experiencing mental 
health problems, and those important to them, to develop and maintain therapeutic 
relationships. They must work alongside people, using a range of interpersonal approaches 
and skills to help them explore and make sense of their experience that promotes recovery” 
(Nursing and Midwifery Council 2010). 
 Domain 3: Nursing practice and decision making 
The standard for competency for mental health nursing is:   
“Mental health nurses must draw on a range of evidence-based psychological, psychosocial 
and other complex therapeutic skills and interventions to provide person-centred support and 
care across all ages, in a way that supports self-determination and aids recovery. They must 
also promote improvements in physical and mental health and wellbeing and provide direct 
care to meet both the essential and complex physical and mental health needs of people with 
mental health problems” (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2010).  
 
 Domain 4: Leadership, management and team working 
The standard for competency for mental health nursing is: 
“Mental health nurses must contribute to the leadership, management and design of mental 
health services. They must work with service users, carers, other professionals and agencies 
to shape further services, aid recovery and challenge discrimination and inequality” (Nursing 
and Midwifery Council, 2010).  
 
A.4 Influence of values and nursing models in the Standards for Education and 
Competence 
What appears here is that mental health nursing is a practise that involves close 
interpersonal interactions with patients, but also within a context of public expectations and 
managerial roles. The interweaving of ‘personal process’ and ‘contain and fix’ approaches is 
clear here. Some values appear to be prescriptive, based on what the public wants and 
traditional expectations within nursing: 
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- That nurses should have the ‘appropriate attitude’ although it is not defined what this 
may be. 
- Emphasis on legal frameworks, such as human rights and dignity; including medico-
legal concepts such as consent, which guide practice.  
- The idea that transparent communication is possible.  
The influence of nursing models in these standards is not explicitly indicated, but can be 
derived along the following themes, valued as being therapeutic: 
• Empowerment and choice – reflecting Parse’s (1981) focus on existential themes, 
after Sarte, such as freedom.  
• Difference, and the individual as autonomous – reflecting another existential theme, 
found in Barker’s Tidal Model (1998), which focuses on recovery and valuing the 
person’s own words and story. 
• Developing insight into one’s own values, self-awareness, and understanding of how 
one’s own interactions affect relationships – reflecting Peplau’s (1952; 1988) 
psychodynamic theory of interpersonal relations in nursing; the nurse, in order to be 
therapeutic, must be able to allow herself to be affected and changed through her 
interactions with others. 
• Meaning seeking – this is an existential theme developed by M. E. Rogers (1970), 
Parse (1981 and Barker (1998). 
• Kindness, touch, and caring relationships – themes especially developed by Watson 
(2012), where love is a transpersonal phenomenon especially relevant to nursing.  
• Person-centred approach and achievement of goals – This places the patient centre-
stage, and in part reflects the influence of humanistic psychology on nursing (after 
Carl Rogers). 
• The activities of daily living – this is a dominant theme in the standards and directly 
reflects the influence of the Roper, Logan and Tierney (1980) model of nursing, 
centred on activities of daily living, including physical, emotional and spiritual needs.  
 
A.5  Summary 
What appears in the standards of education and competence is that there is something 
intangible about mental health nursing practice that can be learned but is difficult or 
impossible to define. This may be due to the difficulty in moving from frameworks of values 
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to what happens in the actual encounter with another person. McCrae (2011, p. 224) notes 
that nursing models are regarded by many nurses as “unrealistic dogma” and as “diversions 
from intuitive care.” In the standards and the literature there is an indication that nurses are 
guided by an intuitive humanistic ethos tuned by training and experience (McCrae 2011). 
There is a need then to open up a space where mental health nurses can speak of the encounter 
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Appendix 3: Participant 3 interview transcript and full analysis 
 
R: Now that's recording now...we can kind of just forget about it really.... 
so really the question, this study is about, the title of the study is what is the need if, any, for 
therapeutic education in mental health nursing. So, I suppose, I would like your view what it 
is that you do that is therapeutic in your opinion and what kind of… um… learning have 
you had, have you learnt to be therapeutic, and really take it from there… So, any thoughts 
about it? 
 
P3: Well, since qualifying I've only ever really done Community Nursing… 
 
R: When did you qualify? 
 
P3: I qualified in 2010 and I got a job in a CMHT in Manchester so it’s a new area cos I 
trained in Chester, and I walked into the team and I was given a caseload of 35 and they had 
not been seen for 8 months… so I was literally told: Go out, introduce yourself… They 
needed all new care plans and everything… so I suppose I'd never had any training at uni… 
You don't have sessions or lessons about the therapeutic alliance or rapport, or…  
 
R: What kind of training would you have had at uni that would have helped…  
 
P3: I think it was just your placements… the actual practice placements… seeing, you know 
that the two community placements just seeing how they worked really, I suppose and… 
 
R: Was it being in practice with other nurses while you were training? Is that what you 
mean by practice placements? 
 
P3: Yeah practice placement… because I did a placement at X--- with the team I was 
working for as a first year and I had a mentor, and then I did crisis team, was a transition in 
my last placement for 12 weeks… that wasn't a care coordinating but it was going in and 
seeing different people who were in crisis and trying to be helpful… So I suppose it's not 
said but it's implicit rather than explicit isn't it that you have got to try and get a rapport with 
this person so they can trust you so you can be helpful to them.  
 
R: So, what happened that you got 35 people all of a sudden…? None of them have been 
seen for 8 months…  
 
P3: No, not for eight months. 
 
R: And suddenly you have to do something therapeutic with them or…  
 
P3: They felt abandoned... they were struggling, you know, so… they were CPA patients 
who had serious mental illness…  
 
R: Who did they feel abandoned by? 
 
P3: The fact that they were left than they were promised that somebody would get in 
touch… because the team there was so busy, and the waiting lists for people just for 
assessment was 18 months, it was just a different way that it is over this side of the County, 




R: What was that like?  
 




P3: I was determined to be a help to them… I suppose I was naive because I thought I'm 
going to cure them…  
 
R: You want to cure them… 
 
P3: I want to come in and I’m going to care plan them, I'm going to cure them, they're going 
to get all the TLC they need, to know that they can manage their illness, and they can 
manage all the problems that go alongside it and things will get sorted out… and it was that 
absolutely naivety… but I think that's where your nursing comes in you want to be caring, 
you want to be compassionate, you want to help people. 
 
R: Yeah  
 
P3: So… (laughs)…  
 
R: So, like curing them would what? Curing them would be…? 
 
P3: Well, they come in, you talk to them and they would have all the woes in the world and 
you don’t… I used to feel and I still do, but I suppose, helpless is the right word… I’d 
probably be walking out feeling depressed because they’d ring you going, “I need to see 
you, I’m in crisis, something’s happened”, so you become this really important figure in 
their life. 
 
R: How would you respond to something like that? Say, what would you do if someone 
rang you like that… and you’d seen them and walked out feeling a bit helpless and then 
they rang you, is that what you mean? 
 
P3: Yeah, or even if it was just… I suppose that's just the nature of the beast, isn't it? You're 
dealing with a lot of people have got depression and a lot of problems… you might be the 
only person in their life that actually cares enough to sit and listen to their problems for an 
hour once every week or every two weeks… so if you're that person you don't want to feel 
that you are letting them down because, I suppose… Is it counter transference in a way, isn't 
it? Really, you're thinking about… they… you get… I… I wouldn't say I'm emotionally 
involved, I'm not that nurse that goes home and loses sleep about it although I know nurses 
that do that, they care that much, don’t they - I couldn't sleep last night - I suppose that’s a 
risk thing, but  I suppose my anxiety would be, I want to know that I have been helpful, that 
I'm doing my job for that person, because they're looking for me, to me - you are my cpn - I 
have a cpn - so you get caught on this pedestal in a weird way… so there's a power thing 
going on…  
 
R: Right  
 




R: Why have they got the power? In what way…? 
 
P3: Because they’re relying on you… 
 




R: You said something about TLC, that you're going to give this person so much TLC that 
you're going to cure them… 
 
P3: Yeah… and that's the naivety, absolutely naïve…  
 
R: That was your naïve approach at the start? Why do you say it’s naïve...? And what is 
TLC? 
 
P3: Tender loving care… you know I say… it's just that you know, in the sense that, I used 
to see a lot of nurses going in, especially in the crisis team - I understand why because 
they’re super-busy and they sit there for 5 minutes and then you are uh uh, uh uh, uh uh, and 
then they go, ok. But if I go for an hour and a half they get an hour and a half 
 
R: So, they’d sit there for five minutes with the patient and then just go. 
 
P3: They could do. And then it's…kind of like, you write a note and there's no thought 
afterwards and it's hard, and you know… that's their role I suppose they do assessments 
they manage and then they move on. They don't have to take that… they don't feel that 
responsibility…  
 




R: So, you tried to put something else into place that gives the person time. 
 
P3: Yeah, but I suppose that's where the therapeutic thing comes in, but it's just that's my 




P3: Thinking about it…  
 
R: And what happens there? Yeah… it is your personal values. 
 
P3: How I, I suppose I've always treated people how I would want to be treated, so if I was 
in their position… Is it over-empathetic, I don't know? I don't know…  
 
R: I don't know either… So it's as if the other person, if you were in their position what 




P3: Yeah and what would they need… and 
 
R: One of the things you’ve said is time… you’d actually spend time with them, like you 
would spend an hour or an hour and a half, whatever that time was allocated you would give 
it to them. 
 
P3: Yeah  
 
R: And what would happen in that hour, say? 
 
P3: Well, I think as a cpn… it's different now which is another thing… when I have been 
doing the Community Nursing the first few sessions you can see there’s a pattern every 
time, you get to know each other so you start off the first few sessions you put your stall out 
- this is what I can do for you - you make sort of unsaid promises don't you? 
 
R: Do you? 
 
P3: Care plan, your risks… 
 
R: Yes, what's your stall? Sorry, care plan, yeah… 
 
P3: Yeah, we're going to, you know, this is what I do, this is my role, this is what the team 
does. You might have met them in hospital so someone's coming now, come to see you 





P3: To help them to… until you feel better until you settle down… I'll be your name nurse, 
someone you can call. 
 
R: And would you say that? You're not on your own. 
 
P3: Yes. I used to say that. But then I'm making massive promises that I would never ever 
not want to not keep.  
 
R: You’re saying you used to say that? 
 
P3: I probably still would. 
 
R: You probably still would. 
 




P3: I know a lot of nurses work differently and I remember as a student one of the nurses 
said… “Don't over-give because you’ll give too much and then you can’t take it back… 
emm… Let them do it”… which is … which is the recovery model and you try and work 
towards that… but… as I've got more experienced I do work towards that, and it's very hard 
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because when you deal with people who’ve got personality problems, who are very 
depressed, who are very unmotivated… because you're trying to work to a care plan you do 
to take responsibility even though you're not supposed to…  Your name's attached to it then, 
the benefits, they're phoning you up 
 
R: And how do you… emm…  what's it like taking responsibility? What are you taking 
responsibility for there? 
 
P3: It could be I can't fill this form out, or, I'm in loads of debt… you know, it depends on 
whatever is going on or they’re in crisis… or you know you’d sit and talk to them because 
they’ve had a relationship breakdown… So, you’re talking to them just as… not as a nurse, 
are you? Because it’s a personal… it's not about the mental illness now… They’re coming 
to you, they’re having a normative emotional reaction but… they still want you there to 




P3: Because you… you get to know each other so well…  
 
R: To stroke their hand… Do you mean that actually?  
 
P3: Figuratively  
 
R: Figuratively, so it's like a metaphor… so there's something… What's in that… like, to 
stroke their hand? How do you do that, you know, without actually doing it, or would you 
do it sometimes? Would you stroke someone’s hand? 
 
P3: No.  
 
R: So how do you do it? What is the stroking their hand bit? 
 
P3: It… it’s… down to active listening… so even though they will take… they’ll do the… 
well, it’s like a therapist in a way, isn’t it? They’ll do 90% of the talking… but you're trying 




P3: … come to some kind of realisation… But there's no training in there… it's just trying 
to be supportive because for all… for all I've always been there for somebody, I've never 
ever told anybody what to do, ever… 
 
R: Okay… And are you actively trying to guide them towards some realisation or are you 
going with the flow of what's happening? 
 
P3: Probably a bit of both. 
 
R: A bit of both? 
 
P3: Yeah, ‘cos in my head I'll be thinking I'd love to tell you what I think but you can't 
because it's your professional head isn't it? So professionally you’re there as a nurse and 
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you're there to listen to them and to hear what they decide, but I suppose you question 
things and you look up the pros and the cons all the time… so you help them to sort talk 
through a list of positives and negatives… I suppose of the decisions they’re making. 
R: And what's that like to do that? 
 





P3: … and they’re still talking about the same things… 
 
R: Right… (both laugh) …  
 
P3: So, that going back to, I'm going to cure you, you’re not curing anybody, are you? 
You’re just trying to help people get through their lives and… you end up saying, you have 




P3: Because they're looking at you like ‘this is too hard for me’, but, it's hard for everybody, 
isn't it?  
 
R: Yeah  
 
P3: But what makes it more difficult is if they’ve got an SMI, I suppose… 
 
R: And what made it… when did you move from that, you're saying, you’re calling it kind 
of naïve, I'm going to cure you, to the other part what you’re saying, well actually I'm going 
to give you them the pros and cons of, and I'll just stay with them? I think you’re saying 
you're just kind of, that you'll stay with their process… When did you make that shift…? Or 
did you make a shift? 
 
P3: I think I must have done because when I first started, when I first qualified and started 
doing it… even though we use your life experience, your insecurity of making sure you’re 
doing your job properly will be quite textbook, you know… 
 
R: And what’s that? 
 
P3: This is what depression is, you were looking at your biological symptoms are you 
eating, are you sleeping, you know, are you looking after yourself? What can I do…? And I 
still go back to what can I do practically so I feel like I'm helping you? 
 
R: Okay. And what's the textbook? 
 
P3: Just like what your NICE guidelines would say… 
 
R: From your training? 
 






P3: And then as that, as that moves on you feel, ‘ok, I have educated you about your 
illness’, and now I'm learning to know your relapse signs, or your early warning signs, or 
you know… the medication you’re on, I don't need to refer to it because we just know each 




P3: You know I know about your benefits, about your family, I’ve met your family  
 
R: Yeah  
 
P3: I'm on first name terms with your dog and cat, you know… (laughs) … things like 
that… and then you just start having these quite general conversations because… you end 
up having to get to that point where it isn't just well, I'm going to talk to you about 
something you know about now, you've done that part, now it's just staying with you… 
 
R:  Is a bit like you enter into their life or something? Because you know the names of their 
pets and things. Is it like you’re getting into their life in some way? 
 
P3: Yeah… yeah, it's quite a privilege really, isn’t it? Where you become, you started off as 
a stranger, and then suddenly you become actually a key figure… And there are particular 
people who are very good at going, ‘ok, I get the service and you're not part of my life, 
you’re just an aspect of it, and I come in and it's very nice to have you to talk to but I get on 




P3: You know, there’s a lady who at X, who… she did that ice bucket challenge… Now, 
we're not friends on Facebook, but she showed me the Facebook page and she nominated 
me… because I was her only friend…  
 
R: All right 
 
P3: You know… Or she'd ring and go, ‘Oh, you seem sad today, are you okay, you seem 
really stressed’ - so she was worrying about me and I had to reassure her, ‘no, no, no, I'm 
absolutely fine…’  
 
R: And what was it like being her only friend? 
 
P3: It was a responsibility… 
 
R: Were you actually her only friend? 
 
P3: Yeah, pretty much. Well, until she got another friend but it was all very… but… 
because she was another service user within that, it's still within mental health so their 




R: Yeah … and it was a responsibility, was it? In what way? 
 
P3: To, to always be there. 
 
R: Ok… (long pause) 
 
P3: Because you can't walk away… you can't be too busy when they ring up… even if 
you're in the middle of something you have to drop everything and take that call, and it 
could be, you know, that they might be just bored or lonely and they’ll find a reason to ring 
you 
… or to come in and see me, and you have to go down don't you … (smiles) …. 
 
R: Yeah… you can't walk away… It's an interesting relationship, isn’t it? Are there any… 
are there any qualities about you as a person, do you think, that help that happen? Or like 
that, say, a mental health nurse needs to help that happen? 
 
P3: I think… for me… maybe because I have tried without meaning to, or maybe with 
meaning to, trying to build up this really strong therapeutic alliance… I created then, not a 
dependency because I'm always working towards independence and wellness and recovery, 
but I've created a close relationship to… because I feel that's part of my role, that they can 
trust me that they can rely on me and I can be helpful. 
 




R: You know, that trust and reliability and being there are important, you know… That 
that's something you believe. This is something that you've learned not from a textbook, it 
sounds like to me. 
 
P3: No… that's why I became a nurse not a social worker. 
 
R: Right… Why? 
 
P3: Because it's not about the paperwork and you going, ‘right, let's look at your care plan’. 
I know that's where I start off from, that's the business side, and then you get… you're a part 
of the person's life.  
 
R: Yeah. Is that what speaks to you most about nursing?  
 
P3: Yeah  
 
R: That's what you didn't do social work… 
 






R: And the kind of qualities you might need to do that, the qualities you have, what would 
you say they are? Are there any qualities? What are they? I… they must be there, they 
sound in there… (laughs) … 
P3: I just wing it. 
 
R: You wing it.  
 
P3: You wing it. You don't know what's happening, every day is different, you don't know 
what problems people are going to have. And you’ve got your own little toolbox. You go 
like, ‘someone's in crisis, you’ve got your medication, you’ve got the crisis team, you can 
bring an outpatients appointment forward, or if someone’s really risky, a professionals 
meeting… Or they’ve really got massive psychological issues – Tony, well you know I've 
referred here and I feel really good now because I've got someone else, I can say, ‘Look, 
I’ve got, I can do something for you’…’ then I'm passing a little bit of that to somebody else 
and then you know that's building up their tool boxes, isn’t it? 
 
R: Yeah  
 
P3: But, you know, if a CPN is just to oversee medication and to oversee risk, well then all 
that sitting with somebody for an hour every two weeks is not necessary, it could be a phone 
call, couldn’t it? 
 
 R: Yeah 
 
P3: ‘Are you alright? Everything ok? Meds ok? Any side-effects…? I’ll ring again in a 




P3: It's more than that. It has to be, or else what’s the point of all these visits? 
 
R: Yeah… If community nursing was like that would you do it? If that's what it was? 
 
P3: Well, you dream of it, don't you? Because then you're not so busy! And your paperwork 




P3: Because we do. 
 
R: But you’re saying that there’s something else involved in that visit, that hourly visit… 
 
P3: I think it has to be… to know that person… that therapeutic side… it has to be… 
Because talking to that person and giving them that time… is the prescription in itself, I 
suppose, or that’s what it feels your role has become… I don’t know. 
 
R: Does it feel like a prescription, like as if your prescribing something? 
 
P3: Yeah, my role as part of your… ‘cos what makes… Yeah…that, that… that's creating a 




R: Yeah… and who's doing the prescribing there? You know like… Is that what you meant 
by prescription?  
P3: yeah, I suppose 
 
R: That it's almost like a part… a part of what? …. The care, or medical care or something?  
Would you see it as medical care or as separate, isn’t it?  I can see you’re saying ‘no’…. 
 
(both laugh) … 
 
R: What is it? 
 
P3: You’re trying not to medicalise people, are you? You’re trying to humanise them, in a 
medical environment… because, you know, their identity becomes a mental illness if 
they’re seeing a mental health nurse and you’re reminding them I don't see you as just a 
schizophrenic or a manic depressive… 
 
R: Okay, you’re not…  
 
P3: … I see you as a whole, I'm talking to you as a peer… on a level… I don’t know. 
 
R: It sounds like the people you've been looking after appreciate that…You know, that that 
speaks to them. Is that what you're saying as well?  
 
P3: Oh, it's a thankless job… I know that but… your feedback is your wanted and you feel 
needed… and… your time with them… they'll always say ‘I feel so much better after 
talking to you’, it's cathartic, isn't it? 
 
R: So, do you mean it’s thankless?  
 
P3: It’s thankless in the fact that I think it’s become expected, that's what you’re there to do.  
 
R: Okay, right. 
 
P3: So, not that they’re not grateful for it… but you don't do it going, ‘well, say thank you 
now’, you don’t expect that, it's just become that's what your role’s become now, someone 
to listen to, you’re their sounding board, you’re their best friend, you’re they're confidante. 
Because it is confidence.  
 
R: What's that like for you to be in that role when seems a bit thankless and it's almost 
expected…? 
 
P3: You get used to it? 
 
R: You get used to it. 
 
P3: Yeah, it's just that's part of the job in itself, isn't it?  
 
R: And what's in the little bit of ‘getting used to’ - Is there a kind of, you know, it sounds 
like you're saying when you get used to something that initially you're not used to it, you 
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know. So, is there something there that, you know… Is it getting used to not having, not 
being thanked? 
 
P3: I think it's getting used to knowing that even though you've spent a really good hour 
with somebody thinking that you got somewhere, tomorrow you might get a phone call and 
you’re back to square one again…  (laughs a lot) … 
 
R: Right… that's just accepting that… 
 
P3: It's accepting… that for all your motivational, you know, talking… and, you know, 




P3: It might… just… people are going to do what they want to do at the end of the day, you 
know… 
 
R: You sound very encouraging like, you're gee-ing them up, and you've got their back and 
your motivating them… but then you think it might just all collapse the next day. Is that it? 
 
P3: Yeah, but I accept that. I don't take it personally. I have to… you know, I, I… I always 




P3: Because you’ll ring me up again with the same thing and it's like we’d not had that 
conversation before and I remind them of things we said, and things we discussed before, 
but ‘right let's start all over again, let’s gee you up, let's motivate you, let's get you feeling 
ok, so you can get off the phone and not feel so depressed and hopeless, because I've 
reminded you it isn't…’ because that's what they rang me for… Why else? 
 
R: Well, there's something about, emm, is there… Why else would they ring you, is that 




R: I don’t know… Why? Maybe is there something else…? I've got your back, there’s a lot 
in that, isn't there? What does that mean? I mean to you, like? It sounds like… just getting 
back to the idea of being therapeutic, it sounds like all these things that you’re mentioning 
are what it means, kind of makeup what’s therapeutic about nursing, about mental health 




R: Sounds like… 
 
P3: Well, you know, there's, there’s a conflict, isn’t there? From all of that I've become 
somebody you can talk to and trust, you get poorly I might be the one who has to trigger a 
mental health act assessment against you, and I'm sitting with you and the police are stood 
either side of us, and I'm telling you the doctor’s coming and you're going to go to hospital 
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now and you've lost insight so it's a section… and then I'm going to come and visit you on 
the ward and go, ‘right,’ you know, and we’re going to have a tribunal, you’re going to read 
all these things that you don't get and then when you get out we’ll carry on as we used to… 
so… 
 
R: So, there might be a part there where they don't trust you, and if they lose that insight, if 
they become really unwell… 
 
P3: Yeah but I think because you've developed closeness in a weird way, not in a personal 
way, if I walked past that person in the street out of hours I know you just go, ‘Hi, are you 
all right?’ - always acknowledge each other, you might even have a quick chat, but it's not 
like let's go and have a coffee and you tell me your problems… The divide is there, it's 
definitely kept… professional… Or… you know, it's understood that I can talk to you about 
my personal problems within our appointment time, however, you've got a closeness where 
you're allowed into their world and you know about their abuse, all the relationship 
problems, or… the dark things that they think… or the suicidal thoughts they have that have 
don't tell anybody… or the nightmares… and that's really personal… 
 
R: Yeah… and these are the kind of things they would say to you in your conversations in 
the hour? 
 
P3: Yeah  
 
R: What's it like listening to things like that? I mean how do you help them? What's it like 
listening to things like that? - the dark things. 
 
P3: It's sad …  it’s sad.  
 
R: Yeah  
 
P3: It's horrible knowing that there’s people who are struggling, and as I said before, your 
role is to try make them feel better. These can be chronic, chronic… issues 
 
R: These are going on for a long time 
 
P3: For a long time... and then you get to a point where you try and problem solve and you 
try and maybe change medication… because that might cause nightmares. Or you might try 




P3: L---… who was having the nightmares and the suicidal thoughts… and two and a half 
years later you get to the point where you don't give false hope, you just say, ‘Right, well 
this is how it is then right now.’ 
 







R: Does it do something else to you? 
 
P3: I think you start to feel a bit of helplessness, I suppose. 
R: Right… and how do you manage that? 
 
P3: I don't know… I don't know… 
 
R: Do you stay with?  
 
P3: yeah… I suppose I do… you just keep being there… because that's all you've got left… 
well, you know, well we've got a really strong rapport now and you can tell me that, so I 
can't make it go away but at least you can talk to me and we can have a coffee and… and 
I've understood… 
 
R: So, you might be sitting there feeling a bit sad and helpless… but you are still… you're 








R: Does it sound difficult now, or is it just… like…  
 
P3: When you break it down it sounds difficult…  you just do it because it's… 
 
R: Because it's what? It’s just… 
 
P3: It’s what you have to do…  
 




P3: But then when you get big caseloads… you start to compromise your admin time or 
your training time because I suppose again it's down to your personal way of working… 
you prioritise what you’re there to do… then that person… an increasing number of people 
still deserve that service… 
 
R: That kind of quality… of being with them… 
 
P3: I don't know if it's quality but you try and give them what you perceive is the best you 
can give them, you know, that’s… if you've been given that responsibility to work with that 
person… And then you start to feel really stressed… 
 






R: What’s stressful about it?  
 
P3: I think it's just, you know, you start to squeeze people in… and try and see 7 people in a 
day… and then you get a knot in your stomach because you might get the phone ringing and 




P3: And then, where do you do your paperwork… So, you start to… (laughs) …  
 
R: So, what makes it so…? When you say squeeze people in you, you would be giving them 
that kind of attention, like, that you've been talking about… 
 
P3: Yes  
 
R: And you might squeeze in 7 people a day and you get stressed, you get a knot in your 
stomach… What's causing the knot there? I can imagine but what do you think it might be? 
 
P3: Because I'm giving them 60% concentration… and I'm looking at them and I’m going 
through all the process and I know them well and I'm saying all the right things and the 
other half of my brain is thinking… and looking at the clock… I need to, I need to start to 
wind things up, you know… Is there anything I’ve made promises to do? I need to lock that 
in my head, right I said I'm going to do that… I’m going to make sure that’s done, so you 
start thinking of your next step… whilst you’re still trying to give them, that person, the 
quality time they’ve been waiting maybe a week for, or two weeks for, or 3 weeks for… 
 
R: So, if you make promises you keep them, you kind of lock it into your head that you've 




R: You're not scribbling stuff down on a bit of paper, it’s kind of gone into your mind… 
 
P3: Or I will, I’ll have a little to do list, I’ll just write this down, because if I’ve written it 
down it’s going to happen and I won't forget… You know, and if I know I’m running 
behind I'm going to do it today because you don't want to let people down, it's about I will 
do this, I will put a half hour aside so I can do that for you then, we've made an 
understanding and you know it’s, it’ll be done… I suppose that, that’s the communication 
part of it, I suppose… 
 
R: And is the stress, ehhh, the knot in your stomach… that's caused by compromising, is it? 
Or is it just seeing too many people? 
 
P3: I think it's um… I think it's not compromising… not saying I'm too busy… it's a rare 
thing that I’d ever say that to somebody… 
 
R: That you're too busy? 
 




R: You’d always pick up the phone. 
 
P3: Always, yeah. 
 
R: Why do you do that? 
 






R: So, that sounds like something to do with your value, your own values, that you know if 




R: So, you are kind of sacrificing a bit of yourself there, aren’t you? Or you're putting 
yourself under stress.  
 
P3: Yeah… I mean, obviously, you get great, great days, maybe weeks, and you think I'm 
getting on top of it, but it doesn't take much to get really… just needs a few people in 




P3: And it's that old familiar feeling, I'll get sorted… and then you have your own hope just 





P3: But it's been nice because in this current role, it's assessment in custody suite, and in the 
courts, so I've walked into this job… very aware that we are a secondary service to the 




P3: But it's been lovely because… For one, I’ve had the time that I never got  I was at X---
… to actually sit and talk to somebody and formulate a plan and then actually on the same 
day do the referrals… and do all the safeguarding… you know… sit there ringing around 
and checking everything is done and ok… and doing you're really thorough assessment that 
you know is on Carenotes now, so everything's there for that person if they ever need it, or 
for whatever is going on with them.. But even though there in that, the cells… they could be 
bleeding and all sorts… when they know that you're a mental health nurse and they’re in 
that interview room talking… they forget all of that, they’re talking to you as a nurse, 
they’re looking to you as a nurse not as a police officer or a detention officer… 
 





R: How do they look at you? 
 
P3: Some of them go, ‘I've been here before I'm not interested everybody just lets you 
down’, well, you know, if you want to talk let's see what we can do… no promises… and 
some… for the most part they want to talk and they forget what they, where they are…  
 
R: Why they’re there. 
 
P3: Yeah. They're just talking about their problems, and the history and their background 
and the abuse, so much abuse…  
 
R: What kind of abuse? 
 
P3: Sexual… we see 90% men, in custody… it’s about 90% men… And it’s about 60% 
drug and alcohol, and within all of that most of them have got, emm, yeah, have had abuse...  
background… 
 
R: And they suddenly start telling you this? And this might be the first time you’ve met 
them? 
 





P3: But they’ve never accessed services before. So, you come and go, ‘I'm not here for the 
police, I’m here to see how you are.’  
 
R: So, somehow you being a nurse… this facilitates that? 
 
P3: Yeah. And they see the NHS lanyard, so they believe that you are a nurse… and you 
reassure him that you there and it's confidential… and you’re here to support them and to 
see if… they’re suicidal, if they’ve got depression, and you check notes and Primary Care 
and they’re not known, and what's going on… and you do a thorough assessment with 
them… and that is therapeutic, that's therapeutic. 
 
R: How is it therapeutic? 
 
P3: Because they're off-loading and the amount of, you know, they’re crying, and they’re 
telling you all these really personal things and you… you haven't done anything to help but 
to listen and at the end of it they’ll go, ‘Oh, I feel better… I feel better for talking to you… 
thanks for listening…’ Well, you know, I’d go, well, here’s a plan…’… ‘Thank you!’ So 
even that half hour, or hour, and plus the other four hours of paperwork that you don't see… 
Is.. it's really meaningful…  
 
R: And is there something about you, do you think, that they would open up to, more say 




P3: I don't know. No. I think it's just the assessment process. I think it’s just sitting there and 
giving someone an opportunity. 
R: But knowing firstly that you’re a nurse, you think changes things… you're not a 
policewoman, and you’re not, I don't know who else would be seeing them?  
 
P3: The solicitor 
 
R: You’re not a solicitor, you’re not a policewoman. 
 
P3: Yeah, the investigating officer… yeah… yeah… I definitely, I definitely say because 
I'm a nurse you get that privilege… 
 




R: When they tell you all of these things… Does it affect you? If they tell you… you know, 
maybe, bad things or upsetting things, does it affect you?  
 
P3: Yeah, it does, when you think about it… You know, you’re looking at this broken 
person who's had a broken life… because something terrible happened to them that was out 
of their control… you know, there’s so much homelessness going on, you want, you want to 
help them… you want to know that… that you can get them… I don't know you could just 
go on and on, couldn’t you? Because the care coordinator kicks in, you start doing an 
holistic plan… and really all you can do is see what the outcomes are and, you know, we’re 
lucky we’ve got support workers, so we can make some promises, if you’re not going to 
prison the support worker can take you to housing and help you with that, and she'll take 
you to your Primary Care appointment that I’m going to set up for you… whatever it is… 
So you can start to make a few little promises, ‘you know what, I can help’… So it still goes 




P3: And it takes it away from the criminal justice, criminal justice then becomes secondary 
within that interview although it's still a primary thing…  
 
R: Where were we? Oh yes, so… I can see you've written down a lot of stuff there. Is there 
anything there that you wanted to talk about that seems important to talk about? Can I ask 
you one question though? You are doing a lot of listening in those assessments and people 
are opening up to you… Where have you learned… in your training, or anywhere else… 
about how to listen… or how to… you know, that active listening you're talking about? 
Have you learned that anywhere, has anyone taught you it? 
 
P3: No. I think it’s just… what CPNs do, what nurses do…  
 
R: So, it's like… so you may have learnt from watching other nurses doing it, or you’ve 
learned from your life maybe? 
 




R: Yeah… (long pause) … 
P3: It’s their time, isn't it?  
 
R: And was there anything, say…  I suppose you've learned from your life… but, do you 
think you need a certain kind of life to learn from? Or is it just…? 
 
P3: I just think… I just think a lot of nurses, you know, are just caring… that's what drew 
them into that profession. 
 
R: Ok… so it's caring… 
 
P3: And it sounds cliché, doesn't it? Compassion and caring… but that's what drives, I 
think, that is the underpinning… of a lot of the work that we do… 
 
R: And where is that caring coming from? That idea, that activity of caring? 
 
P3: I don't know… 
 
R: Is it just part of you? Or is it? 
 
P3: Yeah, maybe… I suppose it would be part of you, yeah, it has to be, doesn't it? I think 
you can’t fake it, you've got to be genuine… you can’t fake that 2, 3, 4, 10 years with 
somebody, could you? You've got to, you’ve got to mean it, or someone would see right 
through you. 
 




R: Because they’re suddenly opening up to you, these people, they're not opening up to the 
policeman or the solicitor. 
 
P3: Yeah, yeah… 
 








R: So, was there stuff that you’d written… that seems important? Is any of this chiming 
with what you've written down already? 
 
P3: Yeah, a couple of things… yeah… I think I was just putting… I didn't know it would be 
about me! I was just saying generally the things, you know… 
 




P3: You’ve kind of curve-balled me there… (laughs) …  
 




R: I suppose… yeah, it, yeah, there is another part of it, like when I asked have you learned 
anywhere… Like I don’t know, have you done a course on active listening or something? 





R: Ok… Isn’t that interesting? 
 
P3: I have to, I have to say to the people I work with I’m not a trained counsellor… because 
even though you're doing all this pros and cons and you're listening and you’re sharing your 
ideas, you have to remind them I'm just talking to you without any background training… 
 
R: Are these the people in the custody suite now or as a CPN? 
 
P3: As a CPN. The assessment process is such a different aspect of nursing… But I still 
think it's therapeutic in itself… 
 








R: I don't have, I’m not a trained counsellor… 
 
P3: I think you have to remind them… 
 
R: Why do you say that? 
 
P3: Because they'll turn up, because they'll ring, because they look to you for the answers, 
they expect you to have the answers, and I suppose you've been given this job or 
responsibility, or perceived responsibility… it’s you in the Coroners Courts so there is a 
responsibility there… It’s you whose writing notes about this person, directing the care… 
You know, it could be your letter of recommendation that gets the benefits or wipes the 




P3: Or something… so if they're coming to you, and you have to kind of remind them… of 
the boundaries within that role, so they'll take that as well, it’s good counsel to talk to you, 
but it's not… it’s not… therapeutic or a psychotherapy or a psychological approach you've 
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got this, is just between me and you, I'm just you know, your named nurse, I’m overseeing 
your care plan… And it becomes more than that! So, you have to keep reminding yourself 
maybe… (laughs) … 
 
R: So, how does it become more than that? What's happening there, in the ‘more than that’? 
 
P3: Yeah, it's, it’s because you've had to develop the therapeutic alliance with that person, 




P3: Yeah, so, they can trust you… so you can… emm… if they, if they don't get on with 
you and they think you don’t care, they’re not going to believe you when you talk to them 
and say, well, you really need to take that medication that’s making you fat or tired, or 
zonked out… or… they’ll just stop taking it… Whereas maybe if they trust you, they’ll go, 
‘I don't want to take this, and I’ll go, let’s look at something else.’ 
 
R: Yeah… How, how would you find that if someone, say, didn't want to take their 
medication? And because of that reason, say, it was zonking them out or making them 
really overweight or something… 
 
P3: Well, they’re the kind of questions I check… I ask, and it’s so hard for somebody to lie 








P3: So, it still… so, you're still maintaining your professionalism, aren’t you? You're still 
expecting an honesty. 
 
R: And what’s the link there with medicine and psychiatry, you know, because you're doing 
something about medication there, aren’t you? What's the relationship would you say 
between nursing and psychiatry there?  
 
P3: I think… I think for medication, and this is again a personal value, and I don't say this to 
people I work with, but I wonder how therapeutic a lot of medications are… just because I 




P3: Particularly anti-depressants… but the placebo effect of that is something… and I think 
it's something for psychiatry to hold on to when somebody's going, ‘it's not working, oh 
well, we’ll try something else or we’ll increase the dose,’ so that person walks away saying, 
‘ok you've done something practical’…  
 




P3: It gives psychiatry something… 
 
R: Something to do? 
 
P3: And to feel helpful because that’s their area… and has a nurse, ok, you've got all the 
talking, but the practical side of nursing is, I can fill out your benefit form for you, we can 
go for a coffee, we can get out of the house, I can get you a support worker, or I can refer 
you to therapy… but that's not enough for you… let's review your medication and let's talk 
in that medical way and then you feel like this is normal, what's going on, because maybe a 
tablet will help as well… 
 
R: You're doing a huge amount of things there, aren’t you? A lot of things you’re doing… 
and, and… … Sorry, was there anything you’d written there that you wanted to talk about? 
That you, that we haven't brought up… 
 
P3: No, no, I think we've kind of covered that really, saying about how it’s holistic, which is 




P3: I don’t know… 
 
R: When you say holistic, what do you mean, that it…? 
 
P3: Yeah, it's the medical side of it - there’s your illness -  and there’s the human side, 




P3: And then there’s the recovery… model… We’re talking models but you're trying to 
apply those structures to help you structure how you can work with that person…  
 
R: And if you have someone, say, someone you've got who's been moved from… CPA 
standard and they won't be having you anymore, say… What would that be like? 
 
P3: It's… it's really difficult to regrade somebody… you work closely with… and it's great 
when they’re really well and they’re really, really well, you know, ‘this is wonderful, I don't 
have to see you anymore, isn’t this great’… But 99% of the time they’re not happy about it 
because they’ve got very used to having you in their lives, even if it is once every two 
weeks… It's hard to reduce your visits never mind regrade somebody…  
 
R: Yeah. So, what might happen…  might… umm… yeah… So, would they ring you, say? 
Say they are regraded and they are on standard now and there are no arranged visits, will 
they come to see you? 
 








R: And what would you do?  
 
P3: Well, I’d just go and have a chat…  
 
R: So, you just went with it. 
 
P3: Yeah, I just went with it… There's no appointment made, ‘I'll come and see you again 
and let you know I'm getting on’ and things like that, you know… What can you do? That’s 
somebody who… who wants to tell you something, who truly thinks that you… well, you 
do… you truly do care that they’re okay and what’s going on…  so, it's ok… But there’s a 
lot of people who have been regraded who end up back on CPA… because they might have 
been stable for years and then they relapse… and is that because someone's not checking on 
the blister pack, you know, as part of an hour conversation checking their taking their 
medication, let's check how your mood is, not slipping too much, you can nip things in the 
bud without realising that you've done that… 
 
R: Or might it be because they're not getting the visits, you know… they’re not getting that 
one to one time you were talking about…? 
 
P3: Possibly, yeah… it’s something that's missing… 
 






R: Have you thought about stuff like that? How that might make someone unwell? 
 
P3: I think that's why there is a reluctance to regrade people. 
 
R: Ah right, so you have, it’s kind of automatic that you… 
 







P3: And it’s unwritten thing, you can't quantify that, you just know, don't you…? 
 




R: So, you must mean a lot to them, you must be doing a lot, you know? If you are thinking 






R: It's interesting that you said that you got no… um… You know, you didn't have any kind 
of training in your own training… about say, like, skills, say like, I don't know, CBT skills 
or anything like that, or person centred counselling skills… that you didn't have anything 
like that…  
 




P3: And it's weird because the more I'm doing my continued learning now, the more I 
realise, the more I think about… sort of… paternalistic and beneficence… and autonomy… 
you can see why that's applicable and it really is… you know, as a student nurse when 








P3: There was all these modules that we were doing… and you’re at placement, you’re 
doing 6 weeks and alongside that, okay, you've got an assignment that you just want to 
pass… 
 
R: right, yeah. 
 
P3: So, bits sink in, little bits, like you remember Maslow, and then you look at you care 
plan and go, ‘Oh that's from Maslow’… and you’re thinking…  
 
R: Hierarchy of needs 
 
P3: There’s your basics so you can see that's where your care plan’s coming in, and you do 
a session on risk, but then the rest you've got… to pad out yourself thinking about historic 
risk, all of those things… You get an underpinning theory… you can only equate that with 
experience into practice… and now when you're doing assessments with risky people… that 
one session’s not going to cut it… when you’re risk managing or risk formulating and… 
what you're writing down is actually… you could be telling a coroner, couldn't you… 
 
R: Yes, that's right… But… yeah…  
 
P3: Yeah, so things were touched on but they were only touched on… I mean we never had 
a session on what schizophrenia is, and what hallucinations were… in all my mental health 
training, there wasn’t any sessions at all on what mental illnesses were…  because you were 








R: Yeah, so did you just do that reading yourself? 
 
P3: Yeah  
 
R: Right… Where did you read?  
 
P3: Anywhere… and I’d use… I suppose using the placements is where a lot of the learning 
came because you’d get to see it… and then you’d read about it and you’d see it, and you 
then apply it, and then if you’re working with somebody with illnesses… you know… I feel 
confident now and it is with experience not with reading a book ,to know if someone's got 




P3: With experience… with experience, with seeing it, and being able to balance that 
against your knowledge and your experience… 
 
R: Going back to those 35 patients you started off with… They hadn't been seen in 8 
months… that was like the learning curve, wasn’t it?  
 
P3: Yeah… massive… 
 
R: And the thing about the TLC…. Has that been… is that still there? 
 
P3: Yeah, yeah. 
 
R: It's still there… But the expectation isn’t as… It sounds important… 
 
P3: Yeah… yeah 
 
R: I just get a sense that there’s more as well… I get a sense from talking to you that maybe 
there’s more about being therapeutic… um… that you somehow know… and it’s kind of… 
I don't know, do you make people feel safe? It's just something about making them feel… 
you said, ‘I've got your back’… and there was another one… something about, ‘I won't let 
you down’ or something… at the start… 
 
P3: You're not alone… 
 
R: Yeah… It’s quite a powerful thing to say… to actually say that to somebody, isn't it? It’s 
quite… 
 
P3: Yeah, but they’re not… and you, you actually say it, don’t you? ‘I know you’re going to 
be dealing with this but you’ve got somebody you can talk to you now, who’s going to 
share it with you, who’s going to try and make you feel better… 
 
R: And that's down to you personally, isn’t it? 
 




R: And you will pick up the phone… that’s what gets you stressed… 
 
P3: (laughs) But it's my stress they wouldn't know. 
 






P3: But you’re dealing with people risk, aren’t you?  
 
R: And that’s not coming from an ethics module you’ve done…? That’s coming from you, 
isn’t it? 
 
P3: Yeah,,, No, that has… Yeah, that’s coming from me…  
 
R: And also you’re awareness of risk, maybe? 
 
P3: Yeah. I think emm, I read, I read a… an article… I’ve got it somewhere, I’m going to 
have to dig it out for you… about people who are suicidal and a lot of suicide… could be 
prevented because… if that person knew that… they were held in mind, and it doesn't have 
to be family or friends… If you've got a therapeutic relationship with them and, and… the 
fact that they know you think of them can keep them… evidence-based… can keep 
somebody safe… 
 
R: That sounds really good… Is that an article? 
 
P3: Yes, it's an article…  
 
R: It makes sense. 
 
P3: So, that was powerful for me. 
 
R: When did you read that? 
 
P3: When I was in Manchester… one of the psychiatrists gave it to me. 
 
R: Is that when you first started working there? 
 
P3: Yeah… it was always so… It's always been there… If you bear somebody in mind, you 
know… your relationship just can be just as powerful if it can keep somebody safe from 
killing themselves… as much as… the family or the friends, well that must mean 
something. 
 
R: Yeah. And did that speak to you, that sounds like it spoke to you though, something that 
was already there… possibly?  
 




R: Ok… we’re coming to the end… Is there anything that you'd like to say? Anything that 
has crossed your mind, you know? No matter how weird or bizarre or odd…that, you know, 
about the therapeutic and mental health nursing, you know… Or maybe something I haven’t 
asked? How do you learn to be a mental health nurse? How would it be taught? How could 
someone teach you to get to where you are now? 
P3: I think it's because I mentor students… I spend a lot of time talking to them about all the 
textbook stuff, so. But I'm also passively just say… saying ‘show that you're interested’, 
you don't know learn that… You know, I've got students who are like this … (looks 
around)… you’re wondering ‘are you paying attention to this person’, you're in their house 
and they’re telling you things… show that you're interested… You know…so, it’s little 
things like that that you are trying to impart to somebody… so, that, that's nursing too… 
 
R: And when you show you’re interested, I get a sense you actually are interested. 
 
P3: Yeah…  
 
R: You’re not pretending you’re interested. 
 
P3: No. I'll be upset if that student’s not...  
 
R: Yeah… And the textbook stuff.... What’s that that you're teaching them? Is that risk? 
 
P3: Risk, care planning, medication, depots, all that… all the bread and butter stuff…  
 
R: How to do those things? 
 
P3: Yeah and then it's actually… that you can't read in a book… you’re going to knock on 
that person’s door and go and sit in their house and talk to them now… and you’ll quite 
easily fill an hour just by letting them talk and having a conversation with them… and 
humour… I use humour a lot. 
 
R: Yes, you do… you laugh a lot…  
 
P3: Yeah… I always make a joke… and I get a laugh out of them… 
 
R: Will you? 
 
P3: Try and keep it so it’s… 
 
R: What does that do? 
 
P3: I think it's friendly… it’s familiar, isn't it? So, you’re not bringing it – ‘Yes, I'm 
listening to you’ - it's just, it's breaking the barriers down. 
 
R: Yeah. So, it's like a friendliness… and ordinary kind of friendliness…? 
 




R: It sounds difficult to teach, doesn't it? How would you teach that? In a way, I suppose 
through the practice… What you say to your… the students you’re mentoring, you’d say, 
like ‘show that you’re interested’. 
 
P3: Yeah. You could teach by showing, yeah, by example. You want to be a good example, 
don’t you? Because they’re looking to you like rabbits in the headlights… Am I going to be 
able to do this? And I suppose it's reassurance that you are just talking to another human 
being, don't be scared, just get to know them, and get them to feel comfortable with you, 
and the rest will come… Wing it! 
 
R: Wing it! Wing it I suppose means taking a risk, does it? Kind of like, wing it… what? 
 
P3: I think it's just the perennial ‘am I still really a nurse’ - just winging the job every day, 
so I’ve got so much to learn, still trying to be, you know, do the job as best as you can… 




P3: I'm learning from other nurses all the time… I’m listening to how they talk to people… 
looking at their notes and how they write things… and you know, ‘Oh, I like that’ and I lock 
that in, and it’s something else for me… so I'm constantly learning… 
 
P3: Yeah…ok… Well, thank you very much… and I'm very grateful for the interview… 







P3 Transformed Meaning Units 
 
TMU1: lines 1-32 
P3 has been qualified for 6 years and has worked 
only in community mental health nursing. In her 
first job, she was given a caseload of 35 who all 
needed new care plans and had not been seen 
for 8 months. She based her work on what she 
had learned in placements in her training. It is 
implicit that a therapeutic alliance or rapport is 
developed with each patient but there was no 
formal training given for this in university.  
 
TMU2: lines 33-55 
Her patients were all on the Care Program 
Approach who had serious mental illnesses and 
felt abandoned because services had not been in 
touch. Mental health services had an 18-month 
waiting list just for assessments.  
 
TMU3: lines 56-91 
At first, P3 thought she was going to cure her 
patients through tender loving care, and through 
helping them manage their illness and 
associated problems. But she sees this hope of 
curing them as naïve now. She began to feel 
helpless and sometimes depressed that there 
were so many people asking her to talk with 
them, sharing their problems with her. She felt 
she had to be available for each person as she 
was often the only person in their world who 
actually cared enough to sit and listen to them. 
She did not want to feel she was letting them 
down by not being available and she thought of 
this as counter-transference. She feels she is put 
on a pedestal by her patients, as their 
Community Psychiatric Nurse, and her anxiety is 
about wanting to do her job properly for them 




P3 can feel sad and helpless because people are not cured, including 
by tender loving care. They still want time with her nevertheless and 
she can instil realistic hope (TMU2, TMU3, TMU5, TMU11, TMU18, 
TM20, TMU35, TMU38) 
 
Th2 
Because of her role, she feels she must not disappoint anyone who 
relies on her, and she commits herself to them so they know she 
keeps them in mind (TMU3, TMU4, TMU7, TMU44, TMU45, TMU46) 
 
Th3 
She is not emotionally involved with patients although she feels 
wanted and needed (TMU3, TMU17) 
 
Th3i She appears emotionally involved, either through the personal 
importance of being a professional nurse, and/or a personal sense 
that no-one should be abandoned (TMU2, TMU3, TMU17) 
 
Th4 
High caseloads create imbalance between required documentation 




She works using what she has learned from practice and she teaches 





and to be helpful. She does not think she is 
emotionally involved with her patients.  
 
TMU4: lines 92-104 
Patients have power over her because they rely 
on her and she feels she has to respond to them.  
 
TMU5: lines 105-132 
P3 used to think that the Crisis Team were not 
therapeutic because they spent so little time 
with a patient. The role of the Crisis Team was to 
assess and move on, and she thought that they 
did not feel a responsibility towards the patient. 
As a result, she was determined to give her 
patients more time and tender loving care as she 
felt this would make them better. She believes 
now that this was absolutely naïve of her.  
 
TMU6: lines 133-148 
She feels that to have the personal value of 
caring is therapeutic. She sees this caring as 
treating people the way she would like to be 








TMU7: lines 149-189 
When P3 first meets a patient, she tells them 
what she can offer them, explaining her role and 
that of the community mental health team. She 
makes unsaid promises to the patient. She 
explains that the patient is not alone now, that 
she will be there for the patient until things 
settle down, someone the patient can call on. 
She knows she is making commitments to the 
person that she will keep.  
Th6 
Developing a therapeutic alliance is expected but no training was 
given on this in university. She learns from the person as an equal by 
being open to them, using humour and being friendly (TMU1, 
TMU15, TMU18, TMU34, TMU49, TMU50) 
 
Th7 
Responsibility involves overseeing medication, referring to others, 
and documenting risk, as well as spending time with a patient (TMU5, 
TMU13, TMU15, MU16, TMU26, TMU34, TMU36) 
 
Th8 
Treating others how she would like to be treated is itself caring as 
therapeutic, but it might be too personal (TMU6) 
 
Th8i 
It is therapeutic to not identify too much with someone (TMU6i) 
 
Th9 
P3 feels a responsibility to the other person and gives too much, as 
she may be for that person an only friend, a best friend, confidante 
and sounding board (TMU8, TMU13, TMU17, TMU38) 
 
Th10 
Nurses listen. Actively listening and the person speaking with trust is 





She does not show that it is tiring to be non-directive and available, 





TMU8: lines 190-211 
As a student nurse, a qualified nurse advised her 
not to give too much, as what is given cannot be 
taken back; that it was better to encourage the 
patient to do things for themselves and this is 
the Recovery Model of care. But P3 finds she 
gives too much because she feels responsibility 
for the other person. She can take responsibility 
for a broad range of problems, from filling in 
forms to talking about relationship breakdowns.  
 
TMU9: lines 212-244 
Through active listening it is like she is stroking 
the patient’s hand. She is also guiding them to a 
realisation of some kind as well as listening. She 
says she has never told a person what to do.  
 
TMU9i: P3 feels she is guiding the person to 
some realisation but is not sure how.  
 
TMU10: lines 245-259 
P3 wants to tell the person what she thinks and 
to advise them, but she feels as a professional it 
is her role to allow them to make their own 
decisions. She encourages them to look at the 
pros and cons of potential decisions. This can be 
very frustrating and tiring, especially if it has 
been this way for years with some people.  
 
TMU11: lines 260-278 
P3 believes that she is not curing anybody, and 
that she is just helping people get through their 
lives. She finds herself repeating stock phrases to 
patients, that life is hard and this is the human 
condition, when they say life is too difficult for 
them, in order to show solidarity. Severe and 
enduring mental illness can make it more 
difficult for some patients.  
 
TMU12: lines 279-314 
Th12 




She becomes part of a person’s life in a close, personal way, and she 
enjoys this aspect as it is therapeutic (TMU12, TMU14) 
 
Th14 
Part of her role is to transfer received advice and guidelines about 
illnesses to patients (TMU12,  
 
Th15 
She involves colleagues in the person’s care, also to feel less alone 
and learn (TMU15, TMU50) 
 
Th16 
Talking and being with patients is like a prescription of humanity in a 




There is a tension between intimate trust and professional 
assessment, which affects her emotionally (TMU19, TMU20, TMU33)  
 
Th18 
She feels privileged that people confide in her because she is a nurse 
(TMU23, TMU24, TMU25, TMU29, TMU32)  
 
Th19 





When P3 first qualified, she kept her work close 
to what she had learned in training, following 
NICE guidelines, and giving practical advice 
about symptoms, including educating the person 
about their illness, recognising individual 
symptoms and relapse signs. During this process, 
she comes to know the patient on a personal 
level, knowing the family, and pets, and she 
becomes part of their life.  
 
TMU13: lines 315-357 
P3 sees it as a privilege to become such a central 
part of someone’s life. Some patients treat it as 
part of a professional role, but for others P3 is 
their only friend. Being an only friend is a 
responsibility, because it means being available 




TMU14: lines 358-388 
P3 intentionally builds a close relationship, or 
therapeutic alliance, so that the person can trust 
her and rely on her. She views this as part of her 
role, while also believing in its value personally, 
as it facilitates independence, recovery and 
wellness. She became a nurse, and not a social 
worker, because mental health nursing has the 
element of becoming part of the person’s life as 
opposed to paperwork.  
 
TMU15: lines 389-410 
In response to a question about qualities needed 
to be a mental health nurse, P3 indicates a 
readiness to adapt and learn, in the term ‘wing 
it.’ P3 never knows what is going to happen each 
day. She has a set of strategies, or toolbox, 
comprising the crisis team, emergency doctor’s 
appointment, a professionals’ meeting, or a 
referral to psychology. Involving others helps her 
feel less alone with the patient’s problems, and 
can help the patient build strategies also.  




She values formal training (TMU31, TMU33)  
 
Th22 
She explains her role to patients to delimit expectations as she is 
anxious they expect so much (TMU33) 
 
Th23 
She is unsure about the efficacy of medication (TMU35) 
 
Th24 
Psychiatry is not always only the medical model, although prescribing 
medication can make psychiatrists feel effective (TMU35, TMU46) 
 
Th25 
Reducing time with the patient increases relapse rate (TMU39) 
 
Th26 
Ethical ideas show themselves with experience (TMU40) 
 
Th27 
Models of care can structure planning and relieve anxiety about 
explaining her practice to authority (TMU38, TMU41) 
Th28 
Her training had no modules on mental illness. She read about it 






TMU16: lines 411-461 
Being a community psychiatric nurse is more 
than just overseeing medication and risk. If it 
were not, then paperwork would always be up-
to-date and nurses would not be so busy. Talking 
to the person, giving them time, is like a 
prescription of humanity in a medicalised 
environment. By visiting patients personally, P3 
means to show them that she does not just see 
them as a psychiatric diagnosis.  
 
TMU17: lines 462-482 
P3 treats her patients as equals. P3 feels she is a 
sounding board, a best friend and confidante to 
her patients. It is a thankless job because it is 
expected that she is this way. The feedback she 
gets is that she feels wanted and needed. 
Patients always say they feel better after talking 
to her. P3 believes it is cathartic for them.  
 
TMU18: lines 483-535 
P3 says she is a hardened optimist, and does not 
take it personally if her patients seem to 
improve after an hour with them and then they 
return to where they started. She has got used 
to patients phoning her with the same problems 
that had seemed to be resolved. She tries to get 
people to feel better again, through motivating 
them and encouraging them to see that 
situations are not hopeless, and she believes this 
is why they contact her.  
 
TMU19: lines 536-562 
There is a conflict in P3’s role as, despite building 
trust, she may have to ask for a Mental Health 
Act assessment if the patient becomes too 
unwell. She feels close to her patients in a 
strange way. There is an understanding they 
would not go for coffee together if they met in 
the street. At the same time, patients and P3 can 
be personally close because the patient may 
have shared distressing personal details of 
She gauges a student’s suitability based on genuine interest in the 
patient (TMU 47) 
 
Th30 
Important topics to know are care planning, risk, medications and 
















his/her life with her, such as sexual abuse, 





TMU20: lines 563-622 
When patients share distressing personal details, 
it makes her feel sad. She can feel helpless when 
someone’s problems never seem to change. She 
does not want give false hope and the patient 
with a good therapeutic rapport will know she 
cannot make the problems go away. She stays 
with the patient, offering understanding and 
accompaniment, and being there for them.  
 
TMU21: lines 623-699 
With big caseloads, P3 can compromise on her 
paperwork and training time in order to see 
people. She feels they deserve the best service 
possible and she will rarely say she is too busy to 
see someone. She does not want to let anyone 
down. She can also try to see too many people, 
causing her stress which she feels as a knot in 
her stomach. Seeing a lot of clients, she may 
start to give each person only 60% attention and 
is over-aware of time. She makes a list of 
promises she makes to each patient and fulfils 
these.  
 
TMU22: lines 700-726 
Sometimes she is not too busy and she can get 
all her paperwork done. But it just takes a few 
people in crisis to fall behind again.  
 
TMU23: lines 727-743 
While working in psychiatric assessment 
services, she had time to formulate plans and 
make the appropriate referrals, and updating 
notes. When people who are awaiting trial 
realise she is a mental health nurse, they speak 
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differently to her than they would to a social 
worker or police officer.  
 
TMU24: lines 744-774 
Some of these people on remand do not want to 
talk in her assessments, but most of them want 
to talk because she is a nurse. Most of them are 
males and have been sexually abused. It is the 
first time they may have spoken about it to 
anyone. They speak to her because she is a 
nurse.  
 
TMU25: lines 775-805 
It is therapeutic to do an assessment because it 
may be the first time someone has spoken about 
really personal things. Listening is therapeutic. 
Being a nurse gives her the privilege of someone 
confiding in her.   
 
TMU26: lines 806-825 
She is affected by assessing distressed people so 
that she wants to help them. She begins to care 
coordinate and put a plan in place if the person 
is not going to prison. She hopes to be able to 
make some promises to people about how she 
can help, such as arranging appointments and 
allocating a support worker.  
 
TMU27: lines 826-845 
P3 has not had any training on how to listen, and 
has learned from her life how to listen. In her 
opinion this is what nurses do. She sees the time 




TMU28: lines 846-865 
A lot of nurses are caring and compassionate and 




TMU29: lines 866-881 
People confided in P3 rather than a solicitor or 
police officer. 
 
TMU30: lines 882-893 
P3 had written notes for the interview but was 
unprepared for the interview being about her. 
 
TMU31: lines 894-908 
P3 has not been on any training courses 
regarding therapies, and she tells her patients 
that she is not a trained counsellor.  
 
TMU32: lines 909-917 
An assessment is an aspect of mental health 
nursing and is therapeutic in itself. 
 
TMU33: lines 918-942 
P3 reminds her patients that she is not a trained 
therapist, that she is a nurse and care 
coordinator and what the boundaries of her role 
are. She is anxious that what she writes in notes, 
and what plans she makes, she may have to 
explain to a coroner’s court. Yet she sees that 
being a mental health nurse with her patients 
becomes more than an overseer of a care plan.  
 
TMU34: lines 943-971 
In order to work with patients, she has to 
develop a therapeutic alliance and be honest 
with them. This will encourage them to be more 
open with her and tell her about concerns 
regarding medication. She also expects honesty 
but will check medication to see that it has been 
taken.  
 
TMU35: lines 972-994 
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P3 personally wonders whether a lot of 
medication is effective because she sees it does 
not work for many people, especially regarding 
anti-depressants. She is unsure about how much 
is placebo effect. She thinks medication gives 
psychiatrists something to hold on to that is 
practical.  
 
TMU36: lines 995-1008 
Mental health nursing is holistic. Apart from 
talking to the patient, filling out forms, getting 
out of the house and going for a coffee, a mental 
health nurse also has to talk in a medical way, 
reviewing medication, normalising taking 
medication, because that might be helpful also.  
 
 
TMU37: lines 1009-1024 
Mental health nursing is holistic because it 
addresses the medical and the human, which the 
care plan approach encompasses. This includes 
the recovery model. These models and ideas 
help P3 structure how she works with the 
person.  
 
TMU38: lines 1025-1050 
It is difficult to change the level of care given, to 
take someone off Care Program Approach level, 
because people get used to having P3 in their 
lives. It is difficult to reduce visits also even if 
they remain on Care Program Approach level. 
One woman continued to come to see P3 to 
have a chat, to update her on her life, because 
she felt P3 really cared about her.  
 
TMU39: lines 1051-1089 
A lot of people who are regraded have a relapse, 
despite having been stable for years, and have to 
return to Care Program Approach level after a 
while. P3 wonders whether this is because 
nobody has been checking that they take their 
medication and their mood has changed. She is 
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unsure whether it is due to the absence of a care 
coordinator. There is a reluctance to regrade 
people because of the risk of relapse.  
 
TMU40: lines 1090-1110 
There were no modules on therapeutic skills in 
university, although there was a helpful module 
on ethics. She relates better now to the content 
of this module after being in practice for some 
years, especially to paternalism, beneficence and 
autonomy.  
 
TMU41: lines 1111-1129 
Some ideas from university made sense in 
practice, for example, Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs. But the module on risk was not enough. 
In practice, managing and formulating risk 
depends on historic risks, and personal 
judgement that she might have to explain to a 
coroner.  
 
TMU42: lines 1130-1145 
In university, she never had a session or module 
on what schizophrenia, hallucinations and 
mental illnesses were. It was expected that they 
would read about this themselves. Some specific 
topics were public health, ethics, and physical 
health.  
 
TMU43: lines 1146-1155 
She read about mental illnesses from any 
sources she could. In placements P3 got to see 
mental illness and in time came to be confident, 
for example, in distinguishing adjustment 
disorder and depression.  
 
TMU44: lines 1156-1193 
P3 can become stressed by committing to being 
there for a person but she does not allow her 





TMU45: lines 1194-1221 
P3 was strongly influenced by an evidence-based 
article she read that said if a person is suicidal 
and knows they are being kept in mind by 
someone in a therapeutic relationship that it 
lowers the risk of that person committing 
suicide.  
 
TMU46: lines 1222-1237 
A psychiatrist gave her the article on keeping 
someone in mind. It means a lot to P3 that the 
therapeutic relationship can be just as powerful 
as that of family and friends. 
 
TMU47: lines 1238-1256 
P3 is a mentor to students and spends a lot of 
time talking about textbook topics. However, it is 
important that students are interested in their 
patients and this cannot be learned. P3 tries to 
impart to students that they need to show an 
interest in their patients. P3 does not pretend 
she is interested, as she actually is interested, 
but she will be upset if her student actually is not 
interested.  
 
TMU48: lines 1257-1263 
Textbook topics include risk, care planning, 
medication and depo injections.  
 
TMU49: lines 1264-1284 
P3 also shows the practice of going to someone’s 
house, talking to the person and having a 
conversation, letting the person talk. An hour 
can quite easily pass this way. She also uses 
humour and friendliness, to break barriers down 
and become familiar in an ordinary way.  
 
TMU50: lines 1285-1309 
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P3 teaches her students by showing them and 
leading by example. Students can be frightened 
and anxious when meeting patients. When they 
visit patients, P3 shows that they are just talking 
to another human being and encourages the 
students not to be scared and to feel 
comfortable. She encourages them to be open to 
learning from the situation, just as she is open to 
learning every day. P3 learns from other nurses 
all the time, how they talk to people, write 









P3 General/Situated structures or Themes 
 
Th1 
P3 can feel sad and helpless because people are not cured, 
including by tender loving care. They still want time with her 
nevertheless and she can instil realistic hope (TMU2, TMU3, 
TMU5, TMU11, TMU18, TM20, TMU35, TMU38) 
 
Th2 
Because of her role, she feels she must not disappoint anyone 
who relies on her, and she commits herself to them so they know 




She is not emotionally involved with patients although she feels 
wanted and needed (TMU3, TMU17) 
 
Th3i She appears emotionally involved, either through the 
personal importance of being a professional nurse, and/or a 




High caseloads create imbalance between required 
documentation and time with patients, causing her physical 
distress (TMU20, TMU21, TMU22) 
 
Th5 
She works using what she has learned from practice and she 
teaches students by showing (TMU1, TMU2, TMU31, TMU49)  
 
Th6 
Developing a therapeutic alliance is expected but no training was 
given on this in university. She learns from the person as an equal 
P3 General synthesis 
 
Spending prolonged time with people is 
therapeutic because she becomes 
personally involved, genuinely listens and is 
interested, feels for, is open to, and learns 
from, the other as an equal, and is cautious 
about identifying herself with the other or 
giving advice. She shows understanding 
and makes her commitment to the person 
explicit. Being able to feel and tolerate 
emotional distress is part of being 
therapeutic.  
 
She has learned from being open to 
patients and colleagues, and her own 
reading. No formal training was offered in 
university on how to be therapeutic 
outside the medical model of cure. Being 
caring and compassionate cannot be 
taught, and are more like personal 
qualities.  
 
Her work is split between applying models 
of care to do with risk management and 
the medical cure (encouraging compliance 
with medication, the recovery model and 
the Care Program Approach, and NICE 
guidelines), and spending time with 
patients, which is like a ‘prescription of 




by being open to them, using humour and being friendly (TMU1, 
TMU15, TMU18, TMU34, TMU49, TMU50) 
 
Th7 
Responsibility involves overseeing medication, referring to others, 
and documenting risk, as well as spending time with a patient 
(TMU5, TMU13, TMU15, MU16, TMU26, TMU34, TMU36) 
 
Th8 
Treating others how she would like to be treated is itself caring as 
therapeutic, but it might be too personal (TMU6) 
 
Th8i 
It is therapeutic to not identify too much with someone (TMU6i) 
 
Th9 
P3 feels a responsibility to the other person and gives too much, 
as she may be for that person an only friend, a best friend, 
confidante and sounding board (TMU8, TMU13, TMU17, TMU38) 
 
Th10 
Nurses listen. Actively listening and the person speaking with 
trust is therapeutic somehow (TMU9, TMU17, TMU25, TMU27) 
 
Th11 
She does not show that it is tiring to be non-directive and 








She becomes part of a person’s life in a close, personal way, and 
she enjoys this aspect as it is therapeutic (TMU12, TMU14) 
distress as she feels responsible across 










Part of her role is to transfer received advice and guidelines about 
illnesses to patients (TMU12)  
 
Th15 
She involves colleagues in the person’s care, also to feel less 
alone and learn (TMU15, TMU50) 
 
Th16 
Talking and being with patients is like a prescription of humanity 




There is a tension between intimate trust and professional 




She feels privileged that people confide in her because she is a 
nurse (TMU23, TMU24, TMU25, TMU29, TMU32)  
 
Th19 
A lot of nurses are caring and compassionate (TMU28) 
 
Th20i 




She values formal training (TMU31, TMU33)  
 
Th22 
She explains her role to patients to delimit expectations as she is 





She is unsure about the efficacy of medication (TMU35) 
 
Th24 
Psychiatry is not always only the medical model, although 




Reducing time with the patient increases relapse rate (TMU39) 
 
Th26 
Ethical ideas show themselves with experience (TMU40) 
 
Th27 
Models of care can structure planning and relieve anxiety about 
explaining her practice to authority (TMU38, TMU41) 
Th28 
Her training had no modules on mental illness. She read about it 




She gauges a student’s suitability based on genuine interest in the 
patient (TMU 47) 
 
Th30 
Important topics to know are care planning, risk, medications and 













Appendix 4 Individual syntheses and General Synthesis 
 
P10 General Synthesis 
Administrative work, such as risk assessments, and medical work, prevents her having therapeutic time 
with patients. Medication helps people get better. Nurses are like a communication channel between 
patients and doctors, and have a more holistic view. The therapeutic is different for different people, 
and getting to know someone in a relationship is important to it. She will try out different ways with 
others, and may be gentle or assertive. She feels that getting a person to speak about what is hidden 
about their problem is therapeutic. She wants a person to get better, and tries to prevent them from 
having disturbing feelings. It is frustrating when they will not talk about their underlying problems 
because it prevents her helping them to get better. Listening is important. Empathy, meaning 
understanding someone to an extent, is central to being therapeutic, and it cannot be taught from books. 
Empathy is learned from life experiences, including feeling depressed, and she can feel that her 
experience is really the same as that of another person. Compassion is a therapeutic quality which is 
like feeling sorry for someone. Like her own experience, it is therapeutic for the person to feel 
understood, listened to, and cared about. Being clear and honest with someone is therapeutic. She has 
learned about being therapeutic with others through observing other nurses. She believes she has a 
calling from God to be a mental health nurse, which gives her confidence, and she may pray with 
Christian patients. Having some cognitive behavioural therapy herself has helped her be therapeutic. 
P9 General synthesis 
Mental health nursing is split into two main activities, concerned with interacting with patients, and 
administrative and medical duties. Talking with, and listening, is the main therapeutic activity of 
mental health nurses, but does not take priority over administrative duties. Talking is like a 
conversation and can be serious or more informally friendly like a chat. She is responsive in the 
conversation, placing the discerned needs of the patient first, making space for the patient to speak. She 
is open to learning from the patient, revising her suggestions and ideas, sensitive to what she may be 
missing, and getting it wrong. She may speak for the patient if necessary. Medication is therapeutic in a 
different way to talking. The nurse’s uniform is a barrier to therapeutic communication. She is not sure 
how she has learned to listen. She has always been caring since she was a child. Confidence is 
important and she has grown in confidence through university and practice. She wanted to be a doctor 
or psychologist. Learning has been from practice, through trial and error. In university, communication 
skills, and treating the person as an individual was encouraged. Her work sometimes involves exposure 
to extreme distress and she relies on colleagues and others in this case to be therapeutic to her. She 
does not think about what is therapeutic much.  
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P8 General Synthesis 
Mental health nursing is divided into a dominant administrative and medical aspect, and a minor 
therapeutic aspect. Medication is an essential aspect of getting better. The therapeutic aspect is difficult 
to express, although is real mental health nursing, involving spending time getting to know patients in 
an idiosyncratic relationship. University learning is about administrative and medical proficiencies 
rather than the therapeutic. Learning to be therapeutic is about practice and watching others. Factors 
which are therapeutic are genuine empathy, which is fully understanding someone, encouraging insight 
and hope. Helping the person identify themselves and their problems is therapeutic, not defining 
themselves through the diagnosis but as a person. A mental health nurse needs to be caring to be 
therapeutic, and this cannot be taught. Caring is looking after, supporting, nurturing, and has to do with 
one’s nature, perhaps linked to life experiences, including being depressed. The therapeutic being a 
minor aspect is ‘soul-destroying’, as the therapeutic gives him a sense of accomplishment and meaning, 
linked to his spirituality. 
P7 General Synthesis 
Being therapeutic is what mental health nursing in itself is, and takes time, getting to know a person as 
an equal, involving trust, genuineness, and complex, sometimes tacit, creative decision-making 
regarding self-disclosure, guidance, and speaking the truth, while respecting the person’s wishes and 
difference. The therapeutic is reciprocal as she receives something from patients since they make her 
feel alive, and privileged. Being therapeutic requires qualities that are innate, including compassion, 
which are perhaps learned from others as a child. She tries to make people happy and selectively 
withholds emotions. She learns from colleagues. In her training, there was focus on psychosocial 
interventions but not on personal qualities. The administrative and medical aspects of nursing, such as 
documenting risk, and managing Lithium, Clozapine and depo clinics is not therapeutic. The medical 
and administrative aspects of nursing are demanding and draining, not the therapeutic nursing aspects. 
However, the medical model of recovery is therapeutic when followed idiosyncratically. Tacit 
knowledge informs therapeutic decision-making.  
P6 General Synthesis 
The therapeutic in mental health nursing is about doing the right thing but is hard to define. It involves 
having the time to spend with others, treating others well, being genuine, respectful and reliable. It 
develops in an inclusive environment of interacting responsively, playfully, imaginatively and flexibly. 
Promoting independence, trust and resilience is therapeutic. Being a Community Psychiatric Nurse is 
repetitive. The 6 C’s are what nursing is really about. Risk management takes precedence over 
therapeutic work. His focus in practice is on the medical model, promoting recovery and the 
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therapeutic as cure. Practical training in managing critical situations helped him more than humanistic 
skills. Perhaps being in dependent relationships is difficult for him. 
P5 General Synthesis 
The therapeutic is about caring, which has nothing to do with skills. It involves being with the patient 
over time, interacting in an ordinary way, while being inclusive and respectful, which allows them to 
trust, be open, and to speak. Something in the relationship itself is healing, which may be idiosyncratic, 
sometimes linked to social isolation. She is an advocate for people who are not heard. The mental 
health nurse must genuinely want to be caring, compassionate, empathic, and genuinely want to listen 
and be actively interested even though sometimes clients are emotionally draining. These are personal 
capacities, acquired through life experience, including childhood, and practice rather than taught 
courses. Care coordinating duties, the medical model, and the recovery model, reduce therapeutic time 
and erode caring from mental health nursing. Medication may provide the stability for the therapeutic 
to take place.  
P4 General Synthesis 
The relationship with the mental health nurse is therapeutic. It takes time to build this relationship as it 
involves demonstrating a self-contained genuine interest, respect, trust, positive regard and being 
attentive. Those with mental illness require this relationship over time rather than a focus on cognitive 
techniques. Getting to know a person is often interlinked with administrative, medical and everyday 
practicalities, and may include family. She prefers an individual rather than general approach to each 
person. Being caring, compassionate and enabling is therapeutic. She does not share her own 
difficulties with patients. Mental health nursing can be emotionally and physically draining. Training in 
humanistic and behavioural psychological approaches has encouraged her to teach skills and coping 
strategies. She has learned to be therapeutic through the trial and error of practice. She makes 
therapeutic decisions based on the relationship and the moment. Being reflectively open, linked with 
being open to learning from the patient, and colleagues, is essential to being therapeutic. Being open 
was facilitated by years of working in a reflective, structured therapeutic environment where she felt 
valued. Being challenging is therapeutic and takes courage and tact. The 6 C’s are a fitting summary of 
what it takes to be a good nurse. Nurses may be damaged in some way to do their work. Nursing 
knowledge is side-lined because doctors are better educated.  
P3 General synthesis 
Spending prolonged time with people is therapeutic because she becomes personally involved, 
genuinely listens and is interested, feels for, is open to, and learns from, the other as an equal, and is 
cautious about identifying herself with the other or giving advice. She shows understanding and makes 
her commitment to the person explicit. Being able to feel and tolerate emotional distress is part of 
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being therapeutic. She has learned from being open to patients and colleagues, and her own reading. No 
formal training was offered in university on how to be therapeutic outside the medical model of cure. 
Being caring and compassionate cannot be taught, and are more like personal qualities. Her work is 
split between applying models of care to do with risk management and the medical cure (encouraging 
compliance with medication, the recovery model and the Care Program Approach, and NICE 
guidelines), and spending time with patients, which is like a ‘prescription of humanity’. The split in her 
work causes her distress as she feels responsible across both aspects.  
P2 General Synthesis 
Being therapeutic is about getting to know a person, spending time, listening, talking, being playful and 
genuine. This involves patience, trust, mutual acceptance and affection, and respecting a person’s 
dignity. But being caring is not enough sometimes to be therapeutic. Acknowledging individuality is 
therapeutic. Treating a person like someone she loved is therapeutic. Learning to be therapeutic came 
through observing others, and being open to others, including patients. Some skills could be learned 
through educational modules, while therapeutic qualities could not and are linked to childhood. 
Administrative and medical duties can be a vehicle for being therapeutic.  
 
P1 General synthesis 
Being therapeutic involves something of the self, acknowledging the other as an individual with unique 
characteristics, and encouraging the person to develop skills and competencies that have been stunted 
in childhood. Empathy is accepting that the other person is different. Transparency is encouraged by 
checking what is helpful with the other person. Changing current anxieties is part of being therapeutic, 
through creative ideas of her own and behavioural principles. Sharing sensory experiences is 
therapeutic, including using touch, because it builds trust and facilitates talking about difficulties and 
cathartic expression of feelings. Skills learned from training courses are helpful in engaging others in 
order to become therapeutic. One can care, as it is a formal approach, without being therapeutic. She 
learned about being therapeutic from mentors and other nurses on placements. Competencies are innate 
rather than learned or taught. Adverse childhood experiences have given her the competencies of 
resilience and being able to challenge others. Practising therapeutically, she feels independent of 
psychiatry, but medically she is not as she administers medication and checks compliance. 
Representing the person, and educating them about mental illness, encourages a therapeutic rapport. 
University training did not encourage critical or original thinking, which resulted in her reading around 
her subject a lot to teach herself.  
 




Mental health nurses work in two separate, sometimes closely intertwined strands, one dominant, involving 
administrative and medical duties, the other involving being with clients. The forum for the therapeutic 
activity of mental nursing to take place is any opportunity of being with clients, and this can be practised as 
they wish. However, the vital importance of time spent with the person means that administrative and medical 
duties undermine such activity. Medication can provide the stability for therapeutic activity, and can also be 
curative at times through removing distressing symptoms. Administrative and medical pressures support a 
model of recovery that minimises therapeutic time spent with mental health nurses. Mental health nursing 
therapeutic knowledge may be side-lined because doctors have a better education. There is an absence of a 
cohering knowledge base for therapeutic mental health nursing outside of psychiatric care, with little mention 
of the 6 C’s (care, compassion, competence, communication, courage, commitment).  
 
Mental health nurses regard being with clients as their main therapeutic activity. Being with clients with 
mental health problems involves spending time with, talking with, listening to, and getting to know, a person, 
crucially, over time. For some participants, being with clients is mental health nursing in itself. Something 
about being personally involved in the relationship itself is healing, perhaps idiosyncratically, involving tact, 
affection and inclusiveness, which may facilitate the client in speaking and being open. The relationship can 
encourage development that has been stunted in childhood, sometimes through developing transparency 
between the nurse and the patient, and allowing cathartic expression of feelings. What is therapeutic is hard to 
define for some and caring is not enough. For some nurses, being therapeutic is mainly about caring, which 
has little to do with skills. However, for one participant, caring may not be therapeutic as it can just be a duty, 
for example, in following the 6 C’s. Being therapeutic can involve complex decision-making, linked to the 
moment and the relationship. Being therapeutic can be about being creative, playful, and sharing parts of one’s 
life, and may be reciprocal. It can involve ordinariness, sharing activities and touch. Spiritual beliefs may 
motivate and inform therapeutic interactions.  
 
Characteristics required in being therapeutic are innate, personal capacities, or have been developed through 
life experience, including in childhood. These characteristics are to do with being enabling for the other 
person, and showing genuineness, respectfulness, reliability, and responsiveness, as well as being reflective, 
accepting, caring, compassionate, attentive and empathic. Other characteristics the mental health nurse may 
have, or need to develop, are resilience, self-containment, openness to learning from the other person and self-
confidence. Sometimes, an explicit commitment is made to the person to ‘be there’ for them. Equality and 
individuality are sometimes recognised. Some mental health nurses are cautious about empathy and giving 
advice. Empathy can be acknowledging that the other person is different. Personal experience of going 
through one’s own mental health problems may enable empathy as understanding, at least to some extent, and 
sometimes fully. Being able to tolerate in others, and feel in oneself, physical and emotional distress, is part of 




Learning has been mainly through life experience and practice, including observing other mental health 
nurses, trial and error, and reading about specific topics. What encourages learning to be therapeutic is a safe, 
self-reflective environment of therapeutic reciprocity with colleagues. Learning involves being open to others, 
including patients.   
  
Regarding taught aspects of training, both humanistic, and behavioural, therapeutic approaches have been 
helpful to teach skills. Taught skills require being therapeutic in the first instance to be helpful. Humanistic 
therapeutic approaches may not be helpful on some acute wards however, due to the chaotic environment. In 
training, skills taught through experiential course work are more important for being therapeutic than 





Appendix 5 Examples of the creative process in the phenomenology 
Meanings emerge implicitly, as well as in sharp focus, and the following outline will 
try to give a sense of this changing landscape. It seemed important to write here about some 
things rather than others and the reasons for this seem impossible to find. Not everything 
could be written about due to space and time. The following is a presentation of a 
phenomenology for each participant, in no particular order apart from the first one whose 
considerations set the scene. 
Participant 6 
What invoked an old feeling of abjection was the interminable language and power of 
psychiatry which was overwhelmingly present throughout. This seemed to have most force 
with Participant 6, who will be presented first. He seemed to show the choice that every 
mental health nurse had to make, as to whether to submit to the ideas of psychiatry or to leave 
that career. He chose the former. He had found a certain recognition of his intellect (talking 
about a lecturer, “probably a bit like me, he knew everything” (Line 695)), in finally 
embracing the medical paradigm which he may as well “buy into” (Line 722). He was fearful 
that his promotion to the equivalent of a junior doctor might make him aloof, yet this seemed 
to fit with how he was anxious about dependency in relationships. He had learned from 
experience in mental health settings “to not let people become too dependent” (Line 70). 
“Risk management trumps everything else” (Line 17), so that there was “no time to work in 
a meaningful therapeutic manner” (Line 136), by which he meant having time to talk to people 
in a Rogerian way. But it seemed also that neither would he take a meaningful risk for 
somebody else. He whispered that he worked in a more “holistic” way than the other doctors 
who essentially stuck to an “algorithm” (Line 629), but ‘holism’ for him was providing a 
leaflet on community activities. There was a certain despair in being with him. Through 
experience, he had learned that the key to being therapeutic was “to be nice to people… 
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respectful” (Line 279). When he spoke of how some of the nurses had spoken “scathingly” 
of him as having become “a little doctor” (Line 312), he added that he “had to use a bit of old 
emotional intelligence” (Lines 320-321). It was if the allusion to a ‘mechanism’ of emotional 
intelligence protected him from saying that he felt hurt, so the message was that there was 
indeed an aloof, all-seeing person inside him who knew what to do. Yet it was clear this was 
not the case.   
He had given up on mental health nursing, not only because it was like a “milk round” 
(line 569). Mental health nurses needed training in de-escalation, anger management and risk 
assessment rather than therapeutic models (such as Rogers) and being respectful to people 
was the core of being therapeutic. He had also learned that being trusting and respectful was 
therapeutic from the charismatic leadership of a nurse consultant who worked this way. Yet 
he spoke about trust from a place where he appeared to have cut off from that uncertain 
relation, which was also a dependent relation, with the other, or (as may be more often than 
not) restricted it to a certain few. It could be imagined that a despairing patient might walk 
out from an appointment (with a leaflet) and jump off a bridge. It then became clearer why 
he may be so concerned with risk management. It seemed hateful to summarise him as a nice 
man, respectful, but closed to how the other might disturb his person and put him under 
question. He was far more than this, but he had taken on the persona of psychiatry. The 
technicalities of anger management were clearly important for the work of mental health 
nursing, but in terms of the therapeutic as healing what appeared through him as most 
significant (in a kind of photographic negative) was putting one’s own self under question in 
relation to the other, something he seemed to not want to do.  
Participant 4 
Participant 4 seemed to have ‘given up’ in some way to the medical model also, 
although she was open to others (“I think that you can learn a lot from students” (line 588)). 
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But it was as if she knew her remit and would go no further. She showed a patient ability to 
stay with a person in distress, which she regarded as therapeutic, but then it emerged she was 
likely to guide that person towards a psychiatric view of recovery. This way of working within 
a psychiatric system was not so surprising. She seemed tired. It was tiring to read over again 
her interview, as if in and between the words was being felt years of some labour, not in her 
name but in the name of psychiatric care - “mainly I feel tired when I get home because I feel 
work gets the best of me” (Lines 606-607). She was sure of her place in that place and it was 
hard to find her now. The disturbing question came to mind as to whether all credos worked 
through turning the person into a host. What she appeared to need was what she had learned 
from years ago, which was an environment in which new ideas could be thought about and 
challenged by others, which she also at times translated into her work with patients - “I would 
try and get them to talk about how they are feeling, why they are feeling like that, why are 
they feeling hopeless and helpless” (Lines 409-410). Without her seeming to notice, this 
dialogue was losing out in a tension with her commitment to a psychiatric model of the mind, 
which she presumed so much about that she had lost sight of it being an idea - “if you've got 
a good diagnosis of a patient and you have a good pharmacologist they wouldn't have to see 
probably the psychiatrist that often” (lines 627-628). It seemed important that a therapeutic 
education would not be about a preparation to host a credo (that exploited her good will).  
Participant 2 
As participant 2 spoke, there was something fragile (but not weak) about her; 
something of an uncertain young girl flickered in her eyes, perhaps because she was upset 
about something that happened that morning just before the interview. When she touched on 
how she came into nursing, her speech was full of pauses, stops and starts, the beginnings of 
sentences taken up and then abandoned. It was unclear which way to go, yet this uncertainty 
itself seemed important. It opened a space between us that allowed silences to be. In this space 
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she spoke about how her father had died suddenly when she was aged 10, of early onset 
dementia, and during his short illness was offered a bed in the local psychiatric hospital as 
his condition was deemed to be psychiatric. She had felt a stigma that he would be admitted 
to a psychiatric hospital and felt bad about feeling this way. She came across as not having 
ever understood why she became a mental health nurse, but it appeared to have something to 
do with her father being cared for, or not being cared for, by someone. There was an intense 
sense of sadness, of an untold grief, something that had still to be articulated, or perhaps never 
would or could be. Without knowing about it much, it seemed somewhere there was a regret 
for ‘not being there’ to a father, not being able to stop him dying, and for her a feeling of 
stigma that he was going to be in a psychiatric hospital, perhaps ashamed of him, and 
intermingled with this, unspeakable loss. There was an entangled grief here perhaps. There 
was also warmth between us. There was a sense that she needed to be minded, or taken care 
of (just at that moment), and it may have been that this was happening with some of her 
vulnerable patients, that somehow a vulnerability touched them - only those who were 
capable of being touched - and this made them feel important to someone again, so that they 
could show affection and care towards someone. She spoke especially about a woman she 
knew for years, who had been abused as a child, and had grown up to be a kind of vigilante. 
It seemed there may be something reciprocally therapeutic between them, both in some way 
‘minding’ each other. She had retired recently but came back to work part-time as she missed 
her patients and her colleagues.  
 It was easy to imagine the flickering vulnerability and sensibility in her eyes may have 
touched her client, who had been so viciously abused as a child, and perhaps some kind of 
communication, or recognition at this level was healing. She seemed unaware of this. It may 




no, no, it’s nothing at all… it's just… (long pause) … Perhaps it's both of us - she gets on with me and 
accepts me… (P2 MU7-8 extract lines 77-95) 
 This had a disarming sense of ‘truth’ about it, that what is therapeutic depends on how 
the other person accepts, and gets on with, another, as opposed to accepting some ‘therapy’ 
that will be imposed. There seemed to be a lot that was ‘unthought’ in this phrase also. There 
appeared a tacit understanding that she was ‘in relation’ in some important way which was 
indefinable. It seemed as if she had never really thought about her own ways of being 
therapeutic, and as she spoke she said it may be like what was going on in the interview, that 
there was room to speak and there was a genuine interest in what she had to say (a space 
which she also created). But she seemed quite accepting of not knowing what it was, and this 
seemed important. Although she learned from example, especially with respect to how others’ 
dignity should be respected, she also was certain that she did not know as much as the 
psychologist, for example, in working with personality disorders. She did not appear to value 
her own way of ‘working’ with her clients, and some of her clients had this diagnosis 
(including the one she had spoken so warmly about). Perhaps a validation of her own way of 
being therapeutic was needed through ideas that would help her find words. It also seemed 
important that there should be a safe place to speak, not only of a ‘flickering vulnerability’, 
but also for an uncertain, insecure intelligence to show itself.  
 Participant 3 
 A few weeks after Participant 3’s interview, a memory came back out of nowhere. As 
a very young boy, in the almost-dark listening to the indistinct words of my mother and sisters 
by the fire in the next room, it seemed they were talking about mysteries. There is a comfort 
in the sound as if somehow all will be well, and the atmosphere of the interview with 
Participant 3 is the same. This may be an example of how subjectivity constitutes (discloses) 
a meaning which had already been constituted (disclosed) through an intersubjectivity, and 
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the meaning, ‘all will be well,’ appeared like a gestalt in a complex, living, multiply patterned 
landscape ‘overrun with words.’ She would say to patients, “you’re not on your own” (line 
171), that she had “got their back” (line 504), that these were sometimes unspoken promises 
she was making, and “I know I'd never go back on it” (line 1187). Her words seemed to be 
revealing something of her being, which appeared to have to do with an ‘openness’ to those 
who had been injured, which would “soften[s] and brighten[s] the face of the world” (Brooke, 
1993, p. 158). It appeared that to have someone like her being available to someone who was 
in a distressed state, indicating with her words, actions and person that she would “…just 
keep being there…” (Meaning Unit 20), would involve something of the art of healing. There 
was a critically thoughtful hard work going on also. She said that through experience she saw 
it was “naïve” (Line 110) to think that “tender loving care” (Line 115) was enough, and was 
critical of nurses who showed “no[t] thought afterwards” (Line 122). Her openness to others 
included then an ability and desire to learn. This appeared important, as it seemed to show 
being therapeutic involved a way of being (an openness to others) which included an ‘ability’ 
and willingness to be open to something different from one’s own experience. It was the 
opposite to dogma. It seemed clear that these two aspects were interwoven.  
 Participant 7 
 With Participant 7, ‘Rings on her fingers and bells on her toes’ came immediately into 
mind. In the Oxford Dictionary of Nursery Rhymes (Opie & Opie, 1997, pp. 65-67) it goes 
like this, 
Ride a cock horse to Banbury Cross, 
To see a fine lady upon a white horse; 
With rings on her fingers and bells on her toes, 




Her enthusiasm and colour would draw someone along, and it was easy to miss 
something. A kind of vibrant energy seemed to distract from something else, which did not 
register until much later although the nursery rhyme seemed to ‘speak’ it immediately. Mental 
health nursing for her was a “proactive keeping people on a journey” (line 207). Maybe there 
would be no time to stop. She also worked for herself as an Aesthetic Nurse, doing “Botox 
and fillers… I like to make people feel good aesthetically” and it seemed as if ‘keeping things 
on the surface was important.’ She did not “want [patients] to see [her] true emotions… 
sometimes the happiness, yeah, because we have achieved something there…” (Lines 301-
302). It felt like she might ‘gee up!’ someone who was in despair rather than stay with their 
situation and allow something different to develop, although there was also the possibility 
that some people might need to be ‘gee-ed up!’ She made several references to “training the 
brain” (line 304) and how some people “don’t have a logical, rational mind” due to “part of 
the brain not developing” (lines 500-502).  
It seemed as if something had been passed over, something turned away from in her 
relationships with others through being too logical (“still my positive self, I’m very logical” 
(Lines 287-288)). This may have been indicated in the difficulty that was there regarding her 
relationship with her mother, where she referred sharply to not hating her (see Findings, 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3.1), and later how her mother was “very sharp and logical” (Lines 
643-644). It was as if ‘functioning again,’ through this sharp logic, was more important than 
learning through a more complicated view. She was forgiving, of patients at least, as for 
example when she re-established the relationship with the patient who humiliated her in a 
packed reception area (“Look at you, with your charity shop cardigan and bad skin! Who do 
you think you are?!” (Line 746)). It appeared that what would have been important for her 
was slowing down, which might help her see herself, and others, differently, as how she was 
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seemed like a way to distract from something else. How she viewed rationality and logic, and 
spoke of the brain but not the mind, seemed to fit into this cover-up.  
Participant 9 
Participant 9 was qualified a year. She did not like writing essays, but enjoyed classes 
and placements. Talking is the main therapeutic thing in mental health. A certain openness 
was reflected in this way of speaking, which it felt may expose her also so that she would be 
affected by the other person (and it would be dangerous for her if that person was violent). 
She understated her own struggles, and gave the sense she was containing of those of others. 
Some months previously, a patient who she had been very close to had killed herself soon 
after she had been transferred to the care of another nurse and it had affected her badly. This 
only came out at the end of the interview. From the start however, a certain ‘strangeness’ was 
there that seemed linked to how she emanated something ‘open to the other’ from her person. 
In the avalanche of memories she invoked, thoughts of being forgotten, overlooked, looked 
down upon, keeping a low profile, unable to speak, came into mind. Something about feeling 
flawed and stupid, and finding one’s voice against some oppression spoke in the atmosphere 
of the interview. Her presence around someone who was ‘shut down’ or ‘crushed’ would have 
been therapeutic, allowing something not quite destroyed to recover. Thoughts like this 
appeared as simply as patterns in a drawing.  
In the struggle to stay in the reduction, to not try to empathise too much and ‘get out 
of her way’ (as it felt what was being found was an avalanche of memories that were not 
hers), the more it appeared that she would somehow allow others to be. What seemed to be 
happening was that, in being with her, thoughts seemed freed up, and she ‘allowed’ this to 
happen (without apparently knowing it). The only thing she noticed was that she did not fill 
in the gaps in conversations so that the other person had space to speak. But she seemed to be 
doing this through her own self as opposed to implementing it like a technical strategy or 
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‘communication skill.’ It was easy to understand how the patient on the ward who had 
struggled to communicate had been able to speak with her. The disturbing thought insisted 
that that space being taken from her may have contributed to her death soon after being 
transferred. There seemed to have been a crucial opening up for that struggling person which 
had been closed down by the clumsy administration of the ward, not noticing that the 
‘treatment’ was already taking place. Participant 9 had not noticed either that this relation 
may have been the ‘treatment’ (or at least a significant element of it), and she did not object 
strongly enough to the transfer, not having the awareness or confidence to do so. It seemed a 
therapeutic education would have been somewhere around facilitating an understanding of 
her own self in relation to others, and learning ideas in order to be more confident about being 
critical of the ‘standard treatment.’  
Participant 8 
Participant 8 wanted to “truly relate” (line 530) to patients as this was therapeutic, and 
linked to his Christian beliefs which he said defined him. He wanted the other person to know 
that “someone is here who actually cares about them” (line 22). He said he had “always… 
failed and stuff” (line 605) and had a kind of mini-breakdown and gave up his previous career 
as a chef. While getting back on his feet, he started working as a health care assistant. He 
came to realise through this that “working very closely with people” (line 63) was what he 
wanted to do. It gave him meaning, and it felt like he was “making them feel important” (line 
19), as well as “contributing to their greater good” (line 686). He got “positive feelings… 
from looking after someone in a crisis” (line 648). What he did therapeutically was “difficult 
to put into words” (line 215) and he was better with people who had been through depressing 
experiences like he had because “I can identify more with these” (line 455). He could not 
work with people who were manipulative. He mainly learned to be therapeutic through his 
own life experiences. The therapeutic aspects of mental health nursing were “talking and 
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listening” which “all flows naturally” (line 410), and “if you don’t have a nursing caring 
nature you can’t learn it” (line 332). This meaningful and therapeutic work was undermined 
by the overburdening administrative duties involved in mental health nursing, which was 
“soul-destroying” (line 207).  
It took some time for all of these words to sink in, so that they were not just platitudes. 
It seemed a struggle to allow him to have his faith. The ‘soul-destroying’ comment resonated 
somewhere, and it came to mind that perhaps his soul had been almost destroyed through 
trying to work in a career for ‘material things’ - “you can’t take your nice watch with you, it 
just turns to dust” (line 679) - and now it was almost being destroyed again through becoming 
an administrator of a psychiatric system. It was a struggle for this to come across clearly, 
perhaps because there was a tension between one faith dissolved and one very alive. It was 
difficult to view him as not being naïve and lost, until somehow, months later, when 
struggling to get past what seemed like the platitudes of spiritual conviction, there emerged 
the memory of a feeling of warmth that might come with finding meaning, and belonging, in 
one’s life at last. This was empathy as an analogy. It opened out a different understanding, so 
that amongst the naivety there could circulate a certain sweet kindness, that perhaps others 
would also feel. And it seemed so clear that to someone who was injured and distressed this 
kindness would be healing. For a fleeting moment Brother David was spilling out biscuits 
from the golden tin that shone like a chalice. But this offering had to be allowed. The other 
person had to allow something to happen, just as something had to happen in the ‘analysis’ 
to see it. This may have been why he did not work with manipulative people, as the implicit 
aggression might ‘destroy’ his soul.  
It appeared that being caring could not be taught and this seemed to offer a 
predicament regarding education. He called the interview a “kind of reflective account” of 
himself “as a person” (line 702), and he had rarely had this kind of conversation. It seemed 
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crucially important to have some kind of space to reflect with another (or others), as it gave 
room for perhaps new understandings to emerge regarding the meanings involved in choosing 
to work as a mental health nurse.  
Participant 10 
Certain lines from the interview with Participant 10 were unforgiving. The forceful 
way of speaking words such as, “I’ll box it, hammer it down” (line 464), “Oh, spit it out!” 
(line 548), “thrust pills down their throats” (line 310), “It’s better to get it out in the open” 
(line 333), and “this is not about a fucking rat” (line 712), seemed driven from some 
dangerous unknown. She did not see the danger of the conviction in her voice. She meant 
well. She had been qualified for 4 years and came into nursing late. God had called her to be 
a mental health nurse - “me and him have an understanding” (line 636) - and until she received 
other instructions as to “where he wants me” (line 637) she would stay in this work. There 
was a sense that ‘true’ empathy existed in a real relationship between two people, as mirrored 
in her relationship with god, and it was important to get to that place with someone no matter 
what. The relationship with god was so important that it seemed other relationships must have 
failed. There was a certain echo of a far-off empathy in wanting to reach out to her. The 
relation with god seemed to be the way for her to make sense of intolerable anxieties. But 
everything depended perhaps on how she perceived the ‘god-me’ dyad. The off-hand manner 
in which she said that she learned from others - “Where else am I going to learn? ...You can’t 
teach empathy with a book!” (lines 216-220) - seemed to hide something that might be linked 
to such anxieties.  
It was difficult to write this way, or at all, about her as it seemed that she could easily 
have been dismissed, and maybe this was why her guiding relationship in life was with a god 
rather than another human being. There seemed to be a tentative relationship with others 
developing through learning from observing others. She admired the ward manager because 
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she had a way of being with others that was calming and people listened to her. It seemed 
important that Participant 10 would come to understand her own anxieties in being with others 
as part of her training, as she was too caught up in trying to get to the ‘real’ problem with 
people, ignoring the journey someone might be on. She seemed to be caught up in putting an 
idea first, rather than the person in front of her. Her training appeared to have failed her in 
coming to understand something crucial about herself.  
Participant 1 
“I’m grateful for you talking” was the line addressed to her (line 1) before any 
thoughts found their mark. It simply ‘showed itself’ that Participant 1 needed to be 
appreciated. This impression may have been something to do with a surface confidence at 
times rippled by a certain tremor in her voice and how she closed her eyes momentarily as if 
not to see something. The meanings in the interview seemed to lap back on each other in time, 
so that later, talking about a patient, the sense of denial in how she said (line 433) “I don’t 
expect… any acknowledgement” confirmed the original impression. It seemed confusing as 
to which meanings belonged to whom but it appeared there were returns to images, ideas and 
symbols that spoke about her. In the middle of the interview she spoke about her alcoholic 
parents who were unavailable, un-interested and this seemed like a crystal ball in the pub hall 
to fling its colours indifferently onto every surface. Her grandmother had rescued her by 
stepping in, and they would play “role play” games and read stories out loud together (line 
621). She knew a lot about communication skills, which she had learned on training courses 
in her previous career with a bank - active listening, open and closed questioning, mirroring, 
body language. Experience of life had made her critical of empathy and psychiatry. But what 
seemed to throw its light into every shadow was how she closed her eyes sometimes as if to 
block out something, even though she said it was important “to make some sort of bond and 
open up lines of communication” (line 14). What was therapeutic for her was the tactile, the 
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sensory, the reassuring touch, that someone was present, and certain words, like thoughts 
perhaps as well, could be “shelved” (line 185). She said she had learned about being 
therapeutic also through “shadowing” her mentor (line 541).  Her speech often shot across 
like stones skimming on a glassy surface. But when the throw was not so good, the glass 
broke and something foundered.  
 Referring to a client who had “intrusive thoughts” (line 161) … like ‘rape me’ and 
‘cunt’ and ‘turd’… they’re all really horrible” (line 162), she suggested to her that “she could 
perhaps make them into a bit of a comedy” (line 166). She and her client had linked the 
thoughts to sexual abuse, although they had decided to focus on the effects of the abuse, which 
had been to make her feel “worthless and stupid” (line 206), because she did not want to 
“open a box of worms” (line 247). It seemed so accurate, speaking about her nurse training, 
when she said “all this nonsense we learnt” (line 495). It seemed that her training had failed 
her, consigned her to the shadows, to playing games, and what she needed was someone to 
help her step out of there. But like a wounded creature, it would be difficult for her to trust 
the other’s word or the hand held out to help.  
Participant 5 
Participant 5 seemed to have a clarity about her that was blocked by the interview at 
first. Trying to isolate what was therapeutic got in her way, until when asked about ‘qualities’ 
she said, “I hate all these things” (line 71). When she followed with, “I think it’s really 
important to listen…,” and not to “cut them off in the middle” (line 79), it was like a gentle 
reminder about interviewing although this did not seem to be her intention. There was a tacit 
slant to her words. The effort to find out something was just closing her down. Perhaps to be 
kind, she listed things like listening, not being dismissive, empathy, caring, “getting to know 
[how] they feel about their life from their perspective” (line 89). The meanings in the remark 
regarding ‘hating all these things’ returned more clearly after a while, and it seemed to show 
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that these ‘skills’ or ‘elements’ of being therapeutic did not matter much at all if considered 
as something that anyone can be taught, because “people can tell who cares and is interested” 
(line 96). The meaning appeared obliquely, like a ray of light might catch an unexpected 
colour, that a person either is, or is not, therapeutic. Being therapeutic had to do with actually 
caring and being interested in another. She declared she had “absolutely not!” (line 98) 
learned anything from courses on the therapeutic. Instead, she learned from watching others 
and being with others, “bad examples taught me as much as seeing good examples” (line 
140). This had started early as her mother was ill for most of her childhood and needed nursing 
care at home. She knew that the difference between ‘good’ and bad’ was down to her 
“interpretation” (line 122). It seemed that somehow her interpretations would be trustworthy 
and she evoked a kind of calm trust. But she was also unsure of herself, asking “Is that the 
wrong answer?” (line 100) immediately after her declaration. There appeared to be a need to 
have something affirming reflected back, yet her lack of confidence helped open up a space 
also to wonder about things. Others might see it as weakness of some kind. But the lack of 
confidence seemed to indicate that she needed to develop more trust in her own experience, 
not to dominate another but to open a more freed dialogue.  
What came to mind was an underlying ‘clarity,’ and when she said, “We need to listen 
to what they feel their needs are” (line 11), she was showing this also to this other person in 
the interview. What she said and what she did rang true. She was used to putting the other 
person first, and this work seemed to neither come from, nor leave, any bitter edge or hurt. 
But she was unhappy that she did not have much time any more to spend with patients, 
because of the focus now on “care plans and their goal to recovery” (lines 17-18) which had 
to include referrals to courses in the Recovery College, day services, and voluntary work. 
What came to mind was that she wanted to walk alongside those who had been forgotten or 
discarded, “encouraging them, empowering them” (line 30) but this had been replaced by a 
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paper exercise. Her own laboured walk seemed to say something about a burden yet the tone 
that rang true in her voice seemed flawless. A few days later, it rained heavily overnight and 
the garden was drenched in rain. Something insistent was in how the heavy grey skies 
overhung the colours of the garden in a kind of struggle. The rain gave life but could also 
drown. Something insistent in the colours and the rain was in between her words, that went 
beneath the complaint that she no longer had time for patients. Seeds seemed to be sown 
around a bed-ridden mother, life-giving and overburdening, a burden taken on unresentfully 
in kindness, and a sapling having grown strong had now become a weary shelter for others. 
It seemed that she needed someone to cut something back, and open up a space for her instead. 
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